THE "TRADE OR BUSINESS" SCAM

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Table of contents:

  1. Introduction
  2. Overview of the Income Taxation Process
  3. Proof IRC Subtitle A is primarily an excise tax on activities in connection with a "trade or business"
  4. Public v. Private
    4.1 Introduction
    4.2 What is "Property"?
    4.3 "Public" v. "Private" property ownership
    4.4 The purpose and foundation of de jure government: Protection of EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE rights
    4.5 The Ability to Regulate Private Rights and Private Conduct is Repugnant to the Constitution
    4.6 The Right to be left alone
    4.7 The PUBLIC You (straw man) vs. the PRIVATE You (human)
    4.8 All PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT law attaches to government territory, all PRIVATE law attaches to your right to contract
    4.9 "Political (PUBLIC) law" v. "civil" (PRIVATE) law"
    4.10 Lawful methods for converting PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property
    4.11 Unlawful methods abused by government to convert PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property
    4.12 The public office is a "fiction of law"
  5. Synonyms for "trade or business"

    5.1  "wages"

    5.2  "personal services"

    5.3  "United States"
    5.4  Statutory "citizen of the United States" or "U.S.** citizen"

  6. I.R.C. requirements for the exercise of a "trade or business"
  7. What kind of tax is it?: Direct or Indirect, Constitutional ro Unconstitutional?
  8. Who's "trade or business":  The PAYER, the PAYEE, or BOTH?
  9. Public office generally
    9.1 Legal requirements for holding a "public office"
    9.2 De Facto Public Officers
    9.3 How do ordinary government workers not holding public office become "taxpayers"
  10. Methods for Connecting You To the Franchise

    10.1 Reductions in Liability: Graduated Rate of Tax, Deductions, and Earned Income Credits

    10.2 Information Returns

    10.3 Government Identifying Numbers:  SSN and TIN

    10.4 Domicile, Residence, and Resident Tax Returns such as IRS Form 1040
    10.5 W-4 Agreements or Contracts: Illegal for Private People

  11. Government propaganda and deception about the scam
    11.1 Willful government deception in connection with a "trade or business"
    11.2 Proving the government deception yourself
    11.3 False IRS presumptions that must be rebutted
    11.4 Why the IRS and the Courts WON'T Talk about what a "trade or business" or "public office" is and collude to Cover Up the Scam
  12. Defenses
    12.1 How nonresidents in the states of the Union are deceived and coerced to enlist in the scam
    12.2 How to prevent being involuntarily or fraudulently connected to the "trade or business" franchise
  13. Rebutted Arguments Against this Memorandum
    13.1 Argument is "frivolous"
    13.2 "trade or business" includes lots of activities other than simply a public office
  14. Other important implications of the scam
  15. Conclusions and Summary
  16. Resources for Further Study and Rebuttal

Related articles:

Remedies:

Related law:

SOURCE:

Great IRS Hoax, section 5.6.12

______________________________________

"The taxpayer-- that's someone who works for the federal government but doesn't have to take the civil service examination."
[President Ronald W. Reagan]

1.  Introduction

One must be engaged in a “trade or business”, which is defined as “the functions of a public office”, within the statutory but not constitutional “United States**”, which is defined as federal territory, in order to earn “gross income”.  The only exception to this is nonresident aliens with income from the statutory "United States**" (federal terriorty) under  26 U.S.C. 871(a).  This is because:

  1. The income tax under Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is an indirect excise tax, as the Supreme Court pointed out repeatedly.  See section 5.1.3 of the Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302    The “subject of” all indirect excise taxes are voluntary “taxable activities” that are privileged and in many cases licensed.  The tax may only be instituted by the agency or government entity that issues the license or bestows the privilege to the person who volunteers to be the “licensee”, and the tax is only enforceable within the legislative jurisdiction of the taxing entity.  The “privileged activity” in this case of the federal income tax under Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is that of holding “public office” in the U.S. Government.  A “public office” is therefore the only excise taxable activity that a biological person can involve themselves in that will make them the subject of the municipal donation program for the District of Columbia called the Internal Revenue Code.
  2. According to 4 U.S.C. 72, all "public offices" may be exercised ONLY in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere, except as "expressly provided by law".  That is why the "United States" is defined in Subtitle A of the I.R.C. as federal territory in 26 U.S.C.  7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. 110(d).  There is also no provision of law which authorizes "public offices" outside the District of Columbia other than 48 U.S.C.  1612, and therefore, the I.R.C. Subtitle A Income tax upon "public offices" can apply nowhere outside the District of Columbia other than the Virgin Islands.  This is also consistent with the definition of "U.S. sources" found in 26 U.S.C. 864(c)(3), which identifies all earnings originating from the "United States" as "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business".
  3. Income” has the meaning it was given in the Constitution, which is “gain and profit” in connection with an excise taxable activity.  Congress is forbidden to define the word “income” because the Constitution defines it.  This was pointed out by several rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, including Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921).  Where there is no “taxable activity”, there can be no “taxable income”.  We covered this earlier in sections 5.6.5 if you want more detail.
  4. Because all "taxpayers" under Subtitle A of the I.R.C. are “public officers” and work for a federal corporation called the “United States” (see 28 U.S.C. 3002(15)(A)), then they are acting as an “officer or employee of a federal corporation” and they:

    4.1.  Are the proper subject of the penalty statutes, as defined under 26 U.S.C. 6671(b).   This is true even though the Constitution prohibits “Bills of Attainder” in Article 1, Section 10, because the penalty isn’t on the natural person, but upon the “office” or “agency” he volunteered to maintain in the process of declaring that he has “taxpable income”.

    4.2.  May have the code enforced against you without implementing regulations as required by  44 U.S.C. 1505(a)(1) and 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2)

    4.3  Are the proper subject for the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, which identify officers of corporations as the only "persons" within 26 U.S.C. 7343

  5. Earnings not connected with a “trade or business” under 26 U.S.C. 871(b)  and 26 U.S.C. 864  and not originating from the statutory "United States**" (federal territory):

    5.1.  Are identified as part of a “foreign estate” in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(31).  A foreign estate is not includible in gross income either, based on the definition of “foreign estate”, BECAUSE it is not connected with a “trade or business”.

    5.2.  Are not includable as “gross income” if paid by a "nonresident alien".  See 26 U.S.C. 864(b)(1)(A).  Remember: The Great IRS Hoax showed in sections 5.2.13 and 5.6.15 that states of the union are "foreign countries" with respect to the Internal Revenue Code and all of their inhabitants are "non-resident non-persons". ”.  The subsect of state inhabitants who are also public officers are also “nonresident alien individuals”

This means one must be engaged in a “public office” in the District of Columbia in order to earn “gross income” as a human being.  Statutory and not ordinary “gross income” that meets this criteria is described in the code simply as “income effectively connected with a trade or business from sources within the United States”.  This is confirmed by 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(31), which says that an estate that is in no way connected with a "trade or business" and whose sources of income are outside the statutory but not constitutional "United States**" (federal territory) may not have its earnings identified as statutory "gross income" and is a "foreign estate", which means it is not subject in any way to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > Sec. 7701.

Sec. 7701. - Definitions

(a)(31) Foreign estate or trust

(A) Foreign estate

The term ''foreign estate'' means an estate the income of which, from sources without the United States [under 26 U.S.C. 871(a)] which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States [under 26 U.S.C. 871(b) and 26 U.S.C. 864], is not includible in gross income under subtitle A.

Why did Congress HAVE to place the tax upon an activity called a “public office” in the United States government? Because:

  1. The government can only pass civil laws to regulate its own public officers, territory, franchises, and property.  The ability to regulate the PRIVATE conduct of the public at large is “repugnant to the constitution”, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court.  See the following for proof:
    Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  2. The Thirteenth Amendment outlaws involuntary servitude EVERYWHERE, including on federal territory.  It does not and cannot outlaw VOLUNTARY servitude.  The only way they can tax your labor without instituting slavey is for you to volunteer for public office franchise in the government.   See the following for proof:
    How the Government Defrauds You Out of Legitimate Deductions for the Market Value of Your Labor, Form #05.026
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  3. Congress has no legislative jurisdiction within states of the Union, which are “foreign states” that are sovereign, but they have jurisdiction over anyone that contracts with them wherever they are.  Hence, Congress instituted a franchise that functions as a contract that they can enforce anywhere the contractors are found.   See the following for proof:

    Debitum et contractus non sunt nullius loci.
    Debt and contract [franchise agreement, in this case] are of no particular place.

    Locus contractus regit actum.
    The place of the contract [franchise agreement, in this case] governs the act.
    [Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
    SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

    __________________________________________________________________________________________

    “It is generally conceded that a franchise is the subject of a contract between the grantor and the grantee, and that it does in fact constitute a contract when the requisite element of a consideration is present.[1]  Conversely, a franchise granted without consideration is not a contract binding upon the state, franchisee, or pseudo-franchisee.[2]  “
    [American Jurisprudence 2d, Volume 36, Franchises, Section 6:  As a Contract ]



    [1] Larson v. South Dakota,  278 U.S. 429, 73 L.Ed. 441, 49 S Ct 196 ; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 57 L.Ed. 633, 33 S.Ct 303; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 50 L.Ed 801, 26 S Ct 427; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Brown, 176 Ark 774, 4 SW2d 15, 58 ALR 534; Chicago General R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 Ill 253, 52 NE 880; Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 149 Ky 234, 148 SW 13; State ex rel. Kansas City v. East Fifth Street R. Co. 140 Mo 539, 41 SW 955; Baker v. Montana Petroleum Co., 99 Mont 465, 44 P2d 735; Re Board of Fire Comrs. 27 NJ 192, 142 A2d 85; Chrysler Light & P. Co. v. Belfield, 58 ND 33, 224 NW 871, 63 ALR 1337; Franklin County v. Public Utilities Com. 107 Ohio St 442, 140 NE 87, 30 ALR 429; State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co. 157 SC 1, 153 SE 537; Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co. 65 Vt 377, 26 A 635 ; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va 469, 99 SE 723, 9 ALR 1148, cert den  251 U.S. 557, 64 L.Ed. 413, 40 S Ct 179, disapproved on other grounds Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & Power Co. 134 Va 134, 114 SE 92,  28 ALR 562, and disapproved on other grounds Richmond v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co. 141 Va 69, 126 SE 353.

    [2] Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bowers, 124 Pa 183, 16 A 836.

    See:

    Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.018
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

These critical facts are very carefully concealed by the IRS in their publications to hide the true nature of the income tax and instead to make it appear as an “unapportioned direct tax” upon "persons" domiciled in states of the Union.  If the American people understood on a large scale:

  1. That the I.R.C. Subtitle A income tax was an “excise tax” upon privileged "taxable activities" only.
  2. Exactly what activity was being taxed.
  3. That the IRS has no jurisdiction within states of the Union against anyone who does not sign a private agreement with the government by submitting a W-4 or a 1040 tax return.
  4. That one must be domiciled on federal territory as a statutory “citizen” or “resident” before they can lawfully engage in the activity.
  5. That the law specifically forbids the activity to be exercised outside the District of Columbia per 4 U.S.C. 72  or within a state of the Union.
  6. That it is a CRIME for most Americans to engage in the activity pursuant to  18 U.S.C. 912.

. . .then they would exit the tax system en masse by simply avoiding the activity.  All excise taxes are "avoidable" by avoiding the taxed activity, and therefore they are completely "voluntary".  Therefore, the IRS and our public dis-servants have a vested interest in hiding and concealing the true nature of the income tax as an “excise tax” in order to maintain revenues unlawfully collected from the income tax.  They sold the truth and your liberty to Satan for 20 pieces of silver.  Some things never change, do they?

“For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil, for which some have strayed from the faith in their greediness, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows.” 
[1 Tim. 6:10, Bible, NKJV]

In this section, we will demonstrate all the evidence we can find that supports these conclusions, and also show you how the IRS has, with the implicit collusion and approval of the Congress and the Treasury Department, tried to do the following within their deceptive publications:

  1. Taken great pains to hide and obfuscate the fact that Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is an indirect excise tax upon licensed, privileged activities.  They have done this by burying the sordid truth deep in regulations that they hope people will never read and which have been carefully obfuscated over the years to make them virtually unintelligible for the average American.
  2. Confuse the meaning of the term “trade or business” in their publications so that everyone thinks they meet this criteria.
  3. Create a false and unsupportable presumption that all people and all earnings within states of the Union are connected with a “trade or business in the United States".
  4. Create the illusion and deception that IRC Subtitle A describes a direct, unapportioned tax upon natural persons that cannot be avoided or shifted.  Once IRS can establish the false presumption Subtitle A as a direct unapportioned tax, then they:

    4.1.  Can label those who choose not to volunteer as “frivolous” or worst yet, penalize them for filing an accurate return reflecting no “gross income” because not connected to a “trade or business”.

    4.2.  Have a way to exploit the false presumption and ignorance of juries to claim that those who avoid paying or filing are lawbreakers, even though they broke no laws and exercised their constitutionally protected choice not to volunteer to connect their earnings to a “trade or business”.

    4.3.  Have an excuse to ignore those who complain that private employers are forcing them to sign and submit W-4 withholding agreements under duress, or be denied employment.  Instead, they have a presumptuous and mistaken excuse to say that it isn’t voluntary and that everyone must submit the form, when in fact, the regulations at 26 C.F.R. 31.3402(p)-1 clearly show otherwise.

If you read the IRS' Civil and Criminal Actions website at the address below, you will see that ALL of their propaganda in fact focuses on the above goals, as we predicted:

http://www.irs.gov/compliance/index.html

The IRS warned us it was going to try to deceive us by stating in its own Internal Revenue Manual that you can't rely upon any of its own publications.  The federal courts warned us that the IRS was going to do this by telling us that we can't rely upon the phone or oral advice of anyone in the IRS, even if they signed their recommendation under penalty of perjury!  Why didn’t we listen to any of these warnings?  See the surprising truth for yourself:

http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Articles/IRSNotResponsible.htm

We must, however, remember what the Supreme Court said about false presumptions that come from deliberately deceptive IRS publications and phone advice:

"The power to create [false] presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions," 
[New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)]

2. Overview of the Income Taxation Process

This section provides basic background on how the income tax described in Internal Revenue Code Subtitle A  functions.  This will help you fit the explanation contained in this memorandum into the overall taxation process.  Below is a summary of the taxation process:

  1. The purpose for establishing governments is mainly to protect private property.  The Declaration of Independence affirms this:

    “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -“
    [Declaration of Independence, 1776]

  2. Government protects private rights by keeping “public [government] property” and “private property” separate and never allowing them to be joined together.  This is the heart of the separation of powers doctrine:  separation of what is private from what is public with the goal of protecting mainly what is private.  See:
    Government Conspiracy to Destroy the Separation of Powers, Form #05.023
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  3. All property BEGINS as private property. The only way to lawfully change it to public property is through the exercise of your unalienable constitutional right to contract. All franchises qualify as a type of contract, and therefore, franchises are one of many methods to lawfully convert PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property. The exercise of the right to contract, in turn, is an act of consent that eliminates any possibility of a legal remedy of the donor against the donee:

    “Volunti non fit injuria. He who consents cannot receive an injury. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279, 2327; 4 T. R. 657 ; Shelf. on mar. & Div. 449.

    Consensus tollit errorem. Consent removes or obviates a mistake. Co. Litt. 126.

    Melius est omnia mala pati quam malo concentire. It is better to suffer every wrong or ill, than to consent to it. 3 Co. Inst. 23.

    Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt, et consentiunt. One cannot complain of having been deceived when he knew the fact and gave his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 145.”

    [Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856; SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

  4. In law, all rights are “property”.

    Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude every one else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man's courtesy.

    The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d 180, 332 P.2d 250, 252, 254.

    Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership. or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. Davis v. Davis. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 389 S.W.2d 745, 752.

    Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d 694, 697.
    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

    By protecting your constitutional rights, the government is protecting your PRIVATE property.  Your rights are private property because they came from God, not from the government.  Only what the government creates can become public property.  An example is corporations, which are a public franchise that makes officers of the corporation into public officers.

  5. The process of taxation is the process of converting “private property” into a “public use” and a “public purpose”.  Below is a definition of these terms for your enlightenment.

    Public use.  Eminent domain.  The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain.  For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public.  It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.  Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, Mont., 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.

    Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community distinguished from particular individuals.  But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Ringe Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186.  The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit.  It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual.  The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience.  A "public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation.  Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579, 586.

    See also Condemnation; Eminent domain.
    [Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1232]

    __________________________________________________________________________________________

    Public purpose.  In the law of taxation, eminent domain, etc., this is a term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage, the government is to provide, from those which, by the like usage, are left to private interest, inclination, or liberality.  The constitutional requirement that the purpose of any tax, police regulation, or particular exertion of the power of eminent domain shall be the convenience, safety, or welfare of the entire community and not the welfare of a specific individual or class of persons [such as, for instance, federal benefit recipients as individuals].  “Public purpose” that will justify expenditure of public money generally means such an activity as will serve as benefit to community as a body and which at same time is directly related function of government.  Pack v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 Tenn. 503, 387 S.W.2d 789, 794.

    The term is synonymous with governmental purpose.  As employed to denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, it has no relation to the urgency of the public need or to the extent of the public benefit which is to follow; the essential requisite being that a public service or use shall affect the inhabitants as a community, and not merely as individuals.  A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as, for example, a state, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business.”
    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1231, Emphasis added]

  6. The federal government has no power of eminent domain within states of the Union.  This means that they cannot lawfully convert private property to a public use or a public purpose within the exclusive jurisdiction of states of the Union:

    “The United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in cases where it is delegated, and the court denies the faculty of the Federal Government to add to its powers by treaty or compact.‘”
    [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 508-509 (1856)]

  7. The Fifth Amendment prohibits converting private property to a public use or a public purpose without just compensation if the owner does not consent, and this prohibition applies to the Federal government as well as states of the Union.  It was made applicable to states of the Union by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.

    Fifth Amendment - Rights of Persons

    No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
    [United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment]

    If the conversion of private property to public property is done without the express consent of the party affected by the conversion and without compensation, then the following violations have occurred:

    7.1.  Violation of the Fifth Amendment “takings clause” above.

    7.2.  “Conversion” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 654.

    7.3.  Theft.

  8. Because taxation involves converting private property to a public use, public purpose, and public office, then it involves eminent domain if the owner of the property did not expressly consent to the taking:

    Eminent domain.  The power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character. Housing Authority of Cherokee National of Oklahoma v. Langley, Okl., 555 P.2d 1025, 1028. Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.

    In the United States, the power of eminent domain is founded in both the federal (Fifth Amend.) and state constitutions. However, the Constitution limits the power to taking for a public purpose and prohibits the exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation to the owners of the property which is taken. The process of exercising the power of eminent domain is commonly referred to as "condemnation", or, "expropriation".

    The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the public good. Thus, in time of war or insurrection, the proper authorities may possess and hold any part of the territory of the state for the common safety; and in time of peace the legislature may authorize the appropriation of the same to public purposes, such as the opening of roads, construction of defenses, or providing channels for trade or travel. Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. It gives a right to resume the possession of the property in the manner directed by the constitution and the laws of the state, whenever the public interest requires it.

    See also Adequate compensation; Condemnation; Constructive taking; Damages; Expropriation; Fair market value; Just compensation; Larger parcel; Public use; Take.
    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 470]

  9. The Fifth Amendment  requires that any taking of private property without the consent of the owner must involve compensation.  The Constitution must be consistent with itself.  The taxation clauses found in Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 3  cannot conflict with the Fifth Amendment.  The Fifth Amendment contains no exception to the requirement for just compensation upon conversion of private property to a public use, even in the case of taxation.  This is why all taxes must be indirect excise taxes against people who provide their consent by applying for a license to engage in the taxed activity:  The application for the license constitutes constructive consent to donate the fruits of the activity to a public use, public purpose, and public office.
  10. There is only ONE condition in which the conversion of private property to public property does NOT require compensation, which is when the owner donates the private property to a public use, public purpose, or public office.  To wit:

    “Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;' and to 'secure,' not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit [e.g. SOCIAL SECURITY, Medicare, and every other public “benefit”]; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.
    [Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]

    The above rules are summarized below:

    Table 1:  Rules for converting private property to a public use or a public office

    # Description Requires consent of owner to be taken from owner?
    1 The owner of property justly acquired enjoys full and exclusive use and control over the property.  This right includes the right to exclude government uses or ownership of said property. Yes
    2 He may not use the property to injure the equal rights of his neighbor.  For instance, when you murder someone, the government can take your liberty and labor from you by putting you in jail or your life from you by instituting the death penalty against you.  Both your life and your labor are “property”.  Therefore, the basis for the “taking” was violation of the equal rights of a fellow sovereign “neighbor”. No
    3 He cannot be compelled or required to use it to “benefit” his neighbor.  That means he cannot be compelled to donate the property to any franchise that would “benefit” his neighbor such as Social Security, Medicare, etc. Yes
    4 If he donates it to a public use, he gives the public the right to control that use. Yes
    5 Whenever the public needs require, the public may take it without his consent upon payment of due compensation.  E.g. “eminent domain”. No
  11. The following two methods are the ONLY methods involving consent of the owner that may be LAWFULLY employed to convert PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property.  Anything else is unlawful and THEFT:

    11.1  DIRECT CONVERSION:  Owner donates the property by conveying title or possession to the government.  An example of direct conversion would be the process of “registering” a vehicle with the Department of Motor Vehicles in your state.  The act of registration constitutes constent by original ABSOLUTE owner to change the ownership of the property from ABSOLUTE to QUALIFIED and to convey legal title to the state and qualified title to himself.

    11.2  INDIRECT CONVERSION:  Owner assumes a PUBLIC status as a PUBLIC officer in the HOLDING of title to the property.  All such statuses and the rights that attach to it are creations and property of the government, the use of which is a privilege.  The status and all PUBLIC RIGHTS that attach to it conveys a “benefit” for which the status user must pay an excise tax.  The tax acts as a rental or use fee for the status, which is government property. An example of a PUBLIC status is statutory “taxpayer” (public office called “trade or business”), statutory “citizen”, statutory “driver” (vehicle), statutory voter (registered voters are public officers).

  12. You and ONLY you can authorize your private property to be donated to a public use, public purpose, and public office.  No third party can lawfully convert or donate your private property to a public use, public purpose, or public office without your knowledge and express consent.  If they do, they are guilty of theft and conversion, and especially if they are acting in a quasi-governmental capacity as a “withholding agent” as defined in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(16).

    12.1.   A withholding agent cannot file an information return connecting your earnings to a “trade or business” without you actually occupying a “public office” in the government BEFORE you filled out any tax form.

    12.2.   A withholding agent cannot file IRS form W-2 against your earnings if you didn’t sign an  IRS Form W-4 contract and thereby consent to donate your private property to a public office in the U.S. government and therefore a “public use”.

    12.3.   That donation process is accomplished by your own voluntary self-assessment and ONLY by that method. Before such a self-assessment, you are a "nontaxpayer" and a private person. After the assessment, you become a "taxpayer" and a public officer in the government engaged in the "trade or business" franchise. That donation process is described in 31 U.S.C. 321(d):

    12.4.   In order to have an income tax liability, you must complete, sign, and “file” an income tax return and thereby assess yourself:

    “Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not distraint.”
    [Flora v. U.S., 362 U.S. 145 (1960)]

    By assessing yourself, you implicitly give your consent to allow the public the right to control that use of the formerly PRIVATE property donated to a public use.

    12.5.   IRS Forms W-2 and W-4 are identified as Tax Class 5: Estate and Gift Taxes.  Payroll withholdings are GIFTS, not "taxes" in a common law sense. 

    TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE I > CHAPTER 3 > SUBCHAPTER II > 321

    321. General authority of the Secretary

    (d)

    (1) The Secretary of the Treasury may accept, hold, administer, and use gifts and bequests of property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Department of the Treasury. Gifts and bequests of money and the proceeds from sales of other property received as gifts or bequests shall be deposited in the Treasury in a separate fund and shall be disbursed on order of the Secretary of the Treasury. Property accepted under this paragraph, and the proceeds thereof, shall be used as nearly as possible in accordance with the terms of the gift or bequest.

    (2) For purposes of the Federal income, estate, and gift taxes, property accepted under paragraph (1) shall be considered as a gift or bequest to or for the use of the United States.

    They don't become “taxes” and assessments until you attach the Form W-2 "gift statement" to an assessment called a  Form 1040 and create a liability with your own self-assessment signature.  IRS has no delegated authority to convert a “gift” into a “tax”.  That is why when you file the  IRS Form 1040, you must attach the W-2 gift statement.  See:

    Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.007, Section 5.6.15
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

    12.6.   The IRS cannot execute a lawful assessment without your knowledge and express consent because if they didn't have your consent, then it would be criminal conversion and theft.  That is why every time they do an assessment, they have to call you into their office and present it to you to procure your consent in what is called an "examination".  If you make it clear that you don’t consent and hand them the following, they have to delete the assessment because it's only a proposal. See:

    Why the Government Can't Lawfully Assess Human Beings With an Income Tax Liability Without Their Consent, Form #05.011
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

    There is no way other than the above to lawfully create an income tax liability without violating the Fifth Amendment  takings clause.  If you assess yourself, you consent to become a “public officer” and thereby donate the fruits of your labor as such officer to a public use and a public purpose. 

  13. The IRS won't admit this, but this in fact is how the de facto unlawful system currently functions:

    13.1.   You can’t unilaterally “elect” yourself into a “public office”, even if you do consent.

    13.2.   No IRS form nor any provision in the Internal Revenue Code CREATES any new public offices in the government.

    13.3.   The I.R.C. only taxes EXISTING public offices lawfully exercised ONLY in the District of Columbia and in all places expressly authorized pursuant to 4 U.S.C. 72.

  14. Information returns are being abused in effect as “federal election” forms.

    14.1.   Third parties in effect are nominating private persons into public offices in the government without their knowledge, without their consent, and without compensation.  Thus, information returns are being used to impose the obligations of a public office upon people without compensation and thereby impose slavery in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

    14.2.   Anyone who files a false information return connecting a person to the "trade or business"/"public office" franchise who in fact does not ALREADY lawfully occupy a public office in the U.S. government is guilty of impersonating a public officer in criminal violation of  18 U.S.C. 912.

  15. The IRS Form W-4 cannot and does not create an office in the U.S. government, but allows EXISTING public officers to elect to connect their private earnings to a public use, a public office, and a public purpose. The IRS abuses this form to unlawfully create public offices, and this abuse of the I.R.C. is the heart of the tax fraud: They are making a system that only applies to EXISTING public offices lawfully exercised in order to:

    15.1.   Unlawfully create new public offices in places where they are not authorized to exist.

    15.2.   Destroy the separation of powers between what is public and what is private.

    15.3.   Institute eminent domain over private labor using false third party reports. Omission in preventing such fraud accomplishes involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1994, and 18 U.S.C. 1581.

    15.4.   Destroy the separation of powers between the federal and state governments. Any state employee who participates in the federal income tax is serving in TWO offices, which is a violation of most state constitutions.

    15.5.   Enslave innocent people to go to work for them without compensation, without recourse, and in violation of the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. That prohibition, incidentally, applies EVERYWHERE, including on federal territory.

  16. The right to control the use of private property donated to a public use to procure the benefits of a franchise is enforced through the Internal Revenue Code, which is the equivalent of the employment agreement for franchisees called “taxpayers”.

The above criteria explains why:

  1. You cannot be subject to either employment tax withholding or employment tax reporting without voluntarily signing an IRS Form W-4.

    Title 26: Internal Revenue
    PART 31—EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE
    Subpart E—Collection of Income Tax at Source
    Sec. 31.3402(p)-1  Voluntary withholding agreements.

    (a) In general.

    An employee and his employer may enter into an agreement under section 3402(b) to provide for the withholding of income tax upon payments of amounts described in paragraph (b)(1) of 31.3401(a)–3, made after December 31, 1970. An agreement may be entered into under this section only with respect to amounts which are includible in the gross income of the employee under section 61, and must be applicable to all such amounts paid by the employer to the employee. The amount to be withheld pursuant to an agreement under section 3402(p) shall be determined under the rules contained in section 3402 and the regulations thereunder. See 31.3405(c)–1, Q&A–3 concerning agreements to have more than 20-percent Federal income tax withheld from eligible rollover distributions within the meaning of section 402.

    (b) Form and duration of agreement

    (2) An agreement under section 3402 (p) shall be effective for such period as the employer and employee mutually agree upon. However, either the employer or the employee may terminate the agreement prior to the end of such period by furnishing a signed written notice to the other. Unless the employer and employee agree to an earlier termination date, the notice shall be effective with respect to the first payment of an amount in respect of which the agreement is in effect which is made on or after the first "status determination date" (January 1, May 1, July 1, and October 1 of each year) that occurs at least 30 days after the date on which the notice is furnished. If the employee executes a new Form W-4, the request upon which an agreement under section 3402 (p) is based shall be attached to, and constitute a part of, such new Form W-4.

    ______________________________________________________________________________________

    26 C.F.R. 31.3401(a)-3 Amounts deemed wages under voluntary withholding agreements

    (a) In general.

    Notwithstanding the exceptions to the definition of wages specified in section 3401(a) and the regulations thereunder, the term “wages” includes the amounts described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section with respect to which there is a voluntary withholding agreement in effect under section 3402(p). References in this chapter to the definition of wages contained in section 3401(a) shall be deemed to refer also to this section (31.3401(a)–3).

    (b) Remuneration for services.

    (1) Except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the amounts referred to in paragraph (a) of this section include any remuneration for services performed by an employee for an employer which, without regard to this section, does not constitute wages under section 3401(a). For example, remuneration for services performed by an agricultural worker or a domestic worker in a private home (amounts which are specifically excluded from the definition of wages by section 3401(a) (2) and (3), respectively) are amounts with respect to which a voluntary withholding agreement may be entered into under section 3402(p). See 31.3401(c)–1 and 31.3401(d)–1 for the definitions of “employee” and “employer”.

  2. The courts have no authority under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a)  to declare you a franchisee called a “taxpayer”.  You own yourself.

    Specifically, Rowen seeks a declaratory judgment against the United States of America with respect to "whether or not the plaintiff is a taxpayer pursuant to, and/or under 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(14)." (See Compl. at 2.) This Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment "with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986," a code section that is not at issue in the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. 2201; see also Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 536-537 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of claim for declaratory relief under 2201 where claim concerned question of tax liability). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the instant action is hereby DISMISSED.
    [Rowen v. U.S., 05-3766MMC. (N.D.Cal. 11/02/2005)]

  3. The revenue laws may not be cited or enforced against a person who is not a “taxpayer”:

    "The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress does not assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws..."
    [Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236 (1922)]

    “Revenue Laws relate to taxpayers [officers, employees, instrumentalities, and elected officials of the Federal Government] and not to non-taxpayers [American Citizens/American Nationals not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government and who did not volunteer to participate in the federal “trade or business” franchise].  The latter are without their scope.  No procedures are prescribed for non-taxpayers and no attempt is made to annul any of their Rights or Remedies in due course of law.  With them[non-taxpayers] Congress does not assume to deal and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of federal revenue laws.” 
    [Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U.S., 470 F2d. 585 (1972)]

    "And by statutory definition, 'taxpayer' includes any person, trust or estate subject to a tax imposed by the revenue act.  ...Since the statutory definition of 'taxpayer' is exclusive, the federal courts do not have the power to create nonstatutory taxpayers for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Revenue Acts..."
    [C.I.R. v. Trustees of L. Inv. Ass'n, 100 F.2d 18 (1939)]

All of the above requirements have in common that violating them would result in the equivalent of exercising eminent domain over the private property of the private person without their consent and without just compensation, which the U.S. Supreme Court said violates the Fifth Amendment takings clause:

To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.  This is not legislation.  It is a decree under legislative forms.

Nor is it taxation.  ‘A tax,’ says Webster’s Dictionary, ‘is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or State.’  ‘Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the Legislature upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes.’  Cooley, Const. Lim., 479.

Coulter, J., in  Northern Liberties v. St. John’s Church, 13 Pa. St., 104 says, very forcibly, ‘I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purposes of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations—that they are imposed for a public purpose.’  See, also Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa.St., 69; Matter of Mayor of N.Y., 11 Johns., 77; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch., 398; Sharpless v. Mayor, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia., 47; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, supra.”
[Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)]

As a consequence of the above considerations, any government officer or employee who does any of the following is unlawfully converting private property to a public use without the consent of the owner and without consideration:

  1. Assuming or “presuming” you are a “taxpayer” without producing evidence that you consented to become one.  In our system of jurisprudence, a person must be presumed innocent until proven guilty with court admissible evidence.  Presumptions are NOT evidence.  That means they must be presumed to be a “nontaxpayer” until they are proven with admissible evidence to be a “taxpayer”.  See:
    Presumption:  Chief Weapon for Unlawfully Enlarging Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.017
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  2. Performing a tax assessment or re-assessment if you haven’t first voluntarily assessed yourself by filing a tax return.  See:
    Why the Government Can't Lawfully Assess Human Beings With an Income Tax Liability Without Their Consent, Form #05.011
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  3. Citing provisions of the franchise agreement against those who never consented to participate.  This is an abuse of law for political purposes and an attempt to exploit the innocent and the ignorant.  The legislature cannot delegate authority to the Executive Branch to convert innocent persons called “nontaxpayers” into franchisees called “taxpayers” without producing evidence of consent to become “taxpayers”.

    "In Calder v. Bull, which was here in 1798, Mr. Justice Chase said, that there were acts which the Federal and State legislatures could not do without exceeding their authority, and among them he mentioned a law which punished a citizen for an innocent act; a law that destroyed or impaired the lawful private [labor] contracts [and labor compensation, e.g. earnings from employment through compelled W-4 withholding] of citizens; a law that made a man judge in his own case; and a law that took the property from A [the worker]. and gave it to B [the government or another citizen, such as through social welfare programs]. 'It is against all reason and justice,' he added, 'for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers, and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it. They may command what is right and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime, or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private [employment] contract [by compelling W-4 withholding, for instance], or the right of private property. To maintain that a Federal or State legislature possesses such powers [of THEFT!] if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opinion, be a political heresy altogether inadmissible in all free republican governments.' 3 Dall. 388."
    [Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878)]

  4. Relying on third party information returns that are unsigned as evidence supporting the conclusion that you are a “taxpayer”.  These forms include IRS Forms W-2, 1042s, 1098, and 1099  and they are NOT signed and are inadmissible as evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 802  because not signed under penalty of perjury.  Furthermore, the submitters of these forms seldom have personal knowledge that you are in fact and in deed engaged in a “trade or business” as required by  26 U.S.C. 6041(a).  Most people don’t know, for instance, that a “trade or business” includes ONLY “the functions of a public office”.

3.  Proof IRC Subtitle A is primarily an excise tax on activities in connection with a "trade or business"

We’ll start off with a definition of “trade or business":

26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26)

"The term 'trade or business' includes [is limited to] the performance of the functions of a public office."

We know that the IRS likes to point to the word “includes” in the above definition and state that it is an “expansive” definition that does not exclude the common meaning of the term.  We must remember, however, that there is an important principle of statutory construction which states that anything not mentioned in a  law, statute, code, or regulation is “excluded by implication”, which means that all things not connected to a “public office” are excluded from the definition of “trade or business” by implication:

When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-485 (1987)  (“It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term”); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 392-393, n. 10   (“As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term “means” . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated'“); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935)  (Cardozo, J.); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction 47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). That is to say, the statute, read “as a whole,” post at 998 [530 U.S. 943] (THOMAS, J., dissenting), leads the reader to a definition. That definition does not include the Attorney General's restriction -- “the child up to the head.” Its words, “substantial portion,” indicate the contrary.” 
[Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)]

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.  Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325; Newblock v. Bowles, 170 Okl. 487, 40 P.2d 1097, 1100.  Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another.  When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred.  Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 581]

Therefore, the definition of the term “trade or business”, says what it means and means what it says.  The Supreme Court has said many times that words used in a law or statute are to be given their ordinary and plain meaning and are to be restricted to the clear language found in the code itself.  If you would like an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of the word "includes" within the Internal Revenue Code, please refer to our free pamphlet available on the internet below:

Meaning of the words "includes" and "including"

http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/FalseRhetoric/Includess.pdf

The only time in the I.R.C. where the term “trade or business” can mean anything other than what it is defined above to mean is in places where there a regional definition that overrides the general or default definition found in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26) above.  Below is the only example of that within the I.R.C., which is intended to be used only in the context of “self employment”:

26 U.S.C. 1402 Definitions

(c) Trade or business

The term ''trade or business'', when used with reference to self-employment income or net earnings from self-employment, shall have the same meaning as when used in section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses), except that such term shall not include -

(1) the performance of the functions of a public office, other than the functions of a public office of a State or a political subdivision thereof with respect to fees received in any period in which the functions are performed in a position compensated solely on a fee basis and in which such functions are not covered under an agreement entered into by such State and the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to section 218 of the Social Security Act;

(2) the performance of service by an individual as an employee, other than -

(A) service described in section 3121(b)(14)(B) performed by an individual who has attained the age of 18,

(B) service described in section 3121(b)(16),

(C) service described in section 3121(b)(11), (12), or (15) performed in the United States (as defined in section 3121(e)(2)) by a citizen of the United States, except service which constitutes ''employment'' under section 3121(y),

(D) service described in paragraph (4) of this subsection,

(E) service performed by an individual as an employee of a State or a political subdivision thereof in a position compensated solely on a fee basis with respect to fees received in any period in which such service is not covered under an agreement entered into by such State and the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to section 218 of the Social Security Act,

(F) service described in section 3121(b) (20), and

(G) service described in section 3121(b)(8)(B);

(3) the performance of service by an individual as an employee or employee representative as defined in section 3231;

(4) the performance of service by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by such order;

(5) the performance of service by an individual in the exercise of his profession as a Christian Science practitioner; or

(6) the performance of service by an individual during the period for which an exemption under subsection (g) is effective with respect to him. The provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) shall not apply to service (other than service performed by a member of a religious order who has taken a vow of poverty as a member of such order) performed by an individual unless an exemption under subsection (e) is effective with respect to him.

So we look up the definition in 26 U.S.C. 162 and here is what it says:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter B

Part VI-Itemized deductions for Individuals and Corporations

Sec. 162. - Trade or business expenses

(a) In general

There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including –

(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered;

So in other words, in the context of self employment ONLY, the term “trade or businessexcludes public offices in the District of Columbia and only includes those of federal territories and possessions, which are called “States” within the I.R.C.  This is because the default definition in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26)  includes ALL public offices everywhere within federal jurisdiction, whereas those public offices in the District of Columbia are specifically not mentioned by the above definition.  When the authors of the U.S. Code in the Office of Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives wants to confuse and mislead the American people, they will write the code in such as way as to use a double-negative, whereby they define what the new definition of “trade or businessexcludes, and then don’t include public offices in the District of Columbia but include all other types of political offices under federal jurisdiction.  Therefore, for self employment context ONLY, “trade or business” has a different meaning than the default definition in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26) and has been overridden to exclude public offices in the District of Columbia but include all other types of public offices otherwise within federal jurisdiction.

Government franchises and the excise taxes that implement them such as the “trade or business” franchise are commonly called by any of the following names to disguise the nature of the transaction:

  1. “public right”.
  2. “publici juris”.
  3. “privilege”.
  4. “excise taxable privilege”.
  5. “public office”.
  6. “Congressionally created right”.

The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the income tax was an excise tax indirectly when they held the following:

“The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents.[1] Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise “between the government and others.” Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451, 49 S.Ct., at 413.[2] In contrast, “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,” Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 51, 52 S.Ct., at 292, is a matter of private rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies in the former category may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450, n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1266, n. 7, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) ; Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S., at 50-51, 52 S.Ct., at 292.  See also Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894, 917-918 (1930).FN24 Private-rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.”

[. . .]

Although Crowell and Raddatz do not explicitly distinguish between rights created by Congress and other rights, such a distinction underlies in part Crowell's and Raddatz' recognition of a critical difference between rights created by federal statute and rights recognized by the Constitution.    Moreover, such a distinction seems to us to be necessary in light of the delicate accommodations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected in Art. III. The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to guard against “encroachment or aggrandizement” by Congress at the expense of the other branches of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122, 96 S.Ct., at 683.  But when Congress creates a statutory right [a “privilege” in this case, such as a “trade or business”], it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.FN35 Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress' power to define the right that it has created. No comparable justification exists, however, when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress' power to define rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.
[Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 83-84, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1983)]


[1] Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932), attempted to catalog some of the matters that fall within the public-rights doctrine:

“Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans.” Id., at 51, 52 S.Ct., at 292 (footnote omitted).

[2] Congress cannot “withdraw from [Art. III] judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856)  (emphasis added). It is thus clear that the presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing “private rights” from “public rights.” And it is also clear that even with respect to matters that arguably fall within the scope of the “public rights” doctrine, the presumption is in favor of Art. III courts. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S., at 548-549, and n. 21, 82 S.Ct., at 1471-1472, and n. 21  (opinion of Harlan, J.). See also Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part 1, 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 13-14, n. 67 (1968). Moreover, when Congress assigns these matters to administrative agencies, or to legislative courts, it has generally provided, and we have suggested that it may be required to provide, for Art. III judicial review. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S., at 455, n. 13, 97 S.Ct., at 1269, n. 13 .

To give you an example of the above phenomenon, the so-called “U.S. Tax Court” is identified in 26 U.S.C. 7441 as an Article I court, and hence NOT an Article III court as described above.  It is therefore what the U.S. Supreme Court identified above as a “particularized” tribunal that officiates ONLY over “Congressionally created rights”, which is a euphemism for “privileges” incident to a franchise.

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 76 > Subchapter C > PART I > 7441
7441. Status

There is hereby established, under article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court. The members of the Tax Court shall be the chief judge and the judges of the Tax Court.

Only “public rights” exercised by “public officers” may be officiated in the U.S. Tax Court, which is a “legislative franchise court”. 

franchise court. Hist. A privately held court that (usu.) exists by virtue of a royal grant [privilege], with jurisdiction over a variety of matters, depending on the grant and whatever powers the court acquires over time.   In 1274, Edward I abolished many of these feudal courts by forcing the nobility to demonstrate by what authority (quo warranto) they held court. If a lord could not produce a charter reflecting the franchise, the court was abolished. - Also termed courts of the franchise.

Dispensing justice was profitable. Much revenue could come from the fees and dues, fines and amercements. This explains the growth of the second class of feudal courts, the Franchise Courts. They too were private courts held by feudal lords. Sometimes their claim to jurisdiction was based on old pre-Conquest grants ... But many of them were, in reality, only wrongful usurpations of private jurisdiction by powerful lords. These were put down after the famous Quo Warranto enquiry in the reign of Edward 1." W.J.V. Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History 56-57 (2d ed. 1949) .”

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p. 668]

Below are the legal mechanisms involved as described by the Annotated U.S. Constitution:

The Public Rights Distinction

"That is, ''public'' rights are, strictly speaking, those in which the cause of action inheres in or lies against the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity, the understanding since Murray's Lessee. However, to accommodate Crowell v. Benson, Atlas Roofing, and similar cases, seemingly private causes of action between private parties will also be deemed ''public'' rights, when Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its Article I powers, fashions a cause of action that is analogous to a common-law claim and so closely integrates it into a public regulatory scheme that it becomes a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary. (82)"

[Footnote 82: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. at 52-54. The Court reiterated that the Government need not be a party as a prerequisite to a matter being of ''public right.'' Id. at 54. Concurring, Justice Scalia argued that public rights historically were and should remain only those matters to which the Federal Government is a party. Id. at 65.]

[Annotated Constitution, Year 2002, p. 640. 
SOURCE: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/013.pdf]

So the U.S. Tax Court  is really nothing more than an administrative binding arbitration board for federal statutory “employees” and public officers in resolving disputes INTERNAL to the national government and among federal instrumentalities, officers, bureaus, and agencies.  All these entities are identified in 26 U.S.C. 6331(a) as the ONLY proper subject of IRS enforcement activity, which the code calls “distraint”.  That, in fact, is why the INTERNAL Revenue Service begins with the word “INTERNAL”.  The “private causes of action” they are referring to are the exercise of “private law”, which is a fancy term for contract law, where the franchise itself codified in I.R.C. Subtitles A through C is the franchise contract.  The U.S. Supreme Court called income taxes a “quasi contract”, in fact.[1]

Private law.  That portion of the law which defines, regulates, enforces, and administers relationships among individuals, associations, and corporations.  As used in contradistinction to public law, the term means all that part of the law which is administered between citizen and citizen, or which is concerned with the definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in whom the right inheres and the person upon whom the obligation is incident are private individuals.  See also Private bill; Special law.  Compare Public Law.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1196]

Private law such as the I.R.C. Subtitles A through C can only acquire the “force of law” through the consent of BOTH parties to it.  Contracts between private people are an example of private law.  This is thoroughly established in:

Requirement for Consent, Form #05.003, Sections 10 through 13.7
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Many people misrepresent the facts by claiming that the I.R.C. is not “law”.  It IS law, but NOT for everyone.  If someone shoves a signed contract in front of you and you manifest actions that indicate consent to the provisions of the contract, then its as good as if you signed it.  This kind of consent is called “implied” consent or “tacit procuration”.  This kind of consent is manifested in several forms, including:

  1. Filling out “taxpayer” forms.  ALL IRS forms are ONLY for consenting statutory “taxpayers”.

    1.1.  The IRS Mission Statement, IRM Section 1.1.1.1 says that they can help ONLY statutory “taxpayers” who consent to the franchise contract.  That is the true meaning of the word “Service” in their name.  They are helping those who volunteer to “serve” uncle with their “donations”.  31 U.S.C. 321(d), in fact, identifies all income taxes as “donations”.  So whenever you see the word “tax”, it REALLY means a donation paid under the authority of the federal public officer kickback program disguised to LOOK like a lawful constitutional tax.

    1.2.  If you want a nontaxpayer form, you will have to modify theirs to make one or make your own nontaxpayer form.  They don’t help and even interfere with the rights of “nontaxpayers”, which makes us wonder whether they can even really be part of a government.  REAL governments provide EQUAL protection to both “taxpayers” and “nontaxpayers”, don’t discriminate, and are instituted to protect mainly PRIVATE rights, which means constitutional rights of NONTAXPAYERS FIRST, before they can even take on the job of ALSO protecting public rights of public officers.   For a huge collection of “nontaxpayer forms”, see:

    SEDM Forms and Publications Page
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  2. VOLUNTARILY signing and submitting an IRS Form W-4, which the treasury regulations identify as an “agreement”, and hence contract.  See  26 C.F.R. 31.3401(a)-3(a) and 26 C.F.R. 34.3402(p)-1 .  The upper left corner of the form says “EMPLOYEE’S WITHHOLDING ALLOWANCE CERTIFICATE”:

    2.1.  YOU are the one doing the “allowing”.

    2.2.  What you are consenting to is to become a public officer engaged in the “trade or business”, “social insurance” and SOCIALISM franchise.  You are trading RIGHTS for statutory privileges by signing up.

    2.3.  The W-4 form is therefore a request to become a Kelly girl on loan to a formerly private employer and to send kickbacks to the mother corporation and your “parens patriae” that loans out your services as a public officer.

  3. Quoting any provision of the I.R.C. and thereby “purposefully availing” yourself of its “benefits” and thereby:

    3.1.  Waiving sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2).

    3.2.  Changing your status from a statutory "non-resident non-person" to that of a resident alien under 26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(A).

  4. Claiming earned income credits under  26 U.S.C. 32, or “trade or business” deductions under 26 U.S.C. 162.
  5. Petitioning U.S. Tax Court.  Tax Court Rule 13(a) says that only “taxpayers” who are party to the contract can avail themselves of the “benefits” of this brand of administrative rather than judicial remedy.
  6. Using a “Taxpayer Identification Number”, which 26 C.F.R. 301.6109-1(b) says is only mandatory in the case of those engaged in a “trade or business” and therefore a public office in the U.S. government.

The IRS, judges, and government prosecutors don’t want you to know this stuff and carefully hide the nature of the transaction to keep you in the dark.  They love what we call “mushrooms”, which are organisms that you keep in the dark and feed SHIT to.  The SHIT is:

  1. Disinformation.
  2. Deceptive publications that refuse to disclose accurate definitions of key words.
  3. Words of art in their void for vagueness franchise “codes” that are private law.
  4. Concealing of the real names of the IRS agents (they don’t use their REAL names).
  5. False accusations to keep you on the defensive.
  6. Filtering evidence from appearing in litigation to keep the jury from learning what is in this document and thereby unjustly enrich themselves at your expense.  This is naked thievery.

Your public dis-servants play these games to disguise the consensual nature of what they are doing and let you practically convict and hang yourself.  They sit back and watch by doing all the above, never once telling you that your consent is required, or asking you whether you want to consent, or notifying you in their publications that they will protect your right to NOT consent.  We call this the “Rig and bait the trap and hide the consent game”.  The trap is their own omission and the legal ignorance they manufactured in you within the public/government school system that they use to HARVEST your labor and property when you enter the work force.  You live on a corporate farm and you are government livestock.  See:

The REAL Matrix
http://famguardian1.org/Media/The_REAL_Matrix.wmv

Why do they need your consent?  Because the Declaration of Independence says ALL JUST AUTHORITY of any civil government derives from CONSENT of the governed, and they need that consent in a LOT of ways to govern.  Another reason is that he who consents cannot complain of an injury accomplished during tax enforcement and in some cases entirely forfeits their right to sue in REAL, Constitutional court instead of fake U.S. Tax Court franchise court.

"These general rules are well settled:

(1) That the United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself [a "public right", which is a euphemism for a "franchise" to help the court disguise the nature of the transaction], is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12, 32 L. Ed. 354;  Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439, 21 L. Ed. 696 ;   Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195, 19 L. Ed. 35 ;  De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431, 433, 18 L. Ed. 700;  Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212, 7 L. Ed. 108. 

(2)  That where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U. S. 165, 174, 175, 35 Sup. Ct. 398, 59 L. Ed. 520, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 118;  Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U. S. 238, 3 Sup. Ct. 184, 27 L. Ed. 920 ;   Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555, 558, 25 L. Ed. 212; Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 35, 23 L. Ed. 196. Still the fact that the right and the remedy are thus intertwined might not, if the provision stood alone, require us to hold that the remedy expressly given excludes a right of review by the Court of Claims, where the decision of the special tribunal involved no disputed question of fact and the denial of compensation was rested wholly upon the construction of the act. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 198, 19 Sup. Ct. 503, 43 L. Ed. 779 ;   Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U. S. 124, 29 Sup. Ct. 556, 53 L. Ed. 936;  McLean v. United States, 226 U. S. 374, 33 Sup. Ct. 122, 57 L. Ed. 260;   United States v. Laughlin (No. 200), 249 U. S. 440, 39 Sup. Ct. 340, 63 L. Ed. 696 ,  decided April 14, 1919.
[U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464 (1919)]

It is otherwise an unconstitutional “bill of attainder” to institute IRS penalties against a person protected by the Constitution:

Volunti non fit injuria.
He who consents cannot receive an injury. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279, 2327; 4 T. R. 657; Shelf. on mar. & Div. 449.

Consensus tollit errorem.
Consent removes or obviates a mistake. Co. Litt. 126.

Melius est omnia mala pati quam malo concentire.
It is better to suffer every wrong or ill, than to consent to it. 3 Co. Inst. 23.

Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt, et consentiunt.
One cannot complain of having been deceived when he knew the fact and gave his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 145.

[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

The important thing to remember, however, is that Congress is FORBIDDEN from creating franchises within states of the Union.  Why?  Because:

  1. The Declaration of Independence, which is organic law, says our constitutional rights are “unalienable”.
  2. An “unalienable right” is one that you AREN’T ALLOWED BY LAW to consent to give away in relation to a real, de jure government!  Such a right cannot lawfully be sold, bargained away, or transferred through any commercial process, INCLUDING A FRANCHISE.  Hence, even if we consent, the forfeiture of such rights is unconstitutional, unauthorized, and a violation of the fiduciary duty to the public officer we surrender them to.

    “Unalienable.  Inalienable; incapable of being aliened, that is, sold and transferred.”
    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1693]

  3. The only place you can lawfully give up constitutional rights is where they physically do not exist, which is among those domiciled on AND physically present on federal territory not part of any state of the Union.

    “Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect [182 U.S. 244, 279] that the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct. Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government' (art. 4, 4), by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,' Congress did not hesitate, in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights.”
    [Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

  4. All governments are created exclusively to protect PRIVATE RIGHTS.  The way you protect them is to LEAVE THEM ALONE and not burden their exercise in any way.  A lawful de jure government cannot and does not protect your rights by making a business out of destroying, regulating, and taxing their exercise, implement the business as a franchise, and hide the nature of what they are doing as a franchise and an excise.  This would cause and has caused the money changers to take over the charitable public trust and “civic temple” and make it into a whorehouse in violation of the Constitutional trust indenture.  This kind of money changing in fact, is the very reason that Jesus flipped tables over in the temple out of anger:  Turning the bride of Christ and God’s minister for justice into a WHORE.  The nuns are now pimped out and the church is open for business for all the statutory “taxpayer” Johns who walk in.

That is why the geographical definitions within the I.R.C. limit themselves to federal territory exclusively and include no part of any state of the Union.

If you want an exhaustive analysis of how franchises such as the I.R.C. Subtitles A through C  operate, please see the following:

Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm


[1] See Milwaukee v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935).

4. Public v. Private

A very important subject is the division of legal authority between PUBLIC and PRIVATE rights.  On this subject the U.S. Supreme Court held:

“A private person cannot make constitutions or laws, nor can he with authority construe them, nor can he administer or execute them.”
[United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1883)]

If you can't "execute" them, then you ALSO can't enforce them against ANYONE else.  Some people might be tempted to say that we all construe them against the private person daily, but in fact we can't do that WITHOUT being a public officer WITHIN the government.  If we do enforce the law as a private person, we are criminally impersonating a public officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §912.  Another U.S. Supreme Court cite also confirms why this must be:

“All the powers of the government [including ALL of its civil enforcement powers against the public] must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with [private] individuals.
[Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)]

_______________________________________

“…we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an [PRIVATE] individual and a [PUBLIC] corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.

Upon the other hand, the [PUBLIC] corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75]   act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this: That an officer of a corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute, may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. “
[Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)]

You MUST therefore be an agent of the government and therefore a PUBLIC officer in order to “make constitutions or laws or administer, execute, or ENFORCE EITHER”.  Examples of “agents” or “public officers” of the government include all the following:

  1. “person” (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(1)).
  2. “individual” (26 C.F.R. §1441-1(c)(3)).
  3. “taxpayer” (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14)).
  4. “withholding agent” (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(16)).
“The government thus lays a tax, through the [GOVERNMENT] instrumentality [PUBLIC OFFICE] of the company [a FEDERAL and not STATE corporation], upon the income of a non-resident alien over whom it cannot justly exercise any control, nor upon whom it can justly lay any burden.”
[United States v. Erie R. Co., 106 U.S. 327 (1882)]

So how do you “OBEY” a law without “EXECUTING” it?  We’ll give you a hint:  It CAN’T BE DONE!

Likewise, if ONLY public officers can “administer, execute, or enforce” the law, then the following additional requirements of the law are unavoidable and also implied:

  1. Congress cannot impose DUTIES against private persons through the civil law.  Otherwise the Thirteenth Amendment would be violated and the party executing said duties would be criminally impersonating an agent or officer of the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. §912.
  2. Congress can only impose DUTIES upon public officers through the civil statutory law.
  3. The civil statutory law is law for GOVERNMENT, and not PRIVATE persons.  See:

Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  1. Those who enforce any civil statutory duties against you are PRESUMING that you occupy a public office.
  2. You cannot unilaterally “elect” yourself into a public office in the government by filling out a government form, even if you consent to volunteer.
  3. Even if you ARE a public officer, you can only execute the office in a place EXPRESSLY authorized by Congress per 4 U.S.C. §72, which means ONLY the District of Columbia and “not elsewhere”.
  4. If you are “construing, administering, or executing” the laws, then you are doing so as a public officer and the Public Records exception to the Hearsay Exceptions Rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) applies.  EVERYTHING you produce in the process of “construing, administering, or executing” the laws is instantly admissible and cannot be excluded from the record by any judge.  If a judge interferes with the admission of such evidence, he is:
  5. 4.1 Interfering with the duties of a coordinate branch of the government in violation of the Separation of Powers.

    4.2 Criminally obstructing justice. 

4.1 Introduction

In order to fully understand and comprehend the nature of franchises, it is essential to thoroughly understand the distinctions between PUBLIC and PRIVATE property.  The following subsections will deal with this important subject extensively.  In the following subsections, we will establish the following facts:

  1. There are TWO types of property:

    1.1 Public property.  This type of property is protected by the CIVIL law.

    1.2 Private property.  This type of property is protected by the COMMON law.

  2. Specific legal rights attach to EACH of the two types of property.  These “rights” in turn, are ALSO property as legally defined.

    Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man's courtesy.

    The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.

    [. . .]

    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]
  3. Human beings can simultaneously be in possession of BOTH PUBLIC and PRIVATE rights.  This gives rise to TWO legal “persons”:  PUBLIC and PRIVATE. 

    3.1 The CIVIL law attaches to the PUBLIC person.

    3.2 The COMMON law attaches to the PRIVATE person.

    This is consistent with the following maxim of law.

    Quando duo juro concurrunt in und personâ, aequum est ac si essent in diversis.
    When two rights [public right v. private right] concur in one person, it is the same as if they were two separate persons. 4 Co. 118.
    [Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856; SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]
  4. That the purpose of the Constitution and the establishment of government itself is to protect EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE rights. 
    “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these [EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE, God-given] rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -”
    [Declaration of Independence, 1776]

    The VERY FIRST step in protecting PRIVATE rights and PRIVATE property is to prevent such property from being converted to PUBLIC property or PUBLIC rights without the consent of the owner.  In other words, the VERY FIRST step in protecting PRIVATE rights is to protect you from the GOVERNMENT’S OWN theft.  Obviously, if a government becomes corrupted and refuses to protect PRIVATE rights or recognize them, there is absolutely no reason you can or should want to hire them to protect you from ANYONE ELSE.

  5. The main method for protecting PRIVATE rights is to impose the following burden of proof and presumption upon any entity or person claiming to be “government”:
    “All rights and property are PRESUMED to be EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE and beyond the control of government or the CIVIL law unless and until the government meets the burden of proving, WITH EVIDENCE, on the record of the proceeding that:
    1.  A SPECIFIC formerly PRIVATE owner consented IN WRITING to convert said property to PUBLIC property.
    2.  The owner was domiciled on federal territory NOT protected by the Constitution and therefore had the legal capacity to ALIENATE a Constitutional right or relieve a public servant of the fiduciary obligation to respect and protect the right.  Those domiciled in a constitutional but not statutory state and who are “citizens” or “residents” protected by the constitution cannot alienate rights to a real, de jure government.
    3.  If the government refuses to meet the above burden of proof, it shall be CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED to be operating in a PRIVATE, corporate capacity on an EQUAL footing with every other private corporation and which is therefore NOT protected by official, judicial, or sovereign immunity.

  6. That the ability to regulate EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE conduct is repugnant to the constitution and therefore such conduct cannot lawfully become the subject of any civil statutory law.
  7. That the terms “person”, “persons”, “individual”, “individuals” as used within the civil statutory law by default imply PUBLIC “persons” and therefore public offices within the government and not PRIVATE human beings.  All such offices are creations and franchises of the government and therefore property of the government subject to its exclusive control.
  8. That if the government wants to call you a statutory “person” or “individual” under the civil law, then:
  9. 8.1 You must volunteer or consent at some point to occupy a public office in the government while situated physically in a place not protected by the USA Constitution and the Bill of Rights....namely, federal territory.  In some cases, that public office is also called a “citizen” or “resident”.

    8.2 If you don’t volunteer, they are essentially exercising unconstitutional “eminent domain” over your PRIVATE property.  Keep in mind that rights protected by the Constitution are PRIVATE PROPERTY.

  10. That there are VERY SPECIFIC and well defined rules for converting PRIVATE property into PUBLIC PROPERTY and OFFICES, and that all such rules require your express consent except when a crime is involved.
  11. That if a corrupted judge or public servant imposes upon you any civil statutory status, including that of “person” or “individual” without your consent, they are:
  12. 10.1 Violating due process of law.

    10.2 Imposing involuntary servitude.

    10.3 STEALING property from you.  We call this “theft by presumption”.

    10.4 Kidnapping your identity and moving it to federal territory.

    10.5 Instituting eminent domain over EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE property.

  13. That within the common law, the main mechanism for PREVENTING the conversion of PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property through government franchises are the following maxims of law.  These maxims of law MANDATE that all governments must protect your right NOT to participate in franchises or be held accountable for the consequences of receiving a “benefit” you did not consent to receive and/or regarded as an INJURY rather than a “benefit”:
Invito beneficium non datur.
No one is obliged to accept a benefit against his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 69. But if he does not dissent he will be considered as assenting. Vide Assent.
Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto.
Any one may renounce a law introduced for his own benefit. To this rule there are some exceptions. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856,
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

For an example of how this phenomenon works in the case of the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitles A and C “trade or business” franchise, see:


Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

As an example of why an understanding of this subject is EXTREMELY important, consider the following dialog at an IRS audit in which the FIRST question out of the mouth of the agent is ALWAYS “What is YOUR Social Security Number?”:
______________________________________________________________________________________________

IRS AGENT:  What is YOUR Social Security Number?

YOU:  20 C.F.R. §422.103(d) says SSNs belong to the government.  The only way it could be MY number is if I am appearing here today as a federal employee or officer on official business.  If that is the case, no, I am here as a private human being and not a government statutory “employee” in possession or use of “public property” such as a number.  Therefore, I don’t HAVE a Social Security Number.  Furthermore, I am not lawfully eligible and never have been eligible to participate in Social Security and any records you have to the contrary are FALSE and FRAUDULENT and should be DESTROYED.

IRS AGENT:  That’s ridiculous.  Everyone HAS a SSN.

YOU:  Well then EVERYONE is a STUPID whore for acting as a federal employee or agent without compensation THEY and not YOU determine.  The charge for my services to act as a federal “employee” or officer or trustee in possession of public property such as an SSN is ALL the tax and penalty liability that might result PLUS $1,000 per hour.  Will you agree in writing pay the compensation I demand to act essentially as your federal coworker, because if you don’t, then it’s not MY number?

IRS AGENT:  It’s YOUR number, not the government’s.

YOU:  Well why do the regulations at 20 C.F.R. §422.103(d) say it belongs to the Social Security Administration instead of me?  I am not appearing as a Social Security employee at this meeting and its unreasonable and prejudicial for you to assume that I am.  I am also not appearing here as “federal personnel” as defined in 5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(13).  I don’t even qualify for Social Security and never have, and what you are asking me to do by providing an INVALID and knowingly FALSE number is to VIOLATE THE LAW and commit fraud by providing that which I am not legally entitled to and thereby fraudulently procure the benefits of a federal franchise.  Is that your intention?

IRS AGENT:  Don’t play word games with me.  It’s YOUR number.

YOU:  Well good.  Then if it’s MY number and MY property, then I have EXCLUSIVE control and use over it.  That is what the word “property” implies.  That means I, and not you, may penalize people for abusing MY property.  The penalty for wrongful use or possession of MY property is all the tax and penalty liability that might result from using said number for tax collection plus $1,000 per hour for educating you about your lawful duties because you obviously don’t know what they are.  If it’s MY property, then your job is to protect me from abuses of MY property.  If you can penalize me for misusing YOUR procedures and forms, which are YOUR property, then I am EQUALLY entitled to penalize you for misusing MY property.  Are you willing to sign an agreement in writing to pay for the ABUSE of what you call MY property, because if you aren’t, you are depriving me of exclusive use and control over MY property and depriving me of the equal right to prevent abuses of my property??

IRS AGENT:  OK, well it’s OUR number.  Sorry for deceiving you.  Can you give us OUR number that WE assigned to you?

YOU:  You DIDN’T assign it to ME as a private person, which is what I am appearing here today as.  You can’t lawfully issue public property such as an SSN to a private person.  That’s criminal embezzlement.  The only way it could have been assigned to me is if I’m acting as a “public officer” or federal employee at this moment, and I am NOT.  I am here as a private person and not a public employee.  Therefore, it couldn’t have been lawfully issued to me.  Keep this up, and I’m going to file a criminal complaint with the U.S. Attorney for embezzlement in violation of 18 U.S.C. §641 and impersonating a public officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §912.  I’m not here as a public officer and you are asking me to act like one without compensation and without legal authority.  Where is the compensation that I demand to act as a fiduciary and trustee over your STINKING number, which is public property?    I remind you that the very purpose why governments are created is to PROTECT and maintain the separation between "public property" and "private property"  in order to preserve my inalienable constitutional rights that you took an oath to support and defend.  Why do you continue to insist on co-mingling and confusing them in order to STEAL my labor, property, and money without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment takings clause?
______________________________________________________________________________________________

Usually, after the above interchange, the IRS agent will realize he is digging a DEEP hole for himself and will abruptly end that sort of inquiry, and many times will also end his collection efforts.

 

4.2 What is “Property”?

Property is legally defined as follows:

Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man's courtesy.

The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.

Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership. or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. Davis v. Davis. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d. 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 389 S.W.2d. 745, 752.

Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d. 694, 697.

Goodwill is property, Howell v. Bowden, TexCiv. App.. 368 S.W.2d. 842, &18; as is an insurance policy and rights incident thereto, including a right to the proceeds, Harris v. Harris, 83 N.M. 441,493 P.2d. 407, 408.

Criminal code. "Property" means anything of value. including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power. Model Penal Code. Q 223.0. See also Property of another, infra. Dusts. Under definition in Restatement, Second, Trusts, Q 2(c), it denotes interest in things and not the things themselves.

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

Keep in mind the following critical facts about “property” as legally defined:

  1. The essence of the “property” right, also called “ownership”, is the RIGHT TO EXCLUDE others from using or benefitting from the use of the property.

“We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, "the right to exclude [others is] `one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' " Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). “

[Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)]

________________________________________________________________________________

“In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right,[11] falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.

[Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)]
[11] See, e. g., United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 206 Ct.Cl. 649, 669-670, 513 F.2d. 1383, 1394 (1975); United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d. 736, 740 (CA5 1961). As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, "[a]n essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it." International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissenting opinion).
  1. It’s NOT your property if you can’t exclude the GOVERNMENT from using, benefitting from the use, or taxing the specific property.
  2. All constitutional rights and statutory privileges are property.
  3. Anything that conveys a right or privilege is property.
  4. Contracts convey rights or privileges and are therefore property.
  5. All franchises are contracts between the grantor and the grantee and therefore property.

4.3 "Public” v. “Private” property ownership

Next, we would like to compare the two types of property:  Public v. Private.  There are two types of ownership of “property”:  Absolute and Qualified.  The following definition describes and compares these two types of ownership:

Ownership. Collection of rights to use and enjoy property, including right to transmit it to others. Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 92 N.H. 473, 33 A.2d. 665, 673. The complete dominion, title, or proprietary right in a thing or claim. The entirety of the powers of use and disposal allowed by law.

The right of one or more persons to possess and use a thing to the exclusion of others. The right by which a thing belongs to someone in particular, to the exclusion of all other persons. The exclusive right of possession, enjoyment, and disposal; involving as an essential attribute the right to control, handle, and dispose.

Ownership of property is either absolute or qualified. The ownership of property is absolute when a single person has the absolute dominion over it, and may use it or dispose of it according to his pleasure, subject only to general laws. The ownership is qualified when it is shared with one or more persons, when the time of enjoyment is deferred or limited, or when the use is restricted. Calif. Civil Code, §§678-680.

There may be ownership of all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual delivery; of all domestic animals; of all obligations; of such products of labor or skill as the composition of an author, the goodwill of a business, trademarks and signs, and of rights created or granted by statute. Calif. Civil Code, §655.

In connection with burglary, "ownership" means any possession which is rightful as against the burglar.

See also Equitable ownership; Exclusive ownership; Hold; Incident of ownership; Interest; Interval ownership; Ostensible ownership; Owner; Possession; Title.

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1106]

Participation in franchises causes PRIVATE property to transmute into PUBLIC property.  Below is a table comparing these two great classes of property and the legal aspects of their status.

Table 2:  Public v. Private Property


#

Characteristic

Public

Private

1

Authority for ownership comes from

Grantor/
creator of franchise

God/natural law

2

Type of ownership

Qualified

Absolute

3

Law protecting ownership

Statutory franchises

Bill of Rights
(First Ten Amendments to the U.S. Constitution)

4

Owner is

The public as LEGAL owner and the human being as EQUITABLE owner

A single person as LEGAL owner

5

Ownership is a

Privilege/franchise

Right

6

Courts protecting ownership

Franchise court
(Article 4 of the USA Constitution)

Constitutional court

7

Subject to taxation?

Yes

No (you have the right EXCLUDE government from using or benefitting from it)

8

Title held by

Statutory citizen
(Statutory citizens are public officers)

Constitutional citizen
(Constitutional citizens are human beings and may NOT be public officers)

9

Character of YOUR/HUMAN title

Equitable

Legal

10

Conversion to opposite type of property by

  1. Removing government identifying number.
  2. Donation.
  1. Associating with government identifying number.
  2. Donation.
  3. Eminent domain (with compensation).
  4. THEFT (Internal Revenue Service).

See:  About SSNs and TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence, Form #05.012.

4.4 The purpose and foundation of de jure government:  Protection of EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE rights

The main purpose for which all governments are established is the protection of EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE rights and property.  This purpose is the foundation of all the just authority of any government as held by the Declaration of Independence:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -”
[Declaration of Independence, 1776]

The fiduciary duty that a public officer who works for the government has is founded upon the requirement to protect PRIVATE property.

“As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer.   Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts.    That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves.   and owes a fiduciary duty to the public.    It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual.    Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy.
[63C American Jurisprudence 2d., Public Officers and Employees, §247 (1999)]

The VERY FIRST step that any lawful de jure government must take in protecting PRIVATE property and PRIVATE rights is to protect it from being converted to PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT property.  After all:  If the people you hire to protect you won’t even do the job of protecting you from THEM, why should you hire them to protect you from ANYONE ELSE?

The U.S. Supreme Court has also affirmed that the protection of PRIVATE rights and PRIVATE property is “the foundation of the government” when it held the following.  The case below was a challenge to the constitutionality of the first national income tax, and the U.S. government rightfully lost that challenge:

“Here I close my opinion. I could not say less in view of questions of such gravity that they go down to the very foundations of the government. If the provisions of the Constitution can be set aside by an act of Congress, where is the course of usurpation to end?
The present assault upon capital [THEFT! and WEALTH TRANSFER by unconstitutional CONVERSION of PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property] is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping stone to others larger and more sweeping, until our political contest will become war of the poor against the rich; a war of growing intensity and bitterness.”
[Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), hearing the case against the first income tax passed by Congress that included people in states of the Union. They declared that first income tax UNCONSTITUTIONAL, by the way]

In the above landmark case, the lawyer for the petitioner, Mr. Choate, even referred to the income tax as COMMUNISM, and he was obviously right!  Why?  Because communism like socialism operates upon the following political premises:

  1. All property is PUBLIC property and there IS no PRIVATE property.
  2. The government owns and/or controls all property and said property is LOANED to the people.
  3. The government and/or the collective has rights superior to those of the individual.  There is and can be NO equality or equal protection under the law without the right of PRIVATE property.  In that sense, the government or the “state” is a pagan idol with “supernatural powers” because human beings are “natural” and they are inferior to the collective.
  4. Control is synonymous with ownership.  If the government CONTROLS the property but the citizen “owns” it, then:
  5. 4.1 The REAL owner is the government.

    4.2 The ownership of the property is QUALIFIED rather than ABSOLUTE.

    4.3 The person holding the property is a mere CUSTODIAN over GOVERNMENT property and has EQUITABLE rather than LEGAL ownership.  Hence, their name in combination with the Social Security Number constitutes a PUBLIC office synonymous with the government itself.

  6. Everyone in temporary use of said property is an officer and agent of the state.  A “public officer”, after all, is someone who is in charge of the PROPERTY of the public.  It is otherwise a crime to use public property for a PRIVATE use or benefit.  That crime is called theft or conversion:
Public office. The right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government for the benefit of the public. Walker v. Rich, 79 Cal.App. 139, 249 P. 56, 58. An agency for the state, the duties of which involve in their performance the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, either great or small. Yaselli v. Goff, C.C.A., 12 F.2d. 396, 403, 56 A.L.R. 1239; Lacey v. State, 13 Ala.App. 212, 68 So. 706, 710; Curtin v. State, 61 Cal.App. 377, 214 P. 1030, 1035; Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, 75 Ind.App. 493, 129 N.E. 878. State ex rel. Colorado River Commission v. Frohmiller, 46 Ariz. 413, 52 P.2d. 483, 486. Where, by virtue of law, a person is clothed, not as an incidental or transient authority, but for such time as de- notes duration and continuance, with Independent power to control the property of the public, or with public functions to be exercised in the supposed interest of the people, the service to be compensated by a stated yearly salary, and the occupant having a designation or title, the position so created is a public office. State v. Brennan, 49 Ohio.St. 33, 29 N.E. 593.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1235]

Look at some of the planks of the Communist Manifesto and confirm the above for yourself:

  1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
  2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.

[ . . .]
[Wikipedia on “The Communist Manifesto”, 12-27-2011; SOURCE: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Communist_Manifesto]

The legal definition of “property” confirms that one who OWNS a thing has the EXCLUSIVE right to use and dispose of and CONTROL the use of his or her or its property and ALL the fruits and “benefits” associated with the use of such property .  The implication is that you as the PRIVATE owner have a right to EXCLUDE ALL OTHERS including all governments from using, benefitting from, or controlling your property.  Governments, after all, are simply legal “persons” and the constitution guarantees that ALL “persons” are equal.  If your neighbor can’t benefit from your property without your consent, then neither can any so-called “government”.

Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man's courtesy.

The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.

Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership. or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. Davis v. Davis. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d. 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 389 S.W.2d. 745, 752.

Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d. 694, 697.

[. . .]
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

In a lawful de jure government under our constitution:

  1. All “persons” are absolutely equal under the law. No government can have any more rights than a single human being, no matter how many people make up that government.  If your neighbor can’t take your property without your consent, then neither can the government.  The only exception to this requirement of equality is that artificial persons do not have constitutional rights, but only such “privileges” as statutory law grants them.  See:

    Requirement for Equal Protection and Equal Treatment, Form #05.033
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  2. All property is CONCLUSIVELY presumed to be EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE until the GOVERNMENT meets the burden of proof on the record of the legal proceeding that you EXPRESSLY consented IN WRITING to donate the property or use of the property to the PUBLIC:
    “Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable  rights,- 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;' and to 'secure,' not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit [e.g. SOCIAL SECURITY, Medicare, and every other public “benefit”]; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.”
    [Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]
  3. You have to knowingly and intentionally DONATE your PRIVATE property to a public use and a PUBLIC purpose before the government can lawfully REGULATE its use.  In other words, you have to at least SHARE your ownership of otherwise private property with the government and become an EQUITABLE rather than ABSOLUTE owner of the property before they can acquire the right to regulate its use or impose obligations or duties upon its original owner.
  4. That donation ordinarily occurs by applying for and/or using a license in connection with the use of SPECIFIC otherwise PRIVATE property.
  5. The process of applying for or using a license and thereby converting PRIVATE into PUBLIC cannot be compelled.  If it is, the constitutional violation is called “eminent domain” without compensation or STEALING, in violation of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.
  6. You have a PUBLIC persona (office) and a PRIVATE persona (human) at all times. 
  7. That which you VOLUNTARILY attach a government license number to, such as a Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identification Number, becomes PRIVATE property donated to a public use to procure the benefits of a PUBLIC franchise.  That property, in turn, is effectively OWNED by the government grantor of your public persona and the public office it represents.

    If you were compelled to use a government license number, such as an SSN or TIN, then a theft and taking without compensation has occurred, because all property associated with such numbers was unlawfully converted and STOLEN.

  8. If the right to contract of the parties conducting any business transaction has any meaning at all, it implies the right to EXCLUDE the government from participation in their relationship. 
  9. 7.1 You can write the contract such that neither party may use or invoke a license number, or complain to a licensing board, about the transaction, and thus the government is CONTRACTED OUT of the otherwise PRIVATE relationship.  Consequently, the transaction becomes EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE and government may not tax or regulate or arbitrate the relationship in any way under the terms of the license franchise.

    7.2 Every consumer of your services has a right to do business with those who are unlicensed.  This right is a natural consequence of the right to CONTRACT and NOT CONTRACT.  The thing they are NOT contracting with is the GOVERNMENT, and the thing they are not contracting FOR is STATUTORY/FRANCHISE “protection”.  Therefore, even those who have applied for government license numbers are NOT obligated to use them in connection with any specific transaction and may not have their licenses suspended or revoked for failure or refusal to use them for a specific transaction.

  10. If the government invades the commercial relationship between you and those you do business with by forcing either party to use or invoke the license number or pursue remedies or “benefits” under the license, they are:
  11. 8.1 Interfering with your UNALIENABLE right to contract.

    8.2 Compelling you to donate EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE property to a PUBLIC use.

    8.3 Exercising unconstitutional eminent domain over your otherwise PRIVATE property.

    8.4 Compelling you to accept a public “benefit”, where the “protection” afforded by the license is the “benefit”.

The above requirements of the USA Constitution are circumvented with nothing more than the simple PRESUMPTION, usually on the part of the IRS and corrupted judges who want to STEAL from you, that the GOVERNMENT owns it and that you have to prove that they CONSENTED to let you keep the fruits of it.  They can’t and never have proven that they have such a right, and all such presumptions are a violation of due process of law.

(1) [8:4993] Conclusive presumptions affecting protected interests: 

A conclusive presumption may be defeated where its application would impair a party's constitutionally-protected liberty or property interests.  In such cases, conclusive presumptions have been held to violate a party's due process and equal protection rights.  [Vlandis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 449, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2235; Cleveland Bed. of Ed. v. LaFleur (1974) 414 U.S. 632, 639-640, 94 S.Ct. 1208, 1215-presumption under Illinois law that unmarried fathers are unfit violates process]

[Federal Civil Trials and Evidence, Rutter Group, 2006, paragraph 8:4993, p. 8K-34]

In order to unconstitutionally and TREASONOUSLY circumvent the above limitation on their right to presume, corrupt governments and government actors will play “word games” with citizenship and key definitions in the ENCRYPTED “code” in order to KIDNAP your legal identity and place it OUTSIDE the above protections of the constitution by:

  1. PRESUMING that you are a public officer and therefore, that everything held in your name is PUBLIC property of the GOVERNMENT and not YOUR PRIVATE PROPERTY.  See:

    Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008
    DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyThiefOrPubOfficer.pdf
    FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  2. Abusing fraudulent information returns to criminally and unlawfully “elect” you into public offices in the government:

    Correcting Erroneous Information Returns, Form #04.001
    DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/CorrErrInfoRtns/CorrErrInfoRtns.pdf
    FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  3. PRESUMING that because you did not rebut evidence connecting you to a public office, then you CONSENT to occupy the office.
  4. PRESUMING that ALL of the four contexts for "United States" are equivalent.
  5. PRESUMING that CONSTITUTIONAL citizens and STATUTORY citizens are EQUIVALENT under federal law. They are NOT. A CONSTITUTIONAL citizen is a "non-citizen national" under federal law and NOT a "citizen of the United States".

    Why You are a "national", "state national", and Constitutional but not Statutory Citizen, Form #05.006
    DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyANational.pdf
    FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  6. PRESUMING that "nationality" and "domicile" are equivalent. They are NOT. See:

    Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
    DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Domicile.pdf
    FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  7. Using the word "citizenship" in place of "nationality" OR "domicile", and refusing to disclose WHICH of the two they mean in EVERY context.
  8. Confusing the POLITICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL meaning of words with the civil STATUTORY context. For instance, asking on government forms whether you are a POLITICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL citizen and then FALSELY PRESUMING that you are a STATUTORY citizen under 8 U.S.C. §1401.
  9. Confusing the words "domicile" and "residence" or impute either to you without satisfying the burden of proving that you EXPRESSLY CONSENTED to it and thereby illegally kidnap your civil legal identity against your will.  One can have only one "domicile" but many "residences" and BOTH require your consent.  See:

    Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
    DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Domicile.pdf
    FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  10. Adding things or classes of things to the meaning of statutory terms that do not EXPRESSLY appear in their definitions, in violation of the rules of statutory construction. See:

    Meaning of the Words “includes” and "including", Form #05.014
    DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Includes.pdf
    FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  11. Refusing to allow the jury to read the definitions in the law and then give them a definition that is in conflict with the statutory definition. This substitutes the JUDGES will for what the law expressly says and thereby substitutes PUBLIC POLICY for the written law.
  12. Publishing deceptive government publications that are in deliberate conflict with what the statutes define "United States" as and then tell the public that they CANNOT rely on the publication. The IRS does this with ALL of their publications and it is FRAUD. See:

    Reasonable Belief About Income Tax Liability, Form #05.007
    DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ReasonableBelief.pdf
    FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

This kind of arbitrary discretion is PROHIBITED by the Constitution, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court:

“When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.
[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 , 6 S. Sup.Ct. 1064, 1071]

Thomas Jefferson, our most revered founding father, precisely predicted the above abuses when he astutely said:

"It has long been my opinion, and I have never shrunk from its expression,... that the germ of dissolution of our Federal Government is in the constitution of the Federal Judiciary--an irresponsible body (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow), working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief over the field of jurisdiction until all shall be usurped from the States and the government be consolidated into one. To this I am opposed."
[Thomas Jefferson to Charles Hammond, 1821. ME 15:331]

"Contrary to all correct example, [the Federal judiciary] are in the habit of going out of the question before them, to throw an anchor ahead and grapple further hold for future advances of power. They are then in fact the corps of sappers and miners, steadily working to undermine the independent rights of the States and to consolidate all power in the hands of that government in which they have so important a freehold estate."
[Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821. ME 1:121]

"The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our Constitution from a co-ordination of a general and special government to a general and supreme one alone. This will lay all things at their feet, and they are too well versed in English law to forget the maxim, 'boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem.'"
[Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie, 1820. ME 15:297]

"When all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated."
[Thomas Jefferson to Charles Hammond, 1821. ME 15:332]

"What an augmentation of the field for jobbing, speculating, plundering, office-building ["trade or business" scam] and office-hunting would be produced by an assumption [PRESUMPTION] of all the State powers into the hands of the General Government!"
[Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger, 1800. ME 10:168]

The key to preventing the unconstitutional abuse of presumption by the corrupted judiciary and IRS to STEAL from people is to completely understand the content of the following memorandum of law and consistently apply it in every interaction with the government:


Presumption:  Chief Weapon for Unlawfully Enlarging Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.017
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

It ought to be very obvious to the reader that:

  1. The rules for converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property ought to be consistently, completely, clearly, and unambiguously defined by every government officer you come in contact with, and ESPECIALLY in court.  These rules ought to be DEMANDED to be declared EVEN BEFORE you enter a plea in a criminal case.
  2. If the government asserts any right over your PRIVATE property, they are PRESUMING they are the LEGAL owner and relegating you to EQUITABLE ownership.  This presumption should be forcefully challenged.
  3. If they won’t expressly define the rules, or try to cloud the rules for converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property, then they are:

    3.1 Defeating the very purpose for which they were established as a “government”.  Hence, they are not a true “government” but a de facto private corporation PRETENDING to be a “government”, which is a CRIME under 18 U.S.C. §912.

    3.2 Exercising unconstitutional eminent domain over private property without the consent of the owner and without compensation.

    3.3 Trying to STEAL from you.

    3.4 Violating their fiduciary duty to the public.

4.5 The Ability to Regulate Private Rights and Private Conduct is Repugnant to the Constitution

The following cite establishes that private rights and private property are entirely beyond the control of the government:

When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. "A body politic," as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, "is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and 125*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, "are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things." Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. With the Fifth Amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon the city of Washington "to regulate . . . the rates of wharfage at private wharves, . . . the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the rates of fees therefor, . . . and the weight and quality of bread," 3 Stat. 587, sect. 7; and, in 1848, "to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers," 9 id. 224, sect. 2.
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

Notice that they say that the ONLY basis to regulate private rights is to prevent injury of one man to another by the use of said property. They say that this authority is the origin of the "police powers" of the state. What they hide, however, is that these same POLICE POWERS involve the CRIMINAL laws and EXCLUDE the CIVIL laws or even franchises.  You can TELL they are trying to hide something because around this subject they invoke the Latin language that is unknown to most Americans to conceal the nature of what they are doing.  Whenever anyone invokes Latin in a legal setting, a red flag ought to go up because you KNOW they are trying to hide a KEY fact.  Here is the Latin they invoked:

“sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas”

The other phrase to notice in the Munn case above is the use of the word "social compact".  A compact is legally defined as a contract. 

“Compact, n. An agreement or contract between persons, nations, or states. Commonly applied to working agreements between and among states concerning matters of mutual concern. A contract between parties, which creates obligations and rights capable of being enforced and contemplated as such between the parties, in their distinct and independent characters.  A mutual consent of parties concerned respecting some property or right that is the object of the stipulation, or something that is to be done or forborne.  See also Compact clause; Confederacy; Interstate compact; Treaty.” 
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 281]

Therefore, one cannot exercise their First Amendment right to legally associate with or contract with a SOCIETY and thereby become a party to the "social compact/contract" without ALSO becoming a STATUTORY "citizen".  By statutory citizen, we really mean a domiciliary of a SPECIFIC municipal jurisdiction, and not someone who was born or naturalized in that place.  Hence, by STATUTORY citizen we mean a person who:

  1. Has voluntarily chosen a civil domicile within a specific municipal jurisdiction and thereby become a “citizen” or “resident” of said jurisdiction.  “citizens” or “residents” collectively are called “inhabitants”.
  2. Has indicated their choice of domicile on government forms in the block called “residence” or “permanent address”.
  3. CONSENTS to be protected by the regional civil laws of a SPECIFIC municipal government.

A CONSTITUTIONAL citizen, on the other hand, is someone who cannot consent to choose the place of their birth.  These people in statutes are called “non-citizen nationals”.  Neither BEING BORN nor being PHYSICALLY PRESENT in a place is an express exercise of one’s discretion or an act of CONSENT, and therefore cannot make one a government contractor called a statutory “U.S. citizen”.  That is why birth or naturalization determines nationality but not their status under the CIVIL laws.  All civil jurisdiction is based on “consent of the governed”, as the Declaration of Independence indicates.  Those who do NOT consent to the civil laws that implement the social compact of the municipal government they are PHYSICALLY situated within are called “free inhabitants”, “nonresidents”, “transient foreigners”, “non-citizen nationals”, or “foreign sovereigns”.  These “free inhabitants” are mentioned in the Articles of Confederation, which continue to this day and they are NOT the same and mutually exclusive to a statutory “U.S. citizen”.  These “free inhabitants” instead are CIVILLY governed by the common law RATHER than the civil law.

Policemen are NOT allowed to involve themselves in CIVIL disputes and may ONLY intervene or arrest anyone when a CRIME has been committed.  They CANNOT arrest for an "infraction", which is a word designed to hide the fact that the statute being enforced is a CIVIL or FRANCHISE statute not involving the CRIMINAL "police powers".  Hence, civil jurisdiction over PRIVATE rights is NOT authorized among those who HAVE such rights.  Only those who know those rights and claim and enforce them, not through attorneys but in their proper person, have such rights.  Nor can those PRIVATE rights lawfully be surrendered to a REAL, de jure government, even WITH consent, if they are, in fact UNALIENABLE as the Declaration of Independence indicates.

“Unalienable.  Inalienable; incapable of being aliened, that is, sold and transferred.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1693]

The only people who can consent to give away a right are those who HAVE no rights because domiciled on federal territory not protected by the Constitution or the Bill of Rights:

“Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect [182 U.S. 244, 279] that the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct. Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government' (art. 4, 4), by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,' Congress did not hesitate, in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights.”
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

To apply these concepts, the police enforce the "vehicle code", but most of the vehicle code is a civil franchise that they may NOT enforce without ABUSING the police powers of the state.  In recognition of these concepts, the civil provisions of the vehicle code are called "infractions" rather than "crimes".  AND, before the civil provisions of the vehicle code may lawfully be enforced against those using the public roadways, one must be a "resident" with a domicile not within the state, but on federal territory where rights don't exist.  All civil law attaches to SPECIFIC territory. That is why by applying for a driver's license, most state vehicle codes require that the person must be a "resident" of the state, meaning a person with a domicile within the statutory but not Constitutional "United States", meaning federal territory.
So what the vehicle codes in most states do is mix CRIMINAL and CIVIL and even PRIVATE franchise law all into one title of code, call it the "Vehicle code", and make it extremely difficult for even the most law abiding "citizen" to distinguish which provisions are CIVIL/FRANCHISES and which are CRIMINAL, because they want to put the police force to an UNLAWFUL use enforcing CIVIL rather than CRIMINAL law.  This has the practical effect of making the "CODE" not only a deception, but void for vagueness on its face, because it fails to give reasonable notice to the public at large, WHICH specific provisions pertain to EACH subset of the population.  That in fact, is why they have to call it “the code”, rather than simply “law”:  Because the truth is encrypted and hidden in order to unlawfully expand their otherwise extremely limited civil jurisdiction.  The two subsets of the population who they want to confuse and mix together in order to undermine your sovereignty are:

  1. Those who consent to the “social compact” by choosing a domicile or residence within a specific municipal jurisdiction.  These people are identified by the following statutory terms:
  2. 1.1 Individuals.

    1.2 Residents.

    1.3 Citizens.

  3. Inhabitants.
  4. PUBLIC officers serving as an instrumentality of the government.
  5. Those who do NOT consent to the “social compact” and who therefore are called:
  6. 4.1 Free inhabitants.

    4.2 Nonresidents.

    4.3 Transient foreigners.

    4.4 Sojourners.

    4.5 EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE human beings beyond the reach of the civil statutes implementing the social compact.

The way they get around the problem of only being able to enforce the CIVIL provisions of the vehicle code against domiciliaries of the federal zone is to:

  1. ONLY issue driver licenses to "residents" domiciled in the federal zone.
  2. Confuse CONSTITUTIONAL “citizens” with STATUTORY “citizens”, to make them appear the same even though they are NOT.
  3. Arrest people for driving WITHOUT a license, even though technically these provisions can only be enforceable against those who are acting as a public officer WHILE driving AND who are STATUTORY but not CONSTITUTIONAL “citizens”.

The act of "governing" WITHOUT consent therefore implies CRIMINAL governing, not CIVIL governing. To procure CIVIL jurisdiction over a private right requires the CONSENT of the owner of the right. That is why the U.S. Supreme Court states in Munn the following:

"When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain."
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

Therefore, if one DOES NOT consent to join a “society” as a statutory citizen, he RETAINS those SOVEREIGN rights that would otherwise be lost through the enforcement of the civil law.   Here is how the U.S. Supreme Court describes this requirement of law:

“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable  rights,- 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;' and to 'secure,' not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations:
[1] First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit [e.g. SOCIAL SECURITY, Medicare, and every other public “benefit”];
[2] second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and
[3] third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.”
[Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]

A PRIVATE right that is unalienable cannot be given away by a citizen, even WITH consent, to a de jure government. Hence, the only people that any government may CIVILLY govern are those without unalienable rights, all of whom MUST therefore be domiciled on federal territory where CONSTITUTIONAL rights do not exist.

Notice that when they are talking about "regulating" conduct using CIVIL law, all of a sudden they mention "citizens" instead of ALL PEOPLE. These "citizens" are those with a DOMICILE within federal territory not protected by the Constitution:

"Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good."
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

All "citizens" that they can regulate therefore must be WITHIN the government and be acting as public officers. Otherwise, they would continue to be PRIVATE parties beyond the CIVIL control of any government.  Hence, in a Republican Form of Government where the People are sovereign:

  1. The only "subjects" under the civil law are public officers in the government.
  2. The government is counted as a STATUTORY "citizen" but not a CONSTITUTIONAL "citizen". All CONSTITUTIONAL citizens are human beings and CANNOT be artificial entities. All STATUTORY citizens, on the other hand, are artificial entities and franchises and NOT CONSTITUTIONAL citizens.
    "A corporation [the U.S. government, and all those who represent it as public officers,  is a federal corporation per 28 U.S.C. §3002(15)(A) ] is a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the state or country by or under the laws of which it was created, and of that state or country only."
    [19 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Corporations, §886 (2003)]
    _______________________________
    Citizens of the United States within the meaning of this Amendment must be natural and not artificial persons; a corporate body is not a citizen of the United States.14
    __
    14 Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 Fed.Cas. 67 (C.C.D.La. 1870). Not being citizens of the United States, corporations accordingly have been declared unable "to claim the protection of that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which secures the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against abridgment or impairment by the law of a State." Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1869) . This conclusion was in harmony with the earlier holding in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), to the effect that corporations were not within the scope of the privileges and immunities clause of state citizenship set out in Article IV, Sec. 2. See also Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 126 (1912) ; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) ; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Tobacco Growers, 276 U.S. 71, 89 (1928) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
    [SOURCE: Annotated Fourteenth Amendment, Congressional Research Service:
    http://www.law.corne...tml#amdt14a_hd1]
  3. The only statutory "citizens" are public offices in the government.
  4. By serving in a public office, one becomes the same type of "citizen" as the GOVERNMENT is.

These observations are consistent with the very word roots that form the word "republic". The following video says the word origin comes from "res publica", which means a collection of PUBLIC rights shared by the public. You must therefore JOIN "the public" and become a public officer before you can partake of said PUBLIC right.


Overview of America, SEDM Liberty University, Section 2.3
http://sedm.org/LibertyU/LibertyU.htm

This gives a WHOLE NEW MEANING to Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, in which he refers to American government as:

"A government of the people, by the people, and for the people."

You gotta volunteer as an uncompensated public officer for the government to CIVILLY govern you. Hence, the only thing they can CIVILLY GOVERN, is the GOVERNMENT! Pretty sneaky, huh? Here is a whole memorandum of law on this subject proving such a conclusion:


Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Form...StatLawGovt.pdf

The other important point we wish to emphasize is that those who are EXCLUSIVELY private and therefore beyond the reach of the civil law are:

  1. Free inhabitants.
  2. Not a statutory “person” under the civil law or franchise statute in question.
  3. Not “individuals” under the CIVIL law if they are human beings. All statutory “individuals”, in fact, are identified as “employees” under 5 U.S.C. §2105(a).  This is the ONLY statute that describes HOW one becomes a statutory “individual” that we have been able to find.
  4. “foreign”, a “transient foreigner”, and sovereign in respect to government CIVIL but not CRIMINAL jurisdiction.
  5. NOT “subject to” but also not necessarily statutorily “exempt” under the civil or franchise statute in question.

For a VERY interesting background on the subject of this section, we recommend reading the following case:


Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12658364258779560123

State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d. 995, 99 A.L.R. 321; Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d. 8.

Georgia Dep’t of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d. 524.  A public official is held in public trust.  Madlener v. Finley (1st Dist), 161 Ill.App.3d. 796, 113 Ill.Dec. 712, 515 N.E.2d. 697, app gr 117 Ill.Dec. 226, 520 N.E.2d. 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill.2d. 147, 131 Ill.Dec. 145, 538 N.E.2d. 520.

Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d. 555, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d. 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill.App.3d. 222, 63 Ill.Dec. 134, 437 N.E.2d. 783.

United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill), 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds  484 U.S. 807,  98 L.Ed. 2d 18,  108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den  486 U.S. 1035,  100 L.Ed. 2d 608,  108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Little (CA5 Miss) 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass), 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223).

Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill.2d. 559, 2 Ill.Dec. 285, 357 N.E.2d. 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill.App.3d. 298, 61 Ill.Dec. 172, 434 N.E.2d. 325.

Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Nelson (Ind App), 656 N.E.2d. 1172, reh gr (Ind App) 659 N.E.2d. 260, reh den (Jan 24, 1996) and transfer den (May 28, 1996).

4.6 The Right to be left alone

The purpose of the Constitution of the United States of America is to confer the “right to be left alone”, which is the essence of being sovereign:

"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
[Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ;  see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)]

The legal definition of “justice” confirms that it’s purpose is to protect your right to be “left alone”:

PAULSEN, ETHICS (Thilly's translation), chap. 9.

Justice, as a moral habit, is that tendency of the will and mode of conduct which refrains from disturbing the lives and interests of others, and, as far as possible, hinders such interference on the part of others. This virtue springs from the individual's respect for his fellows as ends in themselves and as his co equals. The different spheres of interests may be roughly classified as follows: body and life; the family, or the extended individual life; property, or the totality of the instruments of action; honor, or the ideal existence; and finally freedom, or the possibility of fashioning one's life  as an end in itself. The law defends these different spheres, thus giving rise to a corresponding number of spheres of rights, each being protected by a prohibition. . . . To violate the rights, to interfere with the interests of others, is injustice. All injustice is ultimately directed against the life of the neighbor; it is an open avowal that the latter is not an end in itself, having the same value as the individual's own life. The general formula of the duty of justice may therefore be stated as follows: Do no wrong yourself, and permit no wrong to be done, so far as lies in your power; or, expressed positively: Respect and protect the right.”
[Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Second Edition, Roscoe Pound, 1925, p. 2]

The Bible also states the foundation of justice by saying:

“Do not strive with [or try to regulate or control or enslave] a man without cause, if he has done you no harm.” 
[Prov. 3:30, Bible, NKJV]

And finally, Thomas Jefferson agreed with the above by defining “justice” as follows in his First Inaugural Address:

"With all [our] blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow citizens--a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities."
[Thomas Jefferson: 1st Inaugural, 1801. ME 3:320]

Therefore, the word “injustice” means interference with the equal rights of others absent their consent and which constitutes an injury NOT as any law defines it, but as the PERSON who is injured defines it.  Under this conception of “justice”, anything done with your consent cannot be classified as “injustice” or an injury.

Those who are “private persons” fit in the category of people who must be left alone as a matter of law:

"There is a clear distinction in this particular case between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."

[Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906)]
_________________________________________________________________________________________

IRM 5.14.10.2  (09-30-2004)

Payroll Deduction Agreements

2.  Private employers, states, and political subdivisions are not required to enter into payroll deduction agreements. Taxpayers should determine whether their employers will accept and process executed agreements before agreements are submitted for approval or finalized.

[SOURCE: http://sedm.org/Exhibits/EX05.043.pdf]

The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the ability to regulate what it calls “private conduct” is repugnant to the constitution.  It is the differentiation between PRIVATE rights and PUBLIC rights, in fact, that forms the basis for enforcing your right to be left alone:

“The power to "legislate generally upon" life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the "power to provide modes of redress" against offensive state action, was "repugnant" to the Constitution. Id., at 15. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903). Although the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded or modified, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), their treatment of Congress' §5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned.”
[City of Boerne v. Florez, Archbishop of San Antonio, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]

Only by taking on a “public character” or engaging in “public conduct” rather than a “private” character may our actions become the proper or lawful subject of federal or state legislation or regulation.

“One great object of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law. [500 U.S. 614, 620]  

To implement these principles, courts must consider from time to time where the governmental sphere [e.g. “public purpose” and “public office”] ends and the private sphere begins. Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints. This is the jurisprudence of state action, which explores the "essential dichotomy" between the private sphere and the public sphere, with all its attendant constitutional obligations. Moose Lodge, supra, at 172. “

[. . .]

Given that the statutory authorization for the challenges exercised in this case is clear, the remainder of our state action analysis centers around the second part of the Lugar test, whether a private litigant, in all fairness, must be deemed a government actor in the use of peremptory challenges. Although we have recognized that this aspect of the analysis is often a fact-bound inquiry, see Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939, our cases disclose certain principles of general application. Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic [500 U.S. 614, 622]   Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 -545 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Based on our application of these three principles to the circumstances here, we hold that the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defendant in the District Court was pursuant to a course of state action.

[Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991)]

The phrase “subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law” refers ONLY to statutes or court decisions that pertain to licensed or privileged activities or franchises, all of which:

  1. Cause the licensee or franchisee to represent a “public office” and work for the government.
  2. Cause the licensee or franchisee to act in a representative capacity as an officer of the government, which is a federal corporation and therefore he or she becomes an “officer or employee of a corporation” acting in a representative capacity.  See 26 U.S.C. §6671(b)  and 26 U.S.C. §7434, which both define a “person” within the I.R.C. criminal and penalty provisions as an officer or employee of a corporation.
  3. Change the effective domicile of the “office” or “public office” of the licensee or franchisee to federal territory pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(39), and 26 U.S.C. §7408(d).

    IV. PARTIES > Rule 17.

    (b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued.

    Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows:

    (1) for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law of the individual's domicile;
    (2) for a corporation [or the officers or “public officers” of the corporation], by the law under which it was organized; and
    (3) for all other parties, by the law of the state where the court is located, except that:
    (A) a partnership or other unincorporated association with no such capacity under that state's law may sue or be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United States Constitution or laws; and
    (B) 28 U.S.C. §§754 and 959(a) govern the capacity of a receiver appointed by a United States court to sue or be sued in a United States court.

  4. Creates a “res” or “office” which is the subject of federal legislation and a “person” or “individual” within federal statutes.  For instance, the definition of “individual” within 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2) reveals that it is a government employee with a domicile in the statutory “United States”, which is federal territory.  Notice that the statute below is in Title 5, which is “Government Organization and Employees”, and that “citizens and residents of the United States” share in common a legal domicile on federal territory.  An “individual” is a officer of the government, and not a natural man or woman.  The office is the “individual”, and not the man or woman who fills it:

TITLE 5 > PART I > CHAPTER 5 > SUBCHAPTER II > § 552a

§ 552a. Records maintained on individuals
(a) Definitions.— For purposes of this section—
(2) the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;

If you don’t maintain a domicile on federal territory, which is called the “United States” in the U.S. Code, or you don’t work for the government by participating in its franchises, then the government has NO AUTHORITY to even keep records on you under the authority of the Privacy Act and you would be committing perjury under penalty of perjury to call yourself an “individual” on a government form.  Why?  Because you are the sovereign and the sovereign is not the subject of the law, but the author of the law!

“Since in common usage, the term person does not include the sovereign, statutes not employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.”
[United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600 (1941)]

“There is no such thing as a power of inherent Sovereignty in the government of the United States.  In this country sovereignty resides in the People, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld.” 
[Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)]

Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law for it is the author and source of law;” 
[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)]

“Under our form of government, the legislature is NOT supreme.  It is only one of the organs of that ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY which resides in the whole body of the PEOPLE; like other bodies of the government, it can only exercise such powers as have been delegated to it, and when it steps beyond that boundary, its acts.. are utterly VOID,” 
[Billings v. Hall, 7 CA. 1]

“In Europe, the executive is synonymous with the sovereign power of a state…where it is too commonly acquired by force or fraud, or both…In America, however the case is widely different.  Our government is founded upon compact.  Sovereignty was, and is, in the people.” 
[The Betsy, 3 Dall 6]

In summary, the only way the government can control you through civil law is to connect you to public conduct or a “public office” within the government executed on federal territory.  If they are asserting jurisdiction that you believe they don’t have, it is probably because:

  1. You misrepresented your domicile as being on federal territory within the “United States” or the “State of___” by declaring yourself to be either a statutory “U.S. citizen” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1401 or a statutory “resident” (alien) pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(A).  This made you subject to their laws and put you into a privileged state.
  2. You filled out a government application for a franchise, which includes government benefits, professional licenses, driver’s licenses, marriage licenses, etc.
  3. Someone else filed a document with the government which connected you to a franchise, even though you never consented to participate in the franchise.  For instance, IRS information returns such as W-2, 1042S, 1098, and 1099 presumptively connect you to a “trade or business” in the U.S. government pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6041.  A “trade or business” is then defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)  as “the functions of a public office”.  The only way to prevent this evidence from creating a liability under the franchise agreement provisions is to rebut it promptly.  See:

Correcting Erroneous Information Returns, Form #04.001
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

4.7 The PUBLIC You (straw man) vs. the PRIVATE You (human)

It is extremely important to know the difference between PRIVATE and PUBLIC “persons”, because we all have private and public identities.  This division of our identities is recognized in the following maxim of law:

Quando duo juro concurrunt in und personâ, aequum est ac si essent in diversis.
When two rights [public right v. private right] concur in one person, it is the same as if they were two separate persons. 4 Co. 118.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

The U.S. Supreme Court also recognizes the division of PUBLIC v. PRIVATE:

“A private person cannot make constitutions or laws, nor can he with authority construe them, nor can he administer or execute them.”
[United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1883)]

“All the powers of the government [including ALL of its civil enforcement powers against the public] must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with [private] individuals.
[Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)]

_______________________________________

“…we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an [PRIVATE] individual and a [PUBLIC] corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.

Upon the other hand, the [PUBLIC] corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75]   act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this: That an officer of a corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute, may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. “
[Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)]

The next time you are in court as a PRIVATE person, here are some questions for the next jury, judge, or government prosecutor trying to enforce a civil obligation upon you as a PRESUMED public officer called a “citizen”, “resident”, “person”, or “taxpayer”:

  1. How do you, a PRIVATE human, “OBEY” a law without “EXECUTING” it?  We’ll give you a hint:  It CAN’T BE DONE!
  2. What “public office” or franchise does the government claim to have “created” and therefore have the right to control in the context of my otherwise exclusively PRIVATE property and PRIVATE rights under the Constitution?
  3. Does the national government claim the right to create franchises within a constitutional state in order to tax them?  The Constitution says they CANNOT and that this is an “invasion” within the meaning of Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution:

    “Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee.

    But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.
    [License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

  4. Isn’t a judge compelling you to violate your religious beliefs by compelling you to serve in a public office or accept the DUTES of the office?  Isn’t this a violation of the First Commandment NOT to serve “other gods”, which can and does mean civil rulers or governments?
    But the thing displeased Samuel when they said, “Give us a king to judge us.” So Samuel prayed to the Lord.  And the Lord said to Samuel, “Heed the voice of the people in all that they say to you; for they have rejected Me [God], that I should not reign over them.  According to all the works which they have done since the day that I brought them up out of Egypt, even to this day—with which they have forsaken Me and served other gods [Kings, in this case]—so they are doing to you also [government becoming idolatry].  Now therefore, heed their voice. However, you shall solemnly forewarn them, and show them the behavior of the king who will reign over them.
    [1 Sam. 8:6-9, Bible, NKJV]
  5. How can one UNILATERIALLY ELECT themselves into public office by filling out a government form?  The form isn’t even signed by anyone in the government, such as a tax form or social security application, and therefore couldn’t POSSIBLE be a valid contract anyway?  Isn’t this a FRAUD upon the United States and criminal bribery, using illegal “withholdings” to bribe someone to TREAT you as a public officer?  See 18 U.S.C. §211.
  6. How can a judge enforce civil statutory law that only applies to public officers without requiring proof on the record that you are CONSENSUALLY and LAWFULLY engaged in a public office?  In other words, that you waived sovereign immunity by entering into a contract with the government.
    "It is true, that the person who accepts an office may be supposed to enter into a compact to be answerable to the government, which he serves, for any violation of his duty; and, having taken the oath of office, he would unquestionably be liable, in such case, to a prosecution for perjury in the Federal Courts. But because one man, by his own act [CONSENT], renders himself amenable to a particular jurisdiction, shall another man, who has not incurred a similar obligation, be implicated?If, in other words, it is sufficient to vest a jurisdiction in this court, that a Federal Officer is concerned; if it is a sufficient proof of a case arising under a law of the United States to affect other persons, that such officer is bound, by law, to discharge his duty with fidelity; a source of jurisdiction is opened, which must inevitably overflow and destroy all the barriers between the judicial authorities of the State and the general government. Anything which can prevent a Federal Officer from the punctual, as well as from an impartial, performance of his duty; an assault and battery; or the recovery of a debt, as well as the offer of a bribe, may be made a foundation of the jurisdiction of this court; and, considering the constant disposition of power to extend the sphere of its influence, fictions will be resorted to, when real cases cease to occur. A mere fiction, that the defendant is in the custody of the marshall, has rendered the jurisdiction of the King's Bench universal in all personal actions."
    [United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384 (1798)
    SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3339893669697439168]
  7. Isn’t this involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to serve in a public office if you DON’T consent and they won’t let you TALK about the ABSENCE of your consent?
  8. Isn’t it a violation of due process of law to PRESUME that you are public officer WITHOUT EVIDENCE on the record from an unbiased witness who has no financial interest in the outcome?

    “A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.  A presumption is not evidence.”
    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1185]

    ___________________________

    “If any question of fact or liability be conclusively be presumed [rather than proven] against him, this is not due process of law.  [. . .]  the presumption of innocence under which guilt must be proven by legally obtained evidence and the verdict must be supported by the evidence presented; rights at the earliest stage of the criminal process; and the guarantee that an individual will not be tried more than once for the same offence (double jeopardy).
    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 500]

    ___________________________

    A presumption is neither evidence nor a substitute for evidence.
    [American Jurisprudence 2d, Evidence, §181 (1999)]

  9. If the judge won’t enforce the requirement that the government as moving party has the burden of proving WITH EVIDENCE that you were LAWFULLY “appointed or elected” to a public office, aren’t you therefore PRESUMED to be EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE and therefore beyond the reach of the civil statutory law?
  10. Isn’t the judge criminally obstructing justice to interfere with requiring evidence on the record that you lawfully occupy a public office?  See 18 U.S.C. §1503, whereby the judge is criminally “influencing” the PUBLIC you.
  11. Isn’t an unsupported presumption that prejudices a PRIVATE right a violation of the Constitution and doesn’t the rights that UNCONSTIUTTIONAL presumption prejudicially conveys to the government constitute a taking of rights without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause?
  12. How can the judge permit federal civil jurisdiction within a state, a legislatively but not constitutionally foreign jurisdiction, be permitted absent proof under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) that the party was representing a public office in the government and therefore, that the civil statutory laws of the District of Columbia/federal zone apply rather than the state in question?  See the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. §1652.
  13. Even if we ARE lawfully serving in a public office, don’t we have the right to:
  14. 13.1 Be off duty?

    13.2 Choose WHEN we want to be off duty?

    13.3 Choose WHAT financial transactions we want to connect to the office?

    13.4 Be protected in NOT volunteering to connect a specific activity to the public office?  Governments LIE by calling something “voluntary” and yet refusing to protect those who do NOT consent to “volunteer”, don’t they?

    13.5 Not be coerced to sign up for OTHER, unrelated public offices when we sign up for a single office?  For instance, do we have a right not become a FEDERAL officer when we sign up for a STATE “driver license” and “public office” that ALSO requires us to have a Social Security Number to get the license, and therefore to ALSO become a FEDERAL officer at the same time.

If the answer to all the above is NO, then there ARE no PRIVATE rights or PRIVATE property and there IS no “government” because governments only protect PRIVATE rights and private property!

We’d love to hear a jury, judge, or prosecutor address this subject before they hall him away in a straight jacket to the nuthouse because of a completely irrational and maybe even criminal answer.

The next time you end up in front of a judge or government attorney enforcing a civil statute against you, you might want to insist on proof in the record during the process of challenging jurisdiction as a defendant or respondent:

  1. WHICH of the two “persons” they are addressing or enforcing against.
  2. How the two statuses, PUBLIC v. PRIVATE, became connected.
  3. What specific act of EXPRESS consent connected the two.  PRESUMPTION alone on the part of government can’t.  A presumption that the two became connected WITHOUT consent is an unconstitutional eminent domain in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
In a criminal trial, such a question would be called a “bill of particulars”.

We can handle private and public affairs from the private, but we cannot handle private affairs from the public. The latter is one of the biggest mistakes many people make when trying to handle their commercial and lawful (private) or legal (public) affairs.  Those who use PUBLIC property for PRIVATE gain in fact are STEALING and such stealing has always been a crime.

In law, all rights attach to LAND, and all privileges attach to one’s STATUS under voluntary civil franchises.  An example of privileged statuses include “taxpayer” (under the tax code), “person”, “individual”, “driver” (under the vehicle code), “spouse” (under the family code).  Rights are PRIVATE, PRIVILEGES are PUBLIC.

In our society, the PRIVATE “straw man” was created by the application for the birth certificate.  It is a legal person under contract law and under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), with capacity to sue or be sued under the common law.  It is PRIVATE PROPERTY of the human being described in the birth certificate.

The PUBLIC officer “straw man” (e.g. statutory "taxpayer") was created by the Application for the Social Security Card, SSA Form SS-5.  It is a privileged STATUS under an unconstitutional national franchise of the de facto government.  It is  PROPERTY of the national government.   The PUBLIC “straw man” is thoroughly described in:


Proof that There Is a “Straw Man”, Form #05.042
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

The PRIVATE "John Doe" is a statutory "non-resident alien non-individual" not engaged in the “trade or business”/PUBLIC OFFICER franchise in relation to the PUBLIC.  He exists in the republic and is a free inhabitant under the Articles of Confederation.  He has inalienable rights and unlimited liabilities.  Those unlimited liabilities are described in


The Unlimited Liability Universe
http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Spirituality/Articles/UnlimitedLiabilityUniverse.htm

The PUBLIC "JOHN DOE" is a public office in the government corporation and statutory "U.S. citizen" per 8 U.S.C. §1401, 26 U.S.C. §3121(e), and 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(c).  He exists in the privileged socialist democracy.  He has “benefits”, franchises, obligations, immunities, and limited liability.

In the PRIVATE, money is an ASSET and always in the form of something that has intrinsic value, i.e. gold or silver. Payment for anything is in the form of commercial set off. 

In the PUBLIC, money is a LIABILITY or debt and normally takes the form of a promissory note, i.e. an Federal Reserve Note (FRN), a check, bond or note.  Payment is in the form of discharge in the future.

The PRIVATE realm is the basis for all contract and commerce under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).  The PUBLIC realm was created by the bankruptcy of the PRIVATE entity.  Generally, creditors can operate from the PRIVATE.  PUBLIC entities are all debtors (or slaves).  The exercise of the right to contract by the PRIVATE straw man makes human beings into SURETY for the PUBLIC straw man.

Your judicious exercise of your right to contract and the requirement for consent that protects it is the main thing that keeps the PUBLIC separate from the PRIVATE.  See:


Requirement for Consent, Form #05.003
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Be careful how you use your right to contract!  It is the most DANGEROUS right you have because it can destroy ALL of your PRIVATE rights by converting them to PUBLIC rights and offices.

"These general rules are well settled:

(1) That the United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself [a "public right", which is a euphemism for a "franchise" to help the court disguise the nature of the transaction], is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 9 Sup.Ct. 12, 32 L.Ed. 354; Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439, 21 L.Ed. 696; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195, 19 L.Ed. 35; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431, 433, 18 L.Ed. 700; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212, 7 L.Ed. 108.

(2) That where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174, 175, 35 Sup.Ct. 398, 59 L.Ed. 520, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 118; Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U.S. 238, 3 Sup.Ct. 184, 27 L.Ed. 920; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U.S. 555, 558, 25 L.Ed. 212; Farmers’ & Mechanics’ National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 35, 23 L.Ed. 196. Still the fact that the right and the remedy are thus intertwined might not, if the provision stood alone, require us to hold that the remedy expressly given excludes a right of review by the Court of Claims, where the decision of the special tribunal involved no disputed question of fact and the denial of compensation was rested wholly upon the construction of the act. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U.S. 492, 198, 19 Sup.Ct. 503, 43 L.Ed. 779; Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U.S. 124, 29 Sup.Ct. 556, 53 L.Ed. 936; McLean v. United States, 226 U.S. 374, 33 Sup.Ct. 122, 57 L.Ed. 260; United States v. Laughlin (No. 200), 249 U.S. 440, 39 Sup.Ct. 340, 63 L.Ed. 696, decided April 14, 1919."

[U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464 (1919)]

All PUBLIC franchises are contracts or agreements and therefore participating in them is an act of contracting. 

“It is generally conceded that a franchise is the subject of a contract between the grantor and the grantee, and that it does in fact constitute a contract when the requisite element of a consideration is present.   Conversely, a franchise granted without consideration is not a contract binding upon the state, franchisee, or pseudo-franchisee.   “
[36 American Jurisprudence 2d, Franchises, §6:  As a Contract (1999)]

Franchises include Social Security, income taxation (“trade or business”/public office franchise), unemployment insurance, driver licensing (“driver” franchise), and marriage licensing (“spouse” franchise).

You shall make no covenant [contract or franchise] with them [foreigners, pagans], nor with their [pagan government] gods [laws or judges]. They shall not dwell in your land [and you shall not dwell in theirs by becoming a “resident” or domiciliary in the process of contracting with them], lest they make you sin against Me [God].  For if you serve their [government] gods [under contract or agreement or franchise], it will surely be a snare to you.”
[Exodus 23:32-33, Bible, NKJV]
Governments become corrupt by:

  1. Refusing to recognize the PRIVATE.
  2. Undermining or interfering with the invocation of the common law in courts of justice.
  3. Allowing false information returns to be abused to convert the PRIVATE into the PUBLIC without the consent of the owner.
  4. Destroying or undermining remedies for the protection of PRIVATE rights.
  5. Replacing CONSTITUTIONAL courts with LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE courts.
  6. Making judges into statutory franchisees such as “taxpayers”, through which they are compelled to have a conflict of interest that ultimately destroys or undermines all private rights.  This is a crime and a civil offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §208, 28 U.S.C. §144, and 28 U.S.C. §455.
  7. Offering or enforcing government franchises to people not domiciled on federal territory.  This breaks down the separation of powers and enforces franchise law extraterritorially.
  8. Abusing “words of art” to blur or confuse the separation between the PUBLIC and the PRIVATE. (deception)
  9. Removing the domicile prerequisite for participation in government franchises through policy and not law, thus converting them into essentially PRIVATE business ventures that operate entirely through the right to contract.
  10. Abusing sovereign immunity to protect PRIVATE government business ventures, thus destroying competition and implementing a state-sponsored monopoly.
  11. Refusing to criminally prosecute those who compel participation in government franchises.
  12. Turning citizenship into a statutory franchise, and thus causing people who claim citizen status to unwittingly become PUBLIC officers.
  13. Allowing presumption to be used as a substitute for evidence in any proceeding to enforce government franchises against an otherwise PRIVATE party.  This violates due process of law, unfairly advantages the government, and imputes to the government supernatural powers as an object of religious worship.

Therefore, it is important to learn how to be EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE and a CREDITOR in all of our affairs. Freedom is possible in the PRIVATE; it is not even a valid fantasy in the realm of the PUBLIC.
Below is a summary:
Table 3:  Public v. Private


#

Characteristic

Private

Public

1

Name

“John Doe”

“JOHN DOE” (idemsonans)

2

Created by

Birth certificate

Application for SS Card, Form SS-5

3

Property of

Human being

Government

4

Protected by

Common law

Statutory franchises

5

Type of rights exercised

Private rights
Constitutional rights

Public rights
Statutory privileges

6

Rights/privileges attach to

LAND you stand on

Statutory STATUS under a voluntary civil franchise

7

Courts which protect or vindicate rights/privileges

Constitutional courts under Article III in the true Judicial Branch

Legislative administrative franchise courts under Articles 1 and IV in the Executive Branch.

8

Domiciled on

Private property

Public property/federal territory

9

Commercial standing

Creditor

Debtor

10

Money

Gold and silver

Promissory note (debt instrument)

11

Sovereign being worshipped/obeyed

God

Governments and political rulers (The Beast, Rev. 19:19).  Paganism

12

Purpose of government

Protect PRIVATE rights

Expand revenues and control over the populace and consolidate all rights and sovereignty to itself

13

Government consists of

Body POLITIC (PRIVATE) and body CORPORATE (PUBLIC)

Body CORPORATE (PUBLIC) only.  All those in the body POLITIC are converted into officers of the corporation by abusing franchises.

Levasseur v. Field (Me), 332 A.2d. 765; Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me 349, 155 A.2d. 721, 85 A.L.R.2d. 703 (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Poitras v. R. E. Glidden Body Shop, Inc. (Me) 430 A.2d. 1113); Connizzo v. General American Life Ins. Co. (Mo App), 520 S.W.2d. 661.

Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 73 L.Ed. 441, 49 S.Ct. 196; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 57 L.Ed. 633, 33 S.Ct. 303; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 50 L.Ed. 801, 26 S.Ct. 427; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Brown, 176 Ark. 774, 4 S.W.2d. 15, 58 A.L.R. 534; Chicago General R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 Ill. 253, 52 N.E. 880; Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 149 Ky. 234, 148 S.W. 13; State ex rel. Kansas City v. East Fifth Street R. Co., 140 Mo. 539, 41 S.W. 955; Baker v. Montana Petroleum Co., 99 Mont. 465, 44 P.2d. 735; Re Board of Fire Comrs. 27 N.J. 192, 142 A.2d. 85; Chrysler Light & P. Co. v. Belfield, 58 N.D. 33, 224 N.W. 871, 63 A.L.R. 1337; Franklin County v. Public Utilities Com., 107 Ohio.St. 442, 140 N.E. 87, 30 A.L.R. 429; State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537; Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co., 65 Vt. 377, 26 A. 635; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 469, 99 S.E. 723, 9 A.L.R. 1148, cert den  251 U.S. 557, 64 L.Ed. 413, 40 S.Ct. 179, disapproved on other grounds Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & Power Co. 134 Va. 134, 114 S.E. 92,  28 A.L.R. 562, and disapproved on other grounds Richmond v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co. 141 Va. 69, 126 S.E. 353.

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bowers, 124 Pa 183, 16 A 836.

4.8 All PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT law attaches to government territory, all PRIVATE law attaches to your right to contract

A very important consideration to understand is that:

  1. All EXCLUSIVELY PUBLIC LAW attaches to the government’s own territory.  By “PUBLIC”, we mean law that runs the government and ONLY the government.
  2. All EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE law attaches to one of the following:
  3. 2.1 The exercise of your right to contract with others.

    2.2 The property you own and lend out to others based on specific conditions.

Item 2.2 needs further attention. Here is how that mechanism works:

“How, then, are purely equitable obligations created? For the most part, either by the acts of third persons or by equity alone. But how can one person impose an obligation upon another? By giving property to the latter on the terms of his assuming an obligation in respect to it. At law there are only two means by which the object of the donor could be at all accomplished, consistently with the entire ownership of the property passing to the donee, namely: first, by imposing a real obligation upon the property; secondly, by subjecting the title of the donee to a condition subsequent. The first of these the law does not permit; the second is entirely inadequate. Equity, however, can secure most of the objects of the doner, and yet avoid the mischiefs of real obligations by imposing upon the donee (and upon all persons to whom the property shall afterwards come without value or with notice) a personal obligation with respect to the property; and accordingly this is what equity does. It is in this way that all trusts are created, and all equitable charges made (i.e., equitable hypothecations or liens created) by testators in their wills. In this way, also, most trusts are created by acts inter vivos, except in those cases in which the trustee incurs a legal as well as an equitable obligation. In short, as property is the subject of every equitable obligation, so the owner of property is the only person whose act or acts can be the means of creating an obligation in respect to that property. Moreover, the owner of property can create an obligation in respect to it in only two ways: first, by incurring the obligation himself, in which case he commonly also incurs a legal obligation; secondly, by imposing the obligation upon some third person; and this he does in the way just explained.”
[Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Second Edition, Roscoe Pound, 1925, p. 543]

Next, we must describe exactly what we mean by “territory”, and the three types of “territory” identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to the term “United States”.  Below is how the united States Supreme Court addressed the question of the meaning of the term “United States” (see Black’s Law Dictionary) in the famous case of Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).   The Court ruled that the term United States has three uses:

"The term 'United States' may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position  analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution." 
[Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]

We will now break the above definition into its three contexts and show what each means.

Table 4:  Meanings assigned to "United States" by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hooven &  Allison v. Evatt


#

U.S. Supreme Court Definition of “United States” in Hooven

Context in which usually used

Referred to in this article as

Interpretation

1

“It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations.”

International law

“United States*”

“'These united States,” when traveling abroad, you come under the jurisdiction of the President through his agents in the U.S. State Department, where “U.S.” refers to the sovereign society. You are a “Citizen of the United States” like someone is a Citizen of France, or England.  We identify this version of “United States” with a single asterisk after its name:  “United States*” throughout this article.

2

“It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or”

Federal law
Federal forms

“United States**”

“The United States (the District of Columbia, possessions and territories)”. Here Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. In this sense, the term “United States” is a singular noun.  You are a person residing in the District of Columbia, one of its Territories or Federal areas (enclaves).  Hence, even a person living in the one of the sovereign States could still be a member of the Federal area and therefore a “citizen of the United States.”  This is the definition used in most “Acts of Congress” and federal statutes.  We identify this version of “United States” with two asterisks after its name:  “United States**” throughout this article.  This definition is also synonymous with the “United States” corporation found in 28 U.S.C. §3002(15)(A).

3

“...as the collective name for the states which are united by and under the Constitution.”

Constitution of the United States

“United States***”

“The several States which is the united States of America.” Referring to the 50 sovereign States, which are united under the Constitution of the United States of America. The federal areas within these states are not included in this definition because the Congress does not have exclusive legislative authority over any of the 50 sovereign States within the Union of States. Rights are retained by the States in the 9th and 10th Amendments, and you are a “Citizen of these united States.”  This is the definition used in the Constitution for the United States of America.  We identify this version of “United States” with a three asterisks after its name:  “United States***” throughout this article.

The way our present system functions, all PUBLIC rights are attached to federal territory.  They cannot lawfully attach to EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE property because the right to regulate EXCLUSLIVELY PRIVATE rights is repugnant to the constitution, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Lastly, when the government enters the realm of commerce and private business activity, it operates in equity and is treated as EQUAL in every respect to everyone else.  ONLY in this capacity can it enact law that does NOT attach to its own territory and to those DOMICILED on its territory:

See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ("`The United States does business on business terms'") (quoting United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926)); Perry v. United States, supra at 352 (1935) ("When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference . . . except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent") (citation omitted); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877) ("The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf"); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (explaining that when the United States "comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there").

See Jones, 1 Cl.Ct. at 85 ("Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place, and then the question be determined whether the action will lie against the supposed defendant"); O'Neill v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (sovereign acts doctrine applies where, "[w]ere [the] contracts exclusively between private parties, the party hurt by such governing action could not claim compensation from the other party for the governing action"). The dissent ignores these statements (including the statement from Jones, from which case Horowitz drew its reasoning literally verbatim), when it says, post at 931, that the sovereign acts cases do not emphasize the need to treat the government-as-contractor the same as a private party.

[United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) ]

If a government wants to reach outside its territory and create PRIVATE law for those who have not consented to its jurisdiction by choosing a domicile on its territory, the ONLY method it has for doing this is to exercise its right to contract. 

Debt and contract [franchise agreement, in this case] are of no particular place.
Locus contractus regit actum.
The place of the contract [franchise agreement, in this case] governs the act.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

The most important method by which governments exercise their PRIVATE right to contract and disassociate with the territorial limitation upon their lawmaking powers is through the use or abuse of franchises, which are contracts.

As a rule, franchises spring from contracts between the sovereign power and private citizens, made upon valuable considerations, for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit,   and thus a franchise partakes of a double nature and character.  So far as it affects or concerns the public, it is publici juris and is subject to governmental control.  The legislature may prescribe the manner of granting it, to whom it may be granted, the conditions and terms upon which it may be held, and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising it, and may also provide for its forfeiture upon the failure of the grantee to perform that duty.  But when granted, it becomes the property of the grantee, and is a private right, subject only to the governmental control growing out of its other nature as publici juris.
[American Jurisprudence 2d, Franchises, §4: Generally (1999)]

4.9 "Political (PUBLIC) law” v. “civil (PRIVATE) law”

Within our republican government, the founding fathers recognized three classes of law:

  1. Criminal law.  Protects both PUBLIC and PRIVATE rights.
  2. Civil law.  Protects exclusively PRIVATE rights.
  3. Political law.  Protects exclusively PUBLIC rights of public officers and offices within the government.

The above three types of law were identified in the following document upon which the founding fathers wrote the constitution and based the design of our republican form of government:


The Spirit of Laws, Charles de Montesquieu, 1758
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/SpiritOfLaws/sol.htm

Montesquieu defines “political law” and “political liberty” as follows:

1. A general Idea.

I make a distinction between the laws that establish political liberty, as it relates to the constitution, and those by which it is established, as it relates to the citizen. The former shall be the subject of this book; the latter I shall examine in the next.

[The Spirit of Laws, Charles de Montesquieu, 1758, Book XI, Section 1;
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/SpiritOfLaws/sol_11.htm#001]

The Constitution in turn is a POLITICAL document which represents law EXCLUSIVELY for public officers within the government.  It does not obligate or abrogate any PRIVATE right.  It defines what the courts call “public rights”, meaning rights possessed and owned exclusively by the government ONLY.

“And the Constitution itself is in every real sense a law-the lawmakers being the people themselves, in whom under our system all political power and sovereignty primarily resides, and through whom such power and sovereignty primarily speaks. It is by that law, and not otherwise, that the legislative, executive, and judicial agencies which it created exercise such political authority as they have been permitted to possess. The Constitution speaks for itself in terms so plain that to misunderstand their import is not rationally possible. 'We the People of the United States,' it says, 'do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Ordain and establish! These are definite words of enactment, and without more would stamp what follows with the dignity and character of law. The framers of the Constitution, however, were not content to let the matter rest here, but provided explicitly-'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.' (Const. art. 6, cl. 2.) The supremacy of the Constitution as law is thus declared without qualification. That supremacy is absolute; the supremacy of a statute enacted by Congress is not absolute but conditioned upon its being made in pursuance of the Constitution. And a judicial tribunal, clothed by that instrument with complete judicial power, and, therefore, by the very nature of the power, required to ascertain and apply the law to the facts in every case or proceeding properly brought for adjudication, must apply the supreme law and reject the inferior stat- [298 U.S. 238, 297]   ute whenever the two conflict. In the discharge of that duty, the opinion of the lawmakers that a statute passed by them is valid must be given great weight, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 , 43 S.Ct. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1238; but their opinion, or the court's opinion, that the statute will prove greatly or generally beneficial is wholly irrelevant to the inquiry. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549 , 550 S., 55 S.Ct. 837, 97 A.L.R. 947. “
[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)]

The vast majority of laws passed by Congress are what Montesquieu calls “political law” that is intended exclusively for the government and not the private citizen.  The authority for implementing such political law is Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.  To wit:
United States Constitution

Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

The only areas where POLITICAL law and CIVIL law overlap is in the exercise of the political rights to vote and serve on jury duty.  Why?  Because jurists are regarded as public officers in 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(1):

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 11 > § 201

§ 201. Bribery of public officials and witnesses

(a) For the purpose of this section—
(1) the term “public official” means Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror;

However, it has also repeatedly been held by the courts that poll taxes are unconstitutional.  Hence, voters technically are NOT to be regarded as public officers or franchisees for any purpose OTHER than their role as a voter.  Recall that all statutory “Taxpayers” are public offices in the government.

Tax laws, for instance, are “political law” exclusively for the government or public officer and not the private citizen.  Why?  Because:

  1. The U.S. Supreme Court identified taxes as a “political matter”.  “Political law”, “political questions”, and “political matters” cannot be heard by true constitutional courts and may ONLY be heard in legislative franchise courts officiated by the Executive and not Judicial branch:
    "Thus, the Court has frequently held that domicile or residence, more substantial than mere presence in transit or sojourn, is an adequate basis for taxation, including income, property, and death taxes. Since the Fourteenth Amendment makes one a citizen of the state wherein he resides, the fact of residence creates universally reciprocal duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure is largely a political matter. Of course, the situs of property may tax it regardless of the citizenship, domicile, or residence of the owner, the most obvious illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located." 
    [Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)]
  2. The U.S. Tax Court:
  3. 2.1 Is an Article I Court in the EXECUTIVE and not JUDICIAL branch, and hence, can only officiate over matters INTERNAL to the government.  See 26 U.S.C. §7441.

    2.2 Is a POLITICAL court in the POLITICAL branch of the government.  Namely, the Executive branch.

    2.3 Is limited to the District of Columbia because all public offices are limited to be exercised there per 4 U.S.C. §72.  It travels all over the country, but this is done ILLEGALLY and in violation of the separation of powers.

  4. The activity subject to excise taxation is limited exclusively to “public offices” in the government, which is what a “trade or business” is statutorily defined as in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26).
26 U.S.C. Sec. 7701(a)(26) 
"The term 'trade or business' includes the performance of the functions of a public office."

In Book XXVI, Section 15 of the Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu says that POLITICAL laws should not be allowed to regulate CIVIL conduct, meaning that POLITICAL laws limited exclusively to the government should not be enforced upon the PRIVATE citizen or made to “appear” as though they are “civil law” that applies to everyone:

The Spirit of Laws, Book XXVI, Section 15

15. That we should not regulate by the Principles of political Law those Things which depend on the Principles of civil Law.

As men have given up their natural independence to live under political laws, they have given up the natural community of goods to live under civil laws.

By the first, they acquired [PUBLIC] liberty; by the second, [PRIVATE] property. We should not decide by the laws of [PUBLIC] liberty, which, as we have already said, is only the government of the community, what ought to be decided by the laws concerning [PRIVATE] property. It is a paralogism to say that the good of the individual should give way to that of the public; this can never take place, except when the government of the community, or, in other words, the liberty of the subject is concerned; this does not affect such cases as relate to private property, because the public good consists in every one's having his property, which was given him by the civil laws, invariably preserved.

Cicero maintains that the Agrarian laws were unjust; because the community was established with no other view than that every one might be able to preserve his property.

Let us, therefore, lay down a certain maxim, that whenever the public good happens to be the matter in question, it is not for the advantage of the public to deprive an individual of his property, or even to retrench the least part of it by a law, or a political regulation. In this case we should follow the rigour of the civil law, which is the Palladium of [PRIVATE] property.

Thus when the public has occasion for the estate of an individual, it ought never to act by the rigour of political law; it is here that the civil law ought to triumph, which, with the eyes of a mother, regards every individual as the whole community.

If the political magistrate would erect a public edifice, or make a new road, he must indemnify those who are injured by it; the public is in this respect like an individual who treats with an individual. It is fully enough that it can oblige a citizen to sell his inheritance, and that it can strip him of this great privilege which he holds from the civil law, the not being forced to alienate his possessions.

After the nations which subverted the Roman empire had abused their very conquests, the spirit of liberty called them back to that of equity. They exercised the most barbarous laws with moderation: and if any one should doubt the truth of this, he need only read Beaumanoir's admirable work on jurisprudence, written in the twelfth century.

They mended the highways in his time as we do at present. He says, that when a highway could not be repaired, they made a new one as near the old as possible; but indemnified the proprietors at the expense of those who reaped any advantage from the road.43 They determined at that time by the civil law; in our days, we determine by the law of politics.

[The Spirit of Laws, Charles de Montesquieu, 1758, Book XXVI, Section 15;
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/SpiritOfLaws/sol_11.htm#001]

What Montesquieu is implying is what we have been saying all along, and he said it in 1758, which was even before the Declaration of Independence was written:

  1. The purpose of establishing government is exclusively to protect PRIVATE rights.
  2. PRIVATE rights are protected by the CIVIL law.  The civil law, in turn is based in EQUITY rather than PRIVILEGE:
    “Thus when the public has occasion for the estate of an individual, it ought never to act by the rigour of political law; it is here that the civil law ought to triumph, which, with the eyes of a mother, regards every individual as the whole community.”
  3. PUBLIC or government rights are protected by the PUBLIC or POLITICAL or GOVERNMENT law and NOT the CIVIL law.
  4. The first and most important role of government is to prevent the POLITICAL or GOVERNMENT law from being used or especially ABUSED as an excuse to confiscate or jeopardize PRIVATE property.

Unfortunately, it is precisely the above type of corruption that Montesquieu describes that is the foundation of the present de facto government, tax system, and money system.  ALL of them treat every human being as a PUBLIC officer against their consent, and impose what he calls the “rigors of the political law” upon them, in what amounts to unconstitutional eminent domain and a THEFT and CONFISCATION of otherwise PRIVATE property by enforcing PUBLIC law against PRIVATE people.


Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Atlanta, 154 Ga. 731, 115 S.E. 263; Lippencott v. Allander, 27 Iowa 460; State ex rel. Hutton v. Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 47 So.2d. 665; Tower v. Tower & S. Street R. Co. 68 Minn 500, 71 N.W. 691.

Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Atlanta, 154 Ga. 731, 115 S.E. 263; Lippencott v. Allander, 27 Iowa 460; State ex rel. Hutton v. Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 47 So.2d. 665; Tower v. Tower & S. Street R. Co. 68 Minn 500, 71 N.W. 691.

4.10 Lawful methods for converting PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property

Next, we must carefully consider all the rules by which EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE property is lawfully converted into PUBLIC property subject to government control or civil regulation.  These rules are important, because the status of a particular type of property as either PRIVATE or PUBLIC determines whether either COMMON LAW or STATUTORY LAW apply respectively.

In general, only by either accepting physical property from the government or voluntarily applying for and claiming a status or right under a government franchise can one procure a PUBLIC status and be subject to STATUTORY civil law.  If one wishes to be governed ONLY by the common law, then they must make their status very clear in every interaction with the government and on EVERY government form they fill out so as to avoid connecting them to any statutory franchise.

Below is a detailed list of the rules for converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property:

  1. The purpose for establishing governments is mainly to protect private property.  The Declaration of Independence affirms this:
    “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -”
    [Declaration of Independence, 1776]
  2. Government protects private rights by keeping “public [government] property” and “private property” separate and never allowing them to be joined together.  This is the heart of the separation of powers doctrine:  separation of what is private from what is public with the goal of protecting mainly what is private.  See:

    Government Conspiracy to Destroy the Separation of Powers, Form #05.023
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  3. All property BEGINS as private property.  The only way to lawfully change it to public property is through the exercise of your unalienable constitutional right to contract.  All franchises qualify as a type of contract, and therefore, franchises are one of many methods to lawfully convert PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property.  The exercise of the right to contract, in turn, is an act of consent that eliminates any possibility of a legal remedy of the donor against the donee:
    “Volunti non fit injuria.
    He who consents cannot receive an injury. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279, 2327; 4 T. R. 657; Shelf. on mar. & Div. 449.
    Consensus tollit errorem.
    Consent removes or obviates a mistake. Co. Litt. 126.
    Melius est omnia mala pati quam malo concentire.
    It is better to suffer every wrong or ill, than to consent to it. 3 Co. Inst. 23.
    Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt, et consentiunt.
    One cannot complain of having been deceived when he knew the fact and gave his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 145.”
    [Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
    SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]
  4. In law, all rights are “property”.

    Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no wa y depends on another man's courtesy.

    The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.

    Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership. or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. Davis v. Davis. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d. 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 389 S.W.2d. 745, 752.

    Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d. 694, 697.
    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

    By protecting your constitutional rights, the government is protecting your PRIVATE property.  Your rights are private property because they came from God, not from the government.  Only what the government creates can become public property.  An example is corporations, which are a public franchise that makes officers of the corporation into public officers.

  5. The process of taxation is the process of converting “private property” into a “public use” and a “public purpose”.  Below are definitions of these terms for your enlightenment.

    Public use.  Eminent domain.  The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain.  For condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public.  It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a “public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.  Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, Mont., 457 P.2d. 769, 772, 773.

    Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community distinguished from particular individuals.  But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Ringe Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186.  The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit.  It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual.  The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience.  A “public use” for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation.  Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d. 579, 586.

    See also Condemnation; Eminent domain.

    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1232]
    __________________________________________________________________________________________

    Public purpose.  In the law of taxation, eminent domain, etc., this is a term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage, the government is to provide, from those which, by the like usage, are left to private interest, inclination, or liberality.  The constitutional requirement that the purpose of any tax, police regulation, or particular exertion of the power of eminent domain shall be the convenience, safety, or welfare of the entire community and not the welfare of a specific individual or class of persons [such as, for instance, federal benefit recipients as individuals].  “Public purpose” that will justify expenditure of public money generally means such an activity as will serve as benefit to community as a body and which at same time is directly related function of government.  Pack v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 Tenn. 503, 387 S.W.2d. 789, 794 .

    The term is synonymous with governmental purpose.  As employed to denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, it has no relation to the urgency of the public need or to the extent of the public benefit which is to follow; the essential requisite being that a public service or use shall affect the inhabitants as a community, and not merely as individuals.  A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as, for example, a state, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business.”

    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1231, Emphasis added]

  6. The federal government has no power of eminent domain within states of the Union.  This means that they cannot lawfully convert private property to a public use or a public purpose within the exclusive jurisdiction of states of the Union:
    “The United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in cases where it is delegated, and the court denies the faculty of the Federal Government to add to its powers by treaty or compact.‘“
    [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 508-509 (1856)]
  7. The Fifth Amendment prohibits converting private property to a public use or a public purpose without just compensation if the owner does not consent, and this prohibition applies to the Federal government as well as states of the Union.  It was made applicable to states of the Union by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.

    Fifth Amendment - Rights of Persons

    No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

    [United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment]

    If the conversion of private property to public property is done without the express consent of the party affected by the conversion and without compensation, then the following violations have occurred:

    7.1 Violation of the Fifth Amendment “takings clause” above.

    7.2 “Conversion” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §654.

    7.3 Theft.

  8. Because taxation involves converting private property to a public use, public purpose, and public office, then it involves eminent domain if the owner of the property did not expressly consent to the taking:
  9. Eminent domain.  The power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character. Housing Authority of Cherokee National of Oklahoma v. Langley, Okl., 555 P.2d. 1025, 1028. Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.

    In the United States, the power of eminent domain is founded in both the federal (Fifth Amend.) and state constitutions. However, the Constitution limits the power to taking for a public purpose and prohibits the exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation to the owners of the property which is taken. The process of exercising the power of eminent domain is commonly referred to as “condemnation”, or, “expropriation”.

    The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the public good. Thus, in time of war or insurrection, the proper authorities may possess and hold any part of the territory of the state for the common safety; and in time of peace the legislature may authorize the appropriation of the same to public purposes, such as the opening of roads, construction of defenses, or providing channels for trade or travel. Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. It gives a right to resume the possession of the property in the manner directed by the constitution and the laws of the state, whenever the public interest requires it.

    See also Adequate compensation; Condemnation; Constructive taking; Damages; Expropriation; Fair market value; Just compensation; Larger parcel; Public use; Take.

    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 470]

  10. The Fifth Amendment requires that any taking of private property without the consent of the owner must involve compensation.  The Constitution must be consistent with itself.  The taxation clauses found in Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 3 cannot conflict with the Fifth Amendment.  The Fifth Amendment contains no exception to the requirement for just compensation upon conversion of private property to a public use, even in the case of taxation.  This is why all taxes must be indirect excise taxes against people who provide their consent by applying for a license to engage in the taxed activity:  The application for the license constitutes constructive consent to donate the fruits of the activity to a public use, public purpose, and public office.
  11. There is only ONE condition in which the conversion of private property to public property does NOT require compensation, which is when the owner donates the private property to a public use, public purpose, or public office.  To wit:
    “Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;' and to 'secure,' not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit [e.g. SOCIAL SECURITY, Medicare, and every other public “benefit”]; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.
    [Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892) ]

    The above rules are summarized below:

    Table 5:  Rules for converting private property to a public use or a public office


    #

    Description

    Requires consent of owner to be taken from owner?

    1

    The owner of property justly acquired enjoys full and exclusive use and control over the property.  This right includes the right to exclude government uses or ownership of said property.

    Yes

    2

    He may not use the property to injure the equal rights of his neighbor.  For instance, when you murder someone, the government can take your liberty and labor from you by putting you in jail or your life from you by instituting the death penalty against you.  Both your life and your labor are “property”.  Therefore, the basis for the “taking” was violation of the equal rights of a fellow sovereign “neighbor”.

    No

    3

    He cannot be compelled or required to use it to “benefit” his neighbor.  That means he cannot be compelled to donate the property to any franchise that would “benefit” his neighbor such as Social Security, Medicare, etc.

    Yes

    4

    If he donates it to a public use, he gives the public the right to control that use.

    Yes

    5

    Whenever the public needs require, the public may take it without his consent upon payment of due compensation.  E.g. “eminent domain”.

    No

  12. The following two methods are the ONLY methods involving consent of the owner that may be LAWFULLY employed to convert PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property.  Anything else is unlawful and THEFT:
  13. 11.1 DIRECT CONVERSION:  Owner donates the property by conveying title or possession to the government.

    11.2 INDIRECT CONVERSION:  Owner assumes a PUBLIC status as a PUBLIC officer in the HOLDING of title to the property.   All such statuses and the rights that attach to it are creations and property of the government, the use of which is a privilege.  The status and all PUBLIC RIGHTS that attach to it conveys a “benefit” for which the status user must pay an excise tax.  The tax acts as a rental or use fee for the status, which is government property.

  14. You and ONLY you can authorize your private property to be donated to a public use, public purpose, and public office.  No third party can lawfully convert or donate your private property to a public use, public purpose, or public office without your knowledge and express consent.  If they do, they are guilty of theft and conversion, and especially if they are acting in a quasi-governmental capacity as a “withholding agent” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(16).

    12.1 A withholding agent cannot file an information return connecting your earnings to a “trade or business” without you actually occupying a “public office” in the government BEFORE you filled out any tax form.

    12.2 A withholding agent cannot file IRS Form W-2 against your earnings if you didn’t sign an IRS Form W-4 contract and thereby consent to donate your private property to a public office in the U.S. government and therefore a “public use”.

    12.3 That donation process is accomplished by your own voluntary self-assessment and ONLY by that method. Before such a self-assessment, you are a “nontaxpayer” and a private person. After the assessment, you become a “taxpayer” and a public officer in the government engaged in the “trade or business” franchise.

    12.4 In order to have an income tax liability, you must complete, sign, and “file” an income tax return and thereby assess yourself:

“Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not distraint.”
[Flora v. U.S., 362 U.S. 145 (1960)]

By assessing yourself, you implicitly give your consent to allow the public the right to control that use of the formerly PRIVATE property donated to a public use.

A THEFT of property has occurred on behalf of the government if it attempts to do any of the following:

  1. Circumvents any of the above rules.
  2. Blurs, confuses, or obfuscates the distinction between PRIVATE property and PUBLIC property.
  3. Refuses to identify EXACTLY which of the mechanisms identified in item 10 above was employed in EACH specific case where it:
    1. Asserts a right to regulate the use of private property.
    2. Asserts a right to convert the character of property from PRIVATE to PUBLIC.
    3. Asserts a right to TAX what you THOUGHT was PRIVATE property.

The next time someone from the government asserts a tax obligation, you might want to ask them the following very insightful questions based on the content of this section:

  1. Please describe at EXACTLY what point in the taxation process my earnings were LAWFULLY converted from EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE to PUBLIC and thereby became SUBJECT to civil statutory law and government jurisdiction.  Check one or more.   If none are checked, it shall CONCLUSIVELY be PRESUMED that no tax is owed:
  2. _____There is no private property.  EVERYTHING belongs to us and we just “RENT” it to you through taxes.  Hence, we are NOT a “government” because there is not private property to protect.  Everything is PUBLIC property by default.

    _____When I was born?

    _____When I became a CONSTITUTIONAL citizen?

    _____When I changed my domicile to a CONSTITUTIONAL and not STATUTORY “State”.

    _____When I indicated “U.S. citizen” or “U.S. resident” on a government form, and the agent accepting it FALSELY PRESUMED that meant I was a STATUTORY “national and citizen of the United States” per 8 U.S.C. §1401  rather than a CONSTITUTIONAL “citizen of the United States”.

    _____When I disclosed and used a Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identification Number to my otherwise PRIVATE employer?

    _____When I submitted my withholding documents, such as IRS Forms W-4 or W-8 ?

    _____When the information return was filed against my otherwise PRIVATE earnings that connected my otherwise PRIVATE earnings to a PUBLIC office in the national government?

    _____When I FAILED to rebut the false information return connecting my otherwise PRIVATE earnings to a PUBLIC office in the national government?

    _____When I filed a “taxpayer” form, such as IRS Forms 1040 or 1040NR ?

    _____When the IRS or state did an assessment under the authority if 26 U.S.C. §6020(b) .

    _____When I failed to rebut a collection notice from the IRS?

    _____When the IRS levied monies from my EXCLUSIVELY private account, which must be held by a PUBLIC OFFICER per 26 U.S.C. §6331(a)  before it can lawfully be levied?

    _____When the government decided they wanted to STEAL my money and simply TOOK it, and were protected from the THEFT by a complicit Department of Justice , who split the proceeds with them?

    _____When I demonstrated legal ignorance of the law to the government sufficient to overlook or not recognize that it is impossible to convert PRIVATE to PUBLIC without my consent, as the Declaration of Independence  requires.

  3. How can the conversion from PRIVATE to PUBLIC occur without my consent and without violating the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause?
  4. If you won’t answer the previous questions, how the HELL am I supposed to receive constitutionally mandated “reasonable notice” of the following:
  5. 3.1 EXACTLY what property I exclusively own and therefore what property is NOT subject to government taxation or regulation?

    3.2 EXACTLY what conduct is expected of me by the law?

  6. EXACTLY where in your publications is the first question answered and why should I believe it if even you refuse to take responsibility for the accuracy of said publications?
  7. EXACTLY where in the statutes and regulations is the first question answered?
  8. How can you refuse to answer the above questions if your own mission statement says you are required to help people obey the law and comply with the law?

4.11 Unlawful methods abused by government to convert PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property

There are a LOT more ways to UNLAWFULLY convert PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property than there are ways to do it lawfully.  This section will address the most prevalent methods abused by state actors so that you will immediately recognize them when you are victimized by them.  For the purposes of this section CONTROL and OWNERSHIP are synonymous.  Hence, if the TITLE of the property remains in your name but there is any aspect of control over the USE of said property that does not demonstrably injure others, then the property ceases to be absolutely owned and therefore is owned by the government.

Based on the previous section, there is ONLY one condition in which PRIVATE property can be converted to PUBLCI property without the consent of the owner, which is when it is used to INJURE the rights of others.  Any other type of conversion is THEFT.  The U.S. Supreme Court describes that process of illegally CONVERTING property from PRIVATE to PUBLIC as follows.  Notice that they only reference the “citizen’ as being the object of regulation, which implies that those who are “nonresidents”, “transient foreigners”, and “non-citizen nationals” are beyond the control of those governments in whose territory they have not chosen a civil domicile:

“The doctrine that each one must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor — sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas — is the rule by which every member of society must possess and enjoy his property; and all legislation essential to secure this common and equal enjoyment is a legitimate exercise of State authority. Except in cases where property may be destroyed to arrest a conflagration or the ravages of pestilence, or be taken under the pressure of an immediate and overwhelming necessity to prevent a public calamity, the power of the State over the property of the citizen [NOT EVERYONE, but only those consent to become citizens by choosing a domicile] does not extend beyond such limits.”
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)]

Below is a list of the more prevalent means abused by corrupt and covetous governments to illegally convert PRIVATE property to PUBLIC PROPERTY without the express consent of the owner.  Many of these techniques are unrecognizable to the average American and therefore surreptitious, which is why they continue to be abused so regularly and chronically by public dis-servants:

  1. Deceptively label statutory PRIVILEGES as RIGHTS.
  2. Confuse STATUTORY citizenship with CONSTITUTIONAL citizenship.
  3. Refuse to admit that the court you are litigating in is a FRANCHISE court that has no jurisdiction over non-franchisees or people who do not consent to the franchise.
  4. Abuse the words “includes” and “including” to add anything they want to the definition of “person” or “individual” within the franchise.  All such “persons” are public officers and not private human beings.  See:

    Meaning of the Words “includes” and “including”, Form #05.014
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  5. Refuse to impose the burden of proof upon the government to show that you EXPRESSLY CONSENTED to convert PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property BEFORE they can claim jurisdiction over it.
  6. Silently PRESUME that the property in question is PUBLIC property connected with the “trade or business” (public office per 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)) franchise and force you to prove that it ISN’T by CHALLENGING false information returns filed against it, such as IRS Forms W-2, 1098, 1099, and K-1.  See:

    Correcting Erroneous Information Returns, Form #04.001
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  7. Presume that the STATUTORY and CONSTITUTIONAL contexts for geographical words are the same.  They are NOT, and in fact are mutually exclusive.
  8. Presume that because you submitted an application for a franchise, that you:
    1. CONSENTED to the franchise and were not under duress.
    2. Were requesting a “benefit” and therefore agreed to the obligations associated with the “benefit”. 
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE
DIVISION 3.  OBLIGATIONS
PART 2.  CONTRACTS
CHAPTER 3.  CONSENT
Section 1589

1589.  A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting.

    1. Agree to accept the obligations associated with the status described on the application, such as “taxpayer”, “driver”, “spouse”.

If you want to prevent the above, reserve all your rights on the application, indicate duress, and define all terms on the form as NOT connected with any government or statutory law.

  1. PRESUME that the OWNER has a civil statutory status that he or she did not consent to, such as:
  2. 1.1 “spouse” under the family code of your state, which is a franchise.

    1.2 “driver” under the vehicle code of your state, which is a franchise.

    1.3 “taxpayer” under the tax code of your state, which is a franchise.

  3. PRESUME in the case of physical PROPERTY that is was situated on federal territory to which the general and exclusive jurisdiction of the national government applies, even though it is not.  This is primarily done by playing word games with geographical “words of art” such as “State” and “United States”.
  4. Refuse to satisfy the burden of proving that the owner of the property expressly consented in a manner that he/she prescribed to change the status of either himself or the property over which they claim a public interest.
  5. Judges will interfere with attempts to introduce evidence in the proceeding that challenges any of the above presumptions.
  6. Unlawfully compel the use of Social Security Numbers or Taxpayer Identification Numbers in violation of 42 U.S.C. §408(a)(8)  in connection with specific property as a precondition of rendering a usually essential service.  It will be illegally compelled because:
  7. 5.1 The party against whom it was compelled was not a statutory “Taxpayer” or “person” or “individual” or to whom a duty to furnish said number lawfully applies.

    5.2 The property was not located on territory subject to the territorial jurisdiction of that national government.

  8. Use one franchise as a way to recruit franchisees under OTHER franchises that are completely unrelated.  For instance, they will enact a vehicle code statute that allows for confiscation of REGISTERED vehicles only that are being operated by UNLICENSED drivers.  That way, everyone who wants to protect their vehicle also indirectly has to ALSO become a statutory “driver” using the public road ways for commercial activity and thus subject to regulation by the state, even though they in fact ARE NOT intending to do so.
  9. Issue a license and then refuse to recognize the authority and ability in court of those possessing said license to act in an EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE capacity.  For instance:
  10. 7.1 They may have a contractor’s license but they are NOT allowed to operate as OTHER than a licensed contractor…OR are NOT allowed to operate in an exclusively PRIVATE capacity.

    7.2 They may have a vehicle registration but are NOT allowed to remove it or NOT use it during times when they are NOT using the public roadways for hire, which is most of the time.  In other words, the vehicle is the equivalent to “off duty” at some times.  They allow police officers, who are PUBLIC officers, to be off duty, but not anyone who DOESN’T work for the government.

  11. Issue or demand GOVERNMENT ID and then presume that the applicant is a statutory “resident” for ALL purposes, rather than JUST the specific reason the ID was issued.  Since a “resident” is a public officer, in effect they are PRESUMING that you are a public officer 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and that you HAVE to assume this capacity without pay or “benefit” and without the ability to quit.  See:

    Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002, Section 13.4
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

What all of the above government abuses have in common is that they do one or more of the following:

  1. Involve PRESUMPTIONS which violate due process of law and are therefore UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  See:

    Presumption:  Chief Weapon for Unlawfully Enlarging Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.017
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  2. Refuse to RECOGNIZE the existence of PRIVATE property or PRIVATE rights.
  3. Violate the very purpose of establishing government to begin with, which is to PROTECT PRIVATE property by LEAVING IT ALONE and not regulating or benefitting from its use or abuse until AFTER it has been used to injure the equal rights of anyone OTHER than the original owner.
  4. Violate the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court.
  5. Needlessly interfere with the ownership or control of otherwise PRIVATE property.
  6. Often act upon property BEFORE it is used to institute an injury, instead of AFTER.  Whenever the law acts to PREVENT future harm rather than CORRECT past harm, it requires the consent of the owner.  The common law itself only provides remedies for PAST harm and cannot act on future conduct, except in the case of injunctions where PAST harm is already demonstrated.
  7. Institute involuntary servitude against the owner in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
  8. Represent an eminent domain over PRIVATE property in violation of the state constitution in most states.
  9. Violate the takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
  10. Violate the maxim of law that the government has a duty to protect your right to NOT receive a “benefit” and NOT pay for “benefits” that you don’t want or don’t need.
Invito beneficium non datur.
No one is obliged to accept a benefit against his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 69. But if he does not dissent he will be considered as assenting. Vide Assent.
Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto.
Any one may renounce a law introduced for his own benefit. To this rule there are some exceptions. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856,
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

It ought to be obvious to the reader that the basis for Socialism is public ownership of ALL property. 

“socialism n (1839) 1: any of various economic and political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods 2 a: a system of society or group living in which there is no private property b: a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state 3: a stage of society in Marxist theory transitional between capitalism and communism and distinguished by unequal distribution of goods and pay according to work done.”
[Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1983, ISBN 0-87779-510-X, p. 1118]

Any system of law that recognizes no absolute and inviolable constitutional boundary between PRIVATE property and PUBLIC property, or which regards ALL property as being subject to government taxation and/or regulation is a socialist or collectivist system.  That socialist system is exhaustively described in the following:


Socialism:  The New American Civil Religion, Form #05.016
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Below is how the U.S. Supreme Court characterizes efforts to violate the rules for converting PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property listed above and thereby STEAL PRIVATE property.  The text below the following line up to the end of the section comes from the case indicated:
_______________________________

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)

The question presented, therefore, is one of the greatest importance, — whether it is within the competency of a State to fix the compensation which an individual may receive for the use of his own property in his private business, and for his services in connection with it.
[. . .]

139*139 The validity of the legislation was, among other grounds, assailed in the State court as being in conflict with that provision of the State Constitution which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution which imposes a similar restriction upon the action of the State. The State court held, in substance, that the constitutional provision was not violated so long as the owner was not deprived of the title and possession of his property; and that it did not deny to the legislature the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the use and enjoyment of the property, referring, in support of the position, to instances of its action in prescribing the interest on money, in establishing and regulating public ferries and public mills, and fixing the compensation in the shape of tolls, and in delegating power to municipal bodies to regulate the charges of hackmen and draymen, and the weight and price of bread. In this court the legislation was also assailed on the same ground, our jurisdiction arising upon the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ordaining that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. But it would seem from its opinion that the court holds that property loses something of its private character when employed in such a way as to be generally useful. The doctrine declared is that property "becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large;" and from such clothing the right of the legislature is deduced to control the use of the property, and to determine the compensation which the owner may receive for it. When Sir Matthew Hale, and the sages of the law in his day, spoke of property as affected by a public interest, and ceasing from that cause to be juris privati solely, that is, ceasing to be held merely in private right, they referred to property dedicated by the owner to public uses, or to property the use of which was granted by the government, or in connection with which special privileges were conferred. Unless the property was thus dedicated, or some right bestowed by the government was held with the property, either by specific grant or by prescription of so long a time as 140*140 to imply a grant originally, the property was not affected by any public interest so as to be taken out of the category of property held in private right. But it is not in any such sense that the terms "clothing property with a public interest" are used in this case. From the nature of the business under consideration — the storage of grain — which, in any sense in which the words can be used, is a private business, in which the public are interested only as they are interested in the storage of other products of the soil, or in articles of manufacture, it is clear that the court intended to declare that, whenever one devotes his property to a business which is useful to the public, — "affects the community at large," — the legislature can regulate the compensation which the owner may receive for its use, and for his own services in connection with it. "When, therefore," says the court, "one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control." The building used by the defendants was for the storage of grain: in such storage, says the court, the public has an interest; therefore the defendants, by devoting the building to that storage, have granted the public an interest in that use, and must submit to have their compensation regulated by the legislature.

If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in the principles upon which our republican government is founded, or in the prohibitions of the Constitution against such invasion of private rights, all property and all business in the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature. The public has no greater interest in the use of buildings for the storage of grain than it has in the use of buildings for the residences of families, nor, indeed, anything like so great an interest; and, according to the doctrine announced, the legislature may fix the rent of all tenements used for residences, without reference to the cost of their erection. If the owner does not like the rates prescribed, he may cease renting his houses. He has granted to the public, says the court, an interest in the use of the 141*141 buildings, and "he may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control."

The public is interested in the manufacture of cotton, woollen, and silken fabrics, in the construction of machinery, in the printing and publication of books and periodicals, and in the making of utensils of every variety, useful and ornamental; indeed, there is hardly an enterprise or business engaging the attention and labor of any considerable portion of the community, in which the public has not an interest in the sense in which that term is used by the court in its opinion; and the doctrine which allows the legislature to interfere with and regulate the charges which the owners of property thus employed shall make for its use, that is, the rates at which all these different kinds of business shall be carried on, has never before been asserted, so far as I am aware, by any judicial tribunal in the United States.

The doctrine of the State court, that no one is deprived of his property, within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition, so long as he retains its title and possession, and the doctrine of this court, that, whenever one's property is used in such a manner as to affect the community at large, it becomes by that fact clothed with a public interest, and ceases to be juris privati only, appear to me to destroy, for all useful purposes, the efficacy of the constitutional guaranty. All that is beneficial in property arises from its use, and the fruits of that use; and whatever deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and possession. If the constitutional guaranty extends no further than to prevent a deprivation of title and possession, and allows a deprivation of use, and the fruits of that use, it does not merit the encomiums it has received. Unless I have misread the history of the provision now incorporated into all our State constitutions, and by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments into our Federal Constitution, and have misunderstood the interpretation it has received, it is not thus limited in its scope, and thus impotent for good. It has a much more extended operation than either court, State, or Federal has given to it. The provision, it is to be observed, places property under the same protection as life and liberty. Except by due process of law, no State can 142*142 deprive any person of either. The provision has been supposed to secure to every individual the essential conditions for the pursuit of happiness; and for that reason has not been heretofore, and should never be, construed in any narrow or restricted sense.

No State "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," says the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. By the term "life," as here used, something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world. The deprivation not only of life, but of whatever God has given to everyone with life, for its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question, if its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision.

By the term "liberty," as used in the provision, something more is meant than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in such manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness; that is, to pursue such callings and avocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment.

The same liberal construction which is required for the protection of life and liberty, in all particulars in which life and liberty are of any value, should be applied to the protection of private property. If the legislature of a State, under pretence of providing for the public good, or for any other reason, can determine, against the consent of the owner, the uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices which the owner shall receive for its uses, it can deprive him of the property as completely as by a special act for its confiscation or destruction. If, for instance, the owner is prohibited from using his building for the purposes for which it was designed, it is of little consequence that he is permitted to retain the 143*143 title and possession; or, if he is compelled to take as compensation for its use less than the expenses to which he is subjected by its ownership, he is, for all practical purposes, deprived of the property, as effectually as if the legislature had ordered his forcible dispossession. If it be admitted that the legislature has any control over the compensation, the extent of that compensation becomes a mere matter of legislative discretion. The amount fixed will operate as a partial destruction of the value of the property, if it fall below the amount which the owner would obtain by contract, and, practically, as a complete destruction, if it be less than the cost of retaining its possession. There is, indeed, no protection of any value under the constitutional provision, which does not extend to the use and income of the property, as well as to its title and possession.

This court has heretofore held in many instances that a constitutional provision intended for the protection of rights of private property should be liberally construed. It has so held in the numerous cases where it has been called upon to give effect to the provision prohibiting the States from legislation impairing the obligation of contracts; the provision being construed to secure from direct attack not only the contract itself, but all the essential incidents which give it value and enable its owner to enforce it. Thus, in Bronson v. Kinzie, reported in the 1st of Howard, it was held that an act of the legislature of Illinois, giving to a mortgagor twelve months within which to redeem his mortgaged property from a judicial sale, and prohibiting its sale for less than two-thirds of its appraised value, was void as applied to mortgages executed prior to its passage. It was contended, in support of the act, that it affected only the remedy of the mortgagee, and did not impair the contract; but the court replied that there was no substantial difference between a retrospective law declaring a particular contract to be abrogated and void, and one which took away all remedy to enforce it, or encumbered the remedy with conditions that rendered it useless or impracticable to pursue it. And, referring to the constitutional provision, the court said, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taney, that

"it would be unjust to the memory of the distinguished men who framed it, to suppose that it was designed to protect a mere barren and 144*144 abstract right, without any practical operation upon the business of life. It was undoubtedly adopted as a part of the Constitution for a great and useful purpose. It was to maintain the integrity of contracts, and to secure their faithful execution throughout this Union, by placing them under the protection of the Constitution of the United States. And it would but Ill. become this court, under any circumstances, to depart from the plain meaning of the words used, and to sanction a distinction between the right and the remedy, which would render this provision illusive and nugatory, mere words of form, affording no protection and producing no practical result."

And in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 177, the language of the court is equally emphatic. That case arose in Wisconsin, the constitution of which declares, like the constitutions of nearly all the States, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; and this court held that the flooding of one's land by a dam constructed across a river under a law of the State was a taking within the prohibition, and required compensation to be made to the owner of the land thus flooded. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, said: —

"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if, in construing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual as against the government, and which has received the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators, as placing the just principles of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control them, it shall be held that, if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public, it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for the public use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction on the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, instead of the government, and make it an authority for invasion of private right under the pretext of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices of our ancestors."

The views expressed in these citations, applied to this case, would render the constitutional provision invoked by the defendants effectual to protect them in the uses, income, and revenues of their property, as well as in its title and possession. The construction actually given by the State court and by this court makes the provision, in the language of Taney, a protection to "a mere barren and abstract right, without any practical operation upon the business of life," and renders it "illusive and nugatory, mere words of form, affording no protection and producing no practical result."

The power of the State over the property of the citizen under the constitutional guaranty is well defined. The State may take his property for public uses, upon just compensation being made therefor. It may take a portion of his property by way of taxation for the support of the government. It may control the use and possession of his property, so far as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of others, and to secure to them the equal use and enjoyment of their property. The doctrine that each one must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor — sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas — is the rule by which every member of society must possess and enjoy his property; and all legislation essential to secure this common and equal enjoyment is a legitimate exercise of State authority. Except in cases where property may be destroyed to arrest a conflagration or the ravages of pestilence, or be taken under the pressure of an immediate and overwhelming necessity to prevent a public calamity, the power of the State over the property of the citizen does not extend beyond such limits.

It is true that the legislation which secures to all protection in their rights, and the equal use and enjoyment of their property, embraces an almost infinite variety of subjects. Whatever affects the peace, good order, morals, and health of the community, comes within its scope; and every one must use and enjoy his property subject to the restrictions which such legislation imposes. What is termed the police power of the State, which, from the language often used respecting it, one would suppose to be an undefined and irresponsible element in government, can only interfere with the conduct of individuals in their intercourse with each other, and in the use of their property, so far 146*146 as may be required to secure these objects. The compensation which the owners of property, not having any special rights or privileges from the government in connection with it, may demand for its use, or for their own services in union with it, forms no element of consideration in prescribing regulations for that purpose. If one construct a building in a city, the State, or the municipality exercising a delegated power from the State, may require its walls to be of sufficient thickness for the uses intended; it may forbid the employment of inflammable materials in its construction, so as not to endanger the safety of his neighbors; if designed as a theatre, church, or public hall, it may prescribe ample means of egress, so as to afford facility for escape in case of accident; it may forbid the storage in it of powder, nitro-glycerine, or other explosive material; it may require its occupants daily to remove decayed vegetable and animal matter, which would otherwise accumulate and engender disease; it may exclude from it all occupations and business calculated to disturb the neighborhood or infect the air. Indeed, there is no end of regulations with respect to the use of property which may not be legitimately prescribed, having for their object the peace, good order, safety, and health of the community, thus securing to all the equal enjoyment of their property; but in establishing these regulations it is evident that compensation to the owner for the use of his property, or for his services in union with it, is not a matter of any importance: whether it be one sum or another does not affect the regulation, either in respect to its utility or mode of enforcement. One may go, in like manner, through the whole round of regulations authorized by legislation, State or municipal, under what is termed the police power, and in no instance will he find that the compensation of the owner for the use of his property has any influence in establishing them. It is only where some right or privilege is conferred by the government or municipality upon the owner, which he can use in connection with his property, or by means of which the use of his property is rendered more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys an advantage over others, that the compensation to be received by him becomes a legitimate matter of regulation. Submission to the regulation of compensation in such cases is an implied condition 147*147 of the grant, and the State, in exercising its power of prescribing the compensation, only determines the conditions upon which its concession shall be enjoyed. When the privilege ends, the power of regulation ceases.

Jurists and writers on public law find authority for the exercise of this police power of the State and the numerous regulations which it prescribes in the doctrine already stated, that everyone must use and enjoy his property consistently with the rights of others, and the equal use and enjoyment by them of their property. "The police power of the State," says the Supreme Court of Vermont, "extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property in the State. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, which, being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others." Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 149. "We think it a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society," says the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, "that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community." Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84. In his Commentaries, after speaking of the protection afforded by the Constitution to private property, Chancellor Kent says: —

"But though property be thus protected, it is still to be understood that the law-giver has the right to prescribe the mode and manner of using it, so far as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right, to the injury or annoyance of others, or of the public. The government may, by general regulations, interdict such uses of property as would create nuisances and become dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens. Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam-power to propel cars, the building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all be interdicted by law, in the-midst of dense masses of population, 148*148 on the general and rational principle that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests must be made subservient to the general interests of the community. 2 Kent, 340.

The Italics in these citations are mine. The citations show what I have already stated to be the case, that the regulations which the State, in the exercise of its police power, authorizes with respect to the use of property are entirely independent of any question of compensation for such use, or for the services of the owner in connection with it.

There is nothing in the character of the business of the defendants as warehousemen which called for the interference complained of in this case. Their buildings are not nuisances; their occupation of receiving and storing grain infringes upon no rights of others, disturbs no neighborhood, infects not the air, and in no respect prevents others from using and enjoying their property as to them may seem best. The legislation in question is nothing less than a bold assertion of absolute power by the State to control at its discretion the property and business of the citizen, and fix the compensation he shall receive. The will of the legislature is made the condition upon which the owner shall receive the fruits of his property and the just reward of his labor, industry, and enterprise. "That government," says Story, "can scarcely be deemed to be free where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred." Wilkeson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. The decision of the court in this case gives unrestrained license to legislative will.

The several instances mentioned by counsel in the argument and by the court in its opinion, in which legislation has fixed the compensation which parties may receive for the use of their property and services, do not militate against the views I have expressed of the power of the State over the property of the citizen. They were mostly cases of public ferries, bridges, and turnpikes, of wharfingers, hackmen, and draymen, and of interest on money. In all these cases, except that of interest on money, which I shall presently notice there was some special 149*149 privilege granted by the State or municipality; and no one, I suppose, has ever contended that the State had not a right to prescribe the conditions upon which such privilege should be enjoyed. The State in such cases exercises no greater right than an individual may exercise over the use of his own property when leased or loaned to others. The conditions upon which the privilege shall be enjoyed being stated or implied in the legislation authorizing its grant, no right is, of course, impaired by their enforcement. The recipient of the privilege, in effect, stipulates to comply with the conditions. It matters not how limited the privilege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent to the regulation of its use and the compensation for it. The privilege which the hackman and drayman have to the use of stands on the public streets, not allowed to the ordinary coachman or laborer with teams, constitutes a sufficient warrant for the regulation of their fares. In the case of the warehousemen of Chicago, no right or privilege is conferred by the government upon them; and hence no assent of theirs can be alleged to justify any interference with their charges for the use of their property.

The quotations from the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, so far from supporting the positions of the court, do not recognize the interference of the government, even to the extent which I have admitted to be legitimate. They state merely that the franchise of a public ferry belongs to the king, and cannot be used by the subject except by license from him, or prescription time out of mind; and that when the subject has a public wharf by license from the king, or from having dedicated his private wharf to the public, as in the case of a street opened by him through his own land, he must allow the use of the wharf for reasonable and moderate charges. Thus, in the first quotation which is taken from his treatise De Jure Maris, Hale says that the king has

"a right of franchise or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers without a prescription time out of mind or a charter from the king. He may make a ferry for his own use or the use of his family, but not for the common use of all the king's subjects passing that way; because it doth in consequent tend to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use, and every man for his passage 150*150 pays a toll, which is a common charge, and every ferry ought to be under a public regulation, viz., that it give attendance at due times, keep a boat in due order, and take but reasonable toll; for if he fail in these he is finable."

Of course, one who obtains a license from the king to establish a public ferry, at which "every man for his passage pays a toll," must take it on condition that he charge only reasonable toll, and, indeed, subject to such regulations as the king may prescribe.

In the second quotation, which is taken from his treatise De Portibus Maris, Hale says: —

"A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes the most of his own. If the king or subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharves only licensed by the king, or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected, in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, &c.; neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate, but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the king's license or charter. For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land, it is now no longer bare private interest, but is affected by the public interest."

The purport of which is, that if one have a public wharf, by license from the government or his own dedication, he must exact only reasonable compensation for its use. By its dedication to public use, a wharf is as much brought under the common-law rule of subjection to reasonable charges as it would be if originally established or licensed by the crown. All property dedicated to public use by an individual owner, as in the case of land for a park or street, falls at once, by force of the dedication, under the law governing property appropriated by the government for similar purposes.

I do not doubt the justice of the encomiums passed upon Sir 151*151 Matthew Hale as a learned jurist of his day; but I am unable to perceive the pertinency of his observations upon public ferries and public wharves, found in his treatises on "The Rights of the Sea" and on "The Ports of the Sea," to the questions presented by the warehousing law of Illinois, undertaking to regulate the compensation received by the owners of private property, when that property is used for private purposes.

The principal authority cited in support of the ruling of the court is that of Alnutt v. Inglis, decided by the King's Bench, and reported in 12 East. But that case, so far from sustaining the ruling, establishes, in my judgment, the doctrine that everyone has a right to charge for his property, or for its use, whatever he pleases, unless he enjoys in connection with it some right or privilege from the government not accorded to others; and even then it only decides what is above stated in the quotations from Sir Matthew Hale, that he must submit, so long as he retains the right or privilege, to reasonable rates. In that case, the London Dock Company, under certain acts of Parliament, possessed the exclusive right of receiving imported goods into their warehouses before the duties were paid; and the question was whether the company was bound to receive them for a reasonable reward, or whether it could arbitrarily fix its compensation. In deciding the case, the Chief Justice, Lord Ellenborough, said: —

"There is no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in law and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his own property, or the use of it; but if, for a particular purpose, the public have a right to resort to his premises and make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms."

And, coming to the conclusion that the company's warehouses were invested with "the monopoly of a public privilege," he held that by law the company must confine itself to take reasonable rates; and added, that if the crown should thereafter think it advisable to extend the privilege more generally to other persons and places, so that the public would not be restrained from exercising a choice of warehouses for the purpose, the company might be enfranchised from the restriction which 152*152 attached to a monopoly; but, so long as its warehouses were the only places which could be resorted to for that purpose, the company was bound to let the trade have the use of them for a reasonable hire and reward. The other judges of the court placed their concurrence in the decision upon the ground that the company possessed a legal monopoly of the business, having the only warehouses where goods imported could be lawfully received without previous payment of the duties. From this case it appears that it is only where some privilege in the bestowal of the government is enjoyed in connection with the property, that it is affected with a public interest in any proper sense of the terms. It is the public privilege conferred with the use of the property which creates the public interest in it.

In the case decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama, where a power granted to the city of Mobile to license bakers, and to regulate the weight and price of bread, was sustained so far as regulating the weight of the bread was concerned, no question was made as to the right to regulate the price. 3 Ala. 137. There is no doubt of the competency of the State to prescribe the weight of a loaf of bread, as it may declare what weight shall constitute a pound or a ton. But I deny the power of any legislature under our government to fix the price which one shall receive for his property of any kind. If the power can be exercised as to one article, it may as to all articles, and the prices of everything, from a calico gown to a city mansion, may be the subject of legislative direction.

Other instances of a similar character may, no doubt, be cited of attempted legislative interference with the rights of property. The act of Congress of 1820, mentioned by the court, is one of them. There Congress undertook to confer upon the city of Washington power to regulate the rates of wharfage at private wharves, and the fees for sweeping chimneys. Until some authoritative adjudication is had upon these and similar provisions, I must adhere, notwithstanding the legislation, to my opinion, that those who own property have the right to fix the compensation at which they will allow its use, and that those who control services have a right to fix the compensation at which they will be rendered. The chimney-sweeps may, I think, safely claim all the compensation which 153*153 they can obtain by bargain for their work. In the absence of any contract for property or services, the law allows only a reasonable price or compensation; but what is a reasonable price in any case will depend upon a variety of considerations, and is not a matter for legislative determination.

The practice of regulating by legislation the interest receivable for the use of money, when considered with reference to its origin, is only the assertion of a right of the government to control the extent to which a privilege granted by it may be exercised and enjoyed. By the ancient common law it was unlawful to take any money for the use of money: all who did so were called usurers, a term of great reproach, and were exposed to the censure of the church; and if, after the death of a person, it was discovered that he had been a usurer whilst living, his chattels were forfeited to the king, and his lands escheated to the lord of the fee. No action could be maintained on any promise to pay for the use of money, because of the unlawfulness of the contract. Whilst the common law thus condemned all usury, Parliament interfered, and made it lawful to take a limited amount of interest. It was not upon the theory that the legislature could arbitrarily fix the compensation which one could receive for the use of property, which, by the general law, was the subject of hire for compensation, that Parliament acted, but in order to confer a privilege which the common law denied. The reasons which L.Ed. to this legislation originally have long since ceased to exist; and if the legislation is still persisted in, it is because a long acquiescence in the exercise of a power, especially when it was rightfully assumed in the first instance, is generally received as sufficient evidence of its continued lawfulness. 10 Bac. Abr. 264.[*]

There were also recognized in England, by the ancient common law, certain privileges as belonging to the lord of the manor, which grew out of the state of the country, the condition of the people, and the relation existing between him and 154*154 his tenants under the feudal system. Among these was the right of the lord to compel all the tenants within his manor to grind their corn at his mill. No one, therefore, could set up a mill except by his license, or by the license of the crown, unless he claimed the right by prescription, which presupposed a grant from the lord or crown, and, of course, with such license went the right to regulate the tolls to be received. Woolrych on the Law of Waters, c. 6, of Mills. Hence originated the doctrine which at one time obtained generally in this country, that there could be no mill to grind corn for the public, without a grant or license from the public authorities. It is still, I believe, asserted in some States. This doctrine being recognized, all the rest followed. The right to control the toll accompanied the right to control the establishment of the mill.

It requires no comment to point out the radical differences between the cases of public mills and interest on money, and that of the warehouses in Chicago. No prerogative or privilege of the crown to establish warehouses was ever asserted at the common law. The business of a warehouseman was, at common law, a private business and is so in its nature. It has no special privileges connected with it, nor did the law ever extend to it any greater protection than it extended to all other private business. No reason can be assigned to justify legislation interfering with the legitimate profits of that business, that would not equally justify an intermeddling with the business of every man in the community, so soon, at least, as his business became generally useful.


  An example of direct conversion would be the process of “registering” a vehicle with the Department of Motor Vehicles in your state.  The act of registration constitutes consent by original ABSOLUTE owner to change the ownership of the property from ABSOLUTE to QUALIFIED and to convey legal title to the state and qualified title to himself.

An example of a PUBLIC status is statutory “taxpayer” (public office called “trade or business”), statutory “citizen”, statutory “driver” (vehicle), statutory voter (registered voters are public officers).

4.12  The public office is a “fiction of law”

The fictitious public office and “trade or business” to which all the government’s enforcement rights attach is called a “fiction of law” by some judges. Here is the definition:

“Fiction of law.An assumption or supposition of law that something which is or may be false is true, or that a state of facts exists which has never really taken place. An assumption [PRESUMPTION], for purposes of justice, of a fact that does not or may not exist. A rule of law which assumes as true, and will not allow to be disproved, something which is false, but not impossible. Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 30 N.J.Eq. 531, 23 A.2d. 607, 621. These assumptions are of an innocent or even beneficial character, and are made for the advancement of the ends of justice. They secure this end chiefly by the extension of procedure from cases to which it is applicable to other cases to which it is not strictly applicable, the ground of inapplicability being some difference of an immaterial character. See also Legal fiction.”

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 623]

The key elements of all fictions of law from the above are:

  1. A PRESUMPTION of the existence or truth of an otherwise nonexistent thing.
  2. The presumptions are of an INNOCENT or BENFICIAL character.
  3. The presumptions are made for the advancement of the ends of justice.
  4. All of the above goals are satisfied against BOTH parties to the dispute, not just the government.  Otherwise the constitutional requirement for equal protection and equal treatment has been transgressed.

The fictitious public office that forms the heart of the modern SCAM income tax clearly does not satisfy the elements for being a “fiction of law” because:

  1. All presumptions that violate due process of law or result in an injury to EITHER party affected by the presumption are unconstitutional. See:

    Presumption: Chief Weapon for Unlawfully Enlarging Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.017
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  2. The presumption does not benefit BOTH parties to a dispute that involves it. It ONLY benefits the government at the expense of innocent nontaxpayers and EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE parties.
  3. The presumption of the existence of the BOGUS office does NOT advance justice for BOTH parties who to any dispute involving it. The legal definition of justice is the RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE.  The presumption of the existence of the BOGUS office ensures that those who do not want to volunteer for the office but who are the subject of FALSE information returns are NEVER left alone and are continually harassed illegally by the IRS. Here is the legal definition of “justice” so you can see for yourself:

    “PAULSEN, ETHICS (Thilly's translation), chap. 9.

    Justice, as a moral habit, is that tendency of the will and mode of conduct which refrains from disturbing the lives and interests of others [INCLUDING us], and, as far as possible, hinders such interference on the part of others. This virtue springs from the individual's respect for his fellows as ends in themselves and as his co equals. The different spheres of interests may be roughly classified as follows: body and life; the family, or the extended individual life; property, or the totality of the instruments of action; honor, or the ideal existence; and finally freedom, or the possibility of fashioning one's life as an end in itself. The law defends these different spheres, thus giving rise to a corresponding number of spheres of rights, each being protected by a prohibition. . . . To violate the rights, to interfere with the interests of others, is injustice. All injustice is ultimately directed against the life of the neighbor; it is an open avowal that the latter is not an end in itself, having the same value as the individual's own life. The general formula of the duty of justice may therefore be stated as follows: Do no wrong yourself, and permit no wrong to be done, so far as lies in your power; or, expressed positively: Respect and protect the right.”

    [Readings on the History and System of Common Law, Second Edition, 1925, Roscoe Pound, p. 2

Therefore it is clearly a CRUEL FRAUD for any judge to justify his PRESUMPTION of the existence of the BOGUS public office that is the subject of the excise tax by calling it a “fiction of law”.

If you want to see an example of WHY this fiction of law was created as a way to usurp jurisdiction, read the following U.S. Supreme Court cite:

"It is true, that the person who accepts an office may be supposed to enter into a compact to be answerable to the government, which he serves, for any violation of his duty; and, having taken the oath of office, he would unquestionably be liable, in such case, to a prosecution for perjury in the Federal Courts. But because one man, by his own act, renders himself amenable to a particular jurisdiction, shall another man, who has not incurred a similar obligation, be implicated? If, in other words, it is sufficient to vest a jurisdiction in this court, that a Federal Officer is concerned; if it is a sufficient proof of a case arising under a law of the United States to affect other persons, that such officer is bound, by law, to discharge his duty with fidelity; a source of jurisdiction is opened, which must inevitably overflow and destroy all the barriers between the judicial authorities of the State and the general government. Any thing which can prevent a Federal Officer from the punctual, as well as from an impartial, performance of his duty; an assault and battery; or the recovery of a debt, as well as the offer of a bribe, may be made a foundation of the jurisdiction of this court; and, considering the constant disposition of power to extend the sphere of its influence, fictions will be resorted to, when real cases cease to occur. A mere fiction, that the defendant is in the custody of the marshall, has rendered the jurisdiction of the King's Bench universal in all personal actions."

[United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384 (1798)
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3339893669697439168]

The reason for the controversy in the above case was that the bribe occurred on state land by a nonresident domiciled in the state, and therefore that federal law did not apply. In the above case, the court admitted that a "fiction" was resorted to usurp jurisdiction because no legal authority could be found. The fact that the defendant was in custody created the jurisdiction. It didn't exist before they KIDNAPPED him. Notice also that they mention an implied "compact" or contract related to the office being exercised, and that THAT compact was the source of their jurisdiction over the officer who was bribed.  This is the SAME contract to which all those who engage in a statutory “trade or business” are party to.

5.  Synonyms for "trade or business"

Another important concept we need to be very aware of is that there are also synonyms for "trade or business" used within the Internal Revenue Code. 

5.1  "wages"

The term "wages" is synonymous with a "trade or business".  Below is the proof from 26 U.S.C. 3401, where it says that earnings not in the course of an employers "trade or business" are exempted from "wages".

TITLE 26 > Subtitle C > CHAPTER 24 > 3401

3401. Definitions

(a) Wages

 For purposes of this chapter, the term “wages” means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include remuneration paid—

[. . .]

(4) for service not in the course of the employer’s trade or business performed in any calendar quarter by an employee, unless the cash remuneration paid for such service is $50 or more and such service is performed by an individual who is regularly employed by such employer to perform such service. For purposes of this paragraph, an individual shall be deemed to be regularly employed by an employer during a calendar quarter only if—

(A) on each of some 24 days during such quarter such individual performs for such employer for some portion of the day service not in the course of the employer’s trade or business; or

(B) such individual was regularly employed (as determined under subparagraph (A)) by such employer in the performance of such service during the preceding calendar quarter; or

(11) for services not in the course of the employer’s trade or business, to the extent paid in any medium other than cash; or

The above is also completely consistent with the IRS form W-2 itself, which is an information return that 26 U.S.C.  6041 says may ONLY be filed to document earnings in excess of $600 in the course of a "trade or business".

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 61 > Subchapter A > PART III > Subpart B > 6041

6041. Information at source

(a) Payments of $600 or more

All persons engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course of such trade or business to another person, of rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income (other than payments to which section 6042 (a)(1), 6044 (a)(1), 6047 (e), 6049 (a), or 6050N (a) applies, and other than payments with respect to which a statement is required under the authority of section 6042 (a)(2), 6044 (a)(2), or 6045), of $600 or more in any taxable year, or, in the case of such payments made by the United States, the officers or employees of the United States having information as to such payments and required to make returns in regard thereto by the regulations hereinafter provided for, shall render a true and accurate return to the Secretary, under such regulations and in such form and manner and to such extent as may be prescribed by the Secretary, setting forth the amount of such gains, profits, and income, and the name and address of the recipient of such payment.

So if you aren't engaged in a "trade or business", then your private employer cannot lawfully or truthfully report "wages" on an IRS form W-2 in connection with you.  If they do, they are in criminal violation of 26 U.S.C. 7207, which provides for a $10,000 fine and imprisonment for up to one year for filing a false information return such as a W-2.

Those who do not serve in a "public office" therefore can only earn "wages" if they sign an agreement and stipulate to call their PRIVATE earnings wages.  In the absence of such an agreement, it is false and fraudulent and a criminal offense to report any amount other than ZERO on an IRS form W-2 in connection with a person who is not engaged in a "trade or business".  These conclusions are confirmed by 26 C.F.R. 31.3402(p)-1:

Title 26: Internal Revenue
PART 31—EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE
Subpart E—Collection of Income Tax at Source

Sec. 31.3402(p)-1  Voluntary withholding agreements.

(a) In general.

An employee and his employer may enter into an agreement under section 3402(b) to provide for the withholding of income tax upon payments of amounts described in paragraph (b)(1) of 31.3401(a)–3, made after December 31, 1970. An agreement may be entered into under this section only with respect to amounts which are includible in the gross income of the employee under section 61, and must be applicable to all such amounts paid by the employer to the employee. The amount to be withheld pursuant to an agreement under section 3402(p) shall be determined under the rules contained in section 3402 and the regulations thereunder. See 31.3405(c)–1, Q&A–3 concerning agreements to have more than 20-percent Federal income tax withheld from eligible rollover distributions within the meaning of section 402.

(b) Form and duration of agreement

(2) An agreement under section 3402 (p) shall be effective for such period as the employer and employee mutually agree upon. However, either the employer or the employee may terminate the agreement prior to the end of such period by furnishing a signed written notice to the other. Unless the employer and employee agree to an earlier termination date, the notice shall be effective with respect to the first payment of an amount in respect of which the agreement is in effect which is made on or after the first "status determination date" (January 1, May 1, July 1, and October 1 of each year) that occurs at least 30 days after the date on which the notice is furnished. If the employee executes a new Form W-4, the request upon which an agreement under section 3402 (p) is based shall be attached to, and constitute a part of, such new Form W-4.

The above is also reiterated again in the Treasury Regulations below:

26 C.F.R. 31.3401(a)-3 Amounts deemed wages under voluntary withholding agreements

(a) In general.

Notwithstanding the exceptions to the definition of wages specified in section 3401(a) and the regulations thereunder, the term “wages” includes the amounts described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section with respect to which there is a voluntary withholding agreement in effect under section 3402(p). References in this chapter to the definition of wages contained in section 3401(a) shall be deemed to refer also to this section (31.3401(a)–3).

(b) Remuneration for services.

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the amounts referred to in paragraph (a) of this section include any remuneration for services performed by an employee for an employer which, without regard to this section, does not constitute wages under section 3401(a). For example, remuneration for services performed by an agricultural worker or a domestic worker in a private home (amounts which are specifically excluded from the definition of wages by section 3401(a) (2) and (3), respectively) are amounts with respect to which a voluntary withholding agreement may be entered into under section 3402(p). See 31.3401(c)–1 and 31.3401(d)–1 for the definitions of “employee” and “employer”.

If you do not give your private employer a W-4 form or if it is signed under duress and indicates so, it is a criminal offense to report anything other than ZERO on any IRS form W-2 that is sent to the IRS.  Even if the IRS orders the private employer to withhold at single zero, he can STILL only withhold on "wages", which are ZERO for a person who never signed or submitted an IRS form W-4.  100% of ZERO is still ZERO.  Furthermore, nothing signed under any threat of duress, such as a threat to either fire you or not hire you for refusing to sign and submit an IRS form W-4 can be described as an "agreement" pursuant to any of the above regulations  and anyone who concludes otherwise is engaged in a criminal conspiracy against your rights.  This is ESPECIALLY true if they are acting under the "color of law" as a voluntary officer of the government, such as an "employer".

“An agreement [consent] obtained by duress, coercion, or intimidation is invalid, since the party coerced is not exercising his free will, and the test is not so much the means by which the party is compelled to execute the agreement as the state of mind induced. [1]  Duress, like fraud, rarely becomes material, except where a contract or conveyance has been made which the maker wishes to avoid.  As a general rule, duress renders the contract or conveyance voidable, not void, at the option of the person coerced, [2]  and it is susceptible of ratification.  Like other voidable contracts, it is valid until it is avoided by the person entitled to avoid it. [3]  However, duress in the form of physical compulsion, in which a party is caused to appear to assent when he has no intention of doing so, is generally deemed to render the resulting purported contract void. [4]
[American Jurisprudence 2d, Duress, Section 21]

[1] Brown v Pierce,  74 US 205, 7 Wall 205,  19 L Ed 134

[2] Barnette v Wells Fargo Nevada Nat'l Bank,  270 US 438,  70 L Ed 669,  46 S Ct 326 (holding that acts induced by duress which operate solely on the mind, and fall short of actual physical compulsion, are not void at law, but are voidable only, at the election of him whose acts were induced by it); Faske v Gershman,  30 Misc 2d 442, 215 NYS2d 144; Glenney v Crane (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 352 SW2d 773, writ ref n r e (May 16, 1962); Carroll v Fetty, 121 W Va 215, 2 SE2d 521, cert den  308 US 571,  84 L Ed 479,  60 S Ct 85.

[3] Faske v Gershman,  30 Misc 2d 442, 215 NYS2d 144; Heider v Unicume, 142 Or 416, 20 P2d 384; Glenney v Crane (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 352 SW2d 773, writ ref n r e (May 16, 1962)

[4] Restatement 2d, Contracts 174, stating that if conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by a party who does not intend to engage in that conduct is physically compelled by duress, the conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.

Yet another confirmation of the conclusions of this section is found in the Individual Master File (IMF) that the IRS uses to maintain a record of your tax liability.  The amount of “taxable income” is called NOT "income", but "wages" at the end of the report!  Quite telling.  See for yourself:

Master File Decoder
http://sedm.org/ItemInfo/Programs/MFDecoder/MFDecoder.htm

5.2  "personal services"

The term "personal services" in nearly all cases where it is used in the code means "work performed by an individual in connection with a trade or business".  Here is an example:

26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.469-9 Rules for certain rental real estate activities.

(b)(4) PERSONAL SERVICES.

Personal services means any work performed by an individual in connection with a trade or business. However, personal services do not include any work performed by an individual in the individual's capacity as an investor as described in section 1.469-5T(f)(2)(ii).

The only place in the code where "personal services" is mentioned outside the context of a "trade or business" is the case where earnings from it are NOT taxable:

26 U.S.C. 861 Income from Sources Within the United States

(a)(3) "...Compensation for labor or personal services performed in the United States shall not be deemed to be income from sources within the United States if-

(C) the compensation for labor or services performed as an employee of or under contract with--

(i) a nonresident alien..not engaged in a trade or business in the United States..."

Therefore, whenever you see the term "personal services", it means "work performed by an individual in connection with a 'trade or business'" unless specifically defined otherwise.  This will become very important when we are talking about earnings of "U.S. citizens" who are abroad.

5.3  "United States"

The term “United States” is also a synonym for “trade or business” under the I.R.C. in most cases.  Under 26 U.S.C. 864(c)(3), all earnings originating within the statutory "United States**", which is defined as federal territory in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. 110(d) is also treated as "effectively connected with a trade or business". 

TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter N > PART I > 864
864. Definitions and special rules

(c) Effectively connected income, etc.

(3) Other income from sources within United States

All income, gain, or loss from sources within the United States (other than income, gain, or loss to which paragraph (2) applies) shall be treated as effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

Therefore, whenever you see the phrase "sources within the United States" associated with any earnings, then indirectly, it is being associated with a "trade or business".  This is the case for 26 U.S.C.  871(a), which identifies income of "nonresident aliens" from only from within the statutory "United States**" (federal territory) that is not connected to a "trade or business".  26 U.S.C. 864(c)(3) says that this income is ALSO connected with a trade or business if it was derived from sources within the statutory but not constitutional "United States**" (federal territory).  26 U.S.C. 864(c)(2) identifies all sources of income not associated with a "trade or business" and they include ONLY:

  • 26 U.S.C. 871(a)(1):  Income of nonresident aliens other than capital gains derived from patents, copyrights, sale of original issue discounts, gains described in I.R.C. 631(b) or (c), interest, dividends, rents, salaries, premiums, annuities from sources within the statutory "United States**" (federal territory).
  • 26 U.S.C. 871(h): Earnings of nonresident aliens from portfolio debt instruments
  • 26 U.S.C. 881(a): Earnings of foreign corporations from patents, copyrights, gains, and interest not connected with a trade or business.

26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. 110(d) define the statutory "United States**" in a "geographical sense" only as being federal territories and possessions.

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > Sec. 7701.  [Internal Revenue Code]

Sec. 7701. - Definitions

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—

(9) United States

The term ''United States'' when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

(10) State

The term ''State'' shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.

__________________________________________________________________________________________

TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

Sec. 110. Same; definitions

(d) The term ''State'' includes any Territory or possession of the United States.

However, I.R.C. Section 864 above does not directly state or imply a "geographical sense", so it may have some other undefined meaning.  We allege that the ONLY way that working for a living can be an excise taxable privilege or "trade or business" is where the Constitution itself, in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 requires all "public offices" ("trades or businesses"), to be exercised, which is the District of Columbia:

United States Constitution

Article I: Legislative Department

Section 8: Powers of Congress

Clause 17: Seat of Government

Congress shall have power * * * To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock–Yards, and other needful Buildings.

Since accepting a public office in the federal government is a voluntary act, then the tax is voluntary.  If you don't want to pay it, you don't accept or run for the office.  In furtherance of the above, 4 U.S.C. 72 requires all "public offices" that are the subject of the tax upon a "trade or business" to be exercised ONLY in the District of Columbia and NOT elsewhere, except as "expressly provided by law":

TITLE 4 > CHAPTER 3 > 72

72. Public offices; at seat of Government

All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.

Therefore, all persons engaged in public offices MUST serve ONLY in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere, and there is no enactment of Congress authorizing them to serve in any state of the Union.  Therefore, the term "United States" as used throughout Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code:

  1. Does not imply a "geographical sense", because that phrase is never used in combination with the term "United States" anywhere we could find.  Instead, this definition is a red herring.
  2. Does not imply any state of the Union or any part of any state of the Union.
  3. Implies the United States government or “national government” and not the "federal government" of the states of the Union.  See Federalist Paper #39 for details.
  4. Applies only to persons domiciled on federal territory called the “United States” and subject to the exclusive or general or plenary jurisdiction of Congress.  26 U.S.C. 911(d)(3)  requires that a person cannot have a “tax home” unless their “abode”, meaning “domicile”, is within the “United States”.  The tax is applied against the “tax home” of the “individual”, which individual is a “public officer” within the United States government.  States of the Union are not “territory” as that word is correctly understood within American legal jurisprudence.

Consequently, "sources within the United States" really refers to payments to or from the U.S. government, all of which are enumerated and described and listed in 26 U.S.C. 871 in the context of nonresident aliens.  Subtitle A of the I.R.C. is therefore a "kickback program" for federal instrumentalities, domiciliaries, franchises, and employees, and the "profit and loss" statement for these instrumentalities is I.R.S. form 1040.  The tax is on the "profit" of these instrumentalities, which the I.R.S. calls "income".  26 U.S.C. 643(b) confirms that "income" means the earnings of a trust or estate connected with a public office and NOT all earnings.  That "trust" is the "public trust".  Government is a "public trust" per Executive Order 12731 and 5 C.F.R. 2635.101(a).   If you never received a payment from the government or accepted a payment on behalf of the government while acting in a representative capacity as a "public officer", then we allege that you cannot be a "taxpayer" or have a tax liability pursuant to Subtitle A of the I.R.C.

“Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L. ed. 98, was an action of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S. 244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power 'to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises,' which 'shall be uniform throughout the United States,' inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States [described in the Constitution]. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States. The fact that art. 1 , 2, declares that 'representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their respective numbers' furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned, but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. 'The words used do not mean that direct taxes shall be imposed on states only which are represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers.' That art. 1, 9, 4 , declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, 'and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective states. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census or enumeration referred to.' It was further held that the words of the 9th section did not 'in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the states. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them.'”
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

The conclusions of this section are also consistent with 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(39) and 26 U.S.C. 7408(d), which both effectively kidnap a “taxpayers” identity and move it to the District of Columbia for the purposes of Subtitle A of the I.R.C.  The "citizen" and "resident" they are talking about in these statutes are statutory and not constitutional "citizens" and "residents" which rely on the statutory term "United States", which means a person domiciled on federal territory and NOT domiciled within any state of the Union.  Why would they need such a provision and why would they try to fool you into declaring yourself to be a statutory "U.S. citizen" using their deceptive forms if they REALLY had jurisdiction within states of the Union?    More about this later.

5.4  Statutory “citizen of the United States**” or “U.S.** citizen”

You may wonder as we have how it is that Congress can make it a crime to falsely claim to be a statutory “U.S. citizen” in 18 U.S.C. 911.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 43 > 911
911. Citizen of the United States

Whoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be a citizen of the United States[**] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

The reason is that you cannot tax or regulate something until abusing it becomes harmful.  A “license”, after all, is legally defined as permission from the state to do that which is otherwise illegal or harmful or both.  And of course, you can only tax or regulate things that are harmful and licensed.  Hence, they had to:

  1. Create yet another franchise.
  2. Attach a “status” to the franchise called “citizen of the United States**”, where “United States” implies the GOVERNMENT and not any geographical place.
  3. Criminalize the abuse of the “status” and the rights that attach to the status.
  4. Make adopting the status entirely discretionary on the part of those participating.  Hence, invoking the “status” and the “benefits” and “privileges” associated with the status constitutes constructive consent to abide by all the statutes that regulate the status.

    California Civil Code
    DIVISION 3.  OBLIGATIONS
    PART 2.  CONTRACTS
    TITLE 1.  NATURE OF A CONTRACT
    CHAPTER 3.  CONSENT

    1589.  A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting.
    [SOURCE: 
    http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=civ&group=01001-02000&file=1565-1590]

  5. Impose a tax or fine or “licensing fee” for those adopting or invoking the status.  That tax, in fact, is the federal income tax codified in I.R.C. Subtitle A.

Every type of franchise works and is implemented exactly the same way, and the statutory  “U.S. citizen” or “citizen of the United States**” franchise is no different.  This section will prove that being a “citizen of the United States**” under the I.R.C. is, in fact, a franchise, that the franchise began in 1924 by judicial pronouncement, and that because the status is a franchise and all franchises are voluntary, you don’t have to participate, accept the “benefits”, or pay for the costs of the franchise if you don’t consent.

As you will eventually learn, one becomes a “citizen” in a common law or constitutional sense by being born or naturalized in a country and exercising their First Amendment right of political association by voluntarily choosing a national and a municipal domicile in that country.  How can Congress criminalize the exercise of the First Amendment right to politically associate with a “state” and thereby become a citizen?  After all, the courts have routinely held that Congress cannot criminalize the exercise of a right protected by the Constitution.

"It is an unconstitutional deprivation of due process for the government to penalize a person merely because he has exercised a protected statutory or constitutional right.  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) ."
[People of Territory of Guam v. Fegurgur, 800 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) ]

Even the U.S. Code recognizes the protected First Amendment right to not associate during the passport application process.  Being a statutory and not constitutional “citizen” is an example of type of membership, because domicile is civil membership in a territorial community usually called a county, and you cannot be a “citizen” without a domicile:

TITLE 22 > CHAPTER 38 > 2721
2721. Impermissible basis for denial of passports 

A passport may not be denied issuance, revoked, restricted, or otherwise limited because of any speech, activity, belief, affiliation, or membership, within or outside the United States, which, if held or conducted within the United States, would be protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The answer to how Congress can criminalize the exercise of a First Amendment protected right of political association that is the foundation of becoming a “citizen” therefore lies in the fact that the statutory “U.S.** citizen” mentioned in 18 U.S.C. 911  is not a constitutional citizen protected by the Constitution, but rather is:

  1. Not a human being or a private person but a statutory creation of Congress.  The ability to regulate private conduct, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, is repugnant to the U.S. Constitution and therefore Congress can ONLY regulate public conduct and the public offices and franchises that it creates.

    “The power to "legislate generally upon" life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the "power to provide modes of redress" against offensive state action, was "repugnant" to the Constitution. Id., at 15. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903). Although the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded or modified, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), their treatment of Congress' 5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned.”
    [City of Boerne v. Florez, Archbishop of San Antonio, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]

  2. A statutory franchise and a federal corporation created on federal territory and domiciled there.  Notice the key language “Whenever the public and private acts of the government seem to comingle [in this case, through the offering and enforcement of PRIVATE franchises to the public at large such as income taxes], a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place…”  What Congress did was perform this substitution in the franchise agreement itself (the I.R.C.) BEFORE the controversy ever even reached the court such that this judicial doctrine could be COVERTLY applied! They want to keep their secret weapon secret.

    See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ("`The United States does business on business terms'") (quoting United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926)); Perry v. United States, supra at 352 (1935) ("When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts [or franchises], it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference . . . except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent") (citation omitted); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877)  ("The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf"); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (explaining that when the United States "comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there").

    See Jones, 1 Cl.Ct. at 85 ("Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place, and then the question be determined whether the action will lie against the supposed defendant"); O'Neill v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (sovereign acts doctrine applies where, "[w]ere [the] contracts exclusively between private parties, the party hurt by such governing action could not claim compensation from the other party for the governing action"). The dissent ignores these statements (including the statement from Jones, from which case Horowitz drew its reasoning literally verbatim), when it says, post at 931, that the sovereign acts cases do not emphasize the need to treat the government-as-contractor the same as a private party.
    [United States v. Winstar Corp. 518 U.S. 839 (1996)]

  3. Property of the U.S. government.  All franchises and statuses incurred under franchises are property of the government grantor.  The government has always had the right to criminalize abuses of its property.
  4. A public office in the government like all other franchise statuses.
  5. An officer of a corporation, which is “U.S. Inc.” and is described in 28 U.S.C. 3002(15)(A).  All federal corporations are “citizens”, and therefore a statutory “U.S. citizen” is really just the corporation that you are representing as a public officer.

    "A corporation is a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the state or country by or under the laws of which it was created, and of that state or country only."
    [19 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corporations, 886]

Ordinarily, and especially in the case of states of the Union, domicile within that state by the state “citizen” is the determining factor as to whether an income tax is owed to the state by that citizen:

"domicileA person's legal home.  That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning.  Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super. 310m 213 A.2d 94.  Generally, physical presence within a state and the intention to make it one's home are the requisites of establishing a "domicile" therein.  The permanent residence of a person or the place to which he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere.  A person may have more than one residence but only one domicile.  The legal domicile of a person is important since it, rather than the actual residence, often controls the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and determines where a person may exercise the privilege of voting and other legal rights and privileges."
[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 485]

"Thus, the Court has frequently held that domicile or residence, more substantial than mere presence in transit or sojourn, is an adequate basis for taxation, including income, property, and death taxes. Since the Fourteenth Amendment makes one a citizen of the state wherein he resides, the fact of residence creates universally reciprocal duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure is largely a political matter. Of course, the situs of property may tax it regardless of the citizenship, domicile, or residence of the owner, the most obvious illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located."

[Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)]

We also establish the connection between domicile and tax liability in the following article.

Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the statutory “citizen of the United States**” mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code at  26 U.S.C. 911 and at 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c )  is not associated with either domicile OR with constitutional citizenship  (nationality) of the human being who is the “taxpayer” in the following case.  The party they mentioned, Cook, was domiciled within Mexico at the time, which meant he was NOT a statutory “citizen of the United States**” under the Internal Revenue Code but rather a “non-resident non-person”.  However, because he CLAIMED to be a statutory “citizen of the United States**” and the Supreme Court colluded with that FRAUD, they treated him as one ANYWAY.

We may make further exposition of the national power as the case depends upon it. It was illustrated at once in United States v. Bennett by a contrast with the power of a state. It was pointed out that there were limitations upon the latter that were not on the national power. The taxing power of a state, it was decided, encountered at its borders the taxing power of other states and was limited by them. There was no such limitation, it was pointed out, upon the national power, and that the limitation upon the states affords, it was said, no ground for constructing a barrier around the United States, 'shutting that government off from the exertion of powers which inherently belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty.'

“The contention was rejected that a citizen's property without the limits of the United States derives no benefit from the United States. The contention, it was said, came from the confusion of thought in 'mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States as a nation and its relations to its citizens and their relation to it.' And that power in its scope and extent, it was decided, is based on the presumption that government by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and that opposition to it holds on to citizenship while it 'belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the possession by government of an essential power required to make citizenship completely beneficial.' In other words, the principle was declared that the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and therefore has the power to make the benefit complete. Or, to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen. The consequence of the relations is that the native citizen who is taxed may have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country and the tax be legal—the government having power to impose the tax.”
[Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)]

So the key thing to note about the above is that the tax liability attaches to the STATUS of BEING a statutory but not constitutional “citizen of the United States” under the Internal Revenue Code, and NOT to domicile of the party, based on the above case.

“Or, to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen. The consequence of the relations is that the native citizen who is taxed may have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country and the tax be legal—the government having power to impose the tax.”
[Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)]

There are only two ways to reach a nonresident party through the civil law:  Domicile and contract.[1]  That status of being a statutory “U.S. citizen” under the Internal Revenue Code, in turn, can only be a franchise contract that establishes a “public office” in the U.S. government, which is the property of the U.S. Government that the creator of the franchise can regulate or tax ANYWHERE under the franchise “protection” contract.  All rights that attach to STATUS are, in fact, franchises, and the Cook case is no exception.  This, in fact, is why falsely claiming to be a “U.S. citizen” is a crime under 18 U.S.C. 911, because the status is “property” of the national government and abuse of said property or the public rights and “benefits” that attach to it is a crime.  The use of the “Taxpayer Identification Number” then becomes a de facto “license” to exercise the privilege.  You can’t license something unless it is ILLEGAL to perform without a license, so they had to make it illegal to claim to be a statutory “U.S. citizen” before they could license it and tax it.

How can they tax someone without a domicile in the “United States” and with no earnings from the United States in the case of Cook, you might ask?  Well, the REAL “taxpayer” is a public office in the U.S. government.  That office REPRESENTS the United States federal corporation.  All corporations are “citizens” of the place of their incorporation, and therefore under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), the effective domicile of the “taxpayer” is the District of Columbia.[2]  All taxes are a civil liability that are implemented with civil law.  The only way they could have reached extraterritorially with civil law to tax Cook without him having a domicile or residence anywhere in the statutory “United States**” was through a private law franchise contract in which he was a public officer.  It is a maxim of law that debt and contract know no place, meaning that they can be enforced anywhere. 

Debt and contract [franchise agreement, in this case] are of no particular place.
Locus contractus regit actum.

The place of the contract [franchise agreement, in this case] governs the act.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

The feds have jurisdiction over their own public officers wherever they are but the EFFECTIVE civil domicile of all such offices and officers is the District of Columbia pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b).  Hence, the ONLY thing such a statutory “citizen of the United States**” could be within the I.R.C. is a statutory creation of Congress that is actually a public office which is domiciled in the statutory but not constitutional “United States*” in order for the ruling in Cook to be constitutional or even lawful.  AND, according to the Cook case, having that status is a discretionary choice that has NOTHING to do with your circumstances, because Cook was NOT a statutory “citizen of the United States**” as someone not domiciled in the statutory but not constitutional “United States**”.  Instead, he was a "non-resident non-person" by virtue of his foreign domicile and the fact that he was not engaged in a public office in the national government. The court allowed him to accept the voluntary “benefit” of the statutory status and hence, it had nothing to do with his circumstances, but rather his CHOICE to nominate a “protector” and join a civil statutory franchise.  Simply INVOKING the status of being a statutory “citizen of the United States**” on a government form is the only magic word needed to give one’s consent to become a a “taxpayer” in that case.  It is what the court called a “benefit”, and all “benefits” are voluntary and the product of a franchise contract.  It was a quasi-contract as all taxes are, because the consent was implied rather than explicit, and it manifested itself by using property of the government, which in this case was the STATUS he claimed.

“Even if the judgment is deemed to be colored by the nature of the obligation whose validity it establishes, and we are free to re-examine it, and, if we find it to be based on an obligation penal in character, to refuse to enforce it outside the state where rendered, see Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265 , 292, et seq. 8 S.Ct. 1370, compare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 , 28 S.Ct. 641, still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a statutory liability, quasi contractual in nature, enforceable, if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common-law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250 , 31 S.Ct. 155 ; Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 , 46 S.Ct. 180 ; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227 ; and see Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 542 ; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486, 493 . This was the rule established in the English courts before the Declaration of Independence. Attorney General v. Weeks, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. 223; Attorney General v. Jewers and Batty, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. 225; Attorney General v. Hatton, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. [296 U.S. 268, 272]   262; Attorney General v. _ _, 2 Ans.Rep. 558; see Comyn's Digest (Title 'Dett,' A, 9); 1 Chitty on Pleading, 123; cf. Attorney General v. Sewell, 4 M.&W. 77. “
[Milwaukee v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935)]

You might reasonably ask of the Cook case, as we have, the following question:

“HOW did the government create the public office that they could tax and which Cook apparently occupied as a franchisee?”

Well, apparently the “citizen of the United States**” status he claimed is a franchise and an office in the U.S. government that carries with it the “public right” to make certain demands upon those who claim this status.  Hence, it represents a “property interest” in the services of the United States federal corporation.  In law, all rights are property, anything that conveys rights is property, contracts convey rights and are therefore property, and all franchises are contracts and therefore property.  A “public officer” is legally defined as someone in charge of the property of the public, and the property Cook was in possession of was the public rights that attach to the status of being a statutory “citizen of the United States**”. 

Public office. The right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government for the benefit of the public. Walker v. Rich, 79 Cal.App. 139, 249 P. 56, 58. An agency for the state, the duties of which involve in their performance the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, either great or small. Yaselli v. Goff, C.C.A., 12 F.2d 396, 403, 56 A.L.R. 1239 ; Lacey v. State, 13 Ala.App. 212, 68 So. 706, 710 ; Curtin v. State, 61 Cal.App. 377, 214 P. 1030, 1035 ; Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, 75 1nd.App. 493, 129 N.E. 878 . State ex rel. Colorado River Commission v. Frohmiller, 46 Ariz. 413, 52 P.2d 483, 486. Where, by virtue of law, a person is clothed, not as an incidental or transient authority, but for such time as de- notes duration and continuance, with Independent power to control the property of the public, or with public functions to be exercised in the supposed interest of the people, the service to be compensated by a stated yearly salary, and the occupant having a designation or title, the position so created is a public office. State v. Brennan, 49 Ohio St. 33. 29 N.E. 593.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1235]

For Cook, the statutory status of being a “citizen of the United States**” was the “res” that “identified” him within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and hence made him a “res-ident” or “resident” subject to the tax with standing to sue in a territorial franchise court, which is what all U.S. District Courts are.  In effect, he waived sovereign immunity and became a statutory “resident alien” by invoking the services of the federal courts, and as such, he had to pay for their services by paying the tax.  Otherwise, he would have no standing to sue in the first place because he would be a “stateless person” and they would have had to dismiss his case.

If you would like a much more thorough discussion of all of the nuances of the Cook case, we strongly recommend the following:

Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.018, Section 6
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Here is another HUGE clue about what they think a “U.S. citizen” really is in federal statutes.  Look at the definition below, and then consider that you CAN’T own a human being as property.  That’s called slavery:

TITLE 46 > Subtitle V > Part A > CHAPTER 505 > 50501
50501. Entities deemed citizens of the United States

(a) In General.—

In this subtitle, a corporation, partnership, or association is deemed to be a citizen of the United States only if the controlling interest is owned by citizens of the United States. However, if the corporation, partnership, or association is operating a vessel in the coastwise trade, at least 75 percent of the interest must be owned by citizens of the United States.

Now look at what the U.S. Supreme Court said about “ownership” of human beings.  You can’t “own” a human being as chattel.  The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits that.  Therefore, the statutory “U.S. citizen” they are talking about above is an instrumentality and public office within the United States.  They can only tax, regulate, and legislate for PUBLIC objects and public offices of the United States under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2.  The ability to regulate PRIVATE conduct of human beings has repeatedly been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to be “repugnant to the constitution” and beyond the jurisdiction of Congress.

“It [the contract] is, in substance and effect, a contract for servitude, with no limitation but that of time; leaving the master to determine what the service should be, and the place where and the person to whom it should be rendered. Such a contract, it is scarcely necessary to say, is against the policy of our institutions and laws. If such a sale of service could be lawfully made for five years, it might, from the same reasons, for ten, and so for the term of one's life. The door would thus be opened for a species of servitude inconsistent with the first and fundamental article of our declaration of rights, which, proprio vigore, not only abolished every vestige of slavery then existing in the commonwealth, but rendered every form of it thereafter legally impossible. That article has always been regarded, not simply as the declaration of an abstract principle, but as having the active force and conclusive authority of law.’ Observing that one who voluntarily subjected himself to the laws of the state must find in them the rule of restraint as well as the rule of action, the court proceeded: ‘Under this contract the plaintiff had no claim for the labor of the servant for the term of five years, or for any term whatever. She was under no legal obligation to remain in his service. There was no time during which her service was due to the plaintiff, and during which she was kept from such service by the acts of the defendants.

[. . .]

Under the contract of service it was at the volition of the master to entail service upon these appellants for an indefinite period. So far as the record discloses, it was an accident that the vessel came back to San Francisco when it did. By the shipping articles, the appellants could not quit the vessel until it returned to a port of the *296 United States, and such return depended absolutely upon the will of the master. He had only to land at foreign ports, and keep the vessel away from the United States, in order to prevent the appellants from leaving his service.

[. . .]

The supreme law of the land now declares that involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, of which the party shall have been duly convicted, shall not exist any where within the United States.
[Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326 (U.S. 1897)]

Federal courts also frequently use the phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”.  Below is an example:

The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States do not necessarily include all the rights protected by the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution against the powers of the Federal Government.

The trial of a person accused as a criminal by a jury of only eight persons instead of twelve, and his subsequent imprisonment after conviction do not abridge his privileges and immunities under the Constitution as a citizen of the United States and do not deprive him of his liberty without due process of law.”
[Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1899)]

Note that the “citizen of the United States**” described above is a statutory rather than constitutional citizen, which is why the court admits that the rights of such a person are inferior to those possessed by a “citizen” within the meaning of the United States Constitution.  A constitutional but not statutory citizen is, in fact, NOT “privileged” in any way and none of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution can truthfully be called “privileges” without violating the law.  It is a tort and a violation of due process, in fact, to convert rights protected by the Constitution and the common law into “privileges” or franchises or “public rights” under statutory law without at least your consent, which anyone in their right mind should NEVER give.

"It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution." Frost & Frost  Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583. "Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied,' Smith v. Allwriqht, 321 US. 649, 644, or manipulated out of existence [by converting them into statutory “privileges”/franchises],' Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.  339, 345."
[Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S 528 at 540, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1185 (1965)]

It is furthermore proven in the following memorandum of law that civil statutory civil law pertains almost exclusively to government officers and employers and cannot and does not pertain to human beings or private persons not engaged in federal franchises/privileges:

Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Consequently, if a court refers to “privileges and immunities” in relation to you, chances are they are presuming, usually FALSELY, that you are a statutory “U.S. citizen” and NOT a constitutional citizen.  If you want to prevent them from making such false presumptions, we recommend attaching the following forms at least to your initial complaint and/or response in any action in court:

  1. Federal Pleading/Motion/Petition Attachment, Litigation Tool #01.002
    http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm
  2. Affidavit of Citizenship, Domicile, and Tax Status, Form #02.001
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

If you would like to know more about the devious abuse of franchises to destroy your rights and break the chains of the Constitution that bind your public servants and protect your rights, see:

Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm


[1] See Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302, Section 5.2.4 :  The Two Sources of Federal Civil Jurisdiction: “Domicile” and “Contract”; http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm.

[2] "A corporation is a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the state or country by or under the laws of which it was created, and of that state or country only." [19 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corporations, 886 TA \s "19 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corporations, 886" ]

6.  I.R.C. requirements for the exercise of a "trade or business"

Next, we must search the code for the uses of the term “trade or business” to define how it applies by using the context.  Below is a summary of our findings:

  1. For “individuals”, who are ALL "aliens" under the I.R.C., only income either "effectively connected with a trade or business in the United States" or originating from the District of Columbia and earned by a nonresident alien under 26 U.S.C.  871(a) are considered "gross income" under I.R.C. Subtitle A.  Statutory “U.S.** citizens” can only earn "taxable income" when they are living abroad, in which case they become “aliens” under the provisions of a treaty with a foreign country.  ONLY in that condition are they the proper subject of the Internal Revenue Code AFTER volunteering to be "taxpayers":

    NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES
    DETERMINATION OF TAX LIABILITY

    Tax on Individuals

    Sec. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals.

    (a)(2)(ii) For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1970, the tax imposed by section 1(d) [married individuals filing separately], as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, shall apply to the income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States by a married alien individual who is a nonresident of the United States for all or part of the taxable year or by a foreign estate or trust. For such years the tax imposed by section 1(c) [unmarried individuals], as amended by such Act, shall apply to the income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States by an unmarried alien individual (other than a surviving spouse) who is a nonresident of the United States for all or part of the taxable year. See paragraph (b)(2) of section 1.871-8.”
    [26 C.F.R. 1.1-1]

  2. Those who are “self employed” do not earn “gross income” unless it is connected to a “trade or business”:

    TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 2 > 1402

    1402: Definitions

    (a) Net earnings from self-employment

    The term ''net earnings from self-employment'' means the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or business, plus his distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss described in section 702(a)(8) from any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a member; ….

  3. The only indirect excise taxable activity connected with a biological person and which is subject to Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is identified in 26 C.F.R. 1.861-8(f)(1)(iv)  as “income effectively connected with a trade or business” of a “nonresident alien”. Therefore, the only earnings of a nonresident alien that can be included in “gross income” are those “effectively connected with a trade or business” (e.g. performance of a public office domiciled in the District of Columbia):

    Title 26: Internal Revenue
    PART 1—INCOME TAXES
    Determination of Sources of Income

    1.861-8  Computation of taxable income from sources within the United States and from other sources and activities.

    (f) Miscellaneous matters.

    (1) Operative sections.

    The operative sections of the Code which require the determination of taxable income of the taxpayer from specific sources or activities and which give rise to statutory groupings to which this section is applicable include the sections described below.

    (iv) Effectively connected taxable income.

    Nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations engaged in trade or business within the United States, under sections 871(b)(1) and 882(a)(1), on taxable income [federal payments] which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the [federal] United States. Such taxable income is determined in most instances by initially determining, under section 864(c), the amount of gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. Pursuant to sections 873 and 882(c), this section is applicable for purposes of determining the deductions from such gross income (other than the deduction for interest expense allowed to foreign corporations (see section 1.882-5)) which are to be taken into account in determining taxable income. See example (21) of paragraph (g) of this section.

    [SOURCE:  http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=ffec583671411651209c041f59a8e75a&rgn=div8&view=text&node=26:9.0.1.1.1.0.4.74&idno=26]

  4. Statutory but not constitutional “U.S. Citizens” abroad whose earnings are subject to tax include only those with income “effectively connected with a trade or business”.  By statutory “U.S. Citizen”, we mean those born anywhere in the country and domiciled on federal terrritory within the District of Columbia or the territories of the United States, as discussed in the previous chapter starting in section 4.11:

    TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter N > PART III > Subpart B > 911

    911. Citizens or residents of the United States living abroad

    (a) Exclusion from gross income

    At the election of a qualified individual (made separately with respect to paragraphs (1) and (2)), there shall be excluded from the gross income of such individual, and exempt from taxation under this subtitle, for any taxable year -

     (1) the foreign earned income of such individual, and

    (2) the housing cost amount of such individual. (d) Definitions and special rules

    (b) Foreign earned income

    (1) Definition

    For purposes of this section -

    (A) In general

    The term ''foreign earned income'' with respect to any individual means the amount received by such individual from sources within a foreign country or countries which constitute earned income attributable to services performed by such individual during the period described in subparagraph (A) or

    (B) of subsection (d)(1), whichever is applicable. (B) Certain amounts not included in foreign earned income

    The foreign earned income for an individual shall not include amounts -

    (i) received as a pension or annuity,

    (ii) paid by the United States or an agency thereof to an employee of the United States or an agency thereof,

    (iii) included in gross income by reason of section 402(b) (relating to taxability of beneficiary of nonexempt trust) or section 403(c) (relating to taxability of beneficiary under a nonqualified annuity), or

    (iv) received after the close of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the services to which the amounts are attributable are performed.

    [. . .]

    (d) Definitions and special rules

    For purposes of this section -

    [. . .]

    (2) Earned income

    (A) In general

    The term ''earned income'' means wages, salaries, or professional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually rendered, but does not include that part of the compensation derived by the taxpayer for personal services rendered by him to a corporation which represents a distribution of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance as compensation for the personal services actually rendered.

    (B) Taxpayer engaged in trade or business

    In the case of a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business in which both personal services and capital are material income-producing factors, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, a reasonable allowance as compensation for the personal services rendered by the taxpayer, not in excess of 30 percent of his share of the net profits of such trade or business, shall be considered as earned income.

    The key "word of art" above is the term "personal services" which 26 C.F.R. 1.469-9  says means "work performed by an individual in connection with a trade or business".  Therefore, “U.S. citizens” abroad who are not involved in a “trade or business” do not earn “taxable income” because they are not engaged in an excise  taxable activity.  Notice also that the term “abroad” is never defined anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code AND that the 50 states of the Union are NOT “domestic” as domestic is used in the Code.  They instead are “foreign” for the purposes of legislative jurisdiction, as we emphasize throughout this chapter. Also notice that there is no mention anywhere within the entire I.R.C. of the status of taxability of earnings of statutory “U.S. citizens” situated outside the statutory "United States**" (federal territory) within the code but NOT abroad.  That is because they ARE NOT subject to the Internal Revenue Code, and can’t even volunteer to be subject to a prima facie statute that they are not even within the territorial jurisdiction of.   

  5. Earnings from labor rendered by a “nonresident alien”, even if within the “United States” (federal zone), to a foreign corporation or foreign partnership that is not involved in a “trade or business in the United States” (public office) is not includible as “gross income”.  Ditto for earnings from a “foreign country”, which includes states of the Union, as we pointed out earlier in section 5.2.13.  Here is the proof:

    TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter N > PART I > 864

    864. Definitions and special rules

    (b) Trade or business within the United States

    For purposes of this part, part II, and chapter 3, the term “trade or business within the United States” includes the performance of personal services within the United States at any time within the taxable year, but does not include

    (1) Performance of personal services for foreign employer

    The performance of personal services—

    (A) for a nonresident alien individual, foreign partnership, or foreign corporation, not engaged in trade or business within the United States, or

    (B) for an office or place of business maintained in a foreign country or in a possession of the United States by an individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States or by a domestic partnership or a domestic corporation,

  6. Whether a legal "person" is considered "resident" or "nonresident" has nothing to do with where it was organized, incorporated or where it has a physical residence.  Instead, it is determined by whether the organization is engaged in a "trade or business".  Therefore, if you aren't engaged in a "trade or business", even if you are domiciled in the District of Columbia, then you are a "nonresident".  Here is the proof:

    26 C.F.R. 301.7701-5 Domestic, foreign, resident, and nonresident persons.

    A domestic corporation is one organized or created in the United States, including only the States (and during the periods when not States, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii), and the District of Columbia, or under the law of the United States or of any State or Territory. A foreign corporation is one which is not domestic. A domestic corporation is a resident corporation even though it does no business and owns no property in the United States. A foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the United States is referred to in the regulations in this chapter as a resident foreign corporation, and a foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the United States, as a nonresident foreign corporation. A partnership engaged in trade or business within the United States is referred to in the regulations in this chapter as a resident partnership, and a partnership not engaged in trade or business within the United States, as a nonresident partnership. Whether a partnership is to be regarded as resident or nonresident is not determined by the nationality or residence of its members or by the place in which it was created or organized.
    [Amended by T.D. 8813, Federal Register: February 2, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 21), Page 4967-4975]

If you examine the above list, there are only four statuses or conditions throughout the I.R.C. that don’t specifically mention that they must be connected to a “trade or business” in order to qualify as “gross income”, which are:

  1. Married individuals” under 26 U.S.C. 1(a).  Not mentioned in item 1 above.
  2. Heads of household” under 26 U.S.C. 1(b).  Not mentioned in item 1 above.
  3. Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) involved in foreign commerce.
  4. Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) involved in foreign commerce.

We know that the first two are ALSO involved in a “trade or business” because in the only place they are mentioned in the I.R.C., which is 26 U.S.C. 1(a) and 1(b), a graduated rate of tax appears there.  There is no way to elect a flat 30% tax rate as a "Married individual" or "Head of household" without declaring oneself as a “nonresident alien” coming under the provisions of 26 U.S.C. 871(a) INSTEAD of these two provisions.  Furthermore, the requirement for "equal protection of the laws", found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and in 42 U.S.C. 1981(a), mandates that "Heads of Household" and "Married individuals" shall be subjected to the same burdens, taxes, and penalties as "Married individuals filing separately" or "Unmarried individuals" or they would be discriminated against.  Therefore, they too must be engaged in a "trade or business" in order to earn "taxable income" as well.  We also know that the graduated rate of tax cannot be implemented in states of the Union, because they are not "uniform", meaning that everyone doesn't pay the same percentage, as required by the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1, which says:

U.S. Constitution

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform [same percentage] throughout the United States [and upon all “persons”]

The reason all excise taxes within states of the Union must be uniform throughout the states and have the same percentage on all persons is that if they weren't, then the federal government would be depriving sovereign American Nationals in the states of "equal protection of the laws".  However, the Constitutional requirement for "equal protection" does not apply within areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as the District of Columbia, under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution, and under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution.  There have been at least two state supreme Court rulings consistent with this conclusion, which declared that graduated rate income taxes are unconstitutional within states of the Union.  See Culliton v. Chase, 25 P.2d 81 (1933) and Jensen v. Henneford, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).   You will also learn later in this section that those who elect for a graduated rate of tax are “effectively connected with a trade or business in the United States” under 26 U.S.C. 871(b).

We’ll now provide a table summarizing our findings to show the excise taxable activity for each type of entity to make the results of this survey of the I.R.C. crystal clear.  Note that all the taxable activities must occur within exclusive federal jurisdiction under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution, or else they become “extortion under the color of law”.  The federal government cannot collect or assess taxes in areas where it has no legislative jurisdiction:

Table  1:  Taxable activity under I.R.C. by type of entity

# Entitle name Entity type Citizenship status Excise taxable Activity I.R.C. Section Regulation Notes
1 Married Individual Natural person Resident alien” or “U.S. citizen abroad” “trade or business”

26 U.S.C. 1(a)  imposes the tax

26 U.S.C. 864(c )(3) says all earnings from the statutory "United States**" (federal territory) are considered to be from a “trade or business”

26 C.F.R. 1.861-8(f)(1) lists all the taxable activities, that are includible in “gross income” and the only one connected with a natural person is a nonresident alien engaged in a “trade or business”

Must be engaged in a “trade or business” to earn “taxable income”
2 Head of Household Natural person Resident alien” or “U.S. citizen abroad” “trade or business”

26 U.S.C. 1(b)  imposes the tax

26 U.S.C. 864(c )(3)  says all earnings from the statutory "United States**" (federal terrtory) are considered to be from a “trade or business”

26 C.F.R. 1.861-8(f)(1)   lists all the taxable activities, that are includible in “gross income” and the only one connected with a natural person is a nonresident alien engaged in a “trade or business”

Must be engaged in a “trade or business” to earn “taxable income”
3 Married Individual Filing Separately Natural person Resident alien” or “U.S. citizen abroad” “trade or business”

26 U.S.C. 1(c)  imposes the tax

26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(a)(2)(ii)   says must be engaged in “trade or business” to earn “taxable income”

26 C.F.R. 1.861-8(f)(1)  lists all the taxable activities, that are includible in “gross income” and the only one connected with a natural person is a nonresident alien engaged in a “trade or business”

Must be engaged in a “trade or business” to earn “taxable income”
4 Unmarried Individual Natural person Resident alien” or “U.S. citizen abroad” “trade or business”

26 U.S.C. 1(d)  imposes the tax

26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(a)(2)(ii)   says must be engaged in “trade or business” to earn “taxable income”

Must be engaged in a “trade or business” to earn “taxable income”
5 Estate or trust Artificial entity U.S. citizen” domiciled in the statutory "United States**" (federal territory) Transfer of property

I.R.C. Subtitle B

26 U.S.C. 2001 imposes tax

26 U.S.C. 2002 creates liability

Only applies to “U.S. citizens” or “Resident aliens” domiciled in the federal zone and NOT in a state of the Union. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)

6 American national living in a state of the Union Natural person national but not citizen” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(21) and 8 U.S.C. 1452 None (nontaxpayer)

26 U.S.C. 864(b)(1)(A) says earnings not includible in “gross income” if paid to a “nonresident alien”

26 U.S.C. 861(a)(3)(C)(i) says earnings of a nonresident alien not connected with a “trade or business” is not deemed income from sources within the U.S.

26 C.F.R. 1.861-8(f)(1)   lists all the taxable activities, that are includible in “gross income” and the only one connected with a natural person is a nonresident alien engaged in a “trade or business”

Nontaxpayer not subject o the Internal Revenue Code.
7 Exempt Organization Artificial organization (DBA) Resident alien”  or “U.S. citizen “trade or business”

26 U.S.C. 501

See IRS Publication 598 and search for the phrase “trade or business” and you will be surprised by what you find.  That publication basically says if the organization is engaged in a “trade or business” that is not substantially related to its exempt purpose.
8 Federal Corporation Corporation (DISC or FSC) U.S. citizen “trade or business”

26 U.S.C. 11 imposes the tax.

26 C.F.R. 1.861-8(f)(1)   lists all the taxable activities, that are includible in “gross income” and the only one connected with a natural person is a nonresident alien engaged in a “trade or business”

 
9 Federal Corporation Corporation U.S. citizen “foreign commerce”

26 U.S.C. 4081(a)  imposes tax on imported petroleum

Imposed under Subtitle D on imported petroleum.  This is a constitutional tax.
10 State (not federally registered) Corporation Corporation “state citizen” but not “U.S. citizen None.  A “nontaxpayer”

No federal legislative jurisdiction inside states of the Union.

Not subject to IRS jurisdiction.

7.  What kind of tax is it?: Direct or Indirect, Constitutional or Unconstitutional?

We already proved in section 3 that the I.R.C. Subtitles A and C income tax is an excise or franchise tax upon public offices within the national but not state government.  The next important questions we must answer are the following, which we frequently hear from our readers:

  1. Is it DIRECT or INDIRECT as described in the U.S. Constitution?
  2. Is it a CONSTITUTIONAL or UNCONSTITUTIONAL tax?

Of I.R.C. Subtitle A income taxes, the U.S. Supreme Court has said:

"...the requirement to pay [excise] taxes involves the exercise of privilege."
[Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911)]

_________________________________________

“We are of opinion, however, that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it...”

“[Taxation of "income" is] in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to disregard form and consider substance alone, and hence subject the tax to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise would not apply to it”  (That is, if the "income" tax ever comes to be administered as something other than an excise, or on something unsuited to an excise, the rule of apportionment must be applied.)
[Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)]

_________________________________________

"The provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation . . ."
[Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916)]

_________________________________________

“The Sixteenth Amendment, although referred to in argument, has no real bearing and may be put out of view. As pointed out in recent decisions, it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects...”
[Peck v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918)]

_________________________________________

"We must reject… …the broad contention submitted in behalf of the government that all receipts-- everything that comes in-- are income…”
[So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918)]

Therefore, Subtitle A of the I.R.C. describes an excise tax upon “privileges”.  If it ain’t a privilege, then they can’t tax it.  Neither can the government lawfully tax the exercise of a right, such as the right to work and support yourself, unless that right is exercised coincident with a “privilege” of federal employment, agency, or benefits.

"PRIVILEGE:  A particular benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class beyond the common advantages of others citizens. An exceptional or extraordinary power of exemption. A particular right, advantage, exemption, power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or class, not generally possessed by others."

[Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1197]

“It has been well said that 'the property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property’.”

[Butcher Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1883)]

”Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property- partaking of the nature of each- is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property”

[Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)]

“Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally admitted; and no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will…”

[The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66; 10 Wheat 66; 6 L.Ed.  268 (1825)]

Now that we have thoroughly analyzed why Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code describes an “excise” tax on a taxable activity called a “trade or business”, we are now ready to address how this tax functions.  We have prepared a table to clarify these mechanisms:

Table  5-41: What makes IRC Subtitle A an Excise Tax

# Characteristics of indirect
excise taxes
Description
1 Taxable privilege Exercising a “public office”, which is called a “trade or business” in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26).
2 “License” that identifies us as engaging in the privilege

1.  Filing a W-4 with your private employer.  When you file a W-4, you signed an “agreement”/contract (see 26 C.F.R. 31.3401(a)-3 ).  This agreement made you into a recipient, “transferee”, and “fiduciary” over payments to the federal government under 26 U.S.C. 6901 .  It also constituted an agreement under 26 C.F.R. 31.3402(p)-1  to include all of your earnings from the employer receiving the W-4 on a tax “return” as “gross income”.  Your private employer is no longer paying you directly and you effectively become a “subcontractor” to the U.S. government, who is your intermediary and real “employer”.  Instead, your private employer is paying a “strawman” or artificial entity called a federal “employee” acting on behalf of the government as a “transferee” and “fiduciary”.  The all caps name on the W-4 and the SSN associated with the all caps name is the “res” or artificial entity that describes the federal subcontractor that you are representing.  The SSN or TIN and the all caps “strawman” name on the pay stub that your private employer gives you is evidence that the payment is a payment to the federal government which is federal property because this number can only used for keeping track of federal payments and “receipts”.  The money your private employer pays you are “earnings” of a U.S. government subcontractor.  Recall that “income”, within the meaning of the Constitution is “corporate profit”.  The U.S. government is described as a “federal corporation” in 28 U.S.C. 3002(15)(A).  The “profit” of this federal corporation is the “tax” deducted from the payment and “returned” to the corporation using a tax “return”.  The SSN is a vehicle the government uses to keep track of federal payments and federal subcontractors called “employees” who are managing these payments and returning “taxes”, which are “corporate profit” payments, to their rightful owner.

2.  Filing a form 1040 rather than the correct 1040NR.  The IRS Published Products catalog says this form can only be filed by “citizens or residents of the United States”, all of whom are domiciled ONLY in the statutory "United States**" (federal territory) (see 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. 110(d)).  Under 26 U.S.C. 864(c )(3), all earnings within the statutory "United States**" (federal territory) are “effectively connected with a trade or business”, so you must be engaged in a “trade or business” whether you realize it or not if you file form 1040 instead of the proper form 1040NR.

3 License number Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) or Social Security Number (SSN)
4 How privilege is exercised

1.  Receiving payments destined for the federal government from private parties, like employers and financial institutions.  These payments are public property that can only be handled by “public officers”.

2.  Ability to claim deductions on tax return.

3.  Ability to apply graduated rate rather than fixed rate.

4.  Ability to claim exemptions and earned income credit on a tax return.

Being domiciled on federal territory in the statutory but not constitutional "United States**".

5 Affect of accepting privilege

1.  Acting as a “transferee”, “fiduciary”, and “trustee” over payments made to the federal government.

2.  Lose control over earnings.  They don’t become yours until the federal overpayment is returned in the form of a “tax”/”kickback”. 

3.  Subject to federal jurisdiction because in custody of federal overpayment.  Jurisdiction is “in rem” under Article 4, Section 3. Clause 2 of the Constitution.

4.   IRS can enforce I.R.C. without implementing regulations.  See 44 U.S.C. 1501(a)(1), 5 USC 552(a)(1), 5 USC 553(a)(2).

6 Why tax is an excise tax The tax is on an activity that can be avoided and therefore is not direct.  If you don’t want to pay the tax, then don’t exercise any of the “privileges” associated with a “trade or business” listed in item 2 above.
7 Tax measured by Taxable income, which is “gross income” minus deductions and exemptions.

A picture is worth a thousand words.  Below is a diagram showing the condition of those who are employed by private employers and who have consented to participate in the federal tax system by completing a W-4.  This diagram shows graphically the relationships described in the table above.

Figure  5-2:  Employment arrangement of those involved in a "trade or business"

Trade or Business

NOTES ON ABOVE DIAGRAM:

1. The I.R.C. Subtitle A income tax is NOT implemented through public law or positive law, but primarily through private law.  Private law always supersedes enacted positive law because no court or government can interfere with your right to contract.  See Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution for the proof.  The W-4 is a contract, and the United States has jurisdiction over its own property and employees under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2, wherever they may reside, including in places where it has no legislative jurisdiction.  The W-4 you signed is a private contract that makes you into a federal employee, and neither the state nor the federal government may interfere with the private right to contract.  26 C.F.R. 31.3402(p)-1  identifies the W-4 as an “agreement”, which is a contract.  It doesn’t say that on the form, because your covetous government doesn’t want you to know you are signing a contract by submitting a W-4.

2.   The “tax” is not paid by you, but by your “strawman”, who is a federal “public officer” engaged in a “trade or business” as defined in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26).  That “public officer” you volunteered to represent is working as a federal “employee” who is part of the United States government, which is defined as a federal corporation in 28 U.S.C. 3002(15)(A).  In that sense, the “tax” is indirect, because you don’t pay it, but your strawman, who is a “public officer”, pays it to your “employer”, the federal government, which is a federal corporation. 

3.  Because you are presumed by the IRS to be a federal “employee” and you work for an unspecified and unidentified federal corporation, then you are acting as an “officer or employee of a federal corporation” and you:

3.1.  Are the proper subject of the penalty statutes, as defined under 26 U.S.C. 6671(b).

3.2.  May have the code enforced against you without implementing regulations as required by  44 U.S.C. 1505(a)(1) and 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2)

4.  The “activity” of performing a “trade or business” is only “taxable” when executed in the statutory “United States**” is defined as in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9)  and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. 110(d).  See 26 U.S.C. 864  and this section for evidence.

5.  Those who file form 1040 instead of the proper form 1040NR provide evidence under penalty of perjury that they are "U.S. persons" (see 26 U.S.C.  7701(a)(30) who are domiciled in the statutory but not constitutional "United States**" (federal territory).  The IRS Published Products catalog says the form can only be used for “citizens or residents” of the “United States”, which is defined as federal territory in the I.R.C..

The words you use to describe this tax can get you into trouble in court and attract insincere and covetous judges and prosecutors to call you frivolous and try to penalize you to evade addressing the issues raised in this memorandum.  We would now like to clarify the following important facts about the nature of the I.R.C. Subtitles A and C income tax to ensure that our readers stay out of harm’s way:

  1. Is NOT an Article 1, Section 8 tax.
    “Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L.Ed. 98, was an action of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S. 244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power 'to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises,' which 'shall be uniform throughout the United States,' inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States [described in the Constitution]. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States. The fact that art. 1 , 2, declares that 'representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their respective numbers' furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned, but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. 'The words used do not mean that direct taxes shall be imposed on states only which are represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers.' That art. 1, 9, 4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, 'and will enable Congress to apportion on it it’s just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective states. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census or enumeration referred to.' It was further held that the words of the 9th section did not 'in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the states. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them.'”
    [Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
  2. It is only applicable to those consensually and contractually engaging in business WITH the U.S. Inc. as public officers.
  3. Extends ONLY where the GOVERNMENT extends. 
    It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States.
    [Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
    Sources WITHIN the government, in fact, are defined in the at 26 U.S.C. §864(c)(3) as “sources within the United States”.
  4. It functions as what we call a “public officer kickback program” disguised to LOOK like a lawful national tax.  That perspective is thoroughly explained in:
    4.1 IRS Humbug, Frank Kowalik.
    4.2 Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302, Section 5.6.10
    http://famguardian.org/Publications/GreatIRSHoax/GreatIRSHoax.htm

  5. It is neither CONSTITUTIONAL nor UNCONSTITUTIONAL, but rather EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL. It is an EXTRA-constitutional tax because the Constitution doesn’t protect what happens by consent to PUBLIC officers within the government.  All those serving in public offices do so by consent and it is a maxim of law that you cannot complain of an injury for things you consent to.
  6. While it is NOT a constitutional but an EXTRA-constitutional tax, if tax terms such as “direct, indirect, excise” used within the constitution WERE used to describe it, then it would have to be described as follows:

    6.1 It is a direct, unapportioned tax on INCOME as property.   All direct taxes are on property.  Note also that the ONLY place it can be administered as a “DIRECT TAX” is the District of Columbia, which is why the terms “United States” and “State” are both defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) as the District of Columbia and no part of any state of the Union.  This is also why the ONLY remaining “internal revenue district” within which the I.R.S. can lawfully enforce pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7601 is the District of Columbia.

    6.2 It is a DIRECT TAX because it involves both real estate and personal property or the "benefits" of such property. This definition of "direct" derives from Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1894).

    6.3 It is a direct tax upon PROPERTY owned BY THE GOVERNMENT because in POSSESSION of the government at the time of payment. 

    6.4 The earnings of public offices are property of the government, because the OFFICE is owned by the government and was created by the government.  The creator of a thing is always the owner.

    6.5 The "income" subject to the tax is payments FROM the government.

    6.6 It is an excise on the SOURCE of income.

    6.7 The SOURCE is the specific place the activity was accomplished, which is ALWAYS the government or a "U.S. source". A "U.S. source" means an activity WITHIN the government. Hence "INTERNAL revenue code". See:

    http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/source.htm

    Source of Earned Income


    The source of your earned income is the place where you perform the services for which you received the income. Foreign earned income is income you receive for performing personal services in a foreign country. Where or how you are paid has no effect on the source of the income. For example, income you receive for work done in France is income from a foreign source even if the income is paid directly to your bank ac-count in the United States and your employer is located in New York City.

    If you receive a specific amount for work done in the United States, you must report that amount as U.S. source income. If you cannot determine how much is for work done in the United States, or for work done partly in the United States and partly in a foreign country, determine the amount of U.S. source income using the method that most correctly shows the proper source of your income.
    In most cases you can make this determination on a time basis. U.S. source income is the amount that results from multiplying your total pay (including allowances, re-imbursements other than for foreign moves, and noncash fringe benefits) by a fraction.  The numerator (top number) is the number of days you worked within the United States.  The denominator is the total number of days of work for which you were paid.
    [IRS Publication 54 (for the year 2000, on page 4)]

    6.8 It is INDIRECT in the sense that all indirect taxes are excise taxes upon activities that can be avoided by avoiding the activity.  However, it becomes DIRECT, a THEFT, and slavery/involuntary servitude if the government:
    6.8.1 Refuses to recognize or protect your right to NOT volunteer and not become a public officer.
    6.8.2 Refuses to acknowledge the nature of the activity being taxed, or PRESUMES that it is NOT a public office.
    6.8.3 Refuses to correct false information returns against those NOT engaging in the activity, and thereby through omission causes EVERYONE who is the subject of such false reports to essentially be elected into a public office through a criminally false and fraudulent information return.
    6.8.4 Enforces it outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress or against those who are not public officers and officers of a corporation as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).

    6.9 The reason that direct and indirect can BOTH describe it, is that the constitution doesn't apply in the only place the activity can lawfully be exercised (per 4 U.S.C. §72), which is federal territory. It doesn't fit the constitution because it doesn't apply to the PRIVATE people who are the only proper subject of the constitution.

  7. Civil choice of law rules found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 and 28 U.S.C. §1652 dictate that the LOCAL state law governs the activity by default and that foreign law (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1) only becomes applicable if the party is acting as an officer of a foreign corporation.  Hence, only by being lawfully engaged in a public office within the U.S. Government, which is a federal corporation and legislatively foreign corporation in respect to constitutional states of the Union, can the municipal laws of the District of Columbia be made applicable to the activity.  Otherwise, there is no federal jurisdiction over the activity subject to tax.
    "A foreign corporation is one that derives its existence solely from the laws of another state, government, or country, and the term is used indiscriminately, sometimes in statutes, to designate either a corporation created by or under the laws of another state or a corporation created by or under the laws of a foreign country."
    "A federal corporation operating within a state is considered a domestic corporation rather than a foreign corporation.  The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state."  
    [19 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corporations, §883]
  8. It is PRIVATE law and SPECIAL law, rather than PUBLIC law, that only applies to specific persons and things CONSENSUALLY engaged in activities on federal territory as AGENTS of the government ONLY.  That is why the entire Title 26 of the U.S. Code is identified as NOT being “positive law” in 1 U.S.C. §204:  Because it doesn’t acquire the “force of law” or become legal evidence of an obligation until AFTER you consent to it.  It is a maxim of law that anything done to you with your consent cannot form the basis for an injury or a remedy in a court of law.  On the OTHER hand, if everyone fills out Form W-4's and ACTS like a government statutory "employee", then for all intents and purposes it applies to EVERYONE and at least LOOKS like it is public law, even though it isn't.
  9. Because it is PRIVATE and SPECIAL LAW, it is what the USSC called "class legislation" in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1894).  The specific “class” to which is applies is that SUBSET of all “citizens” who are lawfully serving in an elected or appointed public office.
  10. The activities SUBJECT to the tax must also occur on federal territory in order to be the lawful subject of any congressional civil enactment.
    10.1 All civil law is prima facie territorial.
    10.2 The separation of powers doctrine, 40 U.S.C. §3112, 28 U.S.C. §1652, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 all forbid the enforcement of federal civil law outside the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress or within a constitutional state of the Union.
    10.3 If territory is divorced from the activity and the tax is enforced outside of federal territory, then the activity subject to tax becomes an act of private contract governed by the local CIVIL laws of the jurisdiction in which the activity occurred. And because it is private business activity, then there is a waiver of sovereign immunity AND it must be heard in a LOCAL state court having jurisdiction over the domicile of the public officer and NOT in a federal court.  These facts are plainly stated in 40 U.S.C. §3112.
  11. If it is enforced or offered in a constitutional state, then:
  12. 11.1 An "invasion" has occurred under Article 4, Section 4. By "enforced", we mean that the ACTIVITY subject to the tax occurs within a constitutional state of the Union. Hence, "INTERNAL" in the phrase "INTERNAL Revenue Service", meaning INTERNAL to the government and INTERNAL to federal territory.
    11.2 The franchise is being illegally enforced:

    “Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee.

    But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.

    [License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

We would therefore strongly suggest that in describing this tax in court pleadings or to juries and in front of malicious judges, you:

  1. Never describe it as either direct or indirect.  It’s irrelevant and could truthfully be described as either.  The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, calls it a “direct unapportioned tax” applicable only to the District of Columbia, while the Congressional Research Service calls it an INDIRECT tax.  They are BOTH right!  This is a red herring.
  2. NOT argue about whether the Internal Revenue Code is constitutional or unconstitutional.  It is entirely constitutional. What is unconstitutional is how it is wilfully and maliciously MISREPRESENTED and illegally enforced by both the Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service.
  3. Demand written proof of your consent to occupy or be held accountable for the duties associated with the illegally created public office that is the subject of the tax.
  4. Pay SPECIAL focus on the CONTEXT for terms:  STATUTORY v. CONSTITUTIONAL.  These two contexts are mutually exclusive and non-overlapping for the purpose of the income tax.  They will attempt many different “fallacies by equivocation” in order to mislead the jury and undermine your defense.  We talk about this at length in:

    Why You are a “national”, “state national”, and Constitutional but not Statutory Citizen, Form #05.008
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

  5. Instead focus on:
    5.1 The activity that is the subject of the tax and how you, as a private nonresident in a legislatively foreign state can lawfully engage in the activity.
    5.2 How the choice of law rules documented herein do not permit the enforcement of the tax under federal law, and therefore, that there is no jurisdiction to enforce or collect the tax.
    5.3 WHERE the activity may be lawfully exercised and that you are NOT located in that place, which is the District of Columbia and no part of any state of the Union.
    5.4 The fact that it is a crime to impersonate a public office, even with your consent.   18 U.S.C. §912.
    5.5 The fact that compelled withholding causes the crime of bribery to solicit you to be treated illegally as a public officer.  18 U.S.C. §211.

8.  Who's "trade or business": The PAYER, the PAYEE, or BOTH?

Every transaction must involve the de facto government and therefore public rights and franchises in order to qualify as an excise taxable event. The income tax under I.R.C. Subtitle A, as we all well know, is a franchise/excise tax.   The only context in which the statutory definition of "United States" makes any sense at all is in fact to treat it as an excise/franchise tax. The "United States" in the I.R.C. then becomes the franchisor in a virtual and not a physical or geographical sense. The ability to regulate, tax, or burden private conduct is beyond the reach of the Constitution, and therefore the activity must involve publici juris and public rights to be taxable.

“The power to "legislate generally upon" life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the "power to provide modes of redress" against offensive state action, was "repugnant" to the Constitution. Id., at 15. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903). Although the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded or modified, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), their treatment of Congress' 5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned.”

[City of Boerne v. Florez, Archbishop of San Antonio, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]

Every transaction involving the government has two parties: The payer and the payee. That is why the tax is upon both "trade or business" earnings and "U.S. source" earnings: The payer is always a public office in the government and the recipient is either a resident alien individual or a nonresident alien "individual" receiving payments from this "U.S. source" if the transaction is taxable to EITHER party. This is made clear by 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(31), which says that the transaction is not "gross income" and is "foreign" and beyond the jurisdiction of the I.R.C. if it does not involve one of these two aspects, meaning if it does not involve a public officer payer OR an "individual" recipient:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > 7701
7701. Definitions

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—
(31) Foreign estate or trust
(A) Foreign estate The term "foreign estate" means an estate the income of which, from sources without the United States which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, is not includible in gross income under subtitle A.
( B) Foreign trust The term "foreign trust" means any trust other than a trust described in subparagraph (E) of paragraph (30).

Whenever a taxable payment occurs, an information return is filed usually by the payer, who in law must always be treated as a public officer in the government, meaning a "source within the United States" (government, not geographical USA).  26 U.S.C. 6041(a)  says that the information return can only be filed in connection with a "trade or business", meaning that at least one end of the transaction must involve a public officer in the government.

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 61 > Subchapter A > PART III > Subpart B > 6041
6041. Information at source

(a) Payments of $600 or more

All persons engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course of such trade or business to another person, of rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income (other than payments to which section 6042 (a)(1), 6044 (a)(1), 6047 (e), 6049 (a), or 6050N (a) applies, and other than payments with respect to which a statement is required under the authority of section 6042 (a)(2), 6044 (a)(2), or 6045), of $600 or more in any taxable year, or, in the case of such payments made by the United States, the officers or employees of the United States having information as to such payments and required to make returns in regard thereto by the regulations hereinafter provided for, shall render a true and accurate return to the Secretary, under such regulations and in such form and manner and to such extent as may be prescribed by the Secretary, setting forth the amount of such gains, profits, and income, and the name and address of the recipient of such payment.

Our job is to figure out WHICH end of the transaction is a public officer, because that is the only one subject to the code and therefore a "taxpayer". The PAYOR can be a public officer and therefore a "taxpayer" as defined in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(14) while the PAYEE can be a nonresident and a "nontaxpayer".  It makes no sense to report a transaction or withhold, in fact, if the PAYEE is not a “taxpayer”.

26 U.S.C. 6041  gives us a clue to the puzzle: it says the PAYER must file the information return and is engaged in a "trade or business", but it doesn't say that the PAYEE ALSO is involved in a "trade or business" as a public officer. Therefore, as a bare minimum every transaction involves a PAYER who is a public officer and therefore a "taxpayer" engaged in a "trade or business". We still don't yet know how the PAYEE would be treated in such a transaction, but as a bare minimum, we know that it is in receipt of "U.S. source" income from a public officer within the "United States" government. Some clues, though:

  1. Congress only has jurisdiction over PUBLIC activity. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ability to regulate private conduct is "repugnant to the Constitution". The constitution exists, in fact, to keep private conduct beyond the reach of the government. Consequently, BOTH parties to the transaction must be acting in a public capacity as public officers and therefore "taxpayers".
  2. If the PAYER was a public officer and a "taxpayer" but the PAYEE was not, then the I.R.C. would be injuring private parties and interfering with the right to contract of both parties by imposing duties above and beyond the contract between them. The Constitution was created to protect your right to contract, and therefore they can't tax or withhold within such a transaction. Frank Kowalik in his wonderful book "IRS Humbug" analyzes this aspect of all such payments and agrees with us on this point.
  3. 26 U.S.C. 6041(a)  uses the phrase "another person" to refer to the payee. so the PAYEE obviously must also be a "taxpayer" and a "person" subject to the code in order for the reporting to occur. Furthermore, if the recipient were NOT such a "person", they would have no liability and therefore would also not be subject to withholding. Withholding is only required for "taxpayers".

An example of payment that would not be taxable or reportable is one made to a nonresident who is not an alien or an "individual". This would be the case with those in the military who file nonresident alien withholding paperwork such as the Form W-8BEN, who modify block 3 of the form to indicate that they are "nonresident" but not "individuals", and who are enlisted rather than commissioned officers. When the transaction involves only one "taxpayer", the code does NOT create a liability to report against the withholding agent because the recipient is not a "person" (or "another person" as referred to in 26 U.S.C. 6041(a)  and 26 U.S.C. 1461) as a nonresident. The code is civil law that is not enforceable against nonresidents.  All civil law attaches to the choice of domicile of the parties and cannot operate beyond the territory of the law making power unless:

  1. A contract or franchise extends its reach beyond the territory of the sovereign.  That franchise or contract, if it is a GOVERNMENT contract, however, CANNOT operate within a state of the Union protected by the Constitution because the rights of those domiciled there are “unalienable”, which means that they can’t be sold, transferred, or bargained away through any commercial process.  Franchises such as a “trade or business” are commercial processes and contracts.

    “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -“

    [Declaration of Independence]

    “Unalienable.  Inalienable; incapable of being aliened, that is, sold and transferred.”

    [Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1693]

  2. It operates on a domiciliary temporarily abroad but not within a state of the Union under 26 U.S.C. 911.

26 U.S.C. 1461 makes the PAYER liable to deduct and withhold payment to another "person" but a nonresident cannot be a "person" within the meaning of this civil provision because all civil law attaches to one’s choice of domicile:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 3 > Subchapter B > 1461

1461. Liability for withheld tax

Every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

___________________________________________

The foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima facie territorial.' Ex parte Blain, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499; People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 590, 596. Words having universal scope, such as 'every contract in restraint of trade,' 'every person who shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken, as a matter of course, to mean only everyone subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch. In the case of the present statute, the improbability of the United States attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious, yet the law begins by making criminal the acts for which it gives a right to sue. We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned. Other objections of a serious nature are urged, but need not be discussed.
[American Banana Co. v. U.S. Fruit, 213 U.S. 347 at 357-358]

The phrase "general or legitimate power" imply "general and exclusive jurisdiction", not subject matter jurisdiction. The feds only have general jurisdiction within federal territory. In a state, they have limited and subject matter jurisdiction ONLY and NOT general jurisdiction. That is not to say that they don't have jurisdiction over ALL PEOPLE within a state. They always have jurisdiction over those domiciled on federal territory, regardless of where they are situated, including in a state, but they don't have such jurisdiction within a state of those domiciled outside of federal territory and who therefore are not statutory "U.S. citizens", "U.S. residents", and "U.S. persons". The following article emphasizes this point, but is FLAT OUT WRONG in concluding that District Courts in the States of the Union are Article III courts. They have NEVER been given this power. The only thing they can or do is officiate over are Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2  franchises such as income taxes, Social Security, etc. and crimes committed on federal territory where they enjoy general jurisdiction. The What Happened to Justice book  proves this with thousands of pages of evidence.

Conflicts in a Nutshell
22 Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Because of our federal system, in which more than 50 sovereigns function within the framework of a national sovereign, the federal court structure is unique in that its principal trial court, the U.S. District Court, is a court of limited rather than general jurisdiction. The state is left to supply the "general" court. The federal constitution permits Congress to confer on federal courts of its creation only such jurisdiction as is outlined in section 2 of Article III. Hence the source of these federal limitations is the constitution itself.

Even within the federal system, however, one can find courts of general jurisdiction. Areas within the jurisdiction of the United States that lack their own sovereignty, and thus a court system of their own, must depend on the federal legislature for a complete court system: the District of Columbia and the few remaining territories of the United States are in this category. For them, Congress has the power (from Article I of the constitution for the District and from Article IV of the constitution for the territories) to create courts of general jurisdiction. But Congress has no such power with respect to the states, for which reason all of the federal courts sitting within the states, including the district courts, must trace their powers to those within the limits of Article III and are hence courts of "limited" jurisdiction.

This is one reason why issues of subject matter jurisdiction arise more frequently in the federal system than in state courts. Another is that for a variety of reasons, federal jurisdiction is often preferred by a plaintiff who has a choice of forums. Taken together, this means that more cases near the subject matter jurisdiction borderline appear in the federal than in the state courts.

One of the major sources of federal subject matter jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship of the parties. It authorizes federal suit even though the dispute involves no issues of federal law. The statute that authorizes this jurisdiction, however (28 U.S.C.A. 1332), requires that there be more than $75,000 in controversy. A plaintiff near that figure and who wants federal jurisdiction will try for it, while a defendant who prefers that the state courts hear the case may try to get it dismissed from federal court on the ground that it can't support a judgment for more than $75,000.

A major source of federal jurisdiction is that the case "arises under" federal law, the phrase the constitution itself uses (Article III, 2). Unless it so arises, there is no subject matter jurisdiction under this caption, and whether it does or does not is often the subject of a dispute between the parties to a federal action.

For these and other reasons, the study of "subject matter" jurisdiction is a more extensive one in federal than in state practice. Indeed, a law school course on federal courts is likely to be devoted in the main to subject matter jurisdiction, with a correspondingly similar time allotment left for mere procedure, rather the reverse of what usually occurs in a course studying the state courts.

[Conflicts in a Nutshell by David D. Siegel and Patrick J. Borchers, ISBN 0-314-160669-3, 3rd Edition, West Group, pp. 39-41]

So there are two criteria: The PAYER and the PAYEE must BOTH be "persons" and therefore "taxpayers" within the I.R.C., which is civil law that attaches to their mutual domiciles, in order for either reporting or withholding to lawfully occur.  If only the PAYER is a "person" but the payee is NOT, then the transaction is not "gross income" TO THE PAYEE.  The term "person" is defined in 26 U.S.C. 7701(c )  to include "individuals", but "individual" in turn does not include statutory or constitutional "citizens" per 26 C.F.R. 1.1441-1(c )(3). Therefore, both the PAYER and the PAYEE MUST be aliens and not citizens engaged in privileged activities. See:

Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: Individual
http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/individual.htm

All of these games with "words of art" relating to Effectively Connected Income (ECI) are designed to disguise and confuse WHICH end of the transaction is a "taxpayer": the PAYER, the PAYEE, or BOTH. Statutes such as 26 U.S.C. 881(a), for instance, refer to the "recipient", meaning the PAYEE:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter N > PART II > Subpart B > 881
881. Tax on income of foreign corporations not connected with United States business

(a) Imposition of tax

Except as provided in subsection ( c), there is hereby imposed for each taxable year a tax of 30 percent of the amount received from sources within the United States by a foreign corporation as—

(1) interest (other than original issue discount as defined in section 1273), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income,

(2) gains described in section 631 (b) or ( c),

(3) in the case of—

(A) a sale or exchange of an original issue discount obligation, the amount of the original issue discount accruing while such obligation was held by the foreign corporation (to the extent such discount was not theretofore taken into account under subparagraph (B)), and

(B) a payment on an original issue discount obligation, an amount equal to the original issue discount accruing while such obligation was held by the foreign corporation (except that such original issue discount shall be taken into account under this subparagraph only to the extent such discount was not theretofore taken into account under this subparagraph and only to the extent that the tax thereon does not exceed the payment less the tax imposed by paragraph (1) thereon), and

(4) gains from the sale or exchange after October 4, 1966, of patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas, good will, trademarks, trade brands, franchises, and other like property, or of any interest in any such property, to the extent such gains are from payments which are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the property or interest sold or exchanged,

but only to the extent the amount so received is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

An amount can only be "received" by a PAYEE.

  1. We already know the PAYER is a public officer and a "taxpayer" and therefore a "person" under the I.R.C. because 26 U.S.C. 6041(a)  admitted he/she/it had to be engaged in a “trade or business” in order to report the transaction.
  2. 26 U.S.C. 1461  also said that the PAYER is only liable if BOTH ends of the transaction are "persons" and therefore "taxpayers".   A "nonresident" would NOT be subject to the code and therefore NOT a "person", "individual", or "taxpayer". See:
    Why Domicile and Becoming a "Taxpayer" Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  3. 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(31)  also says that when NEITHER the PAYER nor the PAYEE are engaged in public office ("trade or business") and the payment does not originate from "sources within the United States", meaning the de facto government, then the transaction isn't taxable.

26 U.S.C. 864(c )(3) at first glance might appear to confuse this explanation, but in fact it doesn’t.  It implies that “sources within the United States” and “trade or business” are synonymous when in fact they aren’t the same for BOTH parties to the transaction:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter N > PART I > 864

864. Definitions and special rules

(c ) Effectively connected income, etc.

(3) Other income from sources within United States

All income, gain, or loss from sources within the United States (other than income, gain, or loss to which paragraph (2) applies) shall be treated as effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

There is no contradiction because the PAYER is ALWAYS a public officer and therefore a "U.S. source" and a "taxpayer" on one side of the coin while the PAYEE can be a nonresident and yet also not a "taxpayer", "individual", or "person" on the other side of the same coin.  Everyone serving in a public office within the U.S. government is, by definition, a “source within the United States” if they are making a payment to someone else in their official capacity.  Once again: EVERY TRANSACTION has two ends, and it depends which end you are looking at.  You need to be VERY clear from the language which end it is and what you are looking for, because the language will try to confuse the ends to make it look like EVERYONE is a "taxpayer", "individual", and therefore "person".  Clues to which end of the transaction they are talking about:

  1. PAYER: Words used would be "paid", "making payment".
  2. PAYEE: Words used would be "received", "amount received".

Another fact is also important that people like Pete Hendrickson  chronically overlook.   Yes, an information return always involves a "trade or business" because 26 U.S.C. 6041(a)  says so.  However, does it ALSO imply or require or impute that the PAYEE is engaged in a "trade or business"?  A worthy exercise would be to go through all the instruction forms for information returns and the IRS publications to see what they say about WHICH ends of the transaction must be engaged in a "trade or business".  We did a cursory look and they almost always talk to the FILER of the information return and use the phrase "YOUR trade or business", as though they are implying that the PAYER is the ONLY one engaged in the public office.

How then, does the PAYEE become involved in a "trade or business" if the information return doesn’t imply it? Below are the MAIN techniques":

  1. Taking deductions under 26 U.S.C. 162, all of which require those taking them to be engaged in a "trade or business". See section  14.1 later
  2. Using a RESIDENT tax form, the 1040. The "United States" that a person is a "resident" (alien) in relation to is the GOVERNMENT, and not the geographical USA. The "United States" one is a "resident" of is the government, and the "person" who is the resident is the public office within the government, and not the human being filling the office. See section  14.4 later
  3. Using government de facto license numbers such as SSNs and TINs.  26 C.F.R. 301.6109-1(b)  says that these numbers are only required by those engaged in a "trade or business" and who are "U.S. persons", meaning people domiciled on federal territory that is no part of any state of the Union. See section   14.3 later and also the following:
    About SSNs and TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence, Form #04.104
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

To summarize the findings of this section:

  1. The language within the I.R.C. surrounding the use of the word “trade or business” is very deliberately and cunningly trying to confuse you about which end of the transaction is the public officer and therefore the "taxpayer" because they want you to assume EVERYONE is a "taxpayer", "person", and "individual". If they were more honest, they would have referred directly to the words "PAYER" and "PAYEE".
  2. Every transaction has TWO parties, a PAYER, and a PAYEE.
    2.1.  The PAYER is always a public officer and a "taxpayer", and therefore a "person" and "U.S. person" (26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(30)) subject to federal law. A "public office" making payments to a nonresident, for instance, is a "U.S. source" and the PAYER is a "trade or business" but the payee is NOT. Some PAYERS unlawfully compel the nonresident to "elect" themself into public office by compelling them to procure and use an identifying numbers before they will make the payment. This is a criminal violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(8)  and 18 U.S.C. 912  and causes perjury on the Forms SS-5, W-7, and W-9  in the case of a nonresident domiciled in a state of the union who does not ALREADY occupy a public office BEFORE they made application for the number.
    2.2.  The PAYEE most often is, in reality, a nonresident who is neither a "person", "individual", nor "taxpayer" but who wrongfully thinks they are because of the deliberate and calculated confusion in the code you point out.
  3. Everything the PAYEE receives from the PAYER is, by definition, "U.S. source income" because the "U.S." means the government, and not the geographical sense. 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) and (a)(10)  is a red herring, because it uses the phrase "geographical sense", but nowhere is the “geographical sense” of the word ever expressly invoked throughout the entire 9500 page Internal Revenue Code.
    3.1.  The payment is ECI IN RELATION TO THE PAYER while also being. . .
    3.2.  "U.S. source" and NOT ECI in relation to a PAYEE who is NOT engaged in a “trade or business” or who is nonresident.
    3.3.  It is only taxable, reportable, or subject to withholding if BOTH the PAYER and the PAYEE are "persons", "U.S. persons", and "taxpayers" domiciled on federal territory.  It isn't taxable if either end of the transaction is a nonresident and therefore not a "person", "individual", or "taxpayer".   Domicile is the origin of the liability for tax. That is why there are so many statutes mentioned in the Nonresident Alien position booklet that say that nonresidents don't earn reportable income. This is made clear below:
      About IRS Form W-8BEN,, Form #04.202, Section 4
      http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

9. Public office generally

9.1.  Legal requirements for holding a “public office”?

The subject of exactly what constitutes a “public office” within the meaning described in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)  is not defined in any IRS publication we could find.  The reason is quite clear:  the “trade or business” scam is the Achilles heal of the IRS fraud and both the IRS and the Courts are loath to even talk about it because there is nothing they can defend themselves with other than unsubstantiated presumption created by the abuse of the word “includes” and certain key “words of art”.  In the face of such overwhelming evidence of their own illegal and criminal mis-enforcement of the tax codes, silence or omission in either admitting it or prosecuting it can only be characterized as FRAUD on a massive scale, in fact:

“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.”
[U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970)]

__________________________________________________________________________________

"Silence can be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . . We cannot condone this shocking behavior by the IRS. Our revenue system is based on the good faith of the taxpayer and the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from the government in its enforcement and collection activities."
[U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977)]

__________________________________________________________________________________

“Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the existence of the state of facts in question , and the estoppel is accordingly a species of estoppel by misrepresentation. When silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud upon the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe and act upon, it will operate as an estoppel.”
[Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906)]

The “duty” the courts are talking about above is the fiduciary duty of all those serving in public offices in the government, and that fiduciary duty was created by the oath of office they took before they entered the office.  Therefore, those who want to know how they could lawfully be classified as a “public office” will have to answer that question completely on their own, which is what we will attempt to do in this section.

We begin our search with a definition of “public office” from Black’s Dictionary:

Public office. The right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government for the benefit of the public. Walker v. Rich, 79 Cal.App. 139, 249 P. 56, 58. An agency for the state, the duties of which involve in their performance the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, either great or small. Yaselli v. Goff, C.C.A., 12 F.2d 396, 403, 56 A.L.R. 1239; Lacey v. State, 13 Ala.App. 212, 68 So. 706, 710; Curtin v. State, 61 Cal.App. 377, 214 P. 1030, 1035; Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, 75 1nd.App. 493, 129 N.E. 878. State ex rel. Colorado River Commission v. Frohmiller, 46 Ariz. 413, 52 P.2d 483, 486. Where, by virtue of law, a person Is clothed, not as an incidental or transient authority, but for such time as de- notes duration and continuance, with Independent power to control the property of the public, or with public functions to be exercised in the supposed interest of the people, the service to be compensated by a stated yearly salary, and the occupant having a designation or title, the position so created is a public office. State v. Brennan, 49 Ohio St. 33. 29 N.E. 593.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1235]

Black’s Law Dictionary Sixth Edition further clarifies the meaning of a “public office” below:

“Essential characteristics of a ‘public office’ are:

(1) Authority conferred by law,

(2) Fixed tenure of office, and

(3) Power to exercise some of the sovereign functions of government.

Key element of such test is that “officer is carrying out a sovereign function.  Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871, 875.  Essential  elements to establish public position as ‘public office’ are:

  Position must be created by Constitution, legislature, or through authority   conferred by legislature.

  Portion of sovereign power of government must be delegated to position,

  Duties and powers must be defined, directly or implied, by legislature or through legislative authority.

  Duties must be performed independently without control of superior power other than law, and

  Position must have some permanency.”

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1230]

American Jurisprudence Legal Encyclopedia further clarifies what a “public office” is as follows:

“As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. [1]  Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. [2]   That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves. [3]  and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. [4]   It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual. [5]   Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy.[6]
[63C Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247]

________________________

[1] State ex rel. Nagle v Sullivan, 98 Mont 425, 40 P2d 995,  99 ALR 321; Jersey City v Hague, 18 NJ 584, 115 A2d 8.

[2] Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v Sistrunk, 249 Ga 543, 291 SE2d 524.  A public official is held in public trust.  Madlener v Finley (1st Dist) 161 Ill App 3d 796, 113 Ill Dec 712, 515 NE2d 697, app gr 117 Ill Dec 226, 520 NE2d 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill 2d 147, 131 Ill Dec 145, 538 NE2d 520.

[3] Chicago Park Dist. v Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill 2d 555, 37 Ill Dec 291, 402 NE2d 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill App 3d 222, 63 Ill Dec 134, 437 NE2d 783.

[4] United States v Holzer (CA7 Ill) 816 F2d 304  and vacated, remanded on other grounds  484 US 807,  98 L Ed 2d 18,  108 S Ct 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F2d 1343, cert den  486 US 1035,  100 L Ed 2d 608,  108 S Ct 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F2d 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v Little (CA5 Miss) 889 F2d 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v Boylan (CA1 Mass) 898 F2d 230, 29 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1223).

[5] Chicago ex rel. Cohen v Keane, 64 Ill 2d 559, 2 Ill Dec 285, 357 NE2d 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill App 3d 298, 61 Ill Dec 172, 434 NE2d 325.

[6] Indiana State Ethics Comm'n v Nelson (Ind App) 656 NE2d 1172, reh gr (Ind App) 659 NE2d 260, reh den (Jan 24, 1996) and transfer den (May 28, 1996).

Ordinary or common-law employees of the government also do not qualify as “public officers”:

Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers
Book 1: Of the Office and the Officer: How Officer Chosen and Qualified
Chapter I: Definitions and Divisions

§2 How Office Differs from Employment.-A public office differs in material particulars from a public employment, for, as was said by Chief Justice MARSHALL, "although an office is an employment, it does not follow that every employment is an office. A man may certainly be employed under a contract, express or implied, to perform a service without becoming an officer." [1]

"We apprehend that the term 'office,'" said the judges of the supreme court of Maine, "implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power to, and the possession of it by, the person filling the office; and the exercise of such power within legal limits constitutes the correct discharge of the duties of such office. The power thus delegated and possessed may be a portion belonging sometimes to one of the three great departments and sometimes to another; still it is a legal power which may be rightfully exercised, and in its effects it will bind the rights of others and be subject to revision and correction only according to the standing laws of the state. An employment merely has none of these distinguishing features. A public agent acts only on behalf of his principal, the public, whoso sanction is generally considered as necessary to give the acts performed the authority and power of a public act or law. And if the act be such as not to require subsequent sanction, still it is only a species of service performed under the public authority and for the public good, but not in the exercise of any standing laws which are considered as roles of action and guardians of rights." [2]

"The officer is distinguished from the employee," says Judge COOLEY, "in the greater importance, dignity and independence of his position; in being required to take an official oath, and perhaps to give an official bond; in the liability to be called to account as a public offender for misfeasance or non-feasance in office, and usually, though not necessarily, in the tenure of his position. In particular cases, other distinctions will appear which are not general."[3]

[A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, Floyd Russell Mechem, 1890, pp. 3-4, §2;
SOURCE:
http://books.google.com/books?id=g-I9AAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage]

________________________

[1] United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. (U.S.C.C.) 96.

[2] Opinion of Judges, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 481.

[3] Throop v. Langdon, 40 Mich. 678, 682; “An office is a public position created by the constitution or law, continuing during the pleasure of the appointing power or for a fixed term with a successor elected or appointed.  An employment is an agency for a temporary purpose which ceases when that purpose is accomplished. “ Cons. Ill., 1870, Art. 5, §24.

Based on the foregoing, one cannot be a “public officer” if:

  1. There is not a statute or constitutional authority that specifically creates the office.  All “public offices” can only be created through legislative authority.
  2. Their duties are not specifically and exactly enumerated in some Act of Congress.
  3. They have a boss or immediate supervisor.  All duties must be performed INDEPENDENTLY.
  4. They have anyone but the law and the courts to immediately supervise their activities.
  5. They are serving as a “public officer” in a location NOT specifically authorized by the law.  The law must create the office and specify exactly where it is to be exercised.  4 U.S.C. §72 says ALL public offices of the federal and national government MUST be exercised ONLY in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere, except as expressly provided by law.
  6. Their position does not carry with it some kind of fiduciary duty to the “public” which in turn is documented in and enforced by enacted law itself.
  7.  The beneficiary of their fiduciary duty is other than the “public”.  Public service is a public trust, and the beneficiary of the trust is the public at large and not any one specific individual or group of individuals.  See 5 C.F.R. §2635.101((b) and Executive Order 12731.

All public officers must take an oath.  The oath, in fact, is what creates the fiduciary duty that attaches to the office.  This is confirmed by the definition of "public official" in Black's Law Dictionary:

"Public Official.  A person who, upon being issued a commission, taking required oath, enters upon, for a fixed tenure, a position called an office where he or she exercises in his or her own right some of the attributes of sovereign he or she serves for benefit of public.  Macy v. Heverin, 44 Md.App. 358, 408 A.2d 1067, 1069.  The holder of a public office though not all persons in public employment are public officials, because public official's position requires the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, whether great or small.  Town of Arlington v. Bds. of Conciliation and Arbitration, Mass., 352 N.E.2d 914."

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1230]

The oath for United States federal and state officials was prescribed in the very first enactment of Congress on March 4, 1789 as follows:

Statutes at Large, March 4, 1789

1 Stat. 23-24

SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and [Home of] Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States, shall be administered in the form following, to wit : '' I, A, B. do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States." The said oath or affirmation shall be administered within three days after the passing of this act, by any one member of the Senate, to the President of the Senate, and by him to all the members and to the secretary; and by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to all the members who have not taken a similar oath, by virtue of a particular resolution of the said House, and to the clerk: and in case of the absence of any member from the service of either House, at the time prescribed for taking the said oath or affirmation, the same shall be administered to such member, when he shall appear to take his seat.

SEC. 2. And he it further enacted, That at the first session of Congress after every general election of Representatives, the oath or affirmation aforesaid, shall be administered by any one member of the House of Representatives to the Speaker; and by him to all the members present, and to the clerk, previous to entering on any other business; and to the members who shall afterwards appear, previous to taking their seats. The President of the Senate for the time being, shall also administer the said oath or affirmation to each Senator who shall hereafter be elected, previous to his taking his seat: and in any future case of a President of the Senate. who shall not have taken the said oath or affirmation, the same shall be administered to him by any one of the members of the Senate.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted. That the members of the several State legislatures, at the next sessions of the said legislatures, respectively, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who have been heretofore chosen or appointed, or who shall be chosen or appointed before the first day of August next, and who shall then be in office, shall, within one month thereafter, take the same oath or affirmation, except where they shall have taken it before; which may be administered by any person authorized by the law of the State, in which such office shall be holden, to administer oaths. And the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who shall be chosen or appointed after the said first day of August, shall, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, take the foregoing oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the person or persons, who by the law of the State shall be authorized to administer the oath of office; and the person or persons so administering the oath hereby required to be taken, shall cause a re- cord or certificate thereof to be made, in the same manner, as, by the law of the State, he or they shall be directed to record or certify the oath of office.

SEC. 4. And he it further enacted, That all officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States, shall, before they act in their respective offices, take the same oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the person or persons who shall be authorized by law to administer to such officers their respective oaths of office; and such officers shall incur the same penalties in case of failure, as shall be imposed by law in case of failure in taking their respective oaths of office.

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That the secretary of the Senate, and the clerk of the House of Representatives for the time being, shall, at the time of taking the oath or affirmation aforesaid, each take an oath or affirmation in the words following, to wit : “1, A. B. secretary of the Senate, or clerk of the House of Representatives (as the case may be) of the United States of America, do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will truly and faithfully discharge the duties of my said office, to the best of my knowledge and abilities."

Based on the above, the following persons within the government are “public officers”:

  1. Federal Officers:

    1.1.  The President of the United States.

    1.2.  Members of the House of Representatives.

    1.3.  Members of the Senate.

    1.4.  All appointed by the President of the United States.

    1.5.  The secretary of the Senate.

    1.6.  The clerk of the House of Representatives.

    1.7.  All district, circuit, and supreme court justices.

  2. State Officers:

    2.1.  The governor of the state.

    2.2.  Members of the House of Representatives.

    2.3.  Members of the Senate.

    2.4.  All district, circuit, and supreme court justices of the state.

At the federal level, all those engaged in the above “public offices” are statutorily identified in 5 U.S.C. §2105.  Consistent with this section, what most people would regard as ordinary common law employees are not included in the definition.  Note the phrase “an officer AND an individual”:

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart A > CHAPTER 21 > § 2105
§ 2105. Employee

(a) For the purpose of this title, “employee”, except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifically modified, means an officer and an individual who is—

(1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official capacity—

(A) the President;
(B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress;
(C) a member of a uniformed service;
(D) an individual who is an employee under this section;
(E) the head of a Government controlled corporation; or
(F) an adjutant general designated by the Secretary concerned under section 709 (c) of title 32;

(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act; and
(3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph (1) of this subsection while engaged in the performance of the duties of his position.

Within the military, only commissioned officers are “public officers”.  Enlisteds or NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) are not.

Those holding Federal or State public office, county or municipal office, under the Legislative, Executive or Judicial branch, including Court Officials, Judges, Prosecutors, Law Enforcement Department employees, Officers of the Court, and etc., before entering into these public offices, are required by the U.S. Constitution and statutory law to comply with 5 U.S.C. §3331, “Oath of office.” State Officials are also required to meet this same obligation, according to State Constitutions and State statutory law.

All oaths of office come under 22 CFR, Foreign Relations, Sections §§92.12 - 92.30, and all who hold public office come under 8 U.S.C. §1481  “Loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizen; voluntary action; burden of proof; presumptions.”

Under Title 22 U.S.C., Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Section §611, a Public Official is considered a foreign agent. In order to hold public office, the candidate must file a true and complete registration statement with the State Attorney General as a foreign principle.

The Oath of Office requires the public officials in his/her foreign state capacity to uphold the constitutional form of government or face consequences, according to 10 U.S.C. §333, “Interference with State and Federal law”

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

Willful refusal action while serving in official capacity violates 18 U.S.C. §1918, “Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the Government”

Whoever violates the provision of 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(2)  is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both.

AND violates 18 U.S.C. §1346:

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 63
§ 1346. Definition of “scheme or artifice to defraud

” For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

The “public offices” described in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)  within the definition of “trade or business” are ONLY public offices located in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere.  To wit:

TITLE 4 > CHAPTER 3 > § 72

§ 72. Public offices; at seat of Government

All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.

[SOURCE: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode04/usc_sec_04_00000072----000-.html]

The only provision of any act of Congress that we have been able to find which authorizes “public offices” outside the District of Columbia as expressly required by law above, is 48 U.S.C. §1612, which authorizes enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code within the U.S. Virgin Islands.  To wit:

TITLE 48 > CHAPTER 12 > SUBCHAPTER V > § 1612

§ 1612. Jurisdiction of District Court

(a) Jurisdiction

The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of title 28 and that of a bankruptcy court of the United States. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal and civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands, regardless of the degree of the offense or of the amount involved, except the ancillary laws relating to the income tax enacted by the legislature of the Virgin Islands. Any act or failure to act with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands which would constitute a criminal offense described in chapter 75 of subtitle F of title 26 shall constitute an offense against the government of the Virgin Islands and may be prosecuted in the name of the government of the Virgin Islands by the appropriate officers thereof in the District Court of the Virgin Islands without the request or the consent of the United States attorney for the Virgin Islands, notwithstanding the provisions of section 1617 of this title.

There is NO PROVISION OF LAW which would similarly extend public offices or jurisdiction to enforce any provision of the Internal Revenue Code to any place within the exclusive jurisdiction of any state of the Union, because Congress enjoys NO LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION THERE. 

“It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation.

[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]

"The difficulties arising out of our dual form of government and the opportunities for differing opinions concerning the relative rights of state and national governments are many; but for a very long time this court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the taxing power of Congress does not extend to the states or their political subdivisions. The same basic reasoning which leads to that conclusion, we think, requires like limitation upon the power which springs from the bankruptcy clause. United States v. Butler, supra."

[Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U.S. 513; 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936)]

By law then, no “public office” may therefore be exercised OUTSIDE the District of Columbia except as “expressly provided by law”, including privileged or licensed activities such as a “trade or business”.  This was also confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the License Tax Cases, when they said:

“Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee.

But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.

 [License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

Since I.R.C. Subtitle A is a tax on “public offices”, which is called a “trade or business”, then the tax can only apply to those domiciled within the statutory but not constitutional "United States**" (federal territory), wherever they are physically located to include states of the Union, but only if they are serving under oath in their official capacity as “public officers”.

"Thus, the Court has frequently held that domicile or residence, more substantial than mere presence in transit or sojourn, is an adequate basis for taxation, including income, property, and death taxes. Since the Fourteenth Amendment makes one a citizen of the state wherein he resides, the fact of residence creates universally reciprocal duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure is largely a political matter. Of course, the situs of property may tax it regardless of the citizenship, domicile, or residence of the owner, the most obvious illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located."

[Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)]

Another important point needs to be emphasized, which is that those working for the federal government, while on official duty, are representing a federal corporation called the “United States”, which is domiciled in the District of Columbia.

TITLE 28 > PART VI > CHAPTER 176 > SUBCHAPTER A > Sec. 3002.

TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

PART VI - PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS

CHAPTER 176 - FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE

SUBCHAPTER A - DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 3002. Definitions

(15) ''United States'' means -

(A) a Federal corporation;

(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or

(C) an instrumentality of the United States.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)  says that the capacity to sue and be sued civilly is based on one’s domicile:

IV. PARTIES > Rule 17.

Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity

(b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued.

Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows:

(1) for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law of the individual's domicile;

(2) for a corporation [the “United States”, in this case, or its officers on official duty representing the corporation], by the law under which it was organized [laws of the District of Columbia]; and

(3) for all other parties, by the law of the state where the court is located, except that:

(A) a partnership or other unincorporated association with no such capacity under that state's law may sue or be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United States Constitution or laws; and

(B) 28 U.S.C. §§ 754 and 959(a) govern the capacity of a receiver appointed by a United States court to sue or be sued in a United States court.

[SOURCE: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/Rule17.htm]

Government employees, including “public officers”, while on official duty representing the federal corporation called the “United States”, maintain the character of the entity they represent and therefore have a legal domicile of the statutory but not constitutional "United States**" (federal territory) within the context of their official duties.  The Internal Revenue Code also reflects this fact in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(39)  and 26 U.S.C. §7408(d):

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > § 7701

§ 7701. Definitions

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—

(39) Persons residing outside United States

If any citizen or resident of the United States does not reside in (and is not found in) any United States judicial district, such citizen or resident shall be treated as residing in the District of Columbia for purposes of any provision of this title relating to—

(A) jurisdiction of courts, or

(B) enforcement of summons

_________________________________________________________________________________

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 76 > Subchapter A > § 7408

§ 7408. Actions to enjoin specified conduct related to tax shelters and reportable transactions

(d) Citizens and residents outside the United States

If any citizen or resident of the United States does not reside in, and does not have his principal place of business in, any United States judicial district, such citizen or resident shall be treated for purposes of this section as residing in the District of Columbia.

Kidnapping and transporting the legal identity of a person domiciled outside the District of Columbia in a foreign state, which includes states of the Union, is illegal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1201.  Therefore, the only people who can be legally and involuntarily “kidnapped” by the courts based on the above two provisions of statutory law are those who individually consent through private contract to act as “public officials” in the execution of their official duties.  The fiduciary duty of these “public officials” is further defined in the I.R.C. as follows, and it is only by an oath of “public office” that this fiduciary duty can lawfully be created:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 68 > Subchapter B > PART I > § 6671

§ 6671. Rules for application of assessable penalties

 (b) Person defined

The term “person”, as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.

________________________________________________________________________________

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 75 > Subchapter D > § 7343

§ 7343. Definition of term “person”

The term “person” as used in this chapter includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.

We remind our readers that there is no liability statute within Subtitle A of the I.R.C. that would create the duty documented above, and therefore the ONLY way it can be created is by the oath of office of the “public officers” who are the subject of the tax in question.  This was thoroughly described in the following article:

There's No Statute Making Anyone Liable to Pay IRC Subtitle A Income Taxes
http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Articles/NoStatuteLiable.htm

The existence of fiduciary duty of “public officers” is therefore the ONLY lawful method by which anyone can be prosecuted for an “omission”, which is a thing they didn’t do that the law required them to do.  It is otherwise illegal and unlawful to prosecute anyone under either common law or statutory law for a FAILURE to do something, such as a FAILURE TO FILE a tax return pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7203.  Below is an example of where the government gets its authority to prosecute "taxpayers" for failure to file a tax return, in fact:

“I: DUTY TO ACCOUNT FOR PUBLIC FUNDS

§ 909. In general.-

It is the duty of the public officer, like any other agent or trustee, although not declared by express statute, to faithfully account for and pay over to the proper authorities all moneys which may come into his hands upon the public account, and the performance of this duty may be enforced by proper actions against the officer himself, or against those who have become sureties for the faithful discharge of his duties.”

[A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and officers, p. 609, §909; Floyd Mechem, 1890;
SOURCE:  http://books.google.com/books?id=g-I9AAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage]

In addition to the above, every attorney admitted to practice law in any state or federal court is described as an “officer of the court”, and therefore ALSO is a “public officer”:

Attorney at law. An advocate, counsel, or official agent employed in preparing, managing, and trying cases in the courts. An officer in a court of justice, who is employed by a party in a cause to manage it for him. In re Bergeron, 220 Mass. 472, 107 N.E. 1007, 1008, Ann.Cas.l917A, 549.

In English law. A public officer belonging to the superior courts of common law at Westminster. who conducted legal proceedings on behalf of others. called his clients, by whom he was retained; he answered to the solicitor in the courts of chancery, and the proctor of the admiralty, ecclesiastical, probate, and divorce courts. An attorney was almost invariably also a solicitor. It is now provided by the judicature act. 1873, 8 87. that solicitors. Attorneys, or proctors of, or by law empowered to practice in, any court the jurisdiction of which is by that act transferred to the high court of justice or the court of appeal, shall be called "solicitors of the supreme court." Wharton.

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 164]

__________________________________________________________________________________

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, Corpus Juris Secundum Legal Encyclopedia Volume 7, Section 4

His [the attorney’s] first duty is to the courts and the public, not to the client, and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter.

[7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client, §4]

Executive Order 12731 and 5 C.F.R. §2635.101(a) furthermore both indicate that “public service is a public trust”:

Executive Order 12731

"Part 1 -- PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

   "Section 101.  Principles of Ethical Conduct. To ensure that every citizen can have complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each Federal employee shall respect and adhere to the fundamental principles of ethical service as implemented in regulations promulgated under sections 201 and 301 of this order:

"(a) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.

___________________________________________________________________________________

TITLE 5--ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL

CHAPTER XVI--OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS

PART 2635--STANDARDS OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH--Table of Contents

Subpart A--General Provisions

Sec. 2635.101   Basic obligation of public service.

(a) Public service is a public trust.

Each employee has a  responsibility to the United States Government and its citizens to place  loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private  gain. To ensure that every citizen can have complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct set forth in this section, as well as the implementing standards contained in this part and in supplemental agency regulations.

The above provisions of law imply that everyone who works for the government is a “trustee” of “We the People”, who are the sovereigns they serve in the public.  In law, EVERY “trustee” is a “fiduciary” of the Beneficiary of the trust within which he serves:

TRUSTEE. The person appointed, or required by law, to execute a trust; one in whom an estate, interest, or power is vested, under an express or implied agreement [e.g. PRIVATE LAW or CONTRACT] to administer or exercise it for the benefit or to the use of another called the cestui que trust. Pioneer Mining Co. v. Ty berg, C.C.A.Alaska, 215 F. 501, 506, L.R.A.l915B, 442; Kaehn v. St. Paul Co-op. Ass'n, 156 Minn. 113, 194 N.W. 112; Catlett v. Hawthorne, 157 Va. 372, 161 S.E. 47, 48. Person who holds title to res and administers it for others' benefit. Reinecke v. Smith, Ill., 53 S.Ct. 570, 289 US. 172, 77 L.Ed. 1109. In a strict sense, a "trustee" is one' who holds the legal title to property for the benefit of another, while, in a broad sense, the term is sometimes applied to anyone standing in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another. such as agent, attorney, bailee, etc. State ex rel. Lee v. Sartorius, 344 Mo. 912, 130 S.W.2d 547, 549, 550. "Trustee" is also used In a wide and perhaps inaccurate sense, to denote that a person has the duty of carrying out a transaction, in which he and another person are interested, in such manner as will be most for the benefit of the latter, and not in such a way that he himself might be tempted, for the sake of his personal advantage, to neglect the interests of the other. In this sense, directors of companies are said to be "trustees for the shareholders." Sweet.

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1684]

The fact that public service is a “public trust” was also confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, when it said:

"Whatever these Constitutions and laws validly determine to be property, it is the duty of the Federal Government, through the domain of jurisdiction merely Federal, to recognize to be property.

“And this principle follows from the structure of the respective Governments, State and Federal, and their reciprocal relations. They are different agents and trustees of the people of the several States, appointed with different powers and with distinct purposes, but whose acts, within the scope of their respective jurisdictions, are mutually obligatory. "
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)] 

An example of someone who is NOT a “public officer” is a federal worker on duty and who is not required to take an oath.  These people may think of themselves as employees in an ordinary and not statutory sense and even be called employees by their supervisor or employer, but in fact NOT be the statutory “employee” defined in 5 U.S.C. §2105(a).  Remember that 5 U.S.C. §2105(a)  defines a STATUTORY “employee” as “an officer and an individual” and you don’t become an “officer” in a statutory sense unless and until you take a Constitutional oath.  Almost invariably, such workers also have some kind of immediate supervisor who manages and oversees and evaluates his activities pursuant to the position description drafted for the position he fills.  He may be a “trustee” and he may have a “fiduciary duty” to the public as a “public servant”, but he isn’t an “officer” or “public officer” unless and until he takes an oath of office prescribed by law.  A federal worker, however, can become a “public office” by virtue of any one or more of the following purposes that we are aware of so far:

  1. Be elected to political office.
  2. Being appointed to political office by the President or the governor of a state of the Union.

A “public office” is not limited to a human being.  It can also extend to an entire entity such as a corporation.  An example of an entity that is a “public office” in its entirety is a federally chartered bank, such as the original Bank of the United States described in Osborn v. United States, in which the U.S. Supreme Court identified the original and first Bank of the United States, a federally chartered bank corporation created by Congress, as a “public office”:

All the powers of the government must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with individuals.  Can any public office be created,  or does one exist, the performance of which may, with propriety, be assigned to this association [or trust], when incorporated? If such office exist, or can be created, then the company may be incorporated, that they may be appointed to execute such office. Is there any portion of the public business performed by individuals upon contracts, that this association could be employed to perform, with greater advantage and more safety to the public, than an individual contractor? If there be an employment of this nature, then may this company be incorporated to undertake it.

There is an employment of this nature. Nothing can be more essential to the fiscal concerns of the nation, than an agent of undoubted integrity and established credit, with whom the public moneys can, at all times, be safely deposited. Nothing can be of more importance to a government, than that there should be some capitalist in the country, who possesses the means of making advances of money to the government upon any exigency, and who is under a legal obligation to make such advances. For these purposes the association would be an agent peculiarly suitable and appropriate. [. . .]

The mere creation of a corporation, does not confer political power or political character. So this Court decided in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, already referred to. If I may be allowed to paraphrase the language of the Chief Justice, I would say, a bank incorporated, is no more a State instrument, than a natural person performing the same business would be. If, then, a natural person, engaged in the trade of banking, should contract with the government to receive the public money upon deposit, to transmit it from place to place, without charging for commission or difference of exchange, and to perform, when called upon, the duties of commissioner of loans, would not thereby become a public officer, how is it that this artificial being, created by law for the purpose of being employed by the government for the same purposes, should become a part of the civil government of the country? Is it because its existence, its capacities, its powers, are given by law? because the government has given it power to take and hold property in a particular form, and to employ that property for particular purposes, and in the disposition of it to use a particular name? because the government has sold it a privilege [22 U.S. 738, 774]   for a large sum of money, and has bargained with it to do certain things; is it, therefore, a part of the very government with which the contract is made?

If the Bank be constituted a public office, by the connexion between it and the government, it cannot be the mere legal franchise in which the office is vested; the individual stockholders must be the officers. Their character is not merged in the charter. This is the strong point of the Mayor and Commonalty v. Wood, upon which this Court ground their decision in the Bank v. Deveaux, and from which they say, that cause could not be distinguished. Thus, aliens may become public officers, and public duties are confided to those who owe no allegiance to the government, and who are even beyond its territorial limits.

With the privileges and perquisites of office, all individuals holding offices, ought to be subject to the disabilities of office. But if the Bank be a public office, and the individual stockholders public officers, this principle does not have a fair and just operation. The disabilities of office do not attach to the stockholders; for we find them every where holding public offices, even in the national Legislature, from which, if they be public officers, they are excluded by the constitution in express terms.

If the Bank be a public institution of such character as to be justly assimilated to the mint and the post office, then its charter may be amended, altered, or even abolished, at the discretion of the National Legislature. All public offices are created [22 U.S. 738, 775]   purely for public purposes, and may, at any time, be modified in such manner as the public interest may require. Public corporations partake of the same character. So it is distinctly adjudged in Dartmouth College v. Woodward. In this point, each Judge who delivered an opinion concurred. By one of the Judges it is said, that 'public corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes and counties; and in many respects they are so, although they involve some private interests; but, strictly speaking, public corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole interest belongs also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects of the institution. For instance, a bank, created by the government for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by the government, is, in the strictest sense, a public corporation. So, a hospital created and endowed by the government for general charity. But a bank, whose stock is owned by private persons, is a private corporation, although it is erected by the government, and its objects and operations partake of a public nature. The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge, and turnpike companies. In all these cases, the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corporations are private; as much [22 U.S. 738, 776]   so, indeed, as if the franchises were vested in a single person.[. . .]

In what sense is it an instrument of the government? and in what character is it employed as such? Do the government employ the faculty, the legal franchise, or do they employ the individuals upon whom it is conferred? and what is the nature of that employment? does it resemble the post office, or the mint, or the custom house, or the process of the federal Courts?

The post office is established by the general government. It is a public institution. The persons who perform its duties are public officers. No individual has, or can acquire, any property in it. For all the services performed, a compensation is paid out of the national treasury; and all the money received upon account of its operations, is public property. Surely there is no similitude between this institution, and an association who trade upon their own capital, for their own profit, and who have paid the government a million and a half of dollars for a legal character and name, in which to conduct their trade.

Again: the business conducted through the agency of the post office, is not in its nature a private business. It is of a public character, and the [22 U.S. 738, 786]   charge of it is expressly conferred upon Congress by the constitution. The business is created by law, and is annihilated when the law is repealed. But the trade of banking is strictly a private concern. It exists and can be carried on without the aid of the national Legislature. Nay, it is only under very special circumstances, that the national Legislature can so far interfere with it, as to facilitate its operations.

The post office executes the various duties assigned to it, by means of subordinate agents. The mails are opened and closed by persons invested with the character of public officers. But they are transported by individuals employed for that purpose, in their individual character, which employment is created by and founded in contract. To such contractors no official character is attached. These contractors supply horses, carriages, and whatever else is necessary for the transportation of the mails, upon their own account. The whole is engaged in the public service. The contractor, his horses, his carriage, his driver, are all in public employ. But this does not change their character. All that was private property before the contract was made, and before they were engaged in public employ, remain private property still. The horses and the carriages are liable to be taxed as other property, for every purpose for which property of the same character is taxed in the place where they are employed. The reason is plain: the contractor is employing his own means to promote his own private profit, and the tax collected is from the individual, though assessed upon the [22 U.S. 738, 787]   means he uses to perform the public service. To tax the transportation of the mails, as such, would be taxing the operations of the government, which could not be allowed. But to tax the means by which this transportation is effected, so far as those means are private property, is allowable; because it abstracts nothing from the government; and because, the fact that an individual employs his private means in the service of the government, attaches to them no immunity whatever.”

[Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)]

The record of the House of Representatives after the enactment of the first income tax during the Civil War in 1862, confirmed that the income tax was upon a “public office” and that even IRS agents, who are not “public officers” and who are not required to take an oath, are therefore exempt from the requirements of the revenue acts in place at the time.  Read the amazing truth for yourself:

House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 99, 1867
http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Evidence/PublicOrPrivate-Tax-Return.pdf

Below is an excerpt from that report proving our point.  The Secretary of the Treasury at the time is comparing the federal tax liabilities of postal clerks to those of internal revenue clerks.  At that time, the IRS was called the Bureau of Internal Revenue.  The office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue was established in 1862 as an emergency measure to fund the Civil War, which ended shortly thereafter, but the illegal enforcement of the revenue laws continued and expanded into the states over succeeding years:

House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 99, 1867, pp. 1-2

39th Congress, 2d Session

Salary Tax Upon Clerks to Postmasters

Letter form the Secretary of the Treasury in answer to A resolution of the House of the 12th of February, relative to salary tax upon clerks to postmasters, with the regulations of the department

Postmasters' clerks are appointed by postmasters, and take the oaths of office prescribed in the 2d section of the act of July 2, 1862, and in the 2d section of the act of March 3, 1863.

Their salaries are not fixed in amount bylaw, but from time to time the Post master General fixes the amount', allotted to each postmaster for clerk hire, under the authority conferred upon him by tile ninth section of the act of June 5, 1836, and then the postmaster, as an agent for and in behalf of the United States, determines the salary to be paid to each of his clerks. These salaries are paid by the postmasters, acting as disbursing agents, .from United States moneys advanced to them for this purpose, either directly from the Post Office Department in pursuance of appropriations made by law, or from the accruing revenues of their offices, under the instructions of the Postmaster General.  The receipt of such clerks constitute vouchers in the accounts of the postmasters acting as disbursing agents in the settlements made with them by the Sixth Auditor.  In the foregoing transactions the postmaster acts not as a principal, but as an agent of the United States, and the clerks are not in his private employment, but in the public employment of the United States.  Such being the facts, these clerks are subjected to and required to account for and pay the salary tax, imposed by the one hundred and twenty-third section of the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864, as amended by the ninth section of the internal revenue act of July 13, 1866, upon payments for services to persons in the civil employment or service of the United States.

Copies of the regulations under which such salary taxes are withheld and paid into the treasury to the credit of internal revenue collection account are herewith transmitted, marked A, b, and C. Clerks to assessors of internal revenue [IRS agents] are appointed by the assessors.  Neither law nor regulations require them to take an oath of office, because, as the law at present stands, they are not in the public service of the United States, through the agency of the assessor, but are in the private service of the assessor, as a principal, who employs them.

The salaries of such clerks are neither fixed in amount by law, nor are they regulated by any officer of the Treasury Department over the clerk hire of assessors is to prescribe a necessary and reasonable amount which shall not be exceeded in reimbursing the assessors for this item of their expenses.

No money is advanced by the United States for the payment of such salaries, nor do the assessors perform the duties of disbursing agents of the United States in paying their clerks.  The entire amount allowed is paid directly to the assessor, and he is not accountable to the United States for its payment to his clerks, for the reason that he has paid them in advance, out of his own funds, and this is a reimbursement to him of such amount as the department decides to be reasonable.  No salary tax is therefore collected, or required by the Treasury Department to be accounted for, or paid, on account of payments to the assessors’ clerks, as the United States pays no such clerks nor has them in its employ or service, and they do not come within the provisions of existing laws imposing such a tax.

Perhaps no better illustration of the difference between the status of postmasters’ clerks and that of assessors’ clerks can be given than the following:  A postmaster became a defaulter, without paying his clerks,; his successor received from the Postmaster General a new remittance for paying them; and if at any time, the clerks in a post office do not receive their salaries, by reason of the death, resignation or removal of a postmaster, the new appointee is authorized by the regulations of the Post Office Department to pay them out of the proceeds of the office; and should there be no funds in his hands belonging to the department, a draft is issued to place money in his hands for that purpose.

If an assessor had not paid his clerks, they would have no legal claim upon the treasury for their salaries.  A discrimination is made between postmasters’ clerks and assessor’s clerks to the extent and for the reasons hereinbefore set forth.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

H. McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury

[House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 99, 1867, pp. 1-2]

Notice based on the above that revenue officers don’t take an oath, so they don’t have to pay the tax, while postal clerks take an oath, so they do.  Therefore, the oath that creates the “public office” is the method by which the government manufactures “public officers”, “taxpayers”, and “sponsors” for its wasteful use or abuse of public monies.    If you would like a whole BOOK full of reasons why the only "taxpayers" under the I.R.C. Subtitle A are "public officials", please see the following exhaustive analysis:

Why Your Government is Either a Thief or you are a “Public Official” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008

http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

9.2.  De Facto Public Officers

Based on the previous section, we are now thoroughly familiar with all the legal requirements for:

  1. How public offices are lawfully created.
  2. The only places where they can lawfully be exercised.
  3. The duties that attach to the public office.
  4. The type of agency exercised by the public officer.
  5. The relationship between the public office and the public officer.

What we didn’t cover in the previous section is what are all the legal consequences when someone performs the duties of a public office without satisfying all the legal requirements for lawfully occupying the office?  In law, such a person is called a “de facto officer” and books have been written about the subject of the “de facto officer doctrine”.  Below is what the U.S. Supreme Court held on the subject of “de facto officers”:

“None of the cases cited militates against the doctrine that, for the existence of a de facto officer, there must be an office de jure, although there may be loose expressions in some of the opinions, not called for by the facts, seemingly against this view. Where no office legally exists, the pretended officer is merely a usurper, to whose acts no validity can be attached; and such, in our judgment, was the position of the commissioners of Shelby county, who undertook to act as the county court, which could be constitutionally held only by justices of the peace. Their right to discharge the duties of justices of the peace was never recognized by the justices, but from the outset was resisted by legal proceedings, which terminated in an adjudication that they were usurpers, clothed with no authority or official function. “
[Norton v. Shelby Co State of Tennessee, 118 U.S. 425, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886) ]

As we have already established, all statutory “taxpayers” are public officers in the U.S. and not state government.  This is exhaustively proven with evidence in:

Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

A person who fulfills the DUTIES of a statutory “taxpayer” under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14)  without lawfully occupying a public office in the U.S. government BEFORE becoming a “taxpayer” would be a good example of a de facto public officer.  Those who exercise the duties of a public officer without meeting all the requirements, from a legal perspective, are in fact committing the crime of impersonating a public officer.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 43 > § 912
§ 912. Officer or employee of the United States

Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

What are some examples where a person would be impersonating a public officer unlawfully?  Here are a few:

  1. You elect or appoint yourself into public office by filling out a tax form without occupying said office BEFORE being a statutory “taxpayer”.
  2. You serve in the office in a geographic place NOT expressly authorized by law.  For instance, 4 U.S.C. §72  requires that ALL federal public offices MUST be exercised ONLY in the District of Columbia and NOT ELSEWHERE, unless expressly authorized by law.
  3. A third party unilaterally ELECTS you into a public office by submitting an information return linking you to such a BOGUS office under the alleged but not actual authority of 26 U.S.C. §6041(a).
  4. You occupy the public office without either expressly consenting to it IN WRITING or without even knowing you occupy such an office.

If a so-called “GOVERNMENT” is established in which:

  1. The only kind of “citizens” or “residents” allowed are STATUTORY citizens and residents.  CONSTITUTIONAL citizens or residents are either not recognized or allowed as a matter of policy and not law.  . . .OR
  2. All “citizens” and “residents” are compelled under duress to accept the duties of a public office or ANY kind of duties imposed by the government upon them.  Remember, the Thirteenth Amendment forbids “involuntary servitude”, so if the government imposes any kind of duty or requires you to surrender private property of any kind by law, then they can only do so through the medium of a public office. . .OR
  3. Everyone is compelled to obey government statutory law.  Remember, nearly all laws passed by government can and do regulate ONLY the government and not private people.  See:
    Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

. . .then you end up not only with a LOT of public officers, but a de facto GOVERNMENT as well.  That government is thoroughly described in:

De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.043
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Even at the state level, it is a crime in every state of the Union to pretend to be a public officer of the state government who does not satisfy ALL of the legal requirements for occupying the public office.  Below is an itemized list by jurisdiction of constitutional and statutory requirements that are violated by those who either impersonate a state public officer OR who serve simultaneously serve in BOTH a FEDERAL public office and a STATE public office AT THE SAME TIME.  That’s right:  When you either impersonate a state public officer OR serve in BOTH a FEDERAL public office and STATE public public office AT THE SAME TIME, then  you are committing a crime and have a financial conflict of interest and conflict of allegiance that can and should disqualify you from exercising or accepting the duties of the office:

Table  4:  Statutory remedies for those compelled to act as public officers and straw man

Jurisdiction Legal Cite Type Title Legal Cite
Alabama Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Article III, Section 25;Article IV, Sect. 22; Art. V, Sect. 10; Article VI, Section 12
Alabama Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer C.O.A. § 13A-10-10
Alabama Statute Crime: Identity Theft C.O.A. Title 13A, Article 10
Alaska Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Sections 2.5, 3.6, 4.8
Alaska Statute Crime: Identity Theft A.S. § 11.46.160
Alaska Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer A.S. § 11.56.830
Arizona Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 4, Part 2, Section 4; Const. Article 6, Section 28
Arizona Statute Crime: Identity Theft A.R.S. § 13-2006
Arizona Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer A.R.S. § 13-2406
Arkansas Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 3, Section 10;Const. Article 5, Section 7;Article 5, Section 10; Art. 80, Sect. 14
Arkansas Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer A.S.C. § 5-37-208
California Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 5, Section 2 (governor);Const. Article 5, Section 14;Article 7, Section 7
California Statute Crime: Identity Theft Penal Code § 484.1
Colorado Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article V, Section 8 (internal)
Connecticut Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 1, Section 11 (internal)
Connecticut Statute Crime: Identity Theft C.G.S.A. § 53a-129a to 53a-129c
Delaware Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 1, Section 19
Delaware Statute Crime: Identity Theft D.C. Title 11, Section 854
Delaware Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer D.C. Title 11, Section 907(3)
District of Columbia Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. of D.C., Article IV, Sect. 4(B) (judges); Art. III, Sect, 4(D) (governor)
District of Columbia Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer D.C. Code § 22-1404
Florida Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article II, Section 5
Florida Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer F.S. Title XLVI, Section 817.02
Georgia Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article I, Section II, Para. III;Const. Article III, Section II, Para. IV(b)
Georgia Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer O.C.G.A. §16-10-23
Hawaii Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III, Section 8 (internal)
Hawaii Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer H.R.S. § 710-1016
Idaho Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article V, Section 7 (judges)
Idaho Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer I.S. § 18-3001
Illinois Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article IV, Section 2(e) (legislative)
Illinois Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer 720 ILCS 5/17‑2
Indiana Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 2, Section 9;Const. Article 4, Section 30 (legislative)
Indiana Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer I.C. § 25-30-1-18
Iowa Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III, Section 22 (legislature); Const. Article IV, Section 14 (governor)
Iowa Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer I.C. Title XVI, Section 718.2
Kansas Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 3, Section 13 (judges)
Kansas Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer K.R.S. § 21-3825
Kentucky Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer K.R.S. § 434.570
Kentucky Statute Crime: Identity Theft K.R.S. § 514.60;K.R.S. § 532.034
Kentucky Statute Dual Office Prohibition K.R.S. § 61.080
Louisiana Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article II, Section 2 (internal); Const. Article IV, Section 2 (executive)
Louisiana Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer R.S. § 14:112
Maine Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III, Section 2 (internal)
Maine Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer 17-A M.R.S. Section 457
Maryland Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Declaration of Rights, Article 33 (judges); Const. Const. Declaration of Rights, Article 35 (officers)
Maryland Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer Statutes §8-301
Massachusetts Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Chapter VI, Article 2
Massachusetts Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer G.L.M. Chapter 268, Section 33
Michigan Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article IV, Section 8
Michigan Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer Mich. Penal Code, Chapter XXXV, Section 750.217c
Minnesota Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article IV, Section 5
Minnesota Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer M.S. § 609.475
Mississippi Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer M.C. § 97-7-43
Missouri Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article VII, Section 9
Missouri Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer M.R.S. § 570.223
Missouri Statute Crime: Identity Theft M.R.S. § 570.223
Montana Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III, Section 1; Const. Article V, Section 9 (office);Article VII, Section 9 (judges)
Montana Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer M.C.A. § 45-7-209
Nebraska Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III-9
Nebraska Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer N.R.S. § 28-636
Nebraska Statute Crime: Identity Theft N.R.S. § 28-639
Nevada Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 4, Section 9 (officers)
Nevada Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer N.R.S. § 197.120
New Hampshire Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Art. 94-95
New Hampshire Statute Crime: Identity Theft N.H.R.S.§ 359-I:2
New Jersey Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III, Section 1; Const. Article IV, Section V, Sections 3-4; Const. Article V, Section I, Section 3
New Jersey Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer N.J.S.A. § 2C:28-8
New Mexico Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article IV, Section 3 (senators);Const. Article VI, Section 19 (judge)
New Mexico Statute Crime: Identity Theft N.M.S.A. § 30-16-21.1
New York Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III, Section 7 (legislature); Const. Article VI, Section 20(b)(1)
New York Statute Crime: Identity Theft General Business Law 380-S;Penal Law 190.78
New York Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer Penal Law § 190.23
North Carolina Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article VI, Section 9
North Carolina Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer N.C.G.S. § 14-277
North Dakota Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer N.D.C.C. § 12.1-13-04
Ohio Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 2, Section 04 (legislature); Const. Article 4, Section 06, Para. (B)
Ohio Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer  
Oklahoma Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article II, Section 12;Const. Article V, Section 18 (legislature)
Oklahoma Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer O.S. Title 21, Section 1533
Oklahoma Statute Crime: Identity Theft O.S. Title 21, Section 1533.1
Oregon Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article II, Section 10
Oregon Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer O.R.S. § 162.365
Oregon Statute Crime: Identity Theft O.R.S. § 165.803
Pennsylvania Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article V, Section 17 (judges)
Pennsylvania Statute Crime: Identity Theft 18 Pa.C.A. § 4120
Rhode Island Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article III, Section 6
Rhode Island Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer G.L.R.I. § 11-14-1
South Carolina Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 1, Section 8(internal);Const. Article VI, Section 3 (officers)
South Carolina Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer S.C.C.O.L. § 16-13-290
South Dakota Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 3, Section 3
South Dakota Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer S.D.C.L. § 22-40-16
South Dakota Statute Crime: Identity Theft S.D.C.L. § 22-40-8
Tennessee Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article II, Section 2 (internal);Const. Article II, Section 26 (officers)
Tennessee Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer T.C. § 39-16-301
Texas Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 2, Section 1 (internal);Const. Article 3, Section 18 (legislature); Const. Article 4, Section 6 (executive)
Texas Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer Penal Code, Section 37.11
Texas Statute Crime: Identity Theft T.S. § 32.51
United States Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer 18 U.S.C. § 912
Utah Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article V, Section 1 (internal);Const. Article VIII, Section 10 (judges)
Utah Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer U.C. § 76-8-512
Vermont Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Chapter II, Section 54
Vermont Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer 13 V.S.A. § 3002
Virginia Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article IV, Section 4 (legislature); Const. Article V, Section 4 (governor)
Virginia Statute Crime: Identity Theft C.O.V. § 18.2-186.3
Washington Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article II, Section 14 (legislature); Const. Article IV, Section 15 (judges)
Washington Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer R.C.W. 18.71.190
West Virginia Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article 6, Section 16 (senators); Const. Article 7, Section 4 (executive); Const. Article 8, Section 7 (judges)
West Virginia Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer W.V.C. § 61-5-27a(e)
Wisconsin Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Article IV, Section 13
Wisconsin Statute Crime: Identity Theft W.S. § 943.201
Wyoming Constitution Dual Office Prohibition Const. Section 97-3-008 (legislature);Const. Section 97-5-027 (judges)
Wyoming Statute Crime: Identity Theft W.S. § 6-3-901
Wyoming Statute Crime: Impersonating Public Officer W.S. § 6-5-307

If you would like to research further the laws and remedies available in the specific jurisdiction you are in, we highly recommend the following free tool:

  1. SEDM Jurisdictions Database, Litigation Tool #09.003
    http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm
  2. SEDM Jurisdictions Database Online, Litigation Tool #09.004
    http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm

The above tool is also available at the top row under the menu on our Litigation Tools page  at the link below:

http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm

9.3.   How do ordinary government workers not holding “public office” become “taxpayers”

A question we are asked frequently is whether ordinary government workers not otherwise engaged in a “public office” are “taxpayers” and how they become “taxpayers”. 

Chapter XVIII: Public Agents and Officers
§ 488. Definitions and classifications.-

Public agents are those persons who are chosen to perform the duties of the public,-that is, the government or municipality. They may be divided into two principal classes; namely, employes and officers. It is true the term "employe," in a sense, applies also to officers, for it may be said that every officer is an employe; but, on the other hand, a public employe is not necessarily a public officer; thus, a mere janitor of county or state buildings, a county physician, and other employes who do not take an official oath nor file an official bond, are not officers but employes. An employe of the government usually owes his position to some officer whose duty it is to make the employment, and it is based entirely upon contract.  On the other hand, an officer owes his selection to a source fixed by the constitution or statute ,  and not by contract.   Moreover, the term "public office" embraces the idea of tenure and duration, while a mere public employment may involve only transient or incidental duties. An office is an entity which may continue even after the death or withdrawal of the incumbent.   A public office involves the delegation to the incumbent of a. portion of the sovereign power of the state,  either to make, administer, or execute the laws; and it signifies that the incumbent is to exercise some functions of that nature, and take the fees and emoluments belonging to the position.   On the other hand, there may be and are many employments by the national, state, city or town government which do not constitute the employe a public officer. "The work of the commonwealth," said the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, ''and of the cities and towns must be done by agents or servants, and much of it is of the nature of an employment.  It is sometimes difficult to make the distinction between a public office and an employment, yet the title of 'public officer' is one well known to the law, and it is often necessary to determine what constitutes a public office. Every copying-clerk · or janitor of a building is not necessarily a public officer.'' A mere employe may, of course, be engaged by the appointing power for a definite time, or to accomplish a definite purpose, and in that sense his position may involve the nature of duration also; while, on the other hand, his employment may be altogether for an indefinite period, and he be subject to removal at any time. An employe under contract may be discharged without cause, unless the statute or constitution directs otherwise, but a public officer cannot generally be removed without cause, although the power of removal is inherent in the appointing power: the reason being that the power of removal is generally restricted by constitutional or statutory provisions. The English notion that an office is hereditary does not obtain in this country, though it is true that the rights and privileges of an officer are the rights and privileges of the incumbent; in this country both the power of appointment and that of removal inhere in the people and are subject to their control by constitutions and statutes.   An office not being the creature of a contract, but simply a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power, it follows, according to the weight of authority, that the incumbent has no right of property in the office.
[A Treatise on the Law of Agency in Contract and Tort, George L. Rienhard, The Bowen-Merrill Company, 1902, pp. 538-539]

Trainor v. Board of County Auditors, 89 Mich. 162, 16 L. R. A. 96; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5; Opinion of Judges, 3 Maine 481.

See Hall v. Wisconsin, supra.

Herrington v. State, 103 Ga. 318, 68 Am. St. 95.

State v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477. 63 Am. St. 174; Water Commissioners v. Cramer, 61 N.J.L. 270.

In re Oaths. 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 492; Olmstead v. Mayor, 42 N.Y. Supr. 481; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall (U.S.) 385.

State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio.St. 347; People v. Stratton, 28 Cal. 382.

See the opinion of Marshall, C. J., m United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 102; State v. Jennings, 57 Ohio.St. 415.

Brown v. Russell, 186 Mass. 14.

Trainor v. Board of County Auditors, 89 Mich. 162, 16 L.R.A. 95; State v. Hewitt, 3 S.D. 187, 16 L.R.A. 413; Jacques v. Little, 51 Kan. 300; Board of Com'rs v. Johnson, 124 Ind. 145, 19 Am.St. 88; State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 41 Am.St. 788; State v. Johnson, 57 Ohio.St. 429.

State v. Dalis, 44 Mo. 129.

State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio.St. 98.

The answer is they aren’t.  The reason is that the above treatise explains that the office CANNOT be a product of contract.  They may file a false and fraudulent IRS Form W-4 AGREEMENT and therefore CONTRACT to be TREATED as if they are public officers, but it constitutes the crime of impersonating a public officer per 18 U.S.C. §912 to do so.  The remainder of this section will explain why this is.

The previous section discussed the differences between a “public office” and “public employment” and clearly proved that they are NOT equivalent.  Consequently, ordinary government workers or civil service employees are NOT “public officers” nor are they therefore engaged in the “trade or business” franchise and contract by default.

So how did sneaky Congress get around the road block that “public offices” and “public employments” are NOT equivalent in law?  Here is how they did it:

  1. They defined all STATUTORY  “employees” as “officers” in 5 U.S.C. §2105.

    TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart A > CHAPTER 21 > § 2105
    § 2105. Employee
    (a) For the purpose of this title, “employee”, except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifically modified, means an officer and an individual who is—
    (1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official capacity—
    (A) the President;
    (B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress;
    (C) a member of a uniformed service;
    (D) an individual who is an employee under this section;
    (E) the head of a Government controlled corporation; or
    (F) an adjutant general designated by the Secretary concerned under section 709 (c) of title 32;
    (2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act; and
    (3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph (1) of this subsection while engaged in the performance of the duties of his position.

  2. They PRESUMED that since this “OFFICER” works for the public, he is a statutory “PUBLIC OFFICER”, even though this is not strictly true.  One can be an AGENT or OFFICER of the government WITHOUT also being a PUBLIC OFFICER.
  3. They falsely told both the public and all government workers that:

    3.1 “employee” in the ORDINARY sense and “employee” in the STATUTORY sense were equivalent.

    3.2 Everyone in the public who works for a living is an “employee” subject to federal law.  In fact, only PUBLIC OFFICERS are subject to federal law.

    3.3 “employee” under the Internal Revenue Code Section 3401 and “employee” under 5 U.S.C. §2105 are equivalent.  In fact, “employee” under the I.R.C. includes only public officers or officials, but not “employees” under 5 U.S.C. §2105.

  4. The above deception is called a “fallacy by equivocation”.  It appeals to the legal ignorance of the public to STEAL from them.  It does so by confusing contexts for key ”words of art”.  In this case, the ORDINARY context was deliberately confused with the  STAUTUTORY context in order to STEAL PRIVATE property from people the government was supposed to be protecting from such theft.

Earnings not connected to the “trade or business” and public office franchise are described in 26 U.S.C. §871(a)  in the case of “nonresident aliens”.  The following article proves that nonresident aliens not engaged in the “trade or business” franchise cannot earn “wages” unless they consent to do so by signing a contract called IRS Form W-4:

Nonresident Alien Position, Form #05.020, Section 12
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

I.R.C. Subtitle A  is a franchise tax on public offices, which the I.R.C. calls a “trade or business”.  “Public office” and “public employment” are NOT equivalent in law.  Even for government workers, they don't earn “wages” as legally defined in 26 U.S.C. §3401  unless they are ALREADY public officers in the government BEFORE they sign the W-4.  This is because:

  1. If a government worker not engaged in a public office refuses to sign the W-4 and is not otherwise engaged in a “public office”, then they can’t lawfully become the subject of W-2 information returns and if they are filed with nonzero “wages”, they are FALSE in violation of  26 U.S.C. §7207 and  26 U.S.C. §7434.
  2. It is “wages” which appear on IRS Form W-2 in block 1. This form connects the term “wages” to the “trade or business” franchise pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6041(a).
  3. 26 U.S.C. §871(a)(1)  mentions “wages” as being taxable when not connected to the “trade or business” franchise and one can only earn “wages” if they consent under the W-4 contract/agreement.

    TITLE 26--INTERNAL REVENUE
    CHAPTER I--INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
    PART 31_EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE--Table of Contents
    Subpart E_Collection of Income Tax at Source
    26 C.F.R. §31.3401(a)-3 Amounts deemed wages under voluntary withholding agreements

    (a) In general.

    Notwithstanding the exceptions to the definition of wages specified in section 3401(a) and the regulations thereunder, the term “wages” includes the amounts described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section with respect to which there is a voluntary withholding agreement in effect under section 3402(p). References in this chapter to the definition of wages contained in section 3401(a) shall be deemed to refer also to this section (§31.3401(a)–3).

    (b) Remuneration for services.

    (1) Except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the amounts referred to in paragraph (a) of this section include any remuneration for services performed by an employee for an employer which, without regard to this section, does not constitute wages under section 3401(a). For example, remuneration for services performed by an agricultural worker or a domestic worker in a private home (amounts which are specifically excluded from the definition of wages by section 3401(a) (2) and (3), respectively) are amounts with respect to which a voluntary withholding agreement may be entered into under section 3402(p). See §§31.3401(c)–1 and 31.3401(d)–1 for the definitions of “employee” and “employer”.

  4. It is “wages” and NOT “all earnings”, “income”, or even “gross income” that appear in the IRS Individual Master File (IMF)  as being taxable.
  5. The income tax is upon “wages” but not even “public officers” earn “wages”.

    TITLE 26 > Subtitle C > CHAPTER 24 > § 3401
    § 3401. Definitions

    (a) Wages

    For purposes of this chapter, the term “wages” means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include remuneration paid—

  6. It is “wages” which are the subject of I.R.C. Subtitle C  withholding and constitute I.R.C. Subtitle A  “gross income” because “wages” is the code word for earnings of those who elect to become “public officers” and thereby donate their private property earnings to a “public office”, a “public use”, and a “public purpose” and thereby subject them to taxation by signing the federal W-4  “public officer” job application and contract.
  7. It is “wages” that 26 C.F.R. §31.3401(p)-1  says become “gross income” and therefore “trade or business” income ONLY AFTER one signs the W-4.

    TITLE 26--INTERNAL REVENUE
    CHAPTER I--INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
    PART 31_EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE--Table of Contents
    Subpart E_Collection of Income Tax at Source
    §31.3402(p)-1  Voluntary withholding agreements.

    (a) In general.

    An employee and his employer may enter into an agreement under section 3402(b) to provide for the withholding of income tax upon payments of amounts described in paragraph (b)(1) of §31.3401(a)–3, made after December 31, 1970. An agreement may be entered into under this section only with respect to amounts which are includible in the gross income of the employee under section 61, and must be applicable to all such amounts paid by the employer to the employee. The amount to be withheld pursuant to an agreement under section 3402(p) shall be determined under the rules contained in section 3402 and the regulations thereunder. See §31.3405(c)–1, Q&A–3 concerning agreements to have more than 20-percent Federal income tax withheld from eligible rollover distributions within the meaning of section 402.

  8. It is for claiming that “wages” are not taxable that many tax protesters are properly sanctioned. See:
    Flawed Tax Arguments to Avoid, Form #08.004, Section 6.2
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

The W-4 form is being used to connect private earnings to “wages” as legally defined and the “trade or business”/”public office” franchise by all of the following mechanisms:

  1. As a federal “election” form where you can elect yourself into public office within the government. You are the only voter in this “election”. Now do you know why the IRS calls it an “election” whenever you consent to something in the I.R.C. They aren't lying!
  2. As a permission form authorizing the filing of information returns connecting otherwise private persons to a public office and a “trade or business” pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6041(a).  If the W-2 is filed against a person who did NOT make such an election, then election fraud is occurring and the employer is committing the crime of impersonating a public officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §912 . Any withholdings against a person who did not submit the W-4 is a bribe to procure a public office in criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §211.

    http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/usc...11----000-.html

  3. To CREATE public offices in the U.S. government unlawfully rather than tax those already in existence.
  4. As a way to create a franchise that turns private labor into public property by donating it to a public use and a public office.

    “Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;' and to 'secure,' not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.
    [Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]

  5. As a way to make private workers into a Kelly Girls and contractors for the government engaged in a “public office”.
  6. As a way to make you party to the franchise agreement codified in I.R.C. Subtitles A and C.
  7. The SSN or TIN on the W-4 form is being used as a de facto “license” to act as a “public officer” in the U.S. government called a “taxpayer”. The IRS Form 1042-s Instructions say the SSN is only required for those engaged in a “trade or business”, which means a public office. The tax is on the office, not on the private person. The office is the “res” that is the subject of the tax and the use of the number is prima facie evidence of the existence of the “res”. All tax proceedings are “in rem” against the office, which is the only real “citizen”, “resident”, and “taxpayer”. The human being filling the office is not the “taxpayer”, but he is surety for the “taxpayer”. They don't call the SSN or TIN a “license number” even though it is for all intents and purposes, because they don't want to admit that they have no authority to license ANYTHING within a state of the Union:

    “But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize [e.g. LICENSE] a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.
    [License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

Please show us a case where the License Tax cases was overruled?  It's still in force.  The feds can't license ANYTHING within a state, including “public offices” and the “trade or business” franchise that is being ILLEGALLY enforced within states of the Union at this time.  To admit otherwise is to sanction a destruction of the separation of powers between the states and the federal government. There is NO PLACE within the I.R.C. that authorizes the CREATION of public offices using any tax form, and yet that is what the IRS is unlawfully using W-2, W-4, and 1040 forms for. 4 U.S.C. §72 says there MUST be a statute that authorizes the creation and exercise of such offices within a state in order for such public offices to be valid. Essentially what is happening is that the forms constitute an election to make you into a “resident agent” for an office that exists in the District of Columbia.

The existence of 26 U.S.C. §871(a)  is a deception, because 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(31)  says the property of those not engaged in the “trade or business' franchise is a foreign estate not subject to the I.R.C.  One's earnings are part of that “foreign estate”.

26 U.S.C. §3401(a)(6)  excludes earnings of “nonresident aliens” from “wages”, if regulations exist.  Government workers who aren't public officers therefore have the same protections as ordinary private industry workers who are nonresident aliens not engaged in the “trade or business” franchise.  The only way a nonresident alien not otherwise engaged in the “trade or business” franchise can become subject is to sign the W-4 contract to:

  1.  Become engaged in the franchise and be eligible for “benefits” under the franchise agreement.
  2.  Waive sovereign i mmunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1605.
  3.  Make an election to become a “resident alien”.

Where within 26 U.S.C. §3401  is the term “wages” treated any differently for government workers who AREN'T “public officers”?  It AIN'T, friend.

Remember: Information returns are the only way the IRS could find out about the earnings of a government employee, and these returns can ONLY be filed against those engaged in the “trade or business” franchise or who elect to be using the W-4 agreement/contract. 26 C.F.R. §31.3401(a)-3(a), 26 C.F.R. §31.3402(p)-1. How would the IRS find out about 871(a) income that is NOT connected with the “trade or business”? There is no information return that is NOT connected to a “trade or business” and it is a CRIME for a person not ALREADY engaged in a public office in the government BEFORE they signed the W-4 to impersonate a public officer or engage in the activities of a public office. 18 U.S.C. §912.

The income tax is upon the COINCIDENCE of DOMICILE within the jurisdiction AND being engaged in the “trade or business” franchise. The VOLUNTARY use of an identifying number connects you to BOTH of these prerequisites:

  1. SSNs and TINs can only be issued to “U.S. persons”. 26 U.S.C. §6109(g) , 26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1(g), and 20 C.F.R. §422.103(d).
  2. The number is only MANDATORY for persons engaged in franchises. See IRS form 1042-s instructions AND section 10 of the following:
    About SSNs/TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence, Form #05.012
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

You can STILL be a government worker as a "non-resident non-person" not engaged in a “trade or business”, not have a domicile on federal territory, and therefore STILL be a “foreigner” who is free and sovereign.  The domicile and the protection it pays for is where the government's authority comes from to collect the tax in the first place.  It is a CIVIL liability and you aren't subject to their CIVIL statutory law without a domicile on federal territory, unless you contract with them to procure an identity or “res”, and thereby become a “res-ident”. When you contract with them, you create a “public office” in the government and become surety for the office you created using your signature.  F.R.Civ.P. 17(b), 26 U.S.C. §7408(d), and 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(39)  then changes the choice of law to the District of Columbia for all functions of the “public office” because now you are acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the federal corporation as such public officer.

On the subject of contracting with the government, the Bible forbids Christians from nominating a King or Protector above them, or from contracting with the pagan government:

“Do not walk in the [civil] statutes of your fathers [the heathens, by selecting a domicile or “residence” in their jurisdiction], nor observe their judgments, nor defile yourselves with their idols. I am the LORD your God: Walk in My statutes, keep My judgments, and do them; hallow My Sabbaths, and they will be a sign between Me and you, that you may know that I am the LORD your God.”
[Ezekial 20:10-20, Bible, NKJV]

“You shall make no covenant [contract or franchise] with them [foreigners, pagans], nor with their [pagan government] gods [laws or judges]. They shall not dwell in your land [and you shall not dwell in theirs by becoming a “resident” in the process of contracting with them], lest they make you sin against Me [God].   For if you serve their gods [under contract or agreement or franchise], it will surely be a snare to you.”
[Exodus 23:32-33, Bible, NKJV]

“Therefore, my brethren, you also have become dead to the law [man's law] through the body of Christ [by shifting your legal domicile to the God's Kingdom], that you may be married to another—to Him who was raised from the dead, that we should bear fruit [as agents, fiduciaries, and trustees] to God. For when we were in the flesh, the sinful passions which were aroused by the law were at work in our members to bear fruit to death. But now we have been delivered from the law, having died to what we were held by, so that we should serve in the newness of the Spirit [and newness of the law, God’s law] and not in the oldness of the letter.”
[Rom. 7:4-6, Bible, NKJV]

“The wicked shall be turned into hell, And all the nations [and peoples] that forget [or disobey] God [or His commandments].”
[Psalm 9:17, Bible, NKJV]

“Do you not know that friendship with the world is enmity with God?  Whoever therefore wants to be a friend [“citizen”, “resident”, “taxpayer”, “inhabitant”, or “subject” under a king or political ruler] of the world [or any man-made kingdom other than God's Kingdom] makes himself an enemy of God. “
[James 4:4, Bible, NKJV]

“Above all, you must live as citizens of heaven [INSTEAD of citizens of earth.  You can only be a citizen of ONE place at a time because you can only have a domicile in one place at a time], conducting yourselves in a manner worthy of the Good News about Christ. Then, whether I come and see you again or only hear about you, I will know that you are standing together with one spirit and one purpose, fighting together for the faith, which is the Good News.”
[Philippians 1:27, Bible, NLT]

The government can’t lawfully force you to choose a domicile in their jurisdiction or to nominate a protector or become a “resident” if you are a “national” who was born in this country.  They can force an alien born in another country to become a privileged “resident”, but the can't force a “national” who is born here to become a “resident”, because they can't lawfully compel a “citizen” under the constitution to suffer any of the disabilities of alienage without engaging in involuntary servitude and violation of constitutional rights.  This is also confirmed by the definition of “residence” at 26 C.F.R. §1.871-2, which only includes aliens and not “nonresident aliens” or even "non-resident non-persons". If they did force you to choose a domicile or residence and thereby become a “taxpayer”, it would be a violation of the First Amendment  prohibition against compelled association and the  Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. It has always been lawful to refuse protection and refuse to be a domiciliary called a statutory “U.S. citizen”, “U.S. person”, or statutory “U.S. resident”, and to refuse to contract with them or accept any “benefits” that might give rise to a “quasi-contractual” obligation to pay for “social insurance”. See:

  1. Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
  2. The Government “Benefits” Scam, Form #05.040
    http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

As Frank Kowalik points out in his wonderful book, IRS Humbug , the income tax is a public officer kickback program disguised to “look” like a legitimate income tax. It's smoke and mirrors. To make it look like an income tax, they had to throw the “domicile” stuff into it, but the public officer status is still the foundation. That is why 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(31)  says everything in the code is “foreign” that is not connected to the public office (“trade or business”) franchise. To be “foreign” means it is outside the jurisdiction of the franchise agreement because not consensually connected to it.

10.  Methods of Connecting You to the Franchise

10.1     Reductions in Liability: Graduated Rate of Tax, Deductions, and Earned Income Credits

All attempts to reduce one’s assumed tax liability require the person filing the tax return to be engaged in the “trade or business” excise taxable franchise.  This includes:

  1. Applying the graduated rate of tax found in 26 U.S.C. §1.  Without the graduated rate of tax, the flat 30% tax applies to “nonresident alien individuals” found in 26 U.S.C. §871(a).  The Section 1 rate usually starts lower than 30%.
  2. Applying for earned income credits in 26 U.S.C. §32.
  3. Taking “trade or business” deductions found in 26 U.S.C. §162:

    TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter B
    Part VI-Itemized deductions for Individuals and Corporations
    Sec. 162. - Trade or business expenses

    (a) In general

    There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including –

    (1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered;

Why must you be engaged in a “trade or business” in order to reduce your liability as a “taxpayer”?  Because this is a commercial “benefit” and only those who work for the government can receive any commercial benefit from the government.  Otherwise, the government is abusing its taxing power to transfer wealth among private individuals:

To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.  This is not legislation.  It is a decree under legislative forms.

Nor is it taxation.  ‘A tax,’ says Webster’s Dictionary, ‘is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or State.’  ‘Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the Legislature upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes.’  Cooley, Const. Lim., 479.

Coulter, J., in  Northern Liberties v. St. John’s Church, 13 Pa. St., 104 says, very forcibly, ‘I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purposes of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations—that they are imposed for a public purpose.’  See, also Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa.St., 69; Matter of Mayor of N.Y., 11 Johns., 77; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch., 398; Sharpless v. Mayor, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia., 47; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, supra.”
[Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)]

IRS Publication 519 confirms the above by saying the following:

Nonresident Aliens

You can claim deductions to figure your effectively connected taxable income.  You generally cannot claim deductions related to income that is not connected with your U.S. business activities.  Except for personal exemptions, and certain itemized deductions, discussed later, you can claim deductions only to the extent they are connected with your effectively connected income.
[IRS Publication 519, Year 2005, p. 24]

10.2  Information Returns

Information returns include but are not limited to IRS Forms W-2, 1042-S, 1098, 1099, and 8300.  Receipt of “trade or business” earnings is the basis for nearly all Information Returns processed by the IRS, which are reports documenting financial payments made to government entities or officers.  The requirement to file these reports is found at 26 U.S.C. §6041.  The “person” they are referring to in the article is none other than a “public officer” in the government:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 61 > Subchapter A > PART III > Subpart B > § 6041

§ 6041. Information at source

(a) Payments of $600 or more

All persons engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course of such trade or business to another person, of rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income (other than payments to which section 6042 (a)(1), 6044 (a)(1), 6047 (e), 6049 (a), or 6050N (a) applies, and other than payments with respect to which a statement is required under the authority of section 6042 (a)(2), 6044 (a)(2), or 6045), of $600 or more in any taxable year, or, in the case of such payments made by the United States, the officers or employees of the United States having information as to such payments and required to make returns in regard thereto by the regulations hereinafter provided for, shall render a true and accurate return to the Secretary, under such regulations and in such form and manner and to such extent as may be prescribed by the Secretary, setting forth the amount of such gains, profits, and income, and the name and address of the recipient of such payment.

In most cases, these reports are not only false, but fraudulent.  The following article documents how the IRS structures the handling of these reports in order to encourage the filing of false reports so as to maximize their revenues from unlawful activities:

The Information Return Scam
http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Remedies/InformationReturnScam.htm

This “trade or business” scam is found in other titles of the U.S. Code as well.  For instance, in Title 31, which is the Money and Finance title, we did a search for the word “trade or business” and were very surprised by what we found there.  You may know that when you try to withdraw $10,000 or more from a bank account, banks will insist on preparing what is called a “Currency Transaction Report”, or “CTR” documenting the withdrawal.  This report is sent to the United States Treasury and inputted into the FINCEN computers at the Treasury.  The report is used to catch money launderers and tax evaders who are handling large amounts of cash.  Well, the only circumstance under which this report can lawfully be prepared is when the subject is engaged in a “trade or business”!  Here is the section:

31 C.F.R. §103.30(d)(2) General

(d) Exceptions to the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5331:

(2) Receipt of currency not in the course of the recipient's trade or business.

The receipt of currency in excess of $10,000 by a person other than in the course of the person's trade or business is not reportable under 31 U.S.C. 5331.

The “trade or business” they are talking about is exactly the same one that appears in the Internal Revenue Code, folks!

Title 31: Money and Finance: Treasury
PART 103—FINANCIAL RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING OF CURRENCY AND FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS
Subpart B—Reports Required To Be Made
§ 103.30 Reports relating to currency in excess of $10,000 received in a trade or business.

(c) Meaning of terms. The following definitions apply for purposes of this section--

(11) Trade or business. The term trade or business has the same meaning as under section 162 of title 26, United States Code.

Quite a scam, huh?  The following memorandum of law describes this scam in detail:

The Money Laundering Enforcement SCAM, Form #05.044
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/MoneyLaunderingScam.pdf

The "trade or business" scam in Title 31 in the context of CTR's explains why financial institutions can demand federal ID numbers from depositors, why the federal government needs to be able to track these deposits, and many other considerations.  Banks and financial institutions are simply volunteering to help the federal government keep track of its "employees" and "subcontractors".   The Slave Surveillance Numbers (SSN) is the license number used to track federal subcontractors and is used by the federal government to track their "corporate" assets.  If you think Microsoft as a corporation is too big for its britches, then what about the mother corporation for all other corporations, the United States government?  All of the assets owned by a person engaged in a "trade or business" become "effectively connected" with the U.S. government by virtue of the fact that if a federal employee fails to deduct and withhold the proper "kickback" for which they are liable under 26 U.S.C.  §1461, then their assets must be tracked so the kickback can be recovered through administrative process without the need to litigate.  Being "effectively connected" means they are administratively attachable without the need for litigation by using an automated "Notice of Levy" form that isn't even signed.    If you are going to engage in “commerce” or business with the government, then you have to help them make it “efficient”, right?  Doesn't that come with the territory: Never look a gift horse in the mouth?  Well, "Uncle" is your new "gift horse", your Master, and you are the slave.  The assets of a federal subcontractor only cease to be administratively attachable at the point when the subcontractor fulfills their fiduciary duty as a "transferee" under 26 U.S.C. §6901 and 6903 and deducts the correct amount of "tax", or "kickback" to send to their new "employer", the federal government.  In effect, they are "Kelly Girls" for the federal government who handle their own payroll and send payments back to the mother corporation.  The compensation they receive for doing their own payroll comes in the form of a reduced tax liability, procured by taking itemized deductions, earned income credit, and applying a graduated rate of tax.  Those not engaged in a “trade or business” are not allowed to avail themselves of any such “privileges”.  If you don't want to continue to be treated inhumanely like a "taxpayer", then quit acting like one, quit sucking on the government tit, and quit asking for "Uncle" to take care of you by volunteering to engage in privileged activities in order to procure special incentives and favors you don't need anyway.

The "trade or business" requirement also extends to nearly all other types of payment reporting within the I.R.C.  Here are just a few examples:

  1. IRS Publication 334 entitled Tax Guide for Small Businesses, Year 2002, p. 12 says:

    "Form 8300.  You must file form 8300, Report of Cash Payments Over $10,000 Received in a Trade or Business, if you receive more than $10,000 in cash in one transaction, or two or more related business transactions.  Cash includes U.S. and foreign coin and currency.  It also includes certain monetary instruments such as cashier's and traveler's checks and money orders.  Cash does not include a check drawn on an individual's personal account (personal check).  For more information, see Publication 1544, Reporting Cash Payments of Over $10,000 (Received in a Trade or Business)

    [http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/IRS/IRSPub334.pdf]

  2. IRS Publication 583 entitled Starting a Business and Keeping Records, Rev. May 2002, p. 8 says:

    "Form 1099-MISC.  Use Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, to report certain payments you make in your trade or business. These payments include the following..."

    [http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/IRS/IRSPub583.pdf]

  3. IRS Form 1099-MISC Instructions, 2005, p. 1 says:

    "Trade or business reporting only.  Report on Form 1099-MISC only when payments are mad in the course of your trade or business.  Personal payments are not reportable.  You are engaged in a trade or business if you operate for gain or profit.  However, nonprofit organizations are considered to be engaged in a trade or business and are subject to these reporting requirements.  Nonprofit organizations subject to these reporting requirements include trusts of qualified pension or profit-sharing plans of employers, certain organizations exempt from tax under section 501(c) or (d), and farmers' cooperatives that are exempt from tax under section 521.  Payments by federal, state, or local government agencies are also reportable."

    [http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/IRS/IRSForm1099Inst.pdf]

  4. Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(a)(11)-1(a) says that those who are not engaged in a “trade or business” can earn no reportable income on a W-2:

    Title 26: Internal Revenue
    PART 31—EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE
    Subpart E—Collection of Income Tax at Source
    § 31.3401(a)(11)-1   Remuneration other than in cash for service not in the course of employer's trade or business.

    (a) Remuneration paid in any medium other than cash for services not in the course of the employer's trade or business is excepted from wages and hence is not subject to withholding. Cash remuneration includes checks and other monetary media of exchange. Remuneration paid in any medium other than cash, such as lodging, food, or other goods or commodities, for services not in the course of the employer's trade or business does not constitute wages. Remuneration paid in any medium other than cash for other types of services does not come within this exception from wages. For provisions relating to cash remuneration for service not in the course of employer's trade or business, see §31.3401(a)(4)–1.

  5. Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(a)(6)-1(b) says that remuneration earned outside the statutory "United States" (federal territory) is exempted from wages and not subject to withholding.

    Title 26: Internal Revenue
    PART 31—EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE
    Subpart E—Collection of Income Tax at Source
    § 31.3401(a)(6)-1   Remuneration for services of nonresident alien individuals.

    (b) Remuneration for services performed outside the United States.

    Remuneration paid to a nonresident alien individual (other than a resident of Puerto Rico) for services performed outside the United States is excepted from wages and hence is not subject to withholding.

How does the IRS trap "nontaxpayers" who are 'non-resident non-persons" or "nonresident aliens" who refuse to get identifying numbers or fill out a W-4?  IRS Publication 515 shows how they do it, which is entitled Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Entities.  That publication capitalizes on the confusion of private employers about the meaning of "United States" and "trade or business" by saying the following:

Income Not Effectively Connected

This section discusses the specific types of income that are subject to NRA withholding.  The income codes contained in this section correspond to the income codes used on Form 1042-S (discussed later), and in most cases on Tables 1 and 2 found at the end of this publication.

You must withhold tax at the statutory rates shown in Chart C unless a reduced rate of exemption under a tax treaty applies.  For U.S. source gross income that is not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business, the rate is usually 30%.  Generally, you must withhold the tax at the time you pay the income to the foreign person.  See "When to withhold under Withholding Agent, earlier.

[IRS Publication 515, Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Entities, 2002, p. 14]

Three "words of art" are used above  that we must pay particular attention to: 

  1. "U.S. source":  Originating from within the "United States" federal corporation or federal territory.
  2. "gross income":  Payment qualifies as "gross income" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §61.  The only payment not connected with a "trade or business" which is explicitly identified in the code as "gross income"  is Social Security payments, under 26 U.S.C.  §861(a)(8).
  3. "U.S. trade or business":  the functions of a public office in the District of Columbia.  "U.S." =federal territory in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. §110(d).

So what they are really saying is that if you are a "nonresident alien" not engaged in the "trade or business" franchise who is receiving payments from the U.S. government in the form of Social Security, then these payments are subject to withholding of 30%, but ONLY if the party doing the withholding has explicitly been designated as a "withholding agent" by the Secretary as required under 26 U.S.C. §3501.  We also know that private employers are NOT required to act as withholding agents, by the admission of the IRS' own Internal Revenue Manual:

Internal Revenue Manual
Section 5.14.10.2  (09-30-2004)
Payroll Deduction Agreements

2.  Private employers, states, and political subdivisions are not required to enter into payroll deduction [withholding] agreements. Taxpayers should determine whether their employers will accept and process executed agreements before agreements are submitted for approval or finalized.

[SOURCE: http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch13s10.html]

10.3  Government Identifying Numbers:  SSN and TIN

Whenever you put a government issued identifying number on any document, you are implicitly establishing that you are engaged in the “trade or business” franchise.  This fact is easily discerned by examining the following:

  1.  26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1(b) indicates that in the case of a foreign person, identifying numbers are only required if that person is engaged in a “trade or business” or if they made an election to be a “U.S. person”, meaning public officer in the government.

    TITLE 26--INTERNAL REVENUE

    CHAPTER I--INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

    PART 301_PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION--Table of Contents

    Information and Returns

    Sec.  301.6109-1  Identifying numbers.

    (b) Requirement to furnish one's own number—

    (1) U.S. [GOVERNMENT] persons.

    Every  U.S. [federal government public officer] person who makes under this title a return, statement, or other document must furnish its own taxpayer identifying number as required by the forms and the accompanying instructions. A U.S. person whose number must be included on a document filed by another person must give the taxpayer identifying number so required to the other person on request.

    For penalties for failure to supply taxpayer identifying numbers, see sections 6721 through 6724. For provisions dealing specifically with the duty of employees with respect to their social security numbers, see Sec.  31.6011(b)-2 (a) and (b) of this chapter (Employment Tax Regulations). For provisions dealing specifically with the duty of employers with respect to employer identification numbers, see Sec.  31.6011(b)-1 of this chapter (Employment Tax Regulations).

    (2) Foreign persons.

    The provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of this section regarding the furnishing of one's own number shall apply to the following foreign persons--

        (i) A foreign person that has income effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business at any time during the taxable year;

        (ii) A foreign person that has a U.S. office or place of business or a U.S. fiscal or paying agent at any time during the taxable year;

        (iii) A nonresident alien treated as a resident under section 6013(g) or (h);

        (iv) A foreign person that makes a return of tax (including income, estate, and gift tax returns), an amended return, or a refund claim under this title but excluding information returns, statements, or documents;

        (v) A foreign person that makes an election under Sec.  301.7701-3(c);

        (vi) A foreign person that furnishes a withholding certificate described in Sec.  1.1441-1(e)(2) or (3) of this chapter or Sec.  1.1441-5(c)(2)(iv) or (3)(iii) of this chapter to the extent required under Sec.  1.1441-1(e)(4)(vii) of this chapter;

        (vii) A foreign person whose taxpayer identifying number is required to be furnished on any return, statement, or other document as required by the income tax regulations under section 897 or 1445. This paragraph (b)(2)(vii) applies as of November 3, 2003; and

        (viii) A foreign person that furnishes a withholding certificate described in Sec.  1.1446-1(c)(2) or (3) of this chapter or whose taxpayer identification number is required to be furnished on any return, statement, or other document as required by the income tax regulations under section 1446. This paragraph (b)(2)(viii) shall apply to partnership taxable years beginning after May 18, 2005, or such earlier time as the regulations under Sec. Sec.  1.1446-1 through 1.1446-5 of this chapter apply by reason of an election under Sec.  1.1446-7 of this chapter.

    1.1. The “U.S. person” they are describing in above is defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)  and it means a person in the “U.S.” defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) , which means a government public officer.  Everything that public officer makes that originates from the government is “trade or business” earnings.  This is also confirmed by 26 U.S.C. §864(c )(3) , which says that everything originating from the “U.S.” described is “trade or business” earnings. 

    1.2. Notice also that the “foreign person” described above is only required to provide the number if they are engaged in the “trade or business” franchise or if they made an election under 26 U.S.C. §6013(g) or (h) to be treated as a resident alien.  Such an election would be ILLEGAL for those who are nationals but not aliens, such as those domiciled in a state of the Union.  Only foreign nationals can make such an election.

  2. IRS Form 1042s Instructions, Year 2006, p. 14.  What all of the circumstances below have in common is that they involve a “benefit” that is usually financial or tangible to the recipient, and therefore require a franchisee license number called a Taxpayer Identification Number:

    Box 14, Recipient’s U.S. Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN)

    You must obtain a U.S. taxpayer identification number (TIN) for:

    ·   Any recipient whose income is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States.

    Note.  For these recipients, exemption code 01 should be entered in box 6.

    ·  Any foreign person claiming a reduced rate of, or exemption from, tax under a tax treaty between a foreign country and the United States, unless the income is an unexpected payment (as described in Regulations section 1.1441-6(g)) or consists of dividends and interest from stocks and debt obligations that are actively traded; dividends from any redeemable security issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (mutual fund); dividends, interest, or royalties from units of beneficial interest in a unit investment trust that are (or were, upon issuance) publicly offered and are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933; and amounts paid with respect to loans of any of the above securities.

    ·  Any nonresident alien individual claiming exemption from tax under section 871(f) for certain annuities received under qualified plans.

    ·   A foreign organization claiming an exemption from tax solely because of its status as a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c ) or as a private foundation.

    ·    Any QI.

    ·    Any WP or WT.

    ·  Any nonresident alien individual claiming exemption from withholding on compensation for independent personal services [services connected with a “trade or business”].

    ·   Any foreign grantor trust with five or fewer grantors.

    ·   Any branch of a foreign bank or foreign insurance company that is treated as a U.S. person.

    If a foreign person provides a TIN on a Form W-8, but is not required to do so, the withholding agent must include the TIN on Form 1042-S.

  3. IRS form 1040NR Instructions, Year 2007, p. 9.  You can’t avail yourself of the “benefits” of the franchise without providing your franchisee license number.

    Line 7c, Column (2)

    You must enter each dependent’s identifying number (SSN, ITIN, or adoption taxpayer identification number (ATIN)).  If you do not enter the correct identifying number, at the time we process your return we may disallow the exemption claimed (such as the child tax credit) based on the dependent.

10.4   Domicile, residence, and Resident Tax Returns such as IRS Form 1040

The requirement to pay an income tax originates from the coincidence of one’s domicile along with the excise taxable activities they engage in within the place of domicile:

"domicileA person's legal home.  That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning.  Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super. 310m 213 A.2d 94.  Generally, physical presence within a state and the intention to make it one's home are the requisites of establishing a "domicile" therein.  The permanent residence of a person or the place to which he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere.  A person may have more than one residence but only one domicile.  The legal domicile of a person is important since it, rather than the actual residence, often controls the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and determines where a person may exercise the privilege of voting and other legal rights and privileges."

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 485]

The above requirement of domicile is then found in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(a) and is hidden within the words “citizen” and “resident”:

TITLE 26--INTERNAL REVENUE

CHAPTER I--INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

PART 1_INCOME TAXES--Table of Contents

Sec.  1.1-1  Income tax on individuals.

(a) General rule.

(1) Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States and, to the extent provided by section 871(b) or 877(b), on the income of a nonresident alien individual. For optional tax in the case of taxpayers with adjusted gross income of less than $10,000 (less than $5,000 for taxable years beginning before January 1, 1970) see section 3. The tax imposed is upon taxable income (determined by subtracting the allowable deductions from gross income). The tax is determined in accordance with the table contained in section 1. See subparagraph (2) of this paragraph for reference guides to the appropriate table for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1964, and before January 1, 1965, taxable years beginning after December 31, 1964, and before January 1, 1971, and taxable years beginning after December 31, 1970. In certain cases credits are allowed against the amount of the tax. See part IV (section 31 and following), subchapter A, chapter 1 of the Code. In general, the tax is payable upon the basis of returns rendered by persons liable therefor (subchapter A (sections 6001 and following), chapter 61 of the Code) or at the source of the income by withholding. For the computation of tax in the case of a joint return of a husband and wife, or a return of a surviving spouse, for taxable years beginning before January 1, 1971, see section 2. The computation of tax in such a case for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1970, is determined in accordance with the table contained in section 1(a) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. For other rates of tax on individuals, see section 5(a). For the imposition of an additional tax for the calendar years 1968, 1969, and 1970, see section 51(a).

What “citizens” and “residents” have in common is a legal domicile in the “United States”.  Collectively, persons with a legal domicile within a jurisdiction are called “inhabitants” and “U.S. persons”:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > Sec. 7701.

Sec. 7701. - Definitions

(a) Definitions

(30) United States person

 The term ''United States person'' means -

 (A) a citizen or resident of the United States,

 (B) a domestic partnership,

 (C) a domestic corporation,

 (D) any estate (other than a foreign estate, within the meaning of paragraph (31)), and

 (E) any trust if -

 (i) a court within the United States is able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust, and

(ii) one or more United States persons have the authority to control all substantial decisions of the trust.

Below is a table showing the relationship between ones domicile and their statutory citizenship status:

Table  3: Effect of domicile on citizenship status

 

CONDITION

Description Domicile WITHIN
the FEDERAL ZONE and located in FEDERAL ZONE
Domicile WITHIN
the FEDERAL ZONE and temporarily located abroad in foreign country
Domicile WITHOUT the FEDERAL ZONE and located WITHOUT the FEDERAL ZONE
Location of domicile “United States” per
26 U.S.C. §§7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) , 7701(a)(39), 7408(d)
“United States” per
26 U.S.C. §§7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) , 7701(a)(39), 7408(d)
Without the “United States” per 26 U.S.C. §§7701(a)(9) and (a)(10), 7701(a)(39), 7408(d)
Physical location Federal territories, possessions, and the District of Columbia Foreign nations ONLY
(NOT states of the Union)
Foreign nations
states of the Union
Federal possessions
Tax Status

“U.S. Person”

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)

“U.S. Person”

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)

“Nonresident alien individual” if a public officer in the U.S. government. 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c )(3)(ii).

“Non-resident NON-person" if NOT a public officer in the U.S. government.

Tax form(s) to file

IRS Form 1040

IRS Form 1040 plus 2555

IRS Form 1040NR: “alien individuals”, “nonresident alien individuals”

No filing requirement: “non-citizen nationals”

Status if DOMESTIC national

Citizen
8 U.S.C. §1401