28 U.S.C.
§1603: Definitions
TITLE
28 > PART
IV > CHAPTER
97 > Sec. 1603.
Sec. 1603. - Definitions
For purposes of this chapter -
(a) A ''foreign state'', except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An ''agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'' means any entity -
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(14): "Foreign State"
TITLE 8 >
CHAPTER 12 >
SUBCHAPTER I > § 1101
§ 1101. Definitions
(a) As used
in this chapter—
(14) The term “foreign state” includes outlying possessions of a
foreign state, but self-governing dominions or territories under
mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign states.
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 648:
"Foreign states.
Nations which are outside the United States. Term may also refer to
another state; i.e. a sister state.
"The term "foreign
nations," as used in the statement of the rule that the laws of
foreign nations should be proved in a certain manner, should be construed
to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is
brought; and hence one state of the Union is foreign to another, in the
sense of that rule.
"A "foreign
state" within statute providing for expatriation of American citizen
who is naturalized under laws of foreign state is a country which is not
the United States, or its possession or colony, an alien country, other
than our own. Kletter v. Dulles, D.C.D.C., 111 F.Supp. 593,
598."
81A Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.) legal
encyclopedia, United State, §29:
"Generally,
the states of the Union sustain toward each other the relationship of
independent sovereigns or independent foreign states, except in so far
as the United States is paramount as the dominating government, and in so
far as the states are bound to recognize the fraternity among
sovereignties established by the federal Constitution, as by the provision
requiring each state to give full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of the other states..."
19 Corpus Juris
Secundum (C.J.S.) legal encyclopedia, United States, §884:
“The United States Government is a foreign corporation
with respect to a state.” [N.Y. v. re Merriam 36 N.E. 505;
141 N.Y. 479; affirmed 16 S.Ct. 1073; 41 L. Ed. 287] [underlines added]
Dual Citizenship [Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, page 498]:
Dual citizenship.
Citizenship in two different countries.
Status of citizens of United States who reside within a state;
i.e., person who are born or naturalized in the U.S. are citizens of the
U.S. and the state wherein they reside.
TITLE
28 > PART
I > CHAPTER
13 > Sec. 297.
Sec.
297. - Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact
states
(a)
The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit or district judge of
the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve
temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted court of the freely
associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by the
laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such
assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the
respective court.
(b)
The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so
authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to
in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including
transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance
in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this
subsection
Finally, several sovereign
and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual
confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state.
They will together constitute a federal republic: their joint
deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of each member, though they
may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in
virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and
independent, when he is obliged to fulfil engagements which he has
voluntarily contracted.
Such were formerly the
cities of Greece; such are at present the Seven United Provinces of the
Netherlands, (13) and such the members of the Helvetic body.
Annotated Constitution, Article III, Congressional Research Service
Suits by Foreign States.—The privilege of a recognized foreign
state to sue in the courts of another state upon the principle of comity
is recognized by both international law and American constitutional law.
To deny a sovereign this privilege “would manifest a want of comity and
friendly feeling.”
Although national sovereignty is continuous, a suit in behalf of a
national sovereign can be maintained in the courts of the United States
only by a government which has been recognized by the political branches
of our own government as the authorized government of[p.775]the
foreign state.
As the responsible agency for the conduct of foreign affairs, the State
Department is the normal means of suggesting to the courts that a
sovereign be granted immunity from a particular suit.
Once a foreign government avails itself of the privilege of suing in the
courts of the United States, it subjects itself to the procedure and
rules of decision governing those courts and accepts whatever
liabilities the court may decide to be a reasonable incident of bringing
the suit.
The rule that a foreign nation instituting a suit in a federal district
court cannot invoke sovereign immunity as a defense to a counterclaim
growing out of the same transaction has been extended to deny a claim of
immunity as a defense to a counterclaim extrinsic to the subject matter
of the suit but limited to the amount of the sovereign’s claim.
Moreover, certain of the benefits extending to a domestic sovereign do
not extend to a foreign sovereign suing in the courts of the United
States. A foreign state does not receive the benefit of the rule which
exempts the United States and its member States from the operation of
the statute of limitations, because those considerations of public
policy back of the rule are regarded as absent in the case of the
foreign sovereign.
We have held, upon full consideration, that although under
existing statutes a circuit court of the United States has
jurisdiction upon habeas corpus to discharge from the custody of
state officers or tribunals one restrained of his liberty in
violation of the Constitution of the United States, it is not
required in every case to exercise its power to that end immediately
upon application being made for the writ. 'We cannot suppose,' this
court has said, 'that Congress intended to compel those courts, by
such means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the
control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in state courts
exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where the
accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear the case
summarily, and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice
require' [R. S. 761], does not deprive the court of discretion as to
the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon
it. That discretion should be exercised in the light of the
relations existing, under our system of government, between the
judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in
recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those
relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
Constitution. When the petitioner is in custody by state
authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a
law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a
court or judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen of a
foreign state, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like
authority, for an act done or omitted under any alleged right,
title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under
the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign state, or under
color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law
of nations; in such and like cases of urgency, involving the
authority and operations of the general government, or the
obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign
nations, [180 U.S.
499, 502] the courts of the United States have
frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged
prisoners who were held in custody under state authority.
So, also, when they are in the custody of a state officer, it may be
necessary, by use of the writ, to bring them into a court of the
United States to testify as witnesses.' Ex parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 250 , 29 S. L. ed. 868, 871, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734;
Ex parte Fonda,
117 U.S. 516, 518 , 29 S. L. ed. 994, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 848; Re
Duncan,
139 U.S. 449 , 454, sub nom. Duncan v. McCall, 35 L. ed. 219,
222, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573; Re Wood,
140 U.S. 278 , 289, Sub nom. Wood v. Bursh, 35 L. ed. 505, 509,
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; McElvaine v. Brush,
142 U.S. 155, 160 , 35 S. L. ed. 971, 973, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 156;
Cook v. Hart,
146 U.S. 183, 194 , 36 S. L. ed. 934, 939, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40;
Re Frederich,
149 U.S. 70, 75 , 37 S. L. ed. 653, 656, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 793;
New York v. Eno,
155 U.S. 89, 96 , 39 S. L. ed. 80, 83, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30;
Pepke v. Cronan,
155 U.S. 100 , 39 L. ed. 84, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34; Re Chapman,
156 U.S. 211, 216 , 39 S. L. ed. 401, 402, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 331;
Whitten v. Tomlinson,
160 U.S. 231, 242 , 40 S. L. ed. 406, 412, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297;
Iasigi v. Van De Carr,
166 U.S. 391, 395 , 41 S. L. ed. 1045, 1049, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.
595; Baker v. Grice,
169 U.S. 284, 290 , 42 S. L. ed. 748, 750, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323;
Tinsley v. Anderson,
171 U.S. 101, 105 , 43 S. L. ed. 91, 96, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805;
Fitts v. McGhee,
172 U.S. 516, 533 , 43 S. L. ed. 535, 543, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269;
Markuson v. Boucher,
175 U.S. 184 , 44 L. ed. 124, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76.
There are cases that come within the exceptions to the general
rule. In Loncy's Case,
134 U.S. 372 , 375, sub nom. Thomas v. Loney, 33 L. ed. 949,
951, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584, 585, it appeared that Loney was held in
custody by the state authorities under a charge of perjury committed
in giving his deposition as a witness before a notary public in
Richmond. Virginia, in the case of a contested election of a member
of the House of Representatives of the United States. He was
discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus sued out from the circuit
court of the United States, this court saying: 'The power of
punishing a witness for testifying falsely in a judicial proceeding
belongs peculiarly to the government in whose tribunals that
proceeding is had. It is essential to the impartial and efficient
administration of justice in the tribunals of the nation, that
witnesses should be able to testify freely before them, unrestrained
by legislation of the state, or by fear of punishment in the state
courts. The administration of justice in the national tribunals
would be greatly embarrassed and impeded if a witness testifying
before a court of the United States, or upon a contested election of
a member of Congress, were liable to prosecution and punishment in
the courts of the state upon a charge of perjury, preferred by a
disappointed suitor or contestant, or instigated by local passion or
prejudice.' So, in Ohio v. Thomas,
173 U.S. 276, 284 , 285 S., 43 L. ed. 699, 702, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.
453, 456, which was the case of the arrest of the acting governor
[180 U.S. 499, 503]
of the Central Branch of the National Home for Disabled
Volunteer Soldiers, at Dayton, Ohio, upon a charge of violating a
law of that state, the action of the circuit court of the United
States discharging him upon habeas corpus, while in custody of the
state authorities, was upheld upon the ground that the state court
had no jurisdiction in the premises, and because the accused, being
a Federal officer, 'may, upon conviction, be imprisoned as a means
of enforcing the sentence of a fine, and thus the operations of the
Federal government might in the meantime be obstructed.' The
exception to the general rule was further illustrated in Boske v.
Comingore,
177 U.S. 459, 466 , 467 S., 44 L. ed. 846, 849, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep.
701, 704, in which the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus was
discharged by the circuit court of the United States, while held by
state officers, this court saying: 'The present case was one of
urgency, in that the appellee was an officer in the revenue service
of the United States whose presence at his post of duty was
important to the public interests, and whose detention in prison by
the state authorities might have interfered with the regular and
orderly course of the business of the department to which he
belonged.'
[State
of Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499 (1901)]
[NOTE: The federal
Courts of the United States as used above do not have the authority
to interpose in foreign countries, but only in states of the Union
for violations of the Constitution, and since they did interpose
above, and since they did so in a "foreign state" and described that
foreign state as a state of the Union, they are admitting of no
federal jurisdiction within any state of the Union]
Elk
v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884):
The Indian tribes,
being within the territorial limits of the United States, were not,
strictly speaking, foreign states; but they were alien nations,
distinct political communities, with whom the United States might and
habitually did deal, as they thought fit, either through treaties made by
the president and senate, or through acts of congress in the ordinary
forms of legislation. The members of those tribes owed immediate
allegiance to their several tribes, and were not part of the people of the
United States. They were in a dependent condition, a state of pupilage,
resembling that of a ward to his guardian. Indians and their property,
exempt from taxation by treaty or statute of the United States, could not
be taxed [112 U.S. 94,
100] by any state. General acts of congress did not
apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention
to include them. Const. art. 1, 2, 8; art. 2, 2; Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515; U. S. v. Rogers, 4
How. 567; U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; Case of the Kansas Indians, 5
Wall. 737; Case of the New York Indians, Id. 761; Case of the Cherokee
Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; U. S. v. Whisky, 93
U.S. 188 ; Pennock v. Commissioners, 103
U.S. 44 ; Crow Dog's Case, 109
U.S. 556 ; S. C. 3 SUP. CT. REP. 396; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns.
693; Hastings v. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293.
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