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The Resignation of Compelled Social Security Trustee form is intended to be used for whoever is legally able to sign for the party the original SS-5 form applies to. For a minor child, that would be the parent until they reach adulthood under the laws of the state they are in. The form used to document the parental relationship is:
Family Articles of Private Incorporation, Form #13.001
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
Alternatively, one may place the words “Parent of minor” after the signature on the SSA-521 form.
Please use your noggin. We can't deal with all the minute details or we wouldn't get any work done. Please think through and post your proposed solutions before asking questions here to encourage you to get used to finding answers on your own. We are not a fish supplier. We teach people how to fish, meaning how to find their own answers.
Get used to using the search page on this site and our sister site, and view the following so you can find your own answers:
Legal Research and Writing Techniques Course, Form #12.013
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Libe…galResearch.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
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Are you marketing his services or his website? Do you have a financial interest in recruiting new members? Just want to make sure these forums are not used for commercial purposes.
The answer to all those questions in our case is NO, just to clarify.
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EDITORIAL: Here is the case of the U.S. Supreme Court cited above:
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Shapiro v. Thompson Washington v. Legrant Reynolds v. Smith 34, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. That
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proposition was early stated by Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849):
'For all the great purposes for w ich the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.'
We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.8 It suffices that, as Mr. Justice Stewart said for the Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757—758, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966):
'The constitutional right to travel from one State to another * * * occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.
'* * * (The) right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is
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that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.'
Thus, the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible. If a law has 'no other purpose * * * than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it (is) patently unconstitutional.' United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 1216, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968).
[…]
Mr. Chief Justice WARREN, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK joins, dissenting.
Congress, pursuant to its commerce power, has enacted a variety of restrictions upon interstate travel. It has taxed air and rail fares and the gasoline needed to power cars and trucks which move interstate. 26 U.S.C. § 4261 (air fares); 26 U.S.C. § 3469 (1952 ed.), repealed in part by Pub.L. 87—508, § 5(b), 76 Stat. 115 (rail fares); 26 U.S.C. § 4081 (gasoline). Many of the federal safety regulations of common carriers which cross state lines burden the right to travel. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1—43 (railroad safety appliances); 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (air safety regulations). And Congress has prohibited by criminal statute interstate travel for certain purposes. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Although these restrictions operate as a limitation upon free interstate movement of persons, their constitutionality appears well settled. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 482, 485, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72 (1911); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577 (C.A.7th Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 1530, 14 L.Ed.2d 435 (1965). As the Court observed in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1279, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965), 'the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due
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process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.'
The Court's right-to-travel cases lend little support to the view that congressional action is invalid merely because it burdens the right to travel. Most of our cases fall into two categories: those in which state-imposed restrictions were involved, see, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L.Ed. 744 (1868), and those concerning congressional decisions to remove impediments to interstate movement, see, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). Since the focus of our inquiry must be whether Congress would exceed permissible bounds by imposing residence requirements, neither group of cases offers controlling principles.
In only three cases have we been confronted with an assertion that Congress has impermissibly burdened the right to travel. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958), did invalidate a burden on the right to travel; however, the restriction was voided on the nonconstitutional basis that Congress did not intend to give the Secretary of State power to create the restriction at issue. Zemel v. Rusk, supra, on the other hand, sustained a flat prohibition of travel to certain designated areas and rejected an attack that Congress could not constitutionally impose this restriction. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964), is the only case in which this Court invalidated on a constitutional basis a congressionally imposed restriction. Aptheker also involved a flat prohibi ion but in combination with a claim that the congressional restriction compelled a potential traveler to choose between his right to travel and his First Amendment right of freedom of association. It was this Hobson's choice, we later explained, which forms the rationale of Aptheker. See Zemel v. Rusk, supra, at 16, 85 S.Ct. at 1280. Aptherker thus contains two characteristics distinguishing it from the appeals now before the Court: a combined
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infringement of two constitutionally protected rights and a flat prohibition upon travel. Residence requirements do not create a flat prohibition, for potential welfare recipients may move from State to State and establish residence wherever they please. Nor is any claim made by appellees that residence requirements compel them to choose between the right to travel and another constitutional right.
Zemel v. Rusk, the most recent of the three cases, provides a framework for analysis. The core inquiry is 'the extent of the governmental restriction imposed' and the 'extent of the necessity for the restriction.' Id., at 14, 85 S.Ct. at 1279. As already noted, travel itself is not prohibited. Any burden inheres solely in the fact that a potential welfare recipient might take into consideration the loss of welfare benefits for a limited period of time if he changes his residence. Not only is this burden of uncertain degree,5 but appellees themselves assert there is evidence that few welfare recipients have in fact been deterred by residence requirements. See Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 Calif.L.Rev. 567, 615—618 (1966); Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes, 51 Iowa L.Rev. 1080, 1083—1085 (1966).
The insubstantiality of the restriction imposed by residence requirements must then be evaluated in light of the possible congressional reasons for such requirements. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425—427, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104—1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). One fact which does emerge with clarity from the legislative history is Congress' belief that a program of cooperative federalism combining federal aid with
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enhanced state participation would result in an increase in the scope of welfare programs and level of benefits. Given the apprehensions of many States that an increase in benefits without minimal residence requirements would result in an inability to provide an adequate welfare system, Congress deliberately adopted the intermediate course of a cooperative program. Such a program, Congress believed, would encourage the States to assume greater welfare responsibilities and would give the States the necessary financial support for such an undertaking. Our cases require only that Congress have a rational basis for finding that a chosen regulatory scheme is necessary to the furtherance of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). Certainly, a congressional finding that residence requirements allowed each State to concentrate its resources upon new and increased programs of rehabilitation ultimately resulting in an enhanced flow of commerce as the economic condition of welfare recipients progressively improved is rational and would justify imposition of residence requirements under the Commerce Clasue. And Congress could have also determined that residence requirements fostered personal mobility. An individual no longer dependent upon welfare would be presented with an unfettered range of choices so that a decision to migrate could be made without regard to considerations of possible economic dislocation.
Appelle § suggest, however, that Congress was not motivated by rational considerations. Residence requirements are imposed, they insist, for the illegitimate purpose of keeping poor people from migrating. Not only does the legislative history point to an opposite conclusion, but it also must be noted that '(i)nto the motives which induced members of Congress to (act) * * * this court may not inquire.' Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455, 51 S.Ct. 522, 526, 75 L.Ed. 1154 (1931). We do not at-
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tribute an impermissible purpose to Congress if the result would be to strike down an otherwise valid statute. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1682, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56, 24 S.Ct. 769, 776, 49 L.Ed. 78 (1904). Since the congressional decision is rational and the restriction on travel insubstantial, I conclude that residence requirements can be imposed by Congress as an exercise of its power to control interstate commerce consistent with the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel.
Without an attempt to determine whether any of Congress' enumerated powers would sustain residence requirements, the Court holds that congressionally imposed requirements violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It thus suggests that, even if residence requirements would be a permissible exercise of the commerce power, they are 'so injustifiable as to be violative of due process.' Ante, at 642. While the reasons for this conclusion are not fully explained, the Court apparently believes that, in the words of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), residence requirements constitute 'an arbitrary deprivation' of liberty.
If this is the import of the Court's opinion, then it seems to have departed from our precedents. We have long held that there is no requirement of uniformity when Congress acts pursuant to its commerce power. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401, 60 S.Ct. 907, 916, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13—14, 59 S.Ct. 379, 385—386, 83 L.Ed. 441 (1939).6 I do not suggest that Congress is completely free when legislating under one of its enumerated powers to enact wholly arbitrary classifications, for Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 84 S.Ct. 1187, 12 L.Ed.2d 218 (1964)
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counsel otherwise. Neither of these cases, however, is authority for invalidation of congressionally imposed residence requirements. The classification in Bolling required racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia and was thus based upon criteria which we subject to the most rigid scrutiny. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). Schneider involved an attempt to distinguish between native-born and naturalized citizens solely for administrative convenience. By authorizing residence requirements Congress acted not to facilitate an administrative function but to further its conviction that an impediment to the commercial life of this Nation would be removed by a program of cooperative federalism combining federal contributions with enhanced state benefits. Congress, not the courts, is charged with determining the proper prescription for a national illness. I cannot say that Congress is powerless to decide that residence requirements would promote this permissible goal and therefore must conclude that such requirements cannot be termed arbitrary.
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Typically, the distinction is still made in the laws of most states, but they are made in older statutes that have never been repealed and which you therefore have to go backward and find. They hide it in a pile of doo doo, but it's still there. That's the way it is in California.
Attached is an example of this phenomenon in California.
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This subject came up on 60 Minutes tv documentary about six months ago. Places were selling medical marijuana in California and the feds weren't doing anything about it. Now the tables have turned.
The important thing to remember is that there can only be a federal nexus if the marijuana crosses state lines. Otherwise federal law cannot be imposed. They can only regulate INTERSTATE and not INTRASTATE commerce. This is true in every assertion of federal power.
If local officials do not recognize this requirement and allow the feds to come in and persecute people who are growing and selling lawfully within the state and not crossing state lines, then a tort has been committed, which can and should be prosecuted in local courts.
Quote:Likewise, as Judge Easterbrook aptly summarized: “Subject matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231…. That's the beginning and the end of the 'jurisdictional' inquiry.” Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir.1999).[McCoy v. U.S., 266 F.3d 1245 (C.A.11 (Fla.),2001)]
18 U.S.C. §3231 reads as follows:
Quote:TITLE 18 > PART II > CHAPTER 211 > § 3231The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.
The legislative noted under 18 U.S.C. §3231 identifies its source as follows:
Quote:TITLE 18 > PART II > CHAPTER 211 > § 3231
NOTES:
Source
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 826.)
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on section 588d of title 12, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Banks and Banking; title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 546, 547 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 326, 340, 35 Stat. 1151, 1153; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167; May 18, 1934, ch. 304, § 4, 48 Stat. 783).
This section was formed by combining sections 546 and 547 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with section 588d of title 12, U.S.C., Banks and Banking, with no change of substance.
The language of said section 588d of title 12, U.S.C., 1940 ed., which related to bank robbery, or killing or kidnapping as an incident thereto (see section 2113, of this title), and which read “Jurisdiction over any offense defined by sections 588b and 588c of this title shall not be reserved exclusively to courts of the United States” was omitted as adequately covered by this section.
The 1940 Criminal code at 18 U.S.C. §546 and 547 reads as follows. We verified that the 1940 Edition of the U.S. Code uses the same section numbers as the present code for sections 546 and 547:
Quote:http://www.law.corne…46—-000-.html
§ 546. Smuggling goods into foreign countries
Any person owning in whole or in part any vessel of the United States who employs, or participates in, or allows the employment of, such vessel for the purpose of smuggling, or attempting to smuggle, or assisting in smuggling, any merchandise into the territory of any foreign government in violation of the laws there in force, if under the laws of such foreign government any penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the United States respecting the customs revenue, and any citizen of, or person domiciled in, or any corporation incorporated in, the United States, controlling or substantially participating in the control of any such vessel, directly or indirectly, whether through ownership of corporate shares or otherwise, and allowing the employment of said vessel for any such purpose, and any person found, or discovered to have been, on board of any such vessel so employed and participating or assisting in any such purpose, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
It shall constitute an offense under this section to hire out or charter a vessel if the lessor or charterer has knowledge or reasonable grounds for belief that the lessee or person chartering the vessel intends to employ such vessel for any of the purposes described in this section and if such vessel is, during the time such lease or charter is in effect, employed for any such purpose.
http://www.law.corne…47—-000-.html
§ 547. Depositing goods in buildings on boundaries
Whoever receives or deposits any merchandise in any building upon the boundary line between the United States and any foreign country, or carries any merchandise through the same, in violation of law, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Notice that the above statute refers to state governments as foreign governments. They are also foreign for the purposes of federal income tax! The interstate commerce nexus is further described in Hugi v. United States mentioned above:
Quote:“Subject-matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes from 18 U.S.C. §3231, and there can be no doubt that Article III permits Congress to assign federal criminal prosecutions to federal courts. That's the beginning and the end of the “jurisdictional” inquiry. Lawyers and judges sometimes refer to the interstate-commerce element that appears in many federal crimes as the “jurisdictional element,” but this is a colloquialism-or perhaps a demonstration that the word “jurisdiction” has so many different uses that confusion ensues. Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527, 529-30 (7th Cir.1997).
A link to interstate commerce may be essential to Congress's substantive authority, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), but the *381 existence of regulatory power differs from the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts. United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529 (7th Cir.1998), clarifies this point by holding that proof of an interstate transaction is no different from proof of any other element of a federal crime. “[T]he nexus with interstate commerce, which courts frequently call the 'jurisdictional element,' is simply one of the essential elements of [the offense]. Although courts frequently call it the 'jurisdictional element' of the statute, it is 'jurisdictional' only in the shorthand sense that without that nexus, there can be no federal crime …. It is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case, here authorized by 18 U.S.C. §3231.” 147 F.3d at 531-32 (citations omitted). Martin adds that, “once a defendant pleads guilty in '[a] court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the defendant, as did the court in the instant case,' the court's judgment cannot be assailed on grounds that the government has not met its burden of proving 'so-called jurisdictional facts.' United States v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346, 352-53 (7th Cir.1959); La Fever v. United States, 279 F.2d 833, 834 (7th Cir.1960). Even if the government fails to establish the connection to interstate commerce, the district court is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear the case.” 147 F.3d at 532. See also, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1009-12, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Hugi pleaded guilty and admitted all of the elements of the offense. No more need be said to demonstrate that the district judge's limitation on the certificate of appealability was proper.”
[Hugi v. U.S., 164 F.3d 378 (C.A.7 (Ill.),1999)]
Bottom line:
1. All federal crimes have interstate commerce as a prerequisite.
2. If you are charged with a crime and appear for the arraignment and enter ANY kind of plea, you have essentially admitted that interstate commerce is involved and relieved the government of the burden of proving interstate commerce was involved in the crime.
3. It is always best to challenge jurisdiction of the court BEFORE entering a plea and demand that the feds prove an interstate commerce connection. This can successfully deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
If you want to read about it, see:
http://www.cbsnews.c…htype=cbsSearch
As far as the Bible, the word “sorcery” is used in describing those who use halucinogenic drugs. That type of abuse is condemned as far as I recall, but if you want the authorities, I'm not going to do your home work for you. Below is a good article on the subject written by someone else:
http://www.gotquesti…/sin-drugs.html
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The certification of constitutional qualification for the office of president
DC Knows that Obama is Ineligible for Office
By JB Williams April, 2010
Members from all three branches of the Federal government already know that Barack Hussein Obama is ineligible for the office of President. National leaders, to include members of the US Supreme Court , already know that Barack Hussein Obama is not a “natural born citizen” of the United States of America, and therefore, is ineligible for the office he currently holds. (See JB's new article on The Bottom Line on Natural Born Citizen)
What they don't know is how long it will take for most Americans to figure it out, or what to do about it.
The diversionary search for an authentic birth certificate is ongoing and Obama has now spent in excess of $2 million in legal fees to keep that search alive.
Eric Holder's Department of Justice continues to deploy taxpayer funded attorneys around the country to file dismissals on behalf of Obama, denying all American citizens access to the courts as a peaceful remedy, which only fuels the fire of discontent and the questions about Obama persist.
Michelle Obama states that Kenya is Barack's “home country.” She knows, after twenty years with Barack. The Ambassador or Kenya has confirmed the same His family friends all know it, and are in fact quite proud of the fact that Americans had no hesitation in electing a “black man from Kenya” as President of the United States.
The US Supreme Court knows what the constitutional condition of “natural born citizen” means. Even the most far left member of that court, Justice Ginsberg, is on record proclaiming that a “natural born citizen” is a birth child of TWO legal US citizens.
Democrat Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi knows that Barack Hussein Obama is not eligible for the office of president, which is why she refused to certify the following language when certifying Obama as the DNC candidate for president in 2008.
This is the normal language for certification of nomination for president and vice president, filed by the DNC only in the state of Hawaii…
This is the language filed by the DNC in the other 49 states, however…
Note that the language which certifies that Barack Hussein Obama meets all constitutional qualifications is missing in the DNC documents filed in 49 of the 50 states. The certification of constitutional qualification for the office of president was filed only in Hawaii. That text is missing in the DNC certification filings for all other states.
Whereas the RNC filed the exact same certification document, including the constitutional text for John McCain in all 50 states, Obama was technically certified in only one state, Hawaii. A mere inconvenient technicality, I'm sure…
The US Congress knows that Barack Hussein Obama is not constitutionally qualified for the office he holds. Although the congress passed a resolution proclaiming Senator John McCain a “natural born citizen” as the son of two US citizens, no such congressional resolution exists for Barack Hussein Obama.
The press knows that Obama is not a “natural born citizen,” having written on several occasions about the “Kenyan born” senator from Chicago. A number of citizens have already been arrested and jailed for asking these questions.
Over four-hundred law suits have been filed across the country asking the courts to force Obama to become the “transparent president” he promised to be, and all four-hundred are being dismissed before discovery, all on the basis that “no citizen has proper legal standing” to ask who and what their president really is…
Over a half-million citizens have now signed a petition demanding to see Obama's birth records.
Numerous members of the US Military have refused deployment orders from Obama, on the basis that he refuses to evidence his constitutional qualifications to issue such orders. In most cases, the soldiers have simply been reassigned, so as to avoid any disciplinary action that could end in “defense discovery” which might finally force Obama to open up his files once and for all.
Now an eighteen year veteran flight surgeon and active Lt. Colonel faces court martial as he makes his demands for proof that Obama is constitutionally eligible to issue orders as Commander-in-Chief.
Obama's entire domestic, foreign and national defense agenda has proven to be wholly anti-American
Obama's entire domestic, foreign and national defense agenda has proven to be wholly anti-American on every possible level. Still, the answers concerning who and what Barack Hussein Obama Jr. Really is remain elusive in the face of unprecedented efforts to ask the right questions.
No matter who asks, how they ask or where they ask, not one single individual in Washington DC or even state government seems willing to weigh in on the most important issue of our era. Who and what is the man sitting in the people's White House?
How in the hell did we get an overtly anti-American resident of the people's White House without so much as a simple birth certificate to prove who this person really is?
And why won't a single elected representative of the people engage in the effort to force an answer to this question?
The answers to these and many more questions are likely very simple and equally chilling…
The Speaker of the House does not refuse to certify her candidate as “constitutionally qualified” in forty-nine of fifty states by accident
Nobody spends $2 million in legal fees to hide an authentic birth certificate. The Speaker of the House does not refuse to certify her candidate as “constitutionally qualified” in forty-nine of fifty states by accident. A press that knew he was the “first Kenyan born senator” didn't forget that he was Kenyan born when he decided to run for president.
Most importantly, the people DO have a right (read – proper standing) to ask who and what their president really is, in any court, any time. And soldiers are court-martialed for refusing orders, unless those orders were issued by an illegitimate Commander-in-Chief.
DC knows what most Americans have yet to figure out…
Obama is NOT a natural born citizen no matter where he might have been born. Obama's birth father was at no time an American citizen and on this basis alone, Obama cannot be a constitutionally qualified resident of the White House.
They know something else that the American people have yet to figure out…
The US Constitution no longer stands as the governing law of this land. Obama's many unconstitutional policies, Czars, executive orders and statements provide the proof, and the fact that nobody in DC cares whether or not Obama is constitutionally qualified to be president of the United States should send a shiver down the spine of every red blooded American citizen, no matter their partisan agendas.
The people willing to ask the tough questions are deemed crackpots and conspiracy theorists, racists or bigots. But those tough questions should be obvious questions to all Americans and every president should have to answer those questions, no matter race, creed, color or party affiliation.
I fear that those questions will only be answered at the tip of pitch forks and torches one day. Sooner or later, the people will run out of patience with a system built to exclude them. When that day comes, I fear what methods will be employed and whether or not there will be a country left to save by then.
But sooner or later, one way or another, Obama will have to answer those questions. One day, the world will know who and what this man is and there will be a day of reckoning like no other in American history.
The longer it takes for that day to arrive, the more dangerous the situation will become. A man not even qualified to hold the office is using that office to destroy the greatest nation on earth. How much patience can the people be expected to display?
Obama is not eligible for the office he currently holds and everyone in a position to know – already know.
What they don't know is how much longer they can keep it all a secret, or what will happen next.
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EDITORIAL: Sent to us by a reader. Describes what happened at the trial of Gino Casternovia and the other people he affiliated with at Pinnacle Quest International (PQI), which is a successor to the Institute for Global Prosperity. PQI was started by one of the three founders of IGP, David Struckman.
Dickstein was an attorney for Claudio Hirmer, who was the chief organizer of the PQI events. He has represented many clients over the years, this being one of his most recent.
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Update:
In mid February, 2010, I traveled to Florida to attend the criminal pre-trial conference in the Hirmer Case, 3:08-cr-79. I represented Mark and Claudia Hirmer.
Pre-trial, two defendants plead guilty. Joseph McPhillips plead guilty to conspiracy to defraud the IRS, conspiracy to commit wire fraud against the customers of Pinnacle Quest International, conspiracy to commit money laundering, several counts of wire fraud. Mark Lyon also plead guilty to several counts.
Pre-trial, the government moved to dismiss the wire fraud counts against all defendants except Ellen Stubenhaus. She is currently in a Costa Rica jail resisting extradition. She has been in jail there for at least six months now.
Pre-trial, Arnold Manansala decided the court lacked jurisdiction and he failed to appear for various court hearings. He was arrested about two months before trial started, deemed a risk of flight, and spent all time since then in custody at a Florida County jail.
Defendant Mark Leitner decided to proceed pro se using the redemption theory, filing numerous admiralty pleadings with the Court, all of which pleadings were rejected by the Court. Being pro se he did nothing to preserve the record, and there are no pleadings to be reviewed by the 11th Circuit.
Defendants Dover Perry, Michael Leonard, and Arnold Manansala fired their attorneys and filed a series of 30 magic bullet motions authored by a new group, the Gatekeepers. As far as I know, the leader calls himself Dr. Eicke. The gist of the motions were 15 supposed substantial motions and for each, a motion for the court to appoint an expert witness who would present testimony regarding the motions to the jury who would have no choice but to immediately dismiss the indictment. A copy of these motions is attached as a .pdf file.
The court denied each of the motions. Ellen Stubenhaus also tried to file the motions, but since she had not made an appearance, the motions were returned without filing.
As to the other defendants: Art Merino was represented by the public defender's office; Gino Casternovia and Robert Pendell were represented by CJA attorneys. Manansala, Leonard, Perry and Leitner all had CJA court appointed attorneys as standby counsel. They sat in the back of the courtroom and remained silent.
During the trial, Leitner, Manansala, Leonard and Perry remained silent and presented no defense whatsoever. Rather than having nine experienced trial attorneys on the defense, our numbers were basically cut in half as the result of the idiots who conviced these people to follow their BS tactics. Let there be no misunderstanding; I hold the Gatekeepers and Redeption people directly responsible for the across the board guilty verdicts returned by the jury after a day and a half deliberations. Government lies were not refuted during the trial because of the standing moot posture the pro se defendants took.
During the trial the judge threatened me with contempt on five separate occassions for attempting to defend my clients. Part of this was a threat that if I did anything during the trial to promote the 16th Amendment issue, I would be thrown in jail, despite the fact that the Hirmers were also charged with evasion of the payment of income tax for several years.
The only highlight was that after 25 years of effort, we were finally able to at least show the jury the original document from the Kentucky Senate, although it was not admitted into evidence.
One of the defendants who plead guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering testified he engaged in no hidden financial transactions, thereby admitting he did not commit that offense. The IRS agent testified he merely guessed and presumed, from gross receipts using the bank deposit method, whether the Hirmers had any gross income. The IRS custodial witness admitted the certification of the assessment and payments was false, but the judge allowed the documents into evidence anyway.
After a two day legal debate as to whether my clients could present a good faith defense as to the various offenses, the judge allowed us to proceed. However, seeing that we actually had a good faith defense resulted in the judge continually interrupting the testimony, and preventing the presentation of the defense. Each time the judge agreed to a procedure for the testimony, she changed her mind. I regrouped to the new procedure, only to have that procedure stopped. This happened three times.
Trial started on March 1, 2010 and ended March 31st. Since mid February I worked a minimum of 18 hours a day. My goal was to stay close to the courthouse, but because my clients were not prepared, I ended up staying with them to help them prepare. They lived one and a half hours each way from the courthouse, resulting in 3 hours of lost time and lost sleep, although I spent time working in the car on my laptop computer.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge gave a judgment of acquittal to Robert Pendall. Everyone else was found guilty and immediately taken off to jail. Two days later the Hirmers had a hearing for bail pending sentencing. The judge decided that since they had offshore bank accounts and holdings in Panama, they were a risk of flight. The judge also decided that since they claimed to be “sovereigns” and believed the government was violating the constitution, this made them a danger to the community. This, notwithstanding, the same allegations were made pretrial and they were released on their own recognizance and proved they were neither a risk flight nor a danger to the community.
The indictment also charged forfeiture, which is mandatory upon conviction of a conspiracy to commit money laundering. The forfeiture allegations were dismissed as to all defendants except Mark and Claudia Hirmer. The jury entered a verdict to forfeit two parcels of real property in Florida and a little over $3,000,000 in money, although they did not render a verdict to forfeit any particular bank account.
All defendants except Robert Pendall and the two who plead guilty are currently in custody in county jails awaiting sentencing. Sentencing is scheduled for the last week in July.
The message is perfectly clear. The federal government will absolutely not tolerate American's speaking out against the government, and has no problem ignoring the First, Fifth and Sixteenth Amendments. Dissidents are to receive kangaroo court trials and only the most skilled lawyers will avoid being jailed for representing their clients. The injunction suits against Bill Benson, PQI, and the criminal trial of the PQI people are perfect examples.
Another perfectly clear message is that paralegal gurus have no problem selling their clients down the river in exchange for a few pieces of silver to pay for their unadulterated, ridiculous, not a chance in hell of winning, “legal advice.” These people just might as well be prosecutors and federal employees; they are certainly a huge part of the problem.
The jury was given adequate grounds to acquit if they wanted to, thanks to my defense efforts, which amounted to 85% of the defense effort put on by any of the defendants. Yes, the judge helped them to vote for conviction, but it is clear to me that for the average, uninformed person sitting on the jury, to be “patriotic” means to support, not resist, the conduct of government. (During jury selection four people who were anti-tax couldn't help but to tell the judge, thereby eliminating anything close to a jury of the defendant's peers.)
I was not paid anything for the six weeks I spent in Florida, and a good portion of my pretrial work was not paid for. As a result of not being paid, I have been evicted from my home/office and have unpaid credit card expenses for money I spent during the trial. I have until the end of April to vacate my home/office.
I am in the process of packing. I have already thrown away two dumpsters full of my possessions, books, legal work, and other things as I have no place to store them. Assuming I can come up with funds, my intent is to load my belongings into the smallest U-Haul truck I can find and see where destiny has me headed. Right now, it looks bleak.
I do not have a forwarding mail address at this time nor phone number, and my current e-mail addresses, jdlaw@wi.rr. com and jdlaw1@wi.rr. com, will be out of service within a week.
A back up e-mail address is jdlaw47@yahoo. com. At some point in time I will be able to check e-mail.
As you know, both 16th amendment web pages, jeffdickstein.com and fightbacknow.us, are off-line. Anyone inclined to assist financially can do so through paypal using the e-mail address jdlaw47@yahoo. com
Take care and good luck to all of you. Hopefully you will be able to discern some wisdom from the Hirmer/Benson civil and criminal litigation experience.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey A. Dickstein
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Lindsey wanted me to pass along an update regarding his immediate incarceration after he was sentenced to 15 years in Federal prison(apparently, this is more time given to any one person than any other tax case in United States history). He first wants you to know that he's doing okay under the circumstances and he's being treated well; however, he is unable to have either pen or paper to defend himself. We are working through those issues but can certainly use your help. We are going to need an attorney because of the confinement and restraint imposed upon Lindsey currently.
If you would be so kind as to consider sending any support that you could afford at this time for Lindsey's defense. He and I would greatly appreciate it. There are several issues Lindsey wants to raise on appeal. The only reason he is incarcerated is because Judge Friot claimed that he is a flight risk. Lindsey is working on his stay request to get out pending appeal. Anything sent will go towards accomplishing that goal.
Please also keep Lindsey in your prayers and help us get him returned to us.
Thank you, Lindsey's wife and family AND thank you from Lindsey
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The non-existence of regulations for IRC 6039E is a great way to prove that the provisions only apply to federal instrumentalties. I use that too, and the USA Passport Application Attachment, Form #06.007, does also I believe.
However, as far as proving that the 8 USC 1401 entity is a federal instrumentality, refer to the following new research recently posted:
1. Why you are a “national”, “state national”, and Constitutional but not Statutory Citizen, Sections 3 through 3.3
http://famguardian.org/Publications/WhyANational/WhyANational.pdf
2. Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.018, Section 5
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Form…urisdiction.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
If you look at the above two references, you will see that you don’t need stinking regulations to prove that a statutory “U.S. citizen” under title 26 is a franchise. The U.S. Supreme Court proved it in Cook v. Tait without any statutory or regulatory authority.
We dont’ know of a way to use the NON-existence of regulations for 8 USC 1401 as a way to prove that the statutory citizen described there is a franchisee. It’s irrelevant based on the analysis in the above two references anyway. Looking in 22 CFR might be a good place to start, but no regs are needed for 8 U.S.C. because it is NOT a franchise as far as we can tell. 22 CFR implements 8 USC. A “citizen” under 26 USC is NOT the same as a “citizen” under 8 U.S.C.. TWO different titles with two completely different definitions of “United States”.
Furthermore, Title 8 has no mandate similar to 26 USC 7805 to publish enforcement regulations. There are no provisions for penalties within that title, in fact, so there is nothing to enforce. Since there is enforcement, there can be no mandate for enforcement regulations in Title 8 and they aren’t required. The DS-11 passport form threatens penalties but they are 26 U.S.C. penalties, not 8 U.S.C. penalties. The mandate for regs to do enforcement at 26 USC 7805 is what makes the non-existence of regulations proof that you aren’t the proper audience as a private person and not a public officer under 26 U.S.C.. If you find a provision for 8 U.S.C. similar to 26 USC 7805 that empowers the Secretary of the Dept. of State to make enforcement regulations, please let us know, because it might change our mind. The closest thing we can find is 8 USC 1104:
http://www.law.corne…04—-000-.html
It looks to us by examining the Federal Register that statutes which prescribe a penalty and which would therefore have “general applicability and legal effect” (44 USC 1505) are NOT published in the Federal Register. Hence, this route you are going on is a dead end. See:
http://www.gpoaccess…r/advanced.html
Otherwise, the non-existence of regs is irrelevant and the analysis in the two references we provided above ought to be enough to prove your hypothesis by a different and better route. These are excellent references, and just published, we are told, and especially item 2. These references prove that the “U.S. citizen” under Title 26 isn’t the same as that under Title 8 and that it is a franchise and public office because the office is a social security trust.
Lastly, if a statute implements a penalty and there is no enforcement regulation, I believe the STATUTE must be published in the F.R. We’re not sure how to prove if this has been done for a specific statute. It’s easy to tell when a CFR reg has been published in the F.R. because the bottom of the reg says so. However, we have never seen a statute that included information about publication in the F.R. If you look at the statutes published on the GPO website, the notes at the end don’t mention F.R. publication. For an example of this, see:
http://frwebgate.acc…12651&TYPE=TEXT
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Prollins,
Welcome to our forums and our fellowship.
Thanks for the kudos. We have worked VERY hard on this website, which is the product of 9 years of evolution from very humble beginnings. Your constructive comments make it better.
We are very familiar with the ridicule you have become used to. It's the norm that the small minority of people who know the TRUTH have suffered throughout the ages. That rejection is why the Jews have been hated through the ages: Because they won't conform to anyone or anything except God's law.
Be patient with yourself. What you see here is the product of ten years of learning and progress. Don't expect to come up to speed overnight or in less than two years.
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Anything that can affect constitutional rights…directly or indirectly, of private parties must be published in the federal register. That requirement comes from the requirement to give “reasonable notice” that is the foundation of constitutional due process of law. See:
Requirement for Reasonable Notice, Form #05.022
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
A statute can have an indirect effect on constitutional rights and yet NOT make the private public the target of its enforcement provisions. For instance, the requirement to file a tax return is published in the federal register at 26 CFR 1.6012-1. The parties affected by that regulation are all federal instrumentalities, because within its provisions, the only parties affected are statutory “U.S. citizens” and “residents”, and “nonresident alien individuals”. All such entities have in common that they are instrumentalities of the U.S. government and statutory creations of Congress engaged in federal franchises. We know that all three of these entities are in fact federal instrumentalities because:
1. Of the way the tax is laid upon a “trade or business”
2. Of the fact that involuntary servitude would be an issue if the participants do not consent. Hence, they must have consented to participate and such consent makes them government instumentalities, such a “taxpayers”, statutory “employees”, etc.
3. Of the ability to regulate private conduct is repugnant to the constitution as held by the Supreme Court.
4. Of the fact that disputes involving the provision are heard in franchise courts such as U.S. District Court and Circuit Court.
5. Of the fact that those using Social Security Numbers are identified in the statutes as “federal personnel” in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(13).
6. Of the fact that the only authorized targets of enforcement in 26 USC 6331(a) are instrumentalities of the U.S. government.
7. Of the fact that “United States” is statutory defined to purposefully exclude states of the Union.
8. Of the definitions in 26 USC 7701.
Publication in the F.R. gives reasonable notice to all PRIVATE parties who are NOT initially PUBLIC officers that if they represent themselves with any of these three public office statuses, avail themselves of the franchise “benefits” such as deductions, or use license numbers associated with the franchise, and thereby volunteer to occupy a public office, then and only then can they lawfully become the target of these provisions and waive their right to demand implementing regulations because no longer private. Otherwise, they are unaffected.
The affect of the I.R.C. is INDIRECT as long as they don't adopt or pursue a status under the franchise. It only becomes DIRECT AFTER they volunteer for the status by filling out a government form, claiming a “benefit” such as “trade or business” deductions in 26 USC 162, or citing the franchise provisions. All such activities constitute:
1. An implied waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 USC 1605
2. What the courts call “purposeful availment” under the Minimum contacts doctrine.
3. A change the status of the participant from a nonresident to a public officer representing a “resident” entity that is a federal corporation. Hence, they become a “resident agent” for a federal business trust…the social security trust.
In other words, publication in the F.R. gives notice of WHAT exactly is government property, and how the public must handle that public property, and all the rights that attach to that property and its use. It acts as the equivalent of a “no trespassing sign” for government property and a warning of what happens when you trespass. Its just like the barbed wire fence around most federal reservations. “Trespassers” are those who use the franchise statuses and property, including SSNs, TINs, franchise courts, the IRS, etc.
You can confirm this yourself by looking at 26 USC 7805, which empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to “make all needful rules respecting the enforcement of the title”. This phrase comes out of Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2. The Secretary is administering public property, and the I.R.C. trade or business franchise, all statuses under the franchise, and all public rights exercised in the Tax Court, District Courts, Circuit courts, and with the IRS are the so-called “benefits” and “public rights” associated with the franchise and franchise property.
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Neo,
The existence of a regulation for a section does not necessarily imply general applicability to PRIVATE persons.
If a regulation doesn't exist, it is only for government persons if regulations are mandated by statute, such as in the I.R.C. in 26 U.S.C. 7805.
The definitions within the U.S.C. statutes implemented and the Statutes at Large references from which they derive still limit the audience. Therefore, if regulations exist, the main limiting factor is the definitions, not publication in the Federal Register. Furthermore, the publication within the F.R. describes the authority for publication and THAT authority also determines who the proper audience is.
And in spite of ALL the above, federal legislation is and always has been limited to those either domiciled on federal territory or representing offices that are domiciled on federal territory. The audience for all federal civil law is people domiciled in the federal zone, regardless of whether its published in the F.R. or not. This is established in:
Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent
http://famguardian.o…ForTaxation.htm
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Neo,
You don't understand the publication process, probably because you haven't read chapter 3 of the Great IRS Hoax.
1. Congress writes a Public law.
2. The Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives codifies the public law into the U.S. Code.
3. The agency interprets the new U.S.C. statute and writes a PROPOSED CFR regulation correlated with the statute number. For instance:
3.1 All 26 U.S.C. Statutes are published in 26 CFR
3.2 All 5 U.S.C. Statutes are published in 20 CFR
NOTE: The U.S.C. Title and the CFR Title are NOT always the same. You have to correlate them yourself.
4. There is a notice and comment period for the proposed new CFR regulation.
5. The final regulation is published in the Federal Register AND the CFR.
The first place to look is not the Federal Regsiter, but the CFR. If you find the CFR regulation pertaining to Title 8 of the U.S.C., then the bottom of the CFR indicates whether and where the CFR was published in the Federal Register. If there is no indication, then it was not published and therefore only pertains to the government.
These facts are also explained in:
Federal Enforcement Authority Within States of the Union, Form #05.032
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Form…fAuthStates.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
The search for authority ALWAYS starts in the CFR, not the Federal Register. Regulations cannot be published without ending up in the CFR.
For additional information see:
How Our Laws are Made
http://www.famguardian.org/PublishedAuthors/Govt/USSenate/SenateDoc105-14HowLawsMade.pdf
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Neo,
Per 26 CFR 301.6109-1(b), a number is ONLY MANDATORY in the case of an NRA if he is engaged in a “trade or business”. Otherwise, it is NOT. The interest must be PROVEN by the financial institution to be connected with a public office and a “trade or business” to connect a number to it, and per 26 USC 6041(a), it is also not reportable unless attached to a “trade or business”. You don't need an express exemption because it isn't reportable and can't be conneted to a number without filing a FRAUDULENT information return and committing a criminal violation of 26 USC 7206 and 7207.
If they pressure for a number, present:
Why It is Illegal for Me to Request or Use a “Taxpayer Identification Number”, Form #04.205
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Form…yTINIllegal.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
Then turn on your tape recorder and DEMAND that the clerk produce a provision within 26 CFR 301.6109-1 that expressly MANDATES the use of a number in the case of a human being who is a “nonresident alien” but not an “individual” and is NOWHERE found in that section. Make sure they also have to disprove your status using the Affidavit of Citizenship, Domicile, and Tax Status, Form #02.001.
You don't need an exemption for that kind of earnings unless it is ALREADY connected to a “trade or business”. Come on neo. You already know all this stuff. Why are you asking the same question again.
If there were such a regulation, it would be in 26 CFR 1.871 through 1.877. Search for yourself:
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Lindsey Springer here and offering you an update as to each of the cases currently pending between me and the attorneys of the United States.
In the case (06-156) where I did actually prevail against 11 agents of the Secretary of the Treasury for violating my constitutional rights the Tenth Circuit has not yet issued any orders on the interlocutory (piecemeal) appeal where Bivens Counsel admitted their clients stole the money from me but did not act out the theft until they departed from the home I then occupied. Their defense in that regard is they are only admitting they stole it so they can get to the issue of whether my alleging they stole the money made out a Bivens claim which is a claim against the Secretary's agents when they violate a taxpayer's constitutional rights. Obviously there is some debate on how to overturn Judge Frizzell's order against each of the 11 and in my favor without making it look like the Tenth Circuit sanctions agents of the Secretary taking property for its Agents own personal gain while under the disguise of acting on behalf of the Secretary. The bottom line is the money never was deposited into the Treasury account. It somehow got stuck in certain pockets or something like that. I have not had discovery on that case and it has now been over 4 years since I commenced action on the theft of my money.
The proof and lesson here is even if you could get a lower United States District Court Judge to rule against the Secretary of the Treasury's agents for violating constitutional rights the Judges at the Tenth Circuit simply divide on upholding that decision because to do so would be problematic for the Secretary since he already knows I know he has no delegates outside of the District of Columbia to act as his agents due to the undisputed fact all district directors and internal revenue districts since at least 2000 have been abolished. This may be the last you hear on this subject from me so I thought I would remind you about the case and give a short update. The case at the Tenth Circuit is 09-5088.
In the case where the attorneys who represent the 11 agents of the Secretary mentioned above sued me under the name of the United States of America to foreclose a lien to judgment and take the home I have occupied for 14 years, after I would not settle with those two attorneys my claims in that case, on March 3, 2010, United States' Northern Oklahoma District Court Judge Terence C. Kern issued an order that found summary judgment in favor of the Bivens Counsel and against me. This is the case where I was given by the Secretary of the Treasury a lien release “certified” and then one year later and after the Bivens Counsel learned of the reclease they contacted a local employee of the United States and had her sign her legal but fake name to a revocation of certificate of release and then had her issue a new lien in favor of the Secretary of the Treasury. In this case I argued that without a district director of an internal revenue district under 26 CFR 301.6325(f)(2) and Title 26 Section 6325(f)(2) the Secretary had no “delegate” outside D.C. to issue or override the Secretary of the Treasury's lien release. This is the case where numerous officials involved in this cover up of fraud (most did not know what they were particpating in) testified they no longer worked for district directors because that position had been abolished in 2000.
Anyway, without mentioning district director or internal revenue district and their relevance to the issuance of a revocation of certificate of lien release, Judge Kern simply ignored every issue under both the tax code and regulations that were clearly and unmistakably in my favor and against the claims of the Bivens Counsel and on March 16, 2010 ruled in their favor and ordered me to vacate the home no later than April 15, 2010. HMMMM!
I have appealed that decision and asked for a stay at both the district court and Tenth Circuit and both were denied without a single word uttered about district director or internal revenue district and the impact neither existing would have on the outcome of any appeal. I asked for a stay on April 15, 2010 with the Supreme Court and Justice Sotomayor (Justice assigned to Tenth Circuit) denied that initial application on April 16, 2010 without comment. I will send off today a request to the entire Court for the stay in that case. I have vacated my family from the home we lived in for 14 years while preparing to be sentenced.
Lastly, I am to be sentenced on April 21, 2010 by United States's Western Judicial District Judge Stephen P. Friot. I know, I know. I live in a county which has been listed in the Northern Judicial District and so you wonder why a Western District Judge is sentencing me? Well, that is the subject of a huge debate between me and currently 6 United States Judges. The case is docketed as 09-8701 in the Supreme Court. I know, I know. You ask what would they do? Well, I simply cannot ever allow the attorneys employed by the United States to ever say I consented to whatever because I did not object. I am a chief objector.
For those of you wondering about this case. All you need to do is read Title 28, Section 292(b) and you will see that a judge outside his or her commission district must be designated and assigned by the chief judge of a circuit court to a specific case for a specific period of time and there must be a public need and the assignment must be temporary. Judge Friot stated on January 28, 2010 and again on February 22, 2010 that it was Judge Eagan from the Northern District who assigned him and not Chief Judge Henry. Chief Judge Herny resigned on December 10, 2009 to begin on June 1, 2010. You are either for or against a United States of limited power.
If you are for limited power then you must be for strict interpretation of laws written by Congress. If you are for a United States that chooses to rule the world by fear and intimidation then you are for a liberal construction of laws written by Congress. What you have seen in my tenure is a person objecting to a liberal construction of certain laws and this case is no different. It is interesting that strick is better known as black and white and not grey ever.
Anyway, I have been pending since January 25, 2010 in the Supreme Court and they are scheduled for a second conference on April 23, 2010 just two days after Judge Friot is to impose sentence upon me.
In the case sentence is to be imposed, the attorneys for the United States are asking for 20 years because they say I counseled thousands to violate the internal revenue laws. They also say I misled many on the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and 1995. The only way they can say this without smiling is if the Judges will say or do anything to avoid ruling on the merits of my claims against Secretary of the Treasury's non compliance with the PRA. It seems amazing to me that Congress can write a law that says “No person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply” with a collection of information request form like Form 1040 and that a “complete defense” to claims otherwise subjecting a person to penalty could be raised, and yet everytime the specific words in these sections are raised, something insane or crazy occurrs in writing by the Attorneys or the Courts. Either the Court completely ignores it or as in my most recent case they said I raised difficult issues between the tax code and PRA but would not elaborate on what those difficult issues were. America deserves better. I deserve better.
If you wish to change America then you need to change Congress and elect a Congress that will send a strong message to the judges by impeaching the worst offenders and giving examples of what type of writings will not be tolerated anymore. The Paperwork Reduction Act is the best example of showing how the law can say one thing and the Judges will say something in total opposition to the words written by Congress. I realize there are many excellent Judges on the bench but it remains to be seen when they will start ruling in the Citizens favor and against the United States at the district court level when the law supports such conclusion. For now, they continue to rule against the Citizen and in favor of the United States no matter how defiant that appears to the public to be.
The Judges write criminal laws are to be strictly construed but then they liberally construe them in favor of the United States. It is upside down, backwards, or in reverse.
I have never advocated anyone not file a Form 1040 because of the Paperwork Reduction Act violations by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue did that all on his own in booklet after booklet after booklet. I merely publicly stated the Form 1040 does not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act and this claim only relates to the Secretary's ability to deprive you of property by way of penalties. Not taxes. You will still owe taxes until you change the law because so long as Attorneys are allowed to write or ignore what Congress wrote we will never be able to rely upon a single word written by Congress that is in the people's favor.
Anyway, unless I am not remanded to custody of the United States Department of Justice (Bivens Counsel) at the conclusion of sentencing, this will be my final report to you. I have done what I can do and I have never nor will I ever give up hope in what I believe is right. My wife for now will monitor your emails and receive any gift or donation that comes in. Her name is Jeanie. If I am sorry for anything it is that I was unable to ever get the Court to rule on the merits of my PRA claims. You must know by now why they have chose not to make such a ruling. For those of you led, I will always be able to receive support through paypal at gnutella@mindspring.com, lindsey@mindspring.com, or through regular mail at 5147 S. Harvard, # 116, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135
God save the 50 independent States of the United States of America first.
Lindsey Springer April 19, 2010