The following list of cites from federal
courts appears on the website at:
http://www.adl.org/mwd/suss5.asp#federal
It was prepared by a law librarian, Bernard
J. Sussman. It lists a number of federal court cases that allegedly
invalidate the proposition that Subtitle A federal income taxes only apply inside of the federal zone
or federal areas. We haven't verified or validated these cites, but
provide them for your research and further study. The important
thing we want you to note is the following:
- Only supreme Court cites can be cited
as precedent applying to more than one taxpayer or citizen by the IRS'
own Internal Revenue Manual, Section
4.10.7.2.9.8. This
therefore rules out most of the cites below and especially those from
Tax Court, which is an Article I court that only has jurisdiction
inside the federal zone.
- There are no Supreme Court cites
below where the U.S. Supreme court actually ruled on this issue.
In all cases, the cert was denied. A cert denied means
absolutely nothing and certainly doesn't imply that the supreme court
agrees with the rulings of the lower court. Appeals are a
privilege not a right.
We agree with Mr. Sussman that Subtitle A of the I.R.C. can apply
outside the "federal zone". However, it may
not lawfully apply to persons domiciled or resident on other
than federal territory, or to persons who are not "abroad" as used in 26 U.S.C. §911,
as the following
authorities show:
- 26 U.S.C.§7601 authorizes
the IRS can only enforce within "internal revenue districts",
and pursuant to Treasury Order 150-02, the only remaining internal revenue
district is in the District of Columbia.
- The term "United
States" is statutorily defined as including only the District of
Columbia, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9)
and (a)(10). Nowhere are states of the Union who are not
federal territories listed in this definition or in the definition
of "State"
found in the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §110(d). The rules of statutory
construction state that when words are defined in statutes, the
definition supersedes and not enlarges the common definition of the
term. See our free pamphlet below for exhaustive treatment of
this scam:
Legal Deception, Propaganda, and Fraud, Form #05.014
https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/FalseRhetoric/LegalDecPropFraud.pdf
- 26 U.S.C. §911 authorizes a tax upon "trade
or business" (public office) activities of government employees when
abroad, for instance. This provision of law, however, doesn't
apply to American Nationals domiciled in a state of the Union who are not "effectively connected with a trade or business".
NOWHERE within the I.R.C. is taxable income ever connected to "U.S.
persons" who are not abroad, or who are domestically situated in
either the federal zone or a state of the Union, which means they
owe NOTHING.
- All income taxes
are based upon "domicile" and you can have a domicile in the
District of Columbia without living there. For a person
domiciled in a state of the Union, all he needs to do to change his
domicile to the District of Columbia is file the WRONG tax form, the
IRS form 1040, which the IRS Published
Products Catalog, Document 7130 says may only be used by
"citizens" and residents", who both have in common a domicile in the
"United States", which 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) defines as the District of
Columbia. A statutory citizen within the I.R.C. is mutually
exclusive to the "citizen" described in the Constitution. See:
- I.R.C. Subtitle A
is an excise tax upon "trade or business", which is defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) as "the functions of a public office".
Since this is an activity that is not tied to a specific
geographical location, it can occur ANYWHERE that Congress
specifically authorizes. 4 U.S.C. §72 says that ALL PUBLIC OFFICES shall be exercised in
the District of Columbia and not elsewhere except as "expressly
provided by law". Since Congress never authorized and CANNOT
authorize public offices where it has no legislative jurisdiction,
then it cannot tax within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state of
the Union. You will note that the term "legislation" includes
the Internal Revenue Code within the cites below
“It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649,
Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect
of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with
regard to legislation.“
[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]
"The difficulties arising out of our dual
form of government and the opportunities for differing opinions
concerning the relative rights of state and national governments
are many; but for a very long time this court has
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the taxing power of
Congress does not extend to the states or their political
subdivisions. The same basic reasoning which leads to
that conclusion, we think, requires like limitation upon the
power which springs from the bankruptcy clause. United States v.
Butler, supra."
[Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298
U.S. 513; 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936)]
“Thus, Congress having power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots,
licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive
power; and the same observation is applicable to every other
power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of
licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority,
and give rights to the licensee.
But very different considerations apply to
the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no
power of regulation nor any direct control. This
power belongs exclusively to the States. No
interference by Congress with the business of citizens
transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution,
except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers
clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a
business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive
power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the
power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given
in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two
qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose
direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by
the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches
every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it
reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade
or business within a State in order to tax it.”
[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224
(1866)]
All of the above simply confirms that federal
judges are "legislating from the bench", willfully destroying the separation of
powers, and engaging in organized crime by extending "public offices"
and the excise taxes associated with them to
places Congress never authorized and CANNOT authorize. Note that
the income tax is a franchise, that all franchises are contracts, and
that "compacts" as used below are the equivalent of contacts:
“The United States
have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction,
sovereignty, or eminent domain [e.g. converting private property to
a "public office"], within the limits of a State or elsewhere,
except in cases where it is delegated, and the court denies the faculty of the
Federal Government to add to its powers by treaty or compact.‘”
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 508-509 (1856)]
The U.S. Supreme Court also said in the License
Tax Cases, in 1866 that Congress cannot license or tax activities
within states of the Union, and a "trade or business" is an activity
that has a de facto license number called a Taxpayer Identification
Number or a Socialist Slave Number.
“Thus, Congress having
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt,
provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to
pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and
extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every
other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of
licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and
give rights to the licensee.
But very different
considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of
the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of
regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to
the States. No interference by Congress with the business of
citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution,
except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers
clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a
business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power
of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of
Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the
Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications.
Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the
rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.
Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be
exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in
order to tax it.”
[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224
(1866)]
As usual, Mr. Sussman, like all the other
government welfare
recipients and parasites in the legal profession and public service who
defend the ILLEGAL enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code, is distracting
the debate away from the main issue with a "red herring" in order to
perpetuate the unlawful PLUNDERING of Americans. Instead of
arguing that Congress has no jurisdiction outside the federal zone,
the debate should really be focused on:
- Where within the Constitution is conferred
upon Congress the power write legislation that applies within the
exclusive jurisdiction of a state that is NOT connected with the
commerce clause found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitution?
- What enactment of Congress "expressly
extends" the public offices that are the subject of the I.R.C.
Subtitle A tax upon "trade or business" activities to any state of
the Union? 4
U.S.C. §72 MANDATES that such a law MUST exist.
- How can the IRS lawfully enforce outside
of an internal revenue district pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7601?
There are not internal revenue districts within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any state of the Union and the ONLY remaining
internal revenue district is in the District of Columbia pursuant to
Treasury Order 150-02. Furthermore, neither Congress nor the
President can create internal revenue districts in places where they
have no legislative jurisdiction, such as a state of the Union.
“It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649,
Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect
of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with
regard to legislation.“
[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]
- How can the IRS lawfully enforce against
persons other than those listed in 26 U.S.C. §6331(a),
who are all federal public officers and instrumentalities?
People in states of the Union do not fit this target audience for
IRS enforcement actions. If you would like to know why I.R.C.
Subtitle A is an excise tax upon government activities, and why YOU,
as a private person, become a government instrumentality by signing
an IRS form W-4, see the following:
Why Your
Government is Either a Thief or you are a "Public Officer" for
Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008
http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyThiefOrEmployee.pdf
- How can the IRS lawfully enforce against
persons domiciled in states of the Union who are not federal public
officers or federal instrumentalities without the implementing
regulations MANDATED by 44 U.S.C. §1505(a)
and 5 U.S.C. §553(a)? See:
IRS Due Process Meeting Handout,
Form #03.008
http://sedm.org/Forms/03-Discovery/IRSDueProcMtgHandout.pdf
- By what authority does the federal
government maintain and enforce federal franchises such as a "trade
or business" against persons not domiciled on
federal territory? The Supreme Court said it is ILLEGAL and
unconstitutional. See and rebut:
Government Instituted Slavery
Using Franchises, Form #05.030
http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf
We conclude this discussion by listing the FOUR methods by which you can become subject under of the laws of an otherwise legislatively "foreign" jurisdiction such as a state of the Union:
- A physical presence in that place. The status would be under the COMMON law.
- CONSENSUALLY doing business in that place. The status would be under the common law.
- A domicile in that place. This would be a status under the civil statutes (Form #05.037) of that place.
- CONSENSUALLY representing an artificial entity (a legal fiction or "straw man") that has a domicile in that place. This would be a status under the civil statutes (Form #05.037) of that place.
The above rules are described in:
- Civil Status (important)
- Why Domicile and Becoming a "Taxpayer" Require Your Consent, Section 11.17
In fact, what the IRS is doing technically to extend an excise or franchise tax that only applies to federal territory is:
- Falsey PRESUMING that the "citizen" mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code is a state citizen. By doing this, they are PRESUMING you have a domicile on federal territory rather than being a "non-resident". See Form #05.006 and Form #05.020.
- Instituting the tax upon a "public office". In the statutes, this is called a "trade or business". See Form #05.001.
- Interpreting the phrase "United States" to mean a federal corporation rather than a geography. To be "in" THIS "United States" is to serve as an officer of a federal corporation. See Form #05.024.
- Using SSNs and TINs as what the FTC calls a "franchise mark". Thus, their use become legal evidence that you are engaged in a public office and a franchise. See Form #05.012.
- Using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(39) and 26 U.S.C. §7408(d) to transport your identity to the District of Columbia by virtue of engaging in the "public officer" franchise.
- For the purpose of state income tax, instituting the tax ONLY within Federal Enclaves. See California Revenue and Taxation Code 6017 and 17018, which define "this State" as federal enclaves not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. See Form #05.031
The result of the above is that your identity is CRIMINALLY KIDNAPPED by the IRS if you don't define the terms on all forms to exclude the STATUTORY meaning of all numbers, terms, etc. as described in:
Government Identity Theft, Form #05.046
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/GovernmentIdentityTheft.pdf
If you want a document that PROVES the criminal identity theft that you can use in court, see:
Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority within Constitutional States of the Union, Form #05.052
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-Memlaw/ChallengeToIRSEnforcementAuth.pdf
If you would like to know the many reasons why we
agree with Sussman that I.R.C. Subtitle A income taxes are NOT
limited to the federal zone, see:
Tax
laws apply only to "federal" areas: {NOTE: This
nonsense appears to arise from a tortured reading of the definition for
United States given in 26 USC sec. 3121(e), with the cranks going to
dictionaries to try to prove that "includes", as used in the
definition, means "only" - but the Tax Code defines
"includes" very differently in 26 USC sec. 7701(c) and United
States is defined in 26 USC sec. 7701(a)(9), making it clear that
throughout the Tax Code, altho only some provisions apply to Samoa and
Puerto Rico, they always apply to the fifty states.}
- Barcroft
v. CIR (1/2/97) TC Memo 1997-5 app.dism (5th Cir 12/17/97) 134
F3d 369(t), 98 USTC para 50157
- Lonsdale
v. US, 919 F2d 1440 (10th Cir 1990)
- US v.
Mundt, 29 F3d 233 (6th
Cir 1994)
- Spoelman
v. Hummel (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89);
- US v.
Freeman (D NJ unpub 1993) 71 AFTR2d 1272, 93 USTC para 50296
aff'd 16 F3d 406 cert.den 511 US 1134 ("federal courts have never
accepted these arguments");
- Secora
v. US, 79 AFTR2d 2686 (D
Neb unpub 4/18/97)
- US v. Kitsos (ND IL unpub 3/28/91)
- US v.
Updegrave, 80 AFTR2d 5290 (ED Penn unpub 5/28/97), 97 USTC para 50465;
- US v. R.L. Keys 991 F2d 797(t) (6th Cir unpub 4/6/93)
- US v.
Kettler 934 F2d 326(t) (10th Cir unpub 6/3/91)
- In re
Becraft, 885 F2d 547 (9th Cir 1989)
- US v.
Foster [& Madge] (D Minn unpub 5/27/97);
- Valldejuli
v. US (SD Fla unpub 12/20/96) 78 AFTR2d 7492 (this argument
"routinely" rejected);
- In re
Angstadt (Bankr. ED Penn unpub 8/17/94);
- Wesselman
v. CIR TC Memo 1996-85 (2/28/96)
- US v.
Barbara Olson, 961 F2d 221(t) (10th Cir unpub 4/14/92)
- Eccles
v. CIR TC Memo 1995-89 (3/2/95)
- US v.
Knudson, 959 F.Supp 1180 (D
Neb 1997) (federal jurisdiction supposedly limited to DC)
- A.J.
Barnett v. USA 5 F3d 545(t) (10th Cir unpub 9/14/93)
cert. denied 510 US 1122;
- K.L.
Anderson v. CIR, TC Memo 1998-253 (7/8/98)
- Powers
v. CIR, TC Memo 1990-623 (12/12/90)
(refuting
argument that IRS can only tax in Puerto Rico and DC);
- In re
Busby (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924; (this argument
raised in a criminal appeal was "frivolous squared" and perp
was fined for frivolous appeal under a provision which had previously
been applied only to civil appeals)
- US v.
A.D. Cooper, 170 F3d 691 (7th
Cir 1999)
- SEC
v. Zubkis (SDNY
unpub 7/15/98) Fed.Sec.L.Rep para 90263 recons.den (SDNY unpub
8/21/98)
- Valldejull
v. Social Security Admin (ND Fla unpub 12/20/94) 75 AFTR2d
607, CCH Unempl.Ins.Rep. para 14368B, (similarly for Social Security)
- Barcroft
v. CIR (1/2/97) TC Memo 1997-5 app.dismissed (5th Cir unpub
12/17/97) 134 F3d 369(t), 81 AFTR2d 453, 98 USTC para 50157;
- R.S.
Powers v. CIR, TC Memo 1990-623 (12/12/90)
- US v.
Sloan, 939 F2d 499 (7th Cir 1991)
(this notion is "simply wrong") cert.den 502 US 1060
- Ross
v. US Internal Revenue
Special Agents, 793 F.Supp 180 (SD Ind 1991)
- US v.
R.W. Collins, 920 F2d 619 (10th Cir 1990) (this argument
"defies credulity"), cert.den 500 US 920
- M.H.
Cotton v. US (10th Cir unpub 10/14/94) 39 F3d 1191(t), 74
AFTR2d 6778;
- Richey
v. Indiana Dept of State Revenue, 634 NE2d 1375(t) (Ind.
Tax Ct unpub 6/3/94) ("simply impossible")
- Spoelman
v. Hummel (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89);
- Eckert
v. Lane 678 F.Supp 773 (WD
Ark 1988)
- In re
Weatherley, 169 Bankr.Rptr 555 (Bankr. E.D. Penn 1994) , 25
Bankr.Ct.Dec 1427
- Christensen
v. Ward, 916 F2d 1462 (10th
Cir 1990) cert.den
498 US 999
- In re
Wm.G. Walters, 166 Bankr.Rptr 119 (Bankr.,
ND Ind. 1993) ,
71 AFTR2d 1047 (citing 26 USC sec. 7701(a)(10) for definition of
United States);
- Skurdal
v. USA, 74 AFTR2d 6918 (D.
Mont unpub 10/20/94), ("not a resident of the District of
Columbia ... not even a resident of nowhere");
- Isaacson
v. US, 35
F3d 571(t) (9th
Cir unpub 9/9/94),
74 AFTR2d 6354;
- Albers
v. IRS, 77 AFTR2d 1234 (D.
Neb unpub 2/15/96),
96 USTC para 50197 aff'd 105 F3d 662 cert.den 520 US 1221;
- US v.
Ward, 833 F2d 1538 (11th
Cir 1987), cert.den 485 US 1022;
- In re
Shugrue, 221 Bankr.Rptr 394 (Bankr.,
ND Tex 1998)
- R.
Miller v. USA (ND Ohio unpub 2/6/98)
- R.
Miller v. Gallagher (ND Ohio unpub 12/17/96)
- Wardell
v. IRS 76 AFTR2d 7290 (D
Ore unpub 10/20/95);
- US v.
Weatherley 12 F.Supp.2d 469 (ED
Penn 1998)
, (tried to argue that he could sue the US without any sovereign
immunity because he supposed that the US meant only the District of
Columbia)
- Richey
v. Indiana Dept of State Revenue (Ind. Tax Ct 1994) 634 NE2d
1375;
- Onkka
v. Herman 80 AFTR2d 6860 (D
Neb unpub 9/19/97 & 10/17/97); (tried to argue that only the [municipal] Superior Ct of DC,
not a local federal court, could hear his suit against the IRS), (this
argument analyzed and debunked)
- J.B.
Smith v. US, IRS, et al. (D. Ida unpub 7/30/93); "All
United States citizens, irrespective of where they reside in the US,
are subject to the IRC. All
individuals are subject to federal income tax on wages." ;
- SEC
v. Zubkis (SDNY
unpub 7/15/98) Fed.Sec.L.Rep para 90263 recons.den (SDNY unpub
8/21/98) ("Nor does the
seat of govt clause, US Constitution art. I, sec. 8 clause 17, provide
a limitation on the exercise of federal power under the commerce
clause. Rather this
clause states that the federal govt has the full panoply of sovereign
powers over those areas used for federal purposes over which states
have ceded their authority. Zubkis
appears to argue that federal power can only be exercised in
Washington, DC, and other federal areas but not over him in
California. This argument
is frivolous. The clause
gives the federal govt power over certain geographic areas. It does not prevent the federal govt from exercising powers
under other provisions of the Constitution, such as the commerce
clause, in other other geographic areas."
- N.J.
Wilson v. US 81 AFTR2d 2240 suit dism with prejudice (D
Colo unpub 8/21/98) 82 AFTR2d 6239 (D
Colo unpub 5/5/98);
- Cox
v. CIR 99
F3d 1149(t) (10th
Cir unpub 10/28/96),
78 AFTR2d 7015, 96 USTC para 50598 (tried to argue that IRS could not
tax income obtained entirely in one state without interstate commerce)
- Noah
v. CIR 153 F3d
727(t) (10th
Cir unpub 7/16/98),
82 AFTR2d 5291, 98 USTC para 50567;
- Kinkade
v. CIR, TC Memo 1999-180 (6/1/99) (tried
to argue that income is taxable only if derived from an activity
dependent on a govt license or which is "detrimental to the well
being of a sovereign citizen")
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