CITES BY TOPIC:  socialism

Wikipedia: Socialism

[EDITOR'S NOTE ON WIKIPEDIA DEFINITION OF SOCIALISM: The contemporary Wikipedia definition removes "abolition of private property" found in the definition of "socialism" less than 50 years ago and instead bases the defition of "socialism" entirely upon control over the "means of production". What they then don't tell the reader in the present definition of socialism is that the "means of production" includes ANYTHING that produces wealth or property, and thus includes ALL property and especially YOUR property. Since the Constitution protects the absolute right of private property, indirectly this means the abolution of the constitutional right of private property found in the Fifth Amendment. Althouth the abolition of private property was removed from the Wikipedia definition of "socialism", it is still an inevitable feature of socialism but a hidden one. The reason they hid "abolition of private property from the contemporary definition is so that you would not know the root of the evil that socialism represents or the methods by which the constitution forbids it. Socialism IS NOT merely and only public control of the "means of INDUSTRIAL production" or production by businesses only. For the purposes of this website, we define instead define socalism as any degree of ownership or control over any property that the government is not PROVABLY the exclusive and absolute owner over. Under the U.S. constitution, the only property government can control is that which it provably and exclusvely owns.]


Wikipedia: types of socialism


Wikipedia category: socialism


Wikipedia: Means of production


Wikipedia: private property


PDF  Socialism:  The New American Civil Religion, Form #05.016 (OFFSITE LINK)-Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry (SEDM)


PDF  Social Security: Mark of the Beast- Steven Miller


Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1983, ISBN 0-87779-510-X, page 1118

socialism n (1839) 1: any of various economic and political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods 2 a: a system of society or group living in which there is no private property b: a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state 3: a stage of society in Marxist theory transitional between capitalism and communism and distinguished by unequal distribution of goods and pay according to work done.

PDF  Click here for the scanned image of this definition


NOTE:  The definition of "socialism" is nowhere to be found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.


James Madison. House of Representatives, February 7, 1792, On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties

“With respect to the words general welfare, I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs was not contemplated by its creator.”
If Congress can employ money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they may appoint teachers in every State, county and parish and pay them out of their public treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may assume the provision of the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all roads other than post-roads; in short, every thing, from the highest object of state legislation down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress…. Were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundations, and transmute the very nature of the limited Government established by the people of America.
“If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare, the government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to particular exceptions.”
[James Madison. House of Representatives, February 7, 1792, On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties]


Federalist #41. Saturday, January 19, 1788, James Madison

It has been urged and echoed, that the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,” amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it… For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars… But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? (Federalists #41)
[Federalist #41. Saturday, January 19, 1788, James Madison]


Thomas Jefferson: Opinion on National Bank, 1791. ME 3:148

Congress has not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but only those specifically enumerated.

They are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please which may be good for the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless. It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please…. Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given them. It was intended to lace them up straightly within the enumerated powers and those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect.

That of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.
[Thomas Jefferson: Opinion on National Bank, 1791. ME 3:148; SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Politics/ThomasJefferson/jeff1020.htm and
http://thefederalistpapers.org/founders/jefferson/thomas-jefferson-opinion-on-national-bank-1791]


On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties. House of Representatives, February 3, 1792

Mr. GILES. The present section of the bill (he continued) appears to contain a direct bounty on occupations; and if that be its object, it is the first attempt as yet made by this government to exercise such authority; -- and its constitutionality struck him in a doubtful point of view; for in no part of the Constitution could he, in express terms, find a power given to Congress to grant bounties on occupations: the power is neither {427} directly granted, nor (by any reasonable construction that he could give) annexed to any other specified in the Constitution.
[On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties. House of Representatives, February 3, 1792]


On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties. House of Representatives, February 7, 1792

Mr. WILLIAMSON. In the Constitution of this government, there are two or three remarkable provisions which seem to be in point. It is provided that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers. It is also provided that "all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States;" and it is provided that no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commercial revenue, to the ports of one state over those of another. The clear and obvious intention of the articles mentioned was, that Congress might not have the power of imposing unequal burdens -- that it might not be in their power to gratify one part of the Union by oppressing another. It appeared possible, and not very improbable, that the time might come, when, by greater cohesion, by more unanimity, by more address, the representatives of one part of the Union might attempt to impose unequal taxes, or to relieve their constituents at the expense of the people. To prevent the possibility of such a combination, the articles that I have mentioned were inserted in the Constitution.

I do not hazard much in saying that the present Constitution had never been adopted without those preliminary guards on the Constitution. Establish the general doctrine of bounties, and all the provisions I have mentioned become useless. They vanish into air, and, like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a trace behind. The common defence and general welfare, in the hands of a good politician, may supersede every part of our Constitution, and leave us in the hands of time and chance. Manufactures in general are useful to the nation; they prescribe the public good and general welfare. How many of them are springing up in the Northern States! Let them be properly supported by bounties, and you will find no occasion for unequal taxes. The tax may be equal in the beginning; it will be sufficiently unequal in the end.

The object of the bounty, and the amount of it, are equally to be disregarded in the present case. We are simply to consider whether bounties may safely be given under the present Constitution. For myself, I would rather begin with a bounty of one million per annum, than one thousand. I wish that my constituents may know whether they are to put any confidence in that paper called the Constitution.

Unless the Southern States are protected by the Constitution, their valuable staple, and their visionary wealth, must occasion their destruction. Three short years has this government existed; it is not three years; but we have already given serious alarms to many of our fellow-citizens. Establish the doctrine of bounties; set aside that part of the Constitution which requires equal taxes, and demands similar distributions; destroy this barrier; -- and it is not a few fishermen that will enter, claiming ten or twelve thousand dollars, but all manner of persons; people of every trade and occupation may enter in at the breach, until they have eaten up the bread of our children.

Mr. MADISON. It is supposed, by some gentlemen, that Congress have authority not only to grant bounties in the sense here used, merely as a commutation for drawback, but even to grant them under a power by virtue of which they may do any thing which they may think conducive to the general welfare! This, sir, in my mind, raises the important and fundamental question, whether the general terms which have been cited are {428} to be considered as a sort of caption, or general description of the specified powers; and as having no further meaning, and giving no further powers, than what is found in that specification, or as an abstract and indefinite delegation of power extending to all cases whatever -- to all such, at least, as will admit the application of money -- which is giving as much latitude as any government could well desire.
I, sir, have always conceived -- I believe those who proposed the Constitution conceived -- it is still more fully known, and more material to observe, that those who ratified the Constitution conceived -- that this is not an indefinite government, deriving its powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers -- but a limited government, tied down to the specified powers, which explain and define the general terms.
It is to be recollected that the terms "common defence and general welfare," as here used, are not novel terms, first introduced into this Constitution. They are terms familiar in their construction, and well known to the people of America. They are repeatedly found in the old Articles of Confederation, where, although they are susceptible of as great a latitude as can be given them by the context here, it was never supposed or pretended that they conveyed any such power as is now assigned to them. On the contrary, it was always considered clear and certain that the old Congress was limited to the enumerated powers, and that the enumeration limited and explained the general terms. I ask the gentlemen themselves, whether it was ever supposed or suspected that the old Congress could give away the money of the states to bounties to encourage agriculture, or for any other purpose they pleased. If such a power had been possessed by that body, it would have been much less impotent, or have borne a very different character from that universally ascribed to it.
The novel idea now annexed to those terms, and never before entertained by the friends or enemies of the government, will have a further consequence, which cannot have been taken into the view of the gentlemen. Their construction would not only give Congress the complete legislative power I have stated, -- it would do more; it would supersede all the restrictions understood at present to lie, in their power with respect to a judiciary. It would put it in the power of Congress to establish courts throughout the United States, with cognizance of suits between citizen and citizen, and in all cases whatsoever.

This, sir, seems to be demonstrable; for if the clause in question really authorizes Congress to do whatever they think fit, provided it be for the general welfare, of which they are to judge, and money can be applied to it, Congress must have power to create and support a judiciary establishment, with a jurisdiction extending to all cases favorable, in their opinion, to the general welfare, in the same manner as they have power to pass laws, and apply money providing in any other way for the general welfare. I shall be reminded, perhaps, that, according to the terms of the Constitution, the judicial power is to extend to certain cases only, not to all cases. But this circumstance can have no effect in the argument, it being presupposed by the gentlemen, that the specification of certain objects does not limit the import of the general terms. Taking these terms as an abstract and indefinite grant of power, they comprise all the objectsof legislative regulations -- as well such as fall under the judiciary article in the Constitution as those falling immediately under the legislative article; and if the partial enumeration of objects in the legislative article does not, as these gentlemen contend, limit the general power, neither will it be limited by the partial enumeration of objects in the judiciary article.

{429} There are consequences, sir, still more extensive, which, as they follow dearly from the doctrine combated, must either be admitted, or the doctrine must be given up. If Congress can employ money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their Own hands; they may appoint teachers in every state, county, and parish, and pay them out of their public treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may assume the provision for the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all roads other than post-roads; in short, every thing, from the highest object of state legislation down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress; for every object I have mentioned would admit of the application of money, and might be called, if Congress pleased, provisions for the general welfare.

The language held in various discussions of this house is a proof that the doctrine in question was never entertained by this body. Arguments, wherever the subject would permit, have constantly been drawn from the peculiar nature of this government, as limited to certain enumerated powers, instead of extending, like other governments, to all cases not particularly excepted. In a very late instance -- I mean the debate on the representation bill -- it must be remembered that an argument much used, particularly by gentlemen from Massachusetts, against the ratio of 1 for 30,000, was, that this government was unlike the state governments, which had an indefinite variety of objects within their power; that it had a small number of objects only to attend to; and therefore, that a smaller number of representatives would be sufficient to administer it.

Arguments have been advanced to show that because, in the regulation of trade, indirect and eventual encouragement is given to manufactures, therefore Congress have power to give money in direct bounties, or to grant it in any other way that would answer the same purpose. But surely, sir, there is a great and obvious difference, which it cannot be necessary to enlarge upon. A duty laid on imported implements of husbandry would, in its operation, be an indirect tax on exported produce; but will any one say that, by virtue of a mere power to lay duties on imports, Congress might go directly to the produce or implements of agriculture, or to the articles exported? It is true, duties on exports are expressly prohibited; but if there were no article forbidding them, a power directly to tax exports could never be deduced from a power to tax imports, although such a power might indirectly and incidentally affect exports.

In short, sir, without going farther into the subject. Which I should not have here touched at all but for the reasons already mentioned, I venture to declare it as my opinion, that, were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundations, and transmute the very nature of the limited government established by the people of America; and what inferences might be drawn, or what consequences ensue, from such a step, it is incumbent on us all to consider.
[On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties. House of Representatives, February 7, 1792]


U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936):

"A tax, in the general understanding of the term and as used in the constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government. The word has never thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another."

[U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)]


Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655,  in 1874

The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers.

There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A. and B. who were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A. should thereafter be the husband of C., and B. the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead now owned by A. should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the property of B.

Of all the powers conferred upon government, that of taxation is most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which taxation may be lawfully used and the extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on the amount of tax to levied or the things to be taxed may be imposed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are levied, as the support of government, the prosecution of war, the National defense, any limitation is unsafe. The entire resources of the people should in some instances be at the disposal of the government.

The power to tax is therefore the strongest, the most pervading of all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch v. state of Maryland, that the power to tax is the power to destroy. A striking instance of the truth of the proposition is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten percent imposed by the United States on the circulation of all other banks than the national banks drove out of existence every [87 U.S. 664] state bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage. This power can as readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exercised.

To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms.

Nor is it taxation. A "tax," says Webster's Dictionary, "is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or state." "Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the legislature upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes."
Coulter, J., in Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,7 says, very forcibly,

I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations -- that they are imposed for a public purpose.

We have established, we think, beyond cavil that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public purpose in this sense and what is not.

It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes or authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to be used for purposes of private interest instead of a public use, and the courts can only be justified in interposing when a violation of this principle is clear and the [87 U.S. 665] reason for interference cogent. And in deciding whether, in the given case, the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line, they must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government, whether state or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to this and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people may well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good government, though this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation.

But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized to contribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of a town by establishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers of the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the businessmen of the city or town.

[Footnote 7:  13 Pa.St. 104; see also Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 id. 69; Matter of Mayor of New York, 11 Johnson 77; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutcher 398; Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia. 47; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 188.]

[The following 34 Supreme Court case(s) cite this case:

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937)
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937)
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935)
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934)
State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931)
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930)
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919)
Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917)
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911)
Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905)
Aldrich v. Chemical National Bank, 176 U.S. 618 (1900)
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896)
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896)
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
Commercial Bank of Cleveland v. Iola, 154 U.S. 617 (1875)
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190 (1893)
Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U.S. 366 (1892)
Scotland County Court v. United States ex Rel. Hill, 140 U.S. 41(1891)
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)
Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885)
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883)
Ralls County Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733 (1881)
County of Moultrie v. Fairfield, 105 U.S. 370 (1881)
Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881)
Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1880)
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878)
Otis v. Cullum, 92 U.S. 447 (1875)]

[Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655,  in 1874]


Black's Law Dictionary, First Edition, pp. 1106

"SOCIALISM. A scheme of government aiming at absolute equality in the distribution of the physical means of life and enjoyment. It is on the continent employed in a larger sense; not necessarily implying communism, or the entire abolition of private property, but applied to any system which requires that the land and the instruments of production should be the property, not of individuals, but of communities or associations or of the government. 1 Mill, Pol. Econ. 248."

[Black's Law Dictionary, First Edition, p. 1101]


Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pp. 1561-1562

"SOCIALISM. Any theory or system of social organization which would abolish, entirely or in great part, the individual effort and competition on which modern society rests, and substitute for it co-operative action, would introduce a more. perfect and equal distribution of the products of labor, and would make land and capital, as the instruments and means of production, the joint possession of the members of the community."

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1561-1562]


Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1232

Public use.  Eminent domain.  The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain.  For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public.  It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.  Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, Mont., 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.

Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community distinguished from particular individuals.  But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Ringe Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186.  The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit.  It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual.  The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience.  A "public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation.  Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579, 586.

See also Condemnation; Eminent domain.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1232]

[IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL NOTE:  See "public office" and "trade or business", both of which are associated with "public use" as defined above]


Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,13 Pa.St. 104  (quoted in Loan Assoc.)

"I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations -- that they are imposed for a public purpose."

[Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,13 Pa.St. 104]


Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900):

"So it was held in the oyster planting case (McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 , 24 L. ed. 248), that the right which the people of that state acquired to appropriate its tide waters and the beds therein for taking and cultivating fish was but a regulation of the use, by the people, of their common property, and the right thus acquired did not come from their citizenship alone, but from their citizenship and property combined. It was therefore a property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship, and for that reason the citizen of one state was not invested by the Constitution of the United States with any interest in the common property of the citizen of another state."

[Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)]


Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892):

“Surely the matters in which the public has the most interest are the supplies of food and clothing; yet can it be that by reason of this interest the state may fix the price at which the butcher must sell his meat, or the vendor of boots and shoes his goods? Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;' and to 'secure,' not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit; second, that if the devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.

[Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]


PDF Senate Document #43, Senate Resolution No. 62, p. 9, paragraph 2, 1933

"The ultimate ownership of all property is in the State; individual so-called "ownership" is only by virtue of Government, i.e., law, amounting to mere user; and use must be in accordance with law and subordinate to the necessities of the State."

[Senate Document #43, Senate Resolution No. 62, p. 9, paragraph 2, 1933]


Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)

"A statutory provision which is not a legitimate police regulation cannot be made such by being placed in the same act with a police regulation, or by being enacted under a title that declares a purpose which would be a proper object for the exercise of that power.

"It being self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.

"The Fourteenth Amendment recognizes "liberty" and "property" as coexistent human rights, and debars the states from any unwarranted interference with either.

"Since a state may not strike down the rights of liberty or property directly, it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring in effect that the public good requires the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of the exercise of those rights, and then invoking the police power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object in view.

"The Fourteenth Amendment debars the states from striking down personal liberty or property rights or materially restricting their normal exercise excepting so far as may be incidentally necessary for the accomplishment of some other and paramount object, and one that concerns the public welfare. The mere restriction of liberty or of property rights cannot, of itself, be denominated "public welfare" and treated as a legitimate object of the police power, for such restriction is the very thing that is inhibited by the Amendment. [236 U.S. 3]"

[Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)]