1. Federal Crimes
  2. Territorial Jurisdiction
  3. Government of Men
  4. Affect of Emergency Powers on Jurisdiction
  5. Types of Courts
  6. Article I Legislative and Article IV Territorial Courts
  7. Article III Constitutional Courts
  8. Statutory Authority of United States Courts
  9. Specific Examples of Federal Courts Exceeding their Federal Zone Jurisdiction
  10. Flawed arguments about the federal courts
  11. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
  12. Article III Judges
  13. Credits
Related Articles:



To get started, let's look at the Criminal Code of the United States government:

TITLE 18 > PART III > CHAPTER 301 > Sec. 4001.
Sec. 4001. - Limitation on detention; control of prisons

(a)  No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.

Building on this theme, we now add a corroborating citation from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, paragraph 2, in the middle,

"On the other hand since all Federal crimes are statutory [ see United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 3 L.ed. 259 (1812)] and all criminal prosecutions in the Federal courts are based on acts of Congress, . . ."


In order to define the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to conduct criminal prosecutions, one would have to find out what the specific definition of "Act of Congress," is. We find such a definition in Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prior to Dec. 2002, wherein is defined "Act of Congress." Rule 54(c) states:

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession."

After we cited the above in our book, the Supreme Court subsequently removed this definition from the rules to obscure the very limited nature of their jurisdiction.  They merged it with Rule 1 and the above limitation was removed, although it still applies. This scam is documented in section 6.9.6 of our Great IRS Hoax book.  THE QUESTION IS, ON WHICH OF THE FOUR LOCATIONS NAMED IN RULE 54(c) IS THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ASSERTING JURISDICTION WHEN THE U.S. ATTORNEY HAULS YOUR ASS IN COURT ON AN INCOME TAX CRIME? Hint, everyone knows what and where the District of Columbia is, and everyone knows where Puerto Rico is, and territories and insular possessions are defined in Title 48 United States Code, happy hunting!  This information from Rule 54(c ) was so damning , in fact, that the federal judiciary decided to remove it from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure following publishment of it in this book.  That change occurred in Dec. 2002, when rule 54 was transferred to Rule 1 and the definition of “Acts of Congress” was conspicuously removed.  We explain this fraud earlier in section 6.7.5.  Do you think your government wants you to know the truth.  They’re systematically hiding it, and people like us have told them exactly what they need to hide using this book.  There is a name for this, and it’s called obstruction of justice and it’s a federal offense.  The people who changed those rules are CRIMINALS.

The U.S. Attorney Manual, section 9-20.000 entitled "Maritime, Territorial, and Indian Jurisdiction" clearly explains the very limited extent of federal jurisdiction in agreement with the above. That jurisdiction describes federal enclaves within the Constitutional states but excludes every other area of the Constitutional state.

The fact is that those occupying the sovereign 50 states living outside of the federal zone (THAT'S YOU IN MOST CASES!) come under Rule 54(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled "Offenses Outside a District or State":

(2) Offenses Outside a District or State.

These rules apply to proceedings for offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district, except that such proceedings may be had in any district authorized by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3238.

The above rule was conveniently censored by the U.S. Supreme Court after 2002 in a rewrite of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because it was too revealing, but it still applies.

Here is what 18 U.S.C. 3238 says about jurisdiction outside of any District or State:

TITLE 18 > PART II > CHAPTER 211 > Sec. 3238.
Sec. 3238. - Offenses not committed in any district

The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia

Federal courts are, by definition "inside their own district" and inside the "federal zone".  What the above is saying is that if they can kidnap/extradite you or get your to walk voluntarily inside one of their districts by walking into a federal courthouse near your home, then they can conduct a trial on you, but they only have jurisdiction based on where the crime was committed, not where the trial is held!  The place of the "crime", however, is outside of the territorial jurisdiction for Subtitle A federal tax crimes, such as Willful Failure to File, found in 26 U.S.C. 7203 or Tax Evasion under 26 U.S.C. 7201, which must happen inside the federal zone.  Furthermore, neither of these two statutes even have implementing regulations that apply them to the income tax found in Subtitle A of the I.R.C. so they are unenforceable.  There are only five ways the "federal mafia" (as Irwin Schiff calls them!) can get jurisdiction over a sovereign inhabitant of the 50 states living outside of the federal zone, and any one of the below methods will incorrectly establish you as a "U.S. person" at great injury to yourself and unnecessarily subject you to the jurisdiction of a corrupt and communist federal court:

  1. Volunteering into their jurisdiction by filing a suit in the court and making a general appearance rather than a special appearance.
  2. Claiming to be a "U.S. citizen", which means you were born in a territory over which the United States is sovereign.  Most people are not "U.S. citizens", but "U.S. nationals" over which the federal courts have no jurisdiction.
  3. Filing an IRS form 1040, and thereby creating a presumption that you are a "U.S. person", which means someone who resides inside the federal zone.  Instead, if you file anything, it should be a 1040NR form and you should modify the perjury statement at the end to clarify that you are “without the United States” so that they can’t drag you into a federal court and prosecute you for fraud if they think there is something false on the return.  Remember, all crimes must be prosecuted based on where they were committed, and if your return was fraudulent but you were not within the territorial jurisdiction of the federal government when you signed it, they must prosecute you under state and not federal law.
  4. Opening any kind of financial account and declaring on the application that you are are  "a U.S. person", which is a person who resides in the federal zone under 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(30).  Instead, modify that phrase by putting a "not" in front of it.
  5. Signing any government form or financial document "under penalty of perjury" (see 28 U.S.C. 1746(2)) instead of saying "under penalty of perjury from without the United States under 28 U.S.C. 1746(1)".  For instance, if you open a bank account and sign the default statement on the signature card saying that you swear "under penalty of perjury", then you have just inadvertently declared yourself to be "within the [federal] United States" and within federal jurisdiction.

For the purpose of federal statutes and "Acts of Congress" defined above, the several states of the Union of states, collectively referred to as the "United States of America", are considered to be legislatively "foreign", but not “foreign countries” with respect to the national government.  This is because the national government has admiralty jurisdiction over the sea and waterways external and internal to the states of the Union. Here is the definition of the term “foreign country” right from the Treasury Regulations:

26 C.F.R. §1.911-2(h):

The term "foreign country" when used in a geographical sense includes any territory under the sovereignty of a government other than that of the United States**.  It includes the territorial waters of the foreign country (determined in accordance with the laws of the United States**), the air space over the foreign country, and the seabed and subsoil of those submarine areas which are adjacent to the territorial waters of the foreign country and over which the foreign country has exclusive rights, in accordance with international law, with respect to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

A frequent term used to describe states that are legislatively foreign like Constitutional states of the Union are "freely associated compact states". If we examine the Title 28, which is the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure statutes governing all federal courts, including the United States District Courts, we find the following relevant evidence mentioning the term "freely associated compact states"::

TITLE 28 > PART I > CHAPTER 13 > Sec. 297.
Sec. 297. - Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states

(a)  The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit or district judge of the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by the laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the respective court.

(b)  The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this subsection

The term "freely associated compact states" does NOT refer to states of the Union, however, even though they are legislatively foreign with respect to the national government. Instead, they refer to Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau and possibly others in the conext of the above statute. Section 297 above deals with reassigning federal judges to the Pacific Islands properties that are associated with the U.S. Government. For proof, see:

  1. Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau, Amending the Compact of Free Association of October 1, 1982, As Amended Signed at Palikir May 14, 2003,
  2. The Compacts of Free Association, CRS Report IF12194, Version 1,

Note that Congress, in subparagraph (a) above refers to the “freely associated compact states” in subparagraph (b) as “countries”.  That is because they fit in every respect the description of “foreign country” found above in 26 C.F.R. §1.911-2(h):

Foreign government:  “The government of the United States of America, as distinguished from the government of the several states.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition)

Foreign Laws:  “The laws of a foreign country or sister state.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition)

Foreign States:  “Nations outside of the United States…Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state.  The term ‘foreign nations’, …should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought; and hence, one state of the Union is foreign to another, in that sense.”  (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition)

The California Supreme Court agreed with the conclusions of this section when it stated in the case of People ex re. Atty. Gen.  v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 234 (1850):

“In determining the boundaries of apparently conflicting powers between states and the general government, the proper question is, not so much what has been, in terms, reserved to the states, as what has been, expressly or by necessary implication, granted by the people to the national government; for each state possess all the powers of an independent and sovereign nation, except so far as they have been ceded away by the constitution.  The federal government is but a creature of the people of the states, and, like an agent appointed for definite and specific purposes, must show an express or necessarily implied authority in the charter of its appointment, to give validity to its acts.

The power of taxation in independent nations, is unrestricted as to things, and, with the exception of foreign ambassadors and agents, and their retinue, is unlimited as to persons; and is deemed a power indispensable to their welfare and even their existence.  The several states may, therefore, subject to the above restrictions, tax everything within their territorial limits, and every person, whether citizen or foreigner, who resides under the protection of their respective governments.”

[Emphasis added]

Once again, Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, describes the jurisdiction and operation of the federal district and circuit (appellate) courts.  Section 1603 contains definitions and includes a very interesting and related definition of the term “foreign state”:

Sec. 1603. - Definitions

For purposes of this chapter -

(a) A ''foreign state'', except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).

(b) An ''agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'' means any entity -

  (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and

  (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and

  (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.

(c) The ''United States'' includes all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

We have no choice to conclude, based on the definition above that the sovereign 50 states of the United States of America are considered “foreign states”, which means they are outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts in most cases.  There are exceptions to this general rule, but most of these exceptions occur when the parties involved reside in two different “foreign states” or in a territory (referred to as a “State”) of the federal United States and wish to voluntarily grant the federal courts jurisdiction over their issues to simplify the litigation.  The other interesting outcome of the above is that We the People are “instrumentalities” of those foreign states, because we fit the description above as:

1.A separate legal person.

2.An organ of the foreign state, because we:

2.1.Fund and sustain its operations with our taxes.

2.2.Select and oversee its officers with our votes.

2.3.Change its laws through the political process, including petitions.

2.4.Control and limit its power with our jury and grand jury service.

2.5.Protect its operation with our military service.

Without the involvement of every citizen of every “foreign state” in the above process, the state governments would disintegrate and cease to exist, based on the way our system is structured now.  The people, are the sovereigns, according to the Supreme Court: Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884); Perry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Yik Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).  Because the people are the the sovereigns, then the government is there to serve them and without people to serve, then we wouldn’t need a government!  How much more of an “instrumentality” can you be as a natural person of the body politic of your state?  We refer you back to section 4.1 (of our Great IRS Hoax book) to reread that section to find out just how very important a role you play in your state government.  By the way, here is the definition of “instrumentality” right from Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 801:

Instrumentality: Something by which an end is achieved; a means, medium, agency.  Perkins v. State, 61 Wis.2d 341, 212 N.W.2d 141, 146.

Another section in that same Chapter 97 above says these foreign states have judicial immunity:

TITLE 28 > PART IV > CHAPTER 97 > Sec. 1602.
Sec. 1602. - Findings and declaration of purpose

The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts. Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter

Why is this important?  Because as you will find out below, your income qualifies as “foreign income” and you qualify as a nonresident alien who lives in a foreign country if you were born outside of the federal zone and inside the United States of America.  This is important because if you have only income not connected with a “trade or business in the United States” and you are a nonresident alien, then your income is not subject to federal income tax:

Sec. 1.864-2  Trade or business within the United States.

    (b) Performance of personal services for foreign employer--

(1) Excepted services. For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the term ``engaged in trade or business within the United States'' does not include the performance of personal services--

    (i) For a nonresident alien individual, foreign partnership, or foreign corporation, not engaged in trade or business within the United States at any time during the taxable year, or


26 C.F.R. 1.871-7

Taxation of nonresident alien individuals not engaged in trade or U.S. business.—

Imposition of tax. (1) “…a nonresident alien individual…is NOT subject to the tax imposed by Section 1” [Subtitle A, Chapter 1]

PDF IRS Publication 515 (Nov. 2001), Withholding Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Entities, confirms the nontaxability of income earned outside of the federal United States (or federal zone) by a Nonresident Alien on page 21::

“Services performed outside the United States.  Compensation paid to a nonresident alien (other than a resident of Puerto Rico, discussed later) for services performed outside the [federal] United States is not considered wages and is not subject to graduated withholding or 30% withholding.”

Now can you see why our deceitful federal government might not want you to know that as a person living in one of the several states and outside the federal zone, you live in a “foreign country” and are a nonresident alien, and are therefore not liable for federal income taxes?

In the context of federal taxes, 28 U.S.C. 2201 says that federal courts may not make declaratory judgments regarding income taxes and may not address "rights or legal relations":

TITLE 28 > PART VI > CHAPTER 151 > Sec. 2201.
Sec. 2201. - Creation of remedy

(a)In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

The "rights" they are talking about in the above statute, folks, are your Constitutional rights found in the Bill of Rights!  The questions then becomes, where is the only jurisdiction in which the U.S. Congress can legislate away enforcement of your Constitutional rights or abrogate their responsibility and oath of office to "support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic"?  A careful reading of the supreme Court case Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) provides the answer. 

“The Constitution had attached to it irrevocably. There are steps which can never be taken backward. The tie that bound the states of Maryland and Virginia to the Constitution could not be dissolved, without at least the consent of the Federal and state governments to a formal separation. The mere cession of the District of Columbia to the Federal government relinquished the authority of the states, but it did not take it out of the United States or from under the aegis of the Constitution. Neither party had ever consented to that construction of the cession. If, before the District was set off, Congress had passed an unconstitutional act affecting its inhabitants, it would have been void.” 
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

The table below summarizes the results our reading the Downes case to answer the question of where Constitutional rights apply:

# Type of property Constitutional
Example Authorities
1 Territories No Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, etc.

1.Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

2. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 422, 4 L. ed. 579, 605, and in United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 10 L. ed. 573

2 Federal enclaves within states: NA NA NA
  2.1   Ceded to federal gov. after  joining union Yes Federal courthouses Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
  2.2   Also enclaves at the time of admission No Indian reservations Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
3 Sovereign states Yes California, Texas, etc. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
4 District of Columbia Yes District of Columbia

1.Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

2. Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L. ed. 98 (1820)

4 Foreign countries (nations) No Japan

1.Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

2.Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)

3. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 422, 4 L. ed. 579, 605 (1819)

4. United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 10 L. ed. 573

5. Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707 , 41 L. ed. 1172, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717 (1897)

The answer to the question of where Congress can legislate away rights is the federal zone, and in particular, those lands where the Constitution has never been applied, such as the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and American Samoa.  These areas, incidentally, are the only areas where "U.S. citizens" actually reside under 26 C.F.R. §31.3121(e).  The reason for this is that the Constitution is  an irrevocable social contract between the inhabitants and the government that attaches to the land.  Congress cannot unilaterally extricate itself from this contract.  The District of Columbia is an example of federal land where the Bill of Rights apply, because that area once belonged to the states of Maryland and Virginia and was ceded to the federal government when it was formed and after the Constitution was ratified by those two states.    This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that only one of the two Article III (of the Constitution) courts anywhere in our country are located in District of Columbia, and the only District Court in the District of Columbia must be an Article III court, because it is one of the few courts that exists on land that is not part of the federal zone.

Furthermore, there is only one place in the federal courts where the Congress can pass legislation that suspends enforcement of the Constitution, and that is in Article I courts inside the federal zone or Article III courts in administering laws that only apply to the federal zone.  This ought to be a BIG clue that Subtitle A federal income taxes can only apply in federal territories that are already devoid of Constitutional protections.


"We remain `a government of laws, and not of men,' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163, only so long as our laws remain clear." 630 F.2d, at 1037" 
[City of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982)]

To show you how the courts are ruling and thinking in the current time frame, it is necessary to go to what the Supreme Court has written. One of the best insights available is Schlup v. Delo, 130 L.Ed.2d 808, 818, 832 (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, where the Supreme Court stated:

at page 818, "To ensure that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would remain 'rare' and be applied only in the 'extraordinary case,' while at the same time ensuring that relief would be extended to those WHO ARE TRULY DESERVING, the Court has explicitly tied the exception to the petitioner's innocence." (emphasis added)

This illustrates that the courts are not making "legal decisions" they are making "decisions legal", in the engineering world, this is called reverse engineering. This also illustrates that the courts are doing nothing more than making a ruling legal by affirming a decision that has already been made administratively.  But with this kind of subjectivity in our court system, one has to ask, folks:

"Are we a society of laws or a society of politically correct judges, I mean men?"

Some questions are:

  • What are the criteria to be "truly deserving" of (whatever you want to name, such as a truly independent, impartial court and judge, the best and most effective attorney, and on and on one could go ad nauseam);
  • Was I "truly deserving" yesterday? Could I be "truly deserving" tomorrow?

This line of ruling from the Supreme Court shows you that the "law" is not in force today, but public policy is, and public policy changes at anytime the people in power say that the public policy has changed.

Now, I know you are going to ask, how is this possible, how did it happen, and what can I do to change it?

Those are the real questions and the answers that we are attempting to explore here.  In order to truly understand this problem and how to remedy it, one has to fully digest the true status of the "law" and how the Federal government is really operating and not just how the Federal government says it is operating.

Justice Harlan gave Americans fair warning of what was possible to happen, back in 1901, by stating in a dissenting opinion:

"The idea prevails with some -- indeed, it found expression in arguments at the bar -- that we have in this country substantially and practically two national governments; one, to be maintained under the Constitution, with all of its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to exercise.

"I take leave to say that if the principles thus announced should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this court, a radical and mischievous change in our system of government will be the result. We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism.

"It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution." See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Harlan dissenting.


The start of our quest is to first determine whether or not the nation is under the social contract the people have made with the Federal government, the Constitution for the united States of America (1789), or not. Part of the answer to that question can be found in documentation from the Senate of the UNITED STATES in Senate Report 93-549, which shows that we have been in a state of national emergency for quite some time.

See for yourself what the document says.


An anonymous legal scholar has so graciously pointed to a U.S. supreme Court decision that states "the Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, . . ." in the whole paragraph in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120(1866):

"Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors; for even these provisions, expressed in such plain English words, that it would seem the ingenuity of man could not evade them, are now, after the lapse of more than seventy years, sought to be avoided. Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, [71 U.S. 2, 121] and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority."

There seems to be a difference of opinion between the legislative branch of the Federal government and the Judicial branch as to the effectiveness of the Constitution in a state of war. This difference certainly needs to be explored to find the real truth, after all that is exactly what we all want, is the truth.

The Supreme Court of the United States of America has stated the truth about the courts of the United States as far back as 1933, in an obscure case brought by a U.S. Court of Claims Judge concerning the diminishment of his salary while he was still in office. This case, Thomas S. Williams v. United States, 77 L.Ed. 1372 (1933) is called by the government of the United States a "judicial embarrassment", but the fact of the matter is that this particular case opinion tells the story about the United States Courts under Article I, III and IV. The reader only has to read this case about 10 to 15 times before all that is said will sink in.


We begin with one of the great masters of Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing in the year 1828. Here, Justice Marshall makes a very clear distinction between judicial courts, authorized by Article III, and legislative (territorial) courts, authorized by Article IV. Marshall even utilizes some of the exact wording of Article IV to differentiate those courts from Article III "judicial power" courts, as follows:

These [territorial] courts then, are not Constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general rights of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the States in those courts only which are established in pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of the State government.

[American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton]
[26 U.S. 511, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), emphasis added]

To come to the truth of what is really happening in the courts of the United States, one has to undertake a study of the three (3) articles in the Constitution under which courts of the United States are created and may operate, Article I, III, and IV.

Article I courts are legislative courts and are created by Congress and operate within very special limited areas of operation. Article III courts are of the third Branch of government, the Judicial Branch, and are supposed to be independent of the other two Branches of the government with no influence or coercion from those two Branches of the government on the Judicial Branch. Article IV courts are created by Congress for the territories, and even though called territorial courts, which they are, the said territorial courts are still under the thumb of Congress and not independent but serve their master, the Congress.

There are actually three areas in the court concerning jurisdiction. There is the court itself, operating on a location that is actually specified by statute or Rule, see Rule 54(c), above listed, and the cause of action needs to be authorized by the Congress or the Constitution as a cause of action requiring the judicial power of the United States, and the "judge" is required to be a member of the third branch of the government, the Judicial Branch, with no coercion or intimidation from either of the other two branches of the government, in order to be a true independent impartial decision maker.

The Supreme Court of the United States covered the matter of Article III courts very thoroughly in Northern Pipeline Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company, 458 U.S. 50 (1982) in Footnote 39:

Our precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal, where the court is restricted to considerations of law, as well as the nature of the case as it has been shaped at the trial level. The Court responded to a similar suggestion in Crowell by stating that to accept such a regime, "would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law."

While Northern is principally about the power and the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts under Title 11, the case also goes into a lengthy discussion about Article III courts and their power and jurisdiction or the lack thereof.

Historical precedents are mentioned in Part II, Section A, from the Founding Fathers and their reasons for the need for an independent and impartial Judicial Branch of the government. The whole Part A is very informative and illustrative of the need for the judiciary's independence and impartiality, with one of the reasons being for the confidence of the people to reside in the decisions of the judiciary, and not be made a mockery of. Compare that with today when the judiciary is nothing more than a stooge for the people in power and everybody knows it, but to date lacks the courage to rectify the situation.

Northern Pipeline is full of case cites for the student of the history and functioning of the federal courts, and sums up the matter by stating:

In sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle - that the "judicial Power of the United States" must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence.

And at the same time most if not all of the federal judges sign contracts with the Executive Branch, for which they can be investigated, prosecuted and placed in prison, and that being a PDF Form 1040 executed with the Internal Revenue Service, IRS, a part of the Treasury Department, which is in turn a part of the Executive Branch.



There is an opinion by some, strongly expressed and backed up with case law and legal opinions, that stands for the proposition that all the Federal government is operating under an "unrevealed" or SECRET Maritime Jurisdiction. For the complete discussion on this matter you may click here on, SPECIAL MARITIME JURISDICTION, and copy or download the whole treatise.

Even before the treatise SPECIAL MARITIME JURISDICTION was published, I was of the opinion that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT was operating in admiralty/maritime jurisdiction when I had been directed to the volumes on the subject known as "BENEDICTS ON ADMIRALTY" and had found therein the Section on Crimes and lo and behold, therein listed were some of the offenses listed that I had been charged with. When I confronted the "judge", Edward C. Prado, with this information and demanded an explanation, his response was, "Do you see any ships here, Mr. Kearns?", to which everybody in the courtroom laughed. I put a Demand into the court to shut down the admiralty side of the court and to convene the common law side of the court, which can be read by clicking on DEMAND FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE.

My desire and attempt at the time was to seat a common law jury of my peers and to have that common law jury act on an ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.

After you have familiarized yourself with the concepts and the law in the SPECIAL MARITIME JURISDICTION, you can click on the PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS to view the said Petition filed on March 28, 1998 along with a MEMORANDUM OF LAW. The concepts in the SPECIAL MARITIME JURISDICTION treatise were listed in the said Petition and the Memorandum of Law, just not as concise and with the clarity of the later work.

I am of the opinion that you will find, just as Justice Harlan above stated in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), that there are actually two Federal District Courts in each Federal District, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, created as an Article IV, section 3, administrative tribunal, American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 7 L.ed 243; Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) and the District Court of the United States, created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, under Article III, currently vacant. In order to confirm the above stated opinion, you can go to the Federal Judiciary Homepage, which is the Directory for the United States Courts to confirm that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the territories of Puerto Rico is in the First Circuit, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT of the Virgin Islands is in the Third Circuit, and the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for Guam is in the Ninth Circuit, and these three UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS are treated the same as the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT within the States of the Union. Could it be, that the Federal Government is treating the Judicial Districts within the States of the Union as Federal Territories? Something to think about.

While the United States District Judge is appointed and confirmed under Article III of the Constitution, when he/she steps into the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, they do so not as an Article III judicial officer but as an Article IV administrative hearing officer, who is not independent nor impartial.

Should a person attempt to go to the United States District Judge, in his Article III capacity, obviously NOT in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, but in chambers, I am of the opinion, one will find that the independence and impartiality of the Article III judicial officer has been co-opted by virtue of the fact he/she has signed a contract with an Executive Branch agency known as the Internal Revenue Service, either a W-4 contract or a Form 1040 contract.

After reading the case of Hatter, et al v. United States of America, USCC # 705-89 C, 21 Cl. Ct. 786(1990) filed December 29, 1989 in the U.S. Claims Court, now the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and ruled upon by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 91-5039, decided January 16, 1992, I am thoroughly convinced that none of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGES ARE ARTICLE III JUDGES, because of what the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated in their opinion:

"No member of this panel [the judges who brought the suit] was an Article III judge in 1984."

Now folks, you and I can read plain English, at least I hope we can, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clearly stated that none of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES OR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES was an Article III judge in 1984, and in my opinion, have not been since.

In the final analysis, I think you will find, we the State Citizens of America, designated as "Citizens of the United States" in the Constitution for the United States of America, long before the 14th Article of Amendment to the Constitution was ever thought of, do not have an independent impartial judicial remedy, from Article III of the Constitution for the United States of America, when it comes to actions by the said State Citizens against or involving the Federal United States of America. It appears the only remedy for State Citizens who have a Petition for Redress of Grievances against the Federal Government of the United States of America, is to go directly to Congress for relief.

The lack of a "competent, independent and impartial tribunal [judicial forum] established by law" for the State Citizens of the United States of America is in direct violation of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States of America is a party signatory, on June 8, 1992, and came into force in the United States on September 8, 1992, while coming into force for the rest of the signatories on March 23, 1976, after being proposed on December 16, 1966. Also, you will want to check out the Reservations and Declarations made by the United States of America specifically governing the application of this Covenant (Treaty/Contract) in the United States of America.

The United States issued a Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1994, and you may read the complete Report right here, just click on the name above.

You will find reading the above that that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, an Article 1 legislative tribunal, and the district court of the United States, an Article III judicial court, which has been for the moment shelved in violation to our Constitution. A process of invoking the district court of the United States with it's Article III powers is being developed by Michael Joseph Kearns for his own Federal case.  You can read about the history of his dealings to come to the bottom of this matter by clicking here.

The process of invoking the Article III power and authority in the district court of the United States has been developed by the Supreme Law Firm and shown at the Supreme Law Library.

We are of the opinion that most people have been in the wrong court for the wrong action, and that the proper court to have been in for any criminal action would have been the district court of the United States and not the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.


All “United States District Courts” are territorial and/or “legislative courts” that may only operate as administrative rather than Constitutional or Common Law courts.  Nearly all of the courts in our federal system are “United States District Courts”.  In fact, the only Constitutional or common law district courts in the country United States exist in Hawaii and the District of Columbia.  This is confirmed by looking at the Notes under 28 U.S.C. 88, which says for the District of Columbia:

“It is consonant with the ruling of the Supreme Court in O'Donoghue v. United States, 1933, 53 S.Ct. 740, 289 U.S. 516, 77 L.Ed. 1356, that the (then called) Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia are constitutional courts of the United States, ordained and established under article III of the Constitution, Congress enacted that the Court of Appeals ''shall hereafter be known as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia''

The Notes section under 28 U.S.C. 91for Hawaii say the following:

"Section 9(a) of Pub. L. 86-3 provided that: ''The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii established by and existing under title 28 of the United States Code shall thence forth be a court of the United States with judicial power derived from article III, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States"

All district courts other than Hawaii and the District of Columbia are, by implication administrative courts, which means that they are territorial courts which may not rule on constitutional rights.  Even courts that are Art. III can only exercise that power when the judges are also Article III judges, which few judges are.  There is a great deal of confusion over this issue within the legal profession and few lawyers fully understand the implications of this distinction in our experience.

All of the territorial “United States District Courts” are listed in Title 28, Part I, Chapter 5.  The notes at the beginning of this chapter indicate the following:

“Sections 81-131 of this chapter show the territorial composition of districts and divisions by counties as of January 1, 1945. All references to dates were omitted as unnecessary. “

The important thing to note is the date of January 1, 1945.  At that time, Alaska and Hawaii were still territories instead of states of the Union.  Consequently, the U.S. District Courts had jurisdiction throughout these two territories at the time this chapter was codified.  All of the sections listed under this chapter identify the boundaries of the various districts, but the actual territory within these districts that falls under federal jurisdiction and under jurisdiction of the U.S. district courts is limited ONLY to areas of land that have been ceded by each state to the federal government by an act of the state legislature or which were owned by the federal government since before the state joined the Union.  Anyone who is not domiciled in a federal area within the outer boundaries of these districts does not reside "within the district", and therefore does not come under federal jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to enforce the Internal Revenue Code Subtitle A.

In the case of the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court admitted in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) that it was covered by the Bill of Rights because it had belonged to the states of Maryland and Virginia before it was ceded to the federal government after the Constitution was ratified in 1789.  At the point when D.C. was ceded in writing by Maryland and Virginia to the new federal government, the land was covered by the Bill of Rights and no formal agreement was subsequently worked out by Maryland and Virginia to remove the applicability of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to that area.  Consequently, all courts trying issues in that area must be Article III courts.

Though the judicial system set up in a Territory of the United States is a part of federal jurisdiction, the phrase "court of the United States", when used in a federal statute, is generally construed as not referring to "territorial courts." See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627. In Balzac, the high Court stated:

The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under Article III of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article IV, Section 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court.

[Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1921)]

Below are some additional cites clarifying the terms “District Court of the United States” as compared with “United States District Court”.

Constitutional provision against diminution of compensation
of federal judges was designed to secure independence of
[O'Donoghue v. U.S., 289 U.S. 516 (1933)]
[headnote 2. Judges]


The term "District Courts of the United States," as used in
Criminal Appeals Rules, without an addition expressing a
wider connotation, had its historic significance and
described courts created under article 3 of Constitution,
and did not include territorial courts.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938)]
[headnote 2. Courts, emphasis added]


Where statute authorized Supreme Court to prescribe Criminal
Appeals Rules in District Courts of the United States
including named territorial courts, omission in rules when
drafted of reference to District Court of Hawaii, and
certain other of the named courts, indicated that Criminal
Appeals Rules were not to apply to those [latter] courts.

[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938)]
[headnote 4. Courts, emphasis added]


United States District Courts have only such jurisdiction as is conferred by an Act of Congress under the Constitution.
[U.S.C.A. Const. art. 3, sec. 2; 28 U.S.C.A. 1344]

[Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir., 1972)]
[headnote 2. Courts]


The United States district courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. They have no jurisdiction except as prescribed by Congress pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. [many cites omitted]
[Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1976)]


Under our Constitutional system of government, Article III courts are the only types of courts empowered under the Constitution to rule on matters that concern the rights of natural persons living inside states of the Union.

The following paragraph from Mookini is extraordinary for several reasons: (1) it refers to the "historic and proper sense" of the term "District Courts of the United States", (2) it makes a key distinction between such courts and application of their rules to territorial courts; (3) the application of the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is obvious here, namely, the omission of territorial courts clearly shows that they were intended to be omitted:

Not only did the promulgating order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the omission of provisions for the application of the rules to the territorial courts and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938)]
[emphasis added]

Below are some additional quotes helping to define the term “District Court of the United States”:

The words "district court of the United States" commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long been the courts of the Territories.
[Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al. v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952)]
[emphasis added]


The phrase "court of the United States", without more, means solely courts created by Congress under Article III of the Constitution and not territorial courts.
[Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al. v. Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1948), headnote 1]
[emphasis added]


The question of jurisdiction in the court either over the person, the subject-matter or the place where the crime was committed can be raised at any stage of a criminal proceeding; it is never presumed, but must always be proved; and it is never waived by a defendant.
[U.S. v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D.C.Ark. 1885)]


In a criminal proceeding lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be asserted at any time by collateral attack.
[U.S. v. Gernie, 228 F.Supp. 329 (D.C.N.Y. 1964)]


Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of habeas corpus.
[U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]


The United States District Court has only such jurisdiction as Congress confers.
[Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F.Supp 245 (D.C.N.Y. 1960)]



Below is a listing of specific powers granted by the Constitution or by the Supreme Court that allows federal jurisdiction to reach outside of the federal zone.  The powers below are the only areas of subject matter jurisdiction that authorize federal jurisdiction outside of the federal zone

"Other authorities to the same effect might be cited. It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the 13th Amendment by direct legislation, punishing the holding of a person in slavery or in involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime. In the exercise of that power Congress has enacted these sections denouncing peonage, and punishing one who holds another in that condition of involuntary servitude. This legislation is not limited to the territories or other parts of the strictly national domain, but is operative in the states and wherever the sovereignty of the United States extends. We entertain no doubt of the validity of this legislation, or its applicability to the case of any person holding and wherever the sovereignty of the United whether there be a municipal ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding. It operates directly on every citizen of the Republic, wherever his residence may be."



There are a few cases which must be filed in federal courts.  By virtue of federal law, state courts have no power to adjudicate (no subject matter jurisdiction):

  • Patent and copyright claims [28 U.S.C. 1338(a)]
  • Admiralty and maritime claims [28 U.S.C. 1333]
  • Claims arising out of bankruptcy proceedings.  [28 U.S.C. 1334; Pauletto v. Reliance Ins. Co. (1998) 64 CA.4th 597, 602, 75 CR.2d 334, 337--state courts lack jurisdiction in action for malicious prosecution based on defendant's having filed adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court: "it is for Congress and the federal courts, not state courts, to decide what incentives and penalties shall be utilized in the bankruptcy process"]
  • Claims under Sherman Antitrust Act [15 U.S.C. 4]
  • Claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (including Rule 10b-5 actions). [15 U.S.C. 78aa]
  • Claims involving activities regulated by federal labor laws.  E.g., the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) preempts state power to adjudicate claims based on union contracts or union activities, unless of "merely peripheral concern" to the Act. [San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon(1959)  359 US 236, 247-248, 79 S.Ct. 773, 781-782; Bassett v. Attebery (1986) 180 CA.3d 288, 294-295, 224 CR 399, 402--NLRB (rather than federal court) has exclusive jurisdiction over wrongful discharge claim alleging violation of federal labor laws]
  • Certain ERISA actions: Suits for injunctive or other equitable relief against an employer or insurer under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (But federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of claims for benefits due.) [29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1)]


In order to get a fair trial, you must understand how the court system works and how to use it to your advantage.  We already explained, for instance, that if you decide to enter a federal court as a last resort, then you want to do so in an Article III court with Article III judges.  The courts do not directly tell you whether they are Article III courts nor do the judges tell you if they are Article III judges.  You must have enough knowledge to understand that you will have to go to a third party to get this information.  That third party is the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, Articles III judges division at:

Administrative Office of the Federal Courts

Article III Judges Division

Washington, D.C. 20544

Phone:  202-502-1860

You can look up the biographical information on any federal judge since 1789 on the Federal Judicial Website at:

Magistrate and bankruptcy and Tax Court judges, which are Article I judges, are not listed in the above database.  These serve a term of 14 years.  Oaths are the same for all judges.  The judge oath is prescribed in 28 U.S.C. 453and 5 U.S.C. 3331.  The oath that all judges take is a combination of the previous two sections and reads as follows:

“I, _______, do solemnly swear and affirm that I will administer justice without regard to persons and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as ______________ under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.  So help me God.”

The Article III Judges Division keeps the oaths of all federal judges on file.  They told us on 9/23/03 on the phone that they don’t give out copies of judges oaths and that the federal judiciary is not covered under FOIA, but they could not give us the authority for this.  We asked what would we would get if we did an FOIA for the oath of a federal judge, and they said they would send out a certificate that the oath is on file, but would not provide a copy of the original oath.  The lady we talked to said the oath form that judges sign says “Judicial officer” and does not say “employee” nor does it say “Art. III judge” on the form.  We asked them what legal basis they had to believe that District Judges were Art. III judges and they could not tell us what statute in Title 28 said that.

We also asked the legal counsel of the Art. III Judges division on 9/23/03 how to establish what courts are Art. III courts, and she said it was in Title 28, but could not give the section.  We pointed out that there were only three courts mentioned in Title 28 as Article III courts, and this included the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and the Court of Claims, and that none of the other courts were specifically identified as Art. III courts.  We reminded them that if it ain’t in the law, then you can assume it ain’t so.  The legal counsel didn’t have any further information on this subject and recommended further research in the Federal Judicial Center website.


We wish to thank the following resources for their contributions to some of the ideas found in this article beyond those of the author:

  • Michael Joseph Kearns.

  • Supreme Law Library:

  • Rutter Group California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, 2002, paragraphs 3:611-3:611.7 for the section 11 above on "Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction".

  • Attorney Eduardo Rivera