Citizenship Status v. Tax Status -Summary of citizenship statuses, confusion, and tax status
Affidavit of U.S. Citizenship, 46 C.F.R. §356.5 -You're NOT one of these
Citizenship, Domicile, and Tax Status Options, Form #10.003 (OFFSITE LINK) -summary of citizenship terms and relationships that you can attach to pleadings as a memorandum of law
Citizenship Diagrams, Form #10.010 (OFFSITE LINK) -summary of citizenship terms and relationships that you can attach to pleadings as a memorandum of law
U.S. citizens and the New World Order (OFFSITE LINK) -Musicians for Freedom
Wikipedia: "Citizenship of the United States"
§1401: Citizens and Nationals of the United States at Birth
SEDM Exhibit Page, Section 1.1: Citizenship, Domicile, and Residency (OFFSITE LINK)
You're not a STATUTORY "citizen" as defined in the Internal Revenue Code
Selective Service System, Form 1M (OFFSITE LINK)-Look at who the Selective Service System thinks is a
"U.S. citizen" in the notes at the bottom of p. 3. It ain't what
you think it is and it doesn't include anyone in a state of the
Reading Law: The Interpetation of Legal Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia, ISBN 978-0-314-27555-4, 2012 (OFFSITE LINK)-How to interpret phrases that invoke the word "or"
EDITORIAL: Canon 19 "Series-Qualifier Canon", p. 148.
Consider the term "citizen or resident of the United States" as used in the IRC.
1. Does the phrase "of the United States" reach back to the word "citizen"?
2. Are we required to construe "citizen" as referring to a citizen of the United States?
We would say no, even though this would seem to violate the Canon.
For an example, look at page 151, where Scalia discusses a case involving whether a company was insured against suits resulting from any infringement of copyright. The phrase in the contract was "any infringement of copyright or improper or unlawful use of slogans in your advertising."
The AZ supreme court ruled that the modified "in your advertising" did NOT reach back to "infringement of copyright". Scalia said this was justified by the rule that ambiguities in contracts will be interpreted against the party that prepared the contract (contra proferentem).
With the IRC we can apply the similar rule for taxing statutes that says any ambiguity is resolved against the government.
We have evidence that Treasury also interprets "citizen" as not necessarily referring to "citizen of the United States". See 26 CFR 1.1-1(b) where Treasury says:
"In general, [but not in every case] all citizens of the United States, wherever resident, and all resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is received from sources within or without the United States."
Also see 26 CFR 1.1-1(c): (c) Who is a citizen. Every person born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen.
Clearly "citizen" is considered by Treasury to be a stand alone term that MAY include a citizen of the United States, but does not necessarily include all citizens of the United States. It is, in fact, the SUBSET of the general term "citizens of the United States" found in the Fourteenth Amendment AND 8 U.S.C. $1401, but limited to only those who are born and domiciled on federal territory.
1913 Revenue Act: A. Subdivision 1. That there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding calendar year to every citizen of the United States, whether residing at home or abroad, and to every person residing in the United States, though not a citizen thereof, a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon such income, except as hereinafter provided; and a like tax shall be assessed, levied, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income from all property owned and of every business, trade, or profession carried on in the United States by to every citizen of the United States,
By the 1916 Act they were using the phrase they use today: "citizen or resident of the United States".
QUESTION: Why change it?
ANSWER: They must have been concerned about the consequences of using the phrase "citizen of the United States" in the Act, lest someone contest the tax in court on the basis that it was subjecting Americans to a form of involuntary servitude. By 1916 SCOTUS had weighed in and stated the tax was NOT direct, but still would be subject to apportionment if it was enforced AS IF it were a direct tax. To tax the income of all citizens of the United States would certainly make it a direct tax in substance. To avoid this issue, they changed the term used in the 1916 Revenue Act and have left it that way ever since. The term "citizen" does NOT apply to every citizen of the United States (however we choose to define that term) but only to those who allow themselves to be labelled as such for tax purposes. From 1919 to 1937 this would have included anyone who answered "yes" to the question on the 1040 form "Are you a citizen". Or in any case, anyone who accepted the lower rate of tax on his first $4000 of net income, thereby accepting the benefit of "citizen or resident of the United States" status. After 1938, this would include anyone who filed a 1040 as his tax return. And once SSN came into common usage in the 1940's, they had a back-up way to trap Americans into the "citizen or resident of the United States" status by presumption.
More on "tax return history" at:
Tax Return History-Citizenship
With that, the modern mechanism of manufacturing evidence of tax liability began. People used to have to be duped into opting IN-- by filing a 1040 and taking that lower tax rate on the first $4000 of income. Since the SSN in 1935, the vast majority of American need a SSN just to feed themselves as a practical matter.And this is leveraged against them when they look for work. Use of it becomes prima facie evidence that they are a STATUTORY citizen under 8 U.S.C. §1401 by virtue of 26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1(g). They are opted into income tax liability nearly by default. Which is why I call it "opting OUT" of income tax to become a "nonresident alien". Because for most people for most tax years, declining to opt in is no longer an available option. They are ALREADY opted in by default via W-2 and/or 1099 forms, or K-1 etc.
And 26 C.F.R. §1.1-(b) reads to me like Treasury is mocking us, and patting itself on the back for how well it has duped Americans for 100 years as well as using weasel words to make it sound like the tax apllies to every American ("in general, every citizen of the United States..."
To us, the change from the 1913 Act vs the 1916 Act demonstrates the SCAM and how they adjusted to ensure their SCAM could not be thwarted in court."citizen of the United States" could be construed to make the tax effectively a direct tax. "citizen or resident of the United States" makes it clear enough that the imposition is contractual in nature, making it EXTRA-constitutional or at least not a violation of the Constitution.
We don't think anyone has to make affirmative claims as what they ARE because that would obligate them to PROVE it in court. All they have to do is deny that they are a "citizen or resident of the United States" and that alone makes them a nonresident alien as far as the IRC is concerned. That is the only status left, it is the default. Domicile is non-justiciable and can't be changed by a court. STATUTORY "citizen" is a product of domicile, not nationality, so a court couldn't rule on that anyway, so why bring it up?
Why?: Because its a First Amendment choice of LEGAL affiliation. But you need not prove you are a nonresident alien, when this is the default status from denying the other statuses apply
They also hid their tracks after World War 2 by confusing NATIONALITY with DOMICILE. They did this by refusing to publish the Hague Convention limitations upon the DISTRINCTIONS between these two in 1955 in English. See:
SEDM Exhibit 01.008
To this day, you STILL can't read the English version of this convention, more than half a century after it was published. Its STILl published only in French.
You can translate the above by pasting into Google Translate:
"Subject to ITS jurisdiction" in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(c) is the key, as compared to "subject to THEIR jurisdiction" in the Fourteenth Amendment. ITS means exclusive federal jurisdiction per Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution. This regulation also refers to 8 U.S.C. §1401-1459 for a definition of the "citizen" they are referring to, and the ONLY "citizen" mentioned there is an 8 U.S.C. §1401 STATUTORY territorial citizen. There is NO mention of constitutional citzens anywhere in the referenced statutes.
What STATUTORY citizens in 8 U.S.C. §1401 all have in common is a domicile on federal territory within the EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the national government.
Also, under Canon 20, the Nearest-Reasonable-Referrent Canon, and Canon 18, the phrase "citizen or resident of the United States, WHEREVER RESIDENT" found in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(a) indicates that the phrase "wherever resident" refers to resident ALIENS, not the STATUTORY citizens referenced. STATUTORY "citizens" can NEVER be "residents" or "resident" and this finding is consistent with the definition of "resident" in the law of nationals AS WELL as that found in 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(A). SO, PHYSICAL location of the "citizen" is immaterial, just as Cook v. Tait indicated. Because "citizen", is a CHOICE, not a product of physical circumstance. Domicile, on the other hand, is ALSO a choice but unlike "citizen", it DOES depend on physical circumstances. This is CRUCIAL to fighting state income tax, because the fight in the case of NRAs always devolves back to whether one is "resident" in the state.
[Reading Law: The Interpetation of Legal Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia, ISBN 978-0-314-27555-4, 2012]
People ex rel. Kimberly v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, (Court: Supreme Court, Date: October 1, 1870
" I have no doubt that HN5 those born in the Territories, or in the District of Columbia, are so far citizens as to entitle them to the [*342] protection guaranteed to citizens of the United States in the Constitution, and to the shield of nationality abroad; but it is evident that they have not the political rights which are vested in citizens of the States. They are not constituents of any community in which is vested any sovereign power of government. Their position partakes more of the character of subjects than of citizens. They are subject to the laws of the United States, but have no voice in its management. If they are allowed to make laws, the validity of these laws is derived from the sanction of a Government in which they are not represented. Mere citizenship they may have, but the political rights of citizens [**56] they cannot enjoy until they are organized into a State, and admitted into the Union."
[People ex rel. Kimberly v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, (Court: Supreme Court,
Date: October 1, 1870)]
HN5 Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Relations With Governments
HN5 State & Territorial Governments, Relations With Governments
Those born in the territories, or in the District of Columbia, are so far citizens as to entitle them to the protection guaranteed to citizens of the United States in the Constitution, and to the shield of nationality abroad; but it is evident that they have not the political rights which are vested in citizens of the states. They are not constituents of any community in which is vested any sovereign power of government. Their position partakes more of the character of subjects than of citizens. They are subject to the laws of the United States, but have no voice in its management . If they are allowed to make laws, the validity of these laws is derived from the sanction of a government in which they are not represented. Mere citizenship they may have, but the political rights of citizens they cannot enjoy until they are organized into a state, and admitted into the union.
INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988)
"More fundamentally, however, the power to make someone a citizen of the United States has not been conferred upon 884*884 the federal courts, like mandamus or injunction, as one of their generally applicable equitable powers. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1361; 28 U. S. C. § 1651. Rather, it has been given them as a specific function to be performed in strict compliance with the terms of an authorizing statute which says that "[a] person may be naturalized . . . in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter, and not otherwise." 8 U. S. C. § 1421(d) (emphasis added).
"An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare." United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 474 (1917).
Or as we have more recently said: " `Once it has been determined that a person does not qualify for citizenship, . . . the district court has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant citizenship.' " Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 517 (1981) (citation omitted).
The congressional command here could not be more manifest. Besides the explicit cutoff date in the 1940 Act, Congress in 1948, adopted a new liberalized citizenship program that excluded Filipino servicemen, and specifically provided that even applications timely filed under the 1940 Act and still pending would be adjudged under the new provisions. Act of June 1, 1948, Ch. 360, 62 Stat. 281. These provisions were carried forward into the 1952 Nationality Act, see 66 Stat. 250, 8 U. S. C. § 1440. (It is particularly absurd to contemplate that Filipinos who actually filed their applications before the 1946 cutoff were denied citizenship by reason of this provision, whereas the present respondents, who filed more than 30 years after the deadline, were awarded it by the Ninth Circuit.) Finally, in 1961, Congress amended the 1952 Act by adding § 310(e), 8 U. S. C. § 1421(e), which specifies that "any" petition thereafter filed will be adjudged 885*885 under the requirements of the 1952 Act. Neither by application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power to confer citizenship in violation of these limitations."
[INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988)]
26 C.F.R. § 301.6109-1 - Identifying numbers
26 C.F.R. § 301.6109-1 - Identifying numbers.
(g) Special rules for taxpayer identifying numbers issued to foreign persons -
(1) General rule -
(i) Social security number.
A social security number is generally identified in the records and database of the Internal Revenue Service as a number belonging to a [STATUTORY rather than CONSTITUTIONAL] U.S. citizen or resident alien individual. A person may establish a different status for the number by providing proof of foreign status with the Internal Revenue Service under such procedures as the Internal Revenue Service shall prescribe, including the use of a form as the Internal Revenue Service may specify. Upon accepting an individual as a nonresident alien individual, the Internal Revenue Service will assign this status to the individual's social security number.
[EDITORIAL: Also under "course of dealing" principles, they would assume from his past 1040 filings (before he stopped filing) that he understood he had a duty to make a return whenever he had gross income above personal exemption amount---but this would be used primarily to prove his failure was willful.
Since tax is imposed in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1 on all income of a STATUTORY citizen or resident alien, and supplying an SSN creates a presumption of "citizen of the U.S.**" then the party using an SSN is presumed person liable per 26 U.S.C. §6001. You can see how easy this is to fix in the above regulation--provide proof of foreign status for the SSN or even specify that the number is NOT a statutory number, but a private number. The wording makes it sound like it is more difficult than it is. They use the term "nonresident alien individual" interchangably with "foreign status", but "nonresident alien INDIVIDUALS or PERSONS" are not the only foreigners. To them, "foreign status" means one who is a "nonresident alien INDIVIDUAL"--which you can "prove" by simply declaring it--they can't FORCE you to remain a citizen of the U.S. when it is a basis for taxing all of your income because that would be slavery.
Keep in mind also that “nonresident alien individual” is NOT the only “foreign status”. Those who are not aliens but who are nonresidents would not be “nonresident alien individuals”, but rather “non-resident non-persons”. THIS is what a state national is and the above regulation doesn’t even acknowledge the existence of such a party. The reason is that:
- They are completely outside the jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Code.
- They have a foreign domicile but not a foreign nationaltity. Therefore, they cannot be sued under federal statutes per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).
- Social Security cannot be offered or enforced against them. See:
U.S. Government Sources for Citizenship Information:
Office of Overseas Citizen
Services, Tom Glover, Phone 202-647-5226
Office of Policy Review
and Interagency Liaison, Phone 202-312-9750
IRS Website: Foreign Persons
The term "United States Citizen" means:
- An individual born in the United States,
- An individual whose parent is a U.S. citizen,
- A former alien who has been naturalized as a U.S. citizen,
- An individual born in Puerto Rico,
- An individual born in Guam, or
- An individual born in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
[ IRS Website: Foreign Persons, Downloaded 20170212; SOURCE: https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/foreign-persons]
IRS Website: Immigration Terms and Definitions Involving Aliens
- An individual born in the United States.
- An individual whose parent is a U.S. citizen.*
- A former alien who has been naturalized as a U.S. citizen
- An individual born in Puerto Rico.
- An individual born in Guam.
- An individual born in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
[ IRS Website: Immigration Terms and Definitions Involving Aliens, Downloaded 20170212; SOURCE: https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/immigration-terms-and-definitions-involving-aliens]
IRS Website: Pay for Independent Personal Services (Income Code 16)
A U.S. national is an individual who owes his sole allegiance
to the United States, but who is not a U.S. citizen
(a citizen of American Samoa, or the Commonwealth of the Northern
[ Click here for PDF version]
8 U.S.C. §1401 Nationals and citizens of the United States:
The following shall
be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
(a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
(b) a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo,
Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of
citizenship under this subsection shall not in any manner impair or
otherwise affect the right of such person to tribal or other property;
(c) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions
of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States and one of
whom has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying
possessions, prior to the birth of such person;
(d) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions
of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been
physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions
for a continuous period of one year prior to the birth of such person,
and the other of whom is a national, but not a citizen of the United
(e) a person born in an outlying possession of the United States of
parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically
present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for
a continuous period of one year at any time prior to the birth of such
(f) a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under
the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of
twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States;
(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States
and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and
the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of
such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying
possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years,
at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years:
Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces
of the United States, or periods of employment with the United States
Government or with an international organization as that term is defined
in section 288 of title 22 by such citizen parent, or any periods during
which such citizen parent is physically present abroad as the dependent
unmarried son or daughter and a member of the household of a person
(A) honorably serving
with the Armed Forces of the United States, or
(B) employed by the United States Government or an international organization
as defined in section 288 of title 22, may be included in order to satisfy
the physical-presence requirement of this paragraph. This proviso shall
be applicable to persons born on or after December 24, 1952, to the
same extent as if it had become effective in its present form on that
(h) a person born before
noon (Eastern Standard Time) May 24, 1934, outside the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States of an alien father and a mother who is a citizen
of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, had resided
in the United States
you are a "national", "state national", and Constitutional but not Statutory
Citizen. Article on our website based on sections
4.12.6 and 188.8.131.52 of the Great IRS
Social Security Program Operations Manual (POM), Section RS00204.015: Developing
Evidence of U.S. citizenship
Social Security Program Operations Manual (POM), Section RS000204.010:
U.S. Citizenship/Lawful Presence Payment Requirement Effective for Claims
Filed Sep 1, 1997 or later
1. "Alien Lawfully Present
in the United States"
For title II purposes, this means the categories of aliens the
Attorney General determined meet the exception to nonpayment of
monthly title II benefits under section 401(B) of the Personal Responsibility
Act. (See RS 00204.025 for the categories of aliens who are lawfully present
in the U.S.)
2. United States Citizen
This means a person who is:
3. United States National
This means a person who was born in American Samoa or Swain's
Island. For SSA purposes, a U.S. national is functionally equivalent
to a U.S. citizen.
Social Security Handbook: Section 1725: Evidence of U.S. Citizenship-details
on what the Social Security Administration "thinks" is a citizen
Social Security Program Operations Manual (POM), Section GN00303.100:
5. SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE U.S.
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment (which states that all individuals
born in the U.S. and to whom U.S. laws apply are U.S. citizens). Acquisition of citizenship is not affected by the fact that the alien
parents are only temporarily in the U.S. at the time of the child's
birth. Under international law, children born in the U.S. to foreign
sovereigns or foreign diplomatic officers listed on the State Department
Diplomatic List are not subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
6. UNITED STATES
When used in a geographical
sense, means the [federal areas within the] 50 states, D.C., Puerto
Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands of the U.S., American Samoa, Swain's Island
and the Northern Mariana Islands.
NOTE: The Harcon Tract
(a small tract of land that was north of the Rio Grande but is now south
of the channel since it was diverted) is considered U.S. territory.
and Immigration Services Website, Frequently Asked Questions About Form
Frequently Asked Questions About Employment Eligibility
Do citizens and nationals of the U. S. need to prove,
to their employers, they are eligible to work?
Yes. While citizens and nationals of the U.S. are automatically
eligible for employment, they too must present proof of employment
eligibility and identity and complete an Employment Eligibility
Verification form (Form I-9). Citizens of the U.S. include
persons born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
the Northern Mariana Islands. Nationals of the U.S. include persons
born in American Samoa, including Swains Island.
26 U.S.C. §2209: Certain residents of possessions considered "nonresidents
not citizens of the United States"
TITLE 26 > Subtitle B > CHAPTER 11 > Subchapter C > § 2209
§ 2209. Certain residents of possessions considered nonresidents
not citizens of the United States
A decedent who was a citizen of the United States and a resident
of a possession thereof at the time of his death shall, for purposes
of the tax imposed by this chapter, be considered a ''nonresident
not a citizen of the United States'' within the meaning
of that term wherever used in this title, but only if such person
acquired his United States citizenship solely by reason of
(1) his being a citizen of such possession of the United States,
(2) his birth or residence within such possession of the United
that people born in possessions are described as "U.S. nationals".
They refer to them above as "nonresident not a citizen of the United
3C AmJur 2d, Aliens
and Citizens, §2682 Sources
of citizenship. American Jurisprudence legal encyclopedia
section defining how "U.S. citizen" status is acquired
3C AmJur 2d, Aliens
and Citizens, §2704 Procedure
for acquiring citizenship "at birth". American Jurisprudence
legal encyclopedia section defining how "U.S. citizen" status is acquired.
Applying for a U.S. passport is all that is required.
U.S. Department of State 7 FAM (Foreign Affairs Manual) Sections 1100,
1110, and 1111 on "U.S. citizenship" vs. "U.S. nationality".
If you want to see the original document on the government website, click here.
Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d, Aliens and Citizens, §2689
3C Am Jur 2d §2689, Who is born in United States and
subject to United States jurisdiction
"A person is born subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, for purposes of
acquiring citizenship at birth, if his or her birth occurs in territory over which the United States is sovereign, even though
another country provides all governmental services within the territory,
and the territory is subsequently ceded to the other country."
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized
in the [federal] United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
United States v. Anthony, 24
Fed. Cas. 829, (Case No. 14,459)(1873)
“...there was no such thing as citizen of the United States,
except as that condition arose from citizenship of some state
[United States v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Cas. 829, (Case No. 14,459)(1873)]
Wadleigh v. Newhall 136 F. 941 (1905)
“The rights and privileges, and immunities which the fourteenth
constitutional amendment and Rev. St. section 1979 [U.S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 1262], for its enforcement, were designated to protect,
are such as belonging to citizens of the United States as such,
and not as citizens of a state”.
[Wadleigh v. Newhall 136 F. 941 (1905)]
26 C.F.R §31.3121(e)-1 State, United States, and citizen.
(b)…The term 'citizen of the United States' includes a citizen
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and, effective
January 1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American Samoa.
26 C.F.R §1.1-1(c):
(c) Who is a citizen.
Every person born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to its [that is, federal and not state] jurisdiction
is a citizen. For other rules governing the acquisition of citizenship,
see Chapters 1 and 2 of Title III of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1401-1459). For rules governing loss of citizenship,
see sections 349 to 357, inclusive, of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1481-1489),
Schneider v. Rusk, (1964) 377 U.S. 163, and Rev. Rul. 70-506, C.B.
1970-2, 1. For rules pertaining to persons who are nationals but
not citizens at birth, e.g., a person born in American Samoa, see
section 308 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1408). For special rules applicable
to certain expatriates who have lost citizenship with a principal
purpose of avoiding certain taxes, see section 877. A foreigner
who has filed his declaration of intention of becoming a citizen
but who has not yet been admitted to citizenship by a final order
of a naturalization court is an alien.
Requirements for being a commissioned officer in the U.S. military, 10 U.S.C. 532:
- Qualifications for original appointment as a commissioned officer
(a) Under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, an original appointment as a
commissioned officer (other than as a commissioned warrant officer)
in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine
Corps may be given only to a person who -
a citizen of the United States;
(2) is able to
complete 20 years of active commissioned service before his fifty-fifth
(3) is of good moral
(4) is physically qualified
for active service; and
(5) has such other
special qualifications as the Secretary of the military department concerned
may prescribe by regulation.
Citizenship Status under 8 U.S.C. v. Tax Status under 26 U.S.C
Publication 3184: Documents Required for Proof of U.S. Citizenship
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935):
[overruled by Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940]
Thus, the dual character of our citizenship is made plainly apparent.
That is to say, a citizen of the United States is ipso facto
and at the same time a citizen of the state in which he resides.
And while the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a national citizenship,
it has the effect of making that citizenship 'paramount and dominant'
instead of 'derivative and dependent' upon state citizenship. 3 'In reviewing the subject,' Chief
Justice White said, in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377 , 388 S., 389, 38 S.Ct. 159, 165, L.R.A. 1918C,
361, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 856: 'We have hitherto considered it as it
has been argued from the point of view of the Constitution as it
stood prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. But
to avoid all misapprehension we briefly direct attention to that
(the fourteenth) amendment for the purpose of pointing out, as has
been frequently done in the past, how completely it broadened the
national scope of the government under the Constitution by causing
citizenship of the United States to be paramount and dominant instead
of being subordinate [296 U.S. 404, 428] and derivative, and therefore operating as it does upon all the
powers conferred by the Constitution leaves no possible support
for the contentions made if their want of merit was otherwise not
to clearly made manifest.'
The result is that whatever latitude may be thought to exist
in respect of state power under the Fourth Article, a state cannot,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, abridge the privileges of a citizen
of the United States, albeit he is at the same time a resident of
the state which undertakes to do so. This is pointed out by Mr.
Justice Bradley in the Slaughter House Case, Fed.Cas. No. 8,408,
1 Woods, 21, 28:
'The 'privileges and immunities' secured by the original constitution,
were only such as each state gave to its own citizens. Each
was prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own citizens,
and against the citizens of other states.
'But the fourteenth amendment prohibits any state from abridging
the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States,
whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely requires
equality of privileges; but it demands that the privileges and
immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired.'
The same distinction is made by this court in Bradwell v. State
of Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 138, where, speaking of the privileges
and immunities provision of the Fourth Article, it was said: 'The
protection designed by that clause, as has been repeatedly held,
has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained
of. If the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Illinois, that
provision of the Constitution gave her no protection against its
courts or its legislation.' 4 [296 U.S. 404, 429] But the court added
that with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment 'there are certain
privileges and immunities which belong to a citizen of the United
States as such; otherwise it would be nonsense for the fourteenth
amendment to prohibit a State from abridging them. ... We agree
... that there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens
of the United States, in that relation and character, and that it
is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge.'
The governments of the United States and of each of the several
states are distinct from one another. The rights of a citizen under
one may be quite different from those which he has under the other.
To each he owes an allegiance; and, in turn, he is entitled to the
protection of each in respect of such rights as fall within its
jurisdiction. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 , 549.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, the simple inquiry
is whether the privilege claimed is one which arises in virtue of
national citizenship. If the privilege be of that character, no
state can abridge it. No attempt has been made by the courts
comprehensively to define or enumerate the privileges and immunities
which the Fourteenth Amendment thus protects. 5 Among those privileges, however, undoubtedly
is the right to pass freely from one state to another. Crandall
v. State of Nevada, supra; Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 , 21 S.Ct. 128. And that privilege, obviously,
is as immune from abridgment by the state from which the citizen
departs as it is from abridgment by the state which he seeks to
enter. This results from the essential character of national citizenship.
Cf. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 , 10 S.Ct. 930; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 , 14 S.Ct. 570; In re Quarles and Butler, [296 U.S. 404, 430] 158 U.S. 532, 536 , 15 S.Ct. 959; United States v. Cruikshank,
supra, 92 U.S. 542 , at page 552.
v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935)]
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393, 15 L.ed 691
The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses
the language, ‘a natural-born citizen.‘ It thus assumes that citizenship
may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution
was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood
in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
which referred citizenship to the place of birth. At the Declaration
of Independence, and ever since, the received general doctrine has
been, in conformity with the common law, that free persons born
within either of the colonies were subjects of the King; that by
the Declaration of Independence, and the consequent acquisition
of sovereignty by the several States, all such persons ceased to
be subjects, and became citizens of the several States, except so
far as some of them were disfranchised by the legislative power
of the States, or availed themselves, seasonably, of the right to
adhere to the British Crown in the civil contest, *577 and thus
to continue British subjects. (McIlvain v. Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch,
209; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, p. 99; Shanks v.
Dupont, Ibid, p. 242.)
The Constitution having recognized the rule that persons born
within the several States are citizens of the United States, one
of four things must be true:
First. That the Constitution itself has described what native-born
persons shall or shall not be citizens of the United States; or,
Second. That it has empowered Congress to do so; or,
Third. That all free persons, born within the several States,
are citizens of the United States; or,
Fourth. That it is left to each State to determine what free
persons, born within its limits, shall be citizens of such State,
and thereby be citizens of the United States.
If there be such a thing as citizenship of the United States
acquired by birth within the States, which the Constitution expressly
recognizes, and no one denies, then these four alternatives embrace
the entire subject, and it only remains to select that one which
That the Constitution itself has defined citizenship of the United
States by declaring what persons, born within the several States,
shall or shall not be citizens of the United States, will not be
pretended. It contains no such declaration. We may dismiss the first
alternative, as without doubt unfounded.
Has it empowered Congress to enact what free persons, born within
the several States, shall or shall not be citizens of the United
Before examining the various provisions of the Constitution which
may relate to this question, it is important to consider for a moment
the substantial nature of this inquiry. It is, in effect, whether
the Constitution has empowered Congress to create privileged classes
within the States, who alone can be entitled to the franchises and
powers of citizenship of the United States. If it be admitted that
the Constitution has enabled Congress to declare what free persons,
born within the several States, shall be citizens of the United
States, it must at the same time be admitted that it is an unlimited
power. If this subject is within the control of Congress, it must
depend wholly on its discretion. For, certainly, no limits of that
discretion can be found in the Constitution, which is wholly silent
concerning it; and the necessary consequence is, that the Federal
Government may select classes of persons within the several States
who alone can be entitled to the political privileges of citizenship
of the United States. If this power exists, what persons born within
the States may be President or Vice President *578 of the United
States, or members of either House of Congress, or hold any office
or enjoy any privilege whereof citizenship of the United States
is a necessary qualification, must depend solely on the will of
Congress. By virtue of it, though Congress can grant no title of
nobility, they may create an oligarchy, in whose hands would be
concentrated the entire power of the Federal Government.
**137 It is a substantive power, distinct in its nature from
all others; capable of affecting not only the relations of the States
to the General Government, but of controlling the political condition
of the people of the United States. Certainly we ought to find this
power granted by the Constitution, at least by some necessary inference,
before we can say it does not remain to the States or the people.
I proceed therefore to examine all the provisions of the Constitution
which may have some bearing on this subject.
Among the powers expressly granted to Congress is ‘the power
to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.‘ It is not doubted
that this is a power to prescribe a rule for the removal of the
disabilities consequent on foreign birth. To hold that it extends
further than this, would do violence to the meaning of the term
naturalization, fixed in the common law, (Co. Lit., 8 a, 129 a;
2 Ves., sen., 286; 2 Bl. Com., 293,) and in the minds of those who
concurred in framing and adopting the Constitution. It was in this
sense of conferring on an alien and his issue the rights and powers
of a native-born citizen, that it was employed in the Declaration
of Independence. It was in this sense it was expounded in the Federalist,
(No. 42,) has been understood by Congress, by the Judiciary, (2
Wheat., 259, 269; 3 Wash. R., 313, 322; 12 Wheat., 277,) and by
commentators on the Constitution. (3 Story's Com. on Con., 1-3;
1 Rawle on Con., 84-88; 1 Tucker's Bl. Com. App., 255-259.)
It appears, then, that the only power expressly granted to Congress
to legislate concerning citizenship, is confined to the removal
of the disabilities of foreign birth.
Whether there be anything in the Constitution from which a broader
power may be implied, will best be seen when we come to examine
the two other alternatives, which are, whether all free persons,
born on the soil of the several States, or only such of them as
may be citizens of each State, respectively, are thereby citizens
of the United States. The last of these alternatives, in my judgment,
contains the truth.
Undoubtedly, as has already been said, it is a principle
of public law, recognized by the Constitution itself, that birth
on the soil of a country both creates the duties and confers the
rights of citizenship. But it must be remembered, that though
*579 the Constitution was to form a Government, and under it the
United States of America were to be one united sovereign nation,
to which loyalty and obedience on the one side, and from which protection
and privileges on the other, would be due, yet the several sovereign
States, whose people were then citizens, were not only to continue
in existence, but with powers unimpaired, except so far as they
were granted by the people to the National Government.
Among the powers unquestionably possessed by the several
States, was that of determining what persons should and what persons
should not be citizens. It was practicable to confer on the Government
of the Union this entire power. It embraced what may, well enough
for the purpose now in view, be divided into three parts. First:
The power to remove the disabilities of alienage, either by special
acts in reference to each individual case, or by establishing a
rule of naturalization to be administered and applied by the courts.
Second: Determining what persons should enjoy the privileges of
citizenship, in respect to the internal affairs of the several States.
Third: What native-born persons should be citizens of the United
**138 The first-named power, that of establishing a uniform rule
of naturalization, was granted; and here the grant, according to
its terms, stopped. Construing a Constitution containing only limited
and defined powers of government, the argument derived from this
definite and restricted power to establish a rule of naturalization,
must be admitted to be exceedingly strong. I do not say it is necessarily
decisive. It might be controlled by other parts of the Constitution.
But when this particular subject of citizenship was under consideration,
and, in the clause specially intended to define the extent of power
concerning it, we find a particular part of this entire power separated
from the residue, and conferred on the General Government, there
arises a strong presumption that this is all which is granted, and
that the residue is left to the States and to the people. And this
presumption is, in my opinion, converted into a certainty, by an
examination of all such other clauses of the Constitution as touch
I will examine each which can have any possible bearing on this
The first clause of the second section of the third article of
the Constitution is, ‘The judicial power shall extend to controversies
between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens
of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming
lands under grants of different States; and between States, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign States, *580 citizens, or subjects.‘
I do not think this clause has any considerable bearing upon the
particular inquiry now under consideration. Its purpose was, to
extend the judicial power to those controversies into which local
feelings or interests might so enter as to disturb the course of
justice, or give rise to suspicions that they had done so, and thus
possibly give occasion to jealousy or ill will between different
States, or a particular State and a foreign nation. At the same
time, I would remark, in passing, that it has never been held, I
do not know that it has ever been supposed, that any citizen of
a State could bring himself under this clause and the eleventh and
twelfth sections of the judiciary act of 1789, passed in pursuance
of it, who was not a citizen of the United States. But I have referred
to the clause, only because it is one of the places where citizenship
is mentioned by the Constitution. Whether it is entitled to any
weight in this inquiry or not, it refers only to citizenship of
the several States; it recognizes that; but it does not recognize
citizenship of the United States as something distinct therefrom.
As has been said, the purpose of this clause did not necessarily
connect it with citizenship of the United States, even if that were
something distinct from citizenship of the several States, in the
contemplation of the Constitution. This cannot be said of other
clauses of the Constitution, which I now proceed to refer to.
**139 ‘The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.‘ Nowhere
else in the Constitution is there anything concerning a general
citizenship; but here, privileges and immunities to be enjoyed throughout
the United States, under and by force of the national compact, are
granted and secured. In selecting those who are to enjoy these national
rights of citizenship, how are they described? As citizens of each
State. It is to them these national rights are secured. The qualification
for them is not to be looked for in any provision of the Constitution
or laws of the United States. They are to be citizens of the several
States, and, as such, the privileges and immunities of general citizenship,
derived from and guarantied by the Constitution, are to be enjoyed
by them. It would seem that if it had been intended to constitute
a class of native-born persons within the States, who should derive
their citizenship of the United States from the action of the Federal
Government, this was an occasion for referring to them. It cannot
be supposed that it was the purpose of this article to confer the
privileges and immunities of citizens in all the States upon persons
not citizens of the United States.
*581 And if it was intended to secure these rights only to citizens
of the United States, how has the Constitution here described such
persons? Simply as citizens of each State.
But, further: though, as I shall presently more fully state,
I do not think the enjoyment of the elective franchise essential
to citizenship, there can be no doubt it is one of the chiefest
attributes of citizenship under the American Constitutions; and
the just and constitutional possession of this right is decisive
evidence of citizenship. The provisions made by a Constitution on
this subject must therefore be looked to as bearing directly on
the question what persons are citizens under that Constitution;
and as being decisive, to this extent, that all such persons as
are allowed by the Constitution to exercise the elective franchise,
and thus to participate in the Government of the United States,
must be deemed citizens of the United States.
Here, again, the consideration presses itself upon us, that if
there was designed to be a particular class of native-born persons
within the States, deriving their citizenship from the Constitution
and laws of the United States, they should at least have been referred
to as those by whom the President and House of Representatives were
to be elected, and to whom they should be responsible.
Instead of that, we again find this subject referred to the laws
of the several States. The electors of President are to be appointed
in such manner as the Legislature of each State may direct, and
the qualifications of electors of members of the House of Representatives
shall be the same as for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State Legislature.
**140 Laying aside, then, the case of aliens, concerning which
the Constitution of the United States has provided, and confining
our view to free persons born within the several States, we find
that the Constitution has recognized the general principle of public
law, that allegiance and citizenship depend on the place of birth;
that it has not attempted practically to apply this principle by
designating the particular classes of persons who should or should
not come under it; that when we turn to the Constitution for an
answer to the question, what free persons, born within the several
States, are citizens of the United States, the only answer we can
receive from any of its express provisions is, the citizens of the
several States are to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens
in every State, and their franchise as electors under the Constitution
depends on their citizenship in the several States. Add to this,
that the Constitution was ordained by the citizens of the several
States; that they were ‘the people of the United States,‘ for whom
*582 and whose posterity the Government was declared in the preamble
of the Constitution to be made; that each of them was ‘a citizen
of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,‘
within the meaning of those words in that instrument; that by them
the Government was to be and was in fact organized; and that no
power is conferred on the Government of the Union to discriminate
between them, or to disfranchise any of them-the necessary conclusion
is, that those persons born within the several States, who, by force
of their respective Constitutions and laws, are citizens of the
State, are thereby citizens of the United States.
It may be proper here to notice some supposed objections to this
view of the subject.
It has been often asserted that the Constitution was made exclusively
by and for the white race. It has already been shown that in five
of the thirteen original States, colored persons then possessed
the elective franchise, and were among those by whom the Constitution
was ordained and established. If so, it is not true, in point of
fact, that the Constitution was made exclusively by the white race.
And that it was made exclusively for the white race is, in my opinion,
not only an assumption not warranted by anything in the Constitution,
but contradicted by its opening declaration, that it was ordained
and established by the people of the United States, for themselves
and their posterity. And as free colored persons were then citizens
of at least five States, and so in every sense part of the people
of the United States, they were among those for whom and whose posterity
the Constitution was ordained and established.
Again, it has been objected, that if the Constitution has left
to the several States the rightful power to determine who of their
inhabitants shall be citizens of the United States, the States may
make aliens citizens.
**141 The answer is obvious. The Constitution has left to the
States the determination what persons, born within their respective
limits, shall acquire by birth citizenship of the United States;
it has not left to them any power to prescribe any rule for the
removal of the disabilities of alienage. This power is exclusively
It has been further objected, that if free colored persons, born
within a particular State, and made citizens of that State by its
Constitution and laws, are thereby made citizens of the United States,
then, under the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution,
such persons would be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States; and if so, then colored persons
could vote, and be *583 eligible to not only Federal offices, but
offices even in those States whose Constitution and laws disqualify
colored persons from voting or being elected to office.
But this position rests upon an assumption which I deem untenable.
Its basis is, that no one can be deemed a citizen of the United
States who is not entitled to enjoy all the privileges and franchises
which are conferred on any citizen. (See 1 Lit. Kentucky R., 326.)
That this is not true, under the Constitution of the United States,
seems to me clear.
A naturalized citizen cannot be President of the United States,
nor a Senator till after the lapse of nine years, nor a Representative
till after the lapse of seven years, from his naturalization. Yet,
as soon as naturalized, he is certainly a citizen of the United
States. Nor is any inhabitant of the District of Columbia, or of
either of the Territories, eligible to the office of Senator or
Representative in Congress, though they may be citizens of the United
States. So, in all the States, numerous persons, though citizens,
cannot vote, or cannot hold office, either on account of their age,
or sex, or the want of the necessary legal qualifications. The truth
is, that citizenship, under the Constitution of the United States,
is not dependent on the possession of any particular political or
even of all civil rights; and any attempt so to define it must lead
to error. To what citizens the elective franchise shall be confided,
is a question to be determined by each State, in accordance with
its own views of the necessities or expediencies of its condition.
What civil rights shall be enjoyed by its citizens, and whether
all shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or lost, are
to be determined in the same way.
One may confine the right of suffrage to white male citizens;
another may extend it to colored persons and females; one may allow
all persons above a prescribed age to convey property and transact
business; another may exclude married women. But whether native-born
women, or persons under age, or under guardianship because insane
or spendthrifts, be excluded from voting or holding office, or allowed
to do so, I apprehend no one will deny that they are citizens of
the United States. Besides, this clause of the Constitution does
not confer on the citizens of one State, in all other States, specific
and enumerated privileges and immunities. They are entitled to such
as belong to citizenship, but not to such as belong to particular
citizens attended by other qualifications. Privileges and immunities
which belong to certain citizens of a State, by reason of the operation
of causes other than mere citizenship, are not conferred. Thus,
if the laws of a State require, in addition to *584 citizenship
of the State, some qualification for office, or the exercise of
the elective franchise, citizens of all other States, coming thither
to reside, and not possessing those qualifications, cannot enjoy
those privileges, not because they are not to be deemed entitled
to the privileges of citizens of the State in which they reside,
but because they, in common with the native-born citizens of that
State, must have the qualifications prescribed by law for the enjoyment
of such privileges, under its Constitution and laws. It rests with
the States themselves so to frame their Constitutions and laws as
not to attach a particular privilege or immunity to mere naked citizenship.
If one of the States will not deny to any of its own citizens a
particular privilege or immunity, if it confer it on all of them
by reason of mere naked citizenship, then it may be claimed by every
citizen of each State by force of the Constitution; and it must
be borne in mind, that the difficulties which attend the allowance
of the claims of colored persons to be citizens of the United States
are not avoided by saying that, though each State may make them
its citizens, they are not thereby made citizens of the United States,
because the privileges of general citizenship are secured to the
citizens of each State. The language of the Constitution is, ‘The
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States. ‘ If each State may make such
persons its citizens, they became, as such, entitled to the benefits
of this article, if there be a native-born citizenship of the United
States distinct from a native-born citizenship of the several States.
**142 There is one view of this article entitled to consideration
in this connection. It is manifestly copied from the fourth of the
Articles of Confederation, with only slight changes of phraseology,
which render its meaning more precise, and dropping the clause which
excluded paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, probably
because these cases, could be dealt with under the police powers
of the States, and a special provision therefor was not necessary.
It has been suggested, that in adopting it into the Constitution,
the words ‘free inhabitants‘ were changed for the word ‘citizens.‘
An examination of the forms of expression commonly used in the State
papers of that day, and an attention to the substance of this article
of the Confederation, will show that the words ‘free inhabitants,‘
as then used, were synonymous with citizens. When the Articles of
Confederation were adopted, we were in the midst of the war of the
Revolution, and there were very few persons then embraced in the
words ‘free inhabitants,‘ who were not born on our soil. It was
not a time when many, save the *585 children of the soil, were willing
to embark their fortunes in our cause; and though there might be
an inaccuracy in the uses of words to call free inhabitants citizens,
it was then a technical rather than a substantial difference. If
we look into the Constitutions and State papers of that period,
we find the inhabitants or people of these colonies, or the inhabitants
of this State, or Commonwealth, employed to designate those whom
we should now denominate citizens. The substance and purpose of
the article prove it was in this sense it used these words: it secures
to the free inhabitants of each State the privileges and immunities
of free citizens in every State. It is not conceivable that the
States should have agreed to extend the privileges of citizenship
to persons not entitled to enjoy the privileges of citizens in the
States where they dwelt; that under this article there was a class
of persons in some of the States, not citizens, to whom were secured
all the privileges and immunities of citizens when they went into
other States; and the just conclusion is, that though the Constitution
cured an inaccuracy of language, it left the substance of this article
in the National Constitution the same as it was in the Articles
The history of this fourth article, respecting the attempt to
exclude free persons of color from its operation, has been already
stated. It is reasonable to conclude that this history was known
to those who framed and adopted the Constitution. That under this
fourth article of the Confederation, free persons of color might
be entitled to the privileges of general citizenship, if otherwise
entitled thereto, is clear. When this article was, in substance,
placed in and made part of the Constitution of the United States,
with no change in its language calculated to exclude free colored
persons from the benefit of its provisions, the presumption is,
to say the least, strong, that the practical effect which it was
designed to have, and did have, under the former Government, it
was designed to have, and should have, under the new Government.
**143 It may be further objected, that if free colored persons
may be citizens of the United States, it depends only on the will
of a master whether he will emancipate his slave, and thereby make
him a citizen. Not so. The master is subject to the will of the
State. Whether he shall be allowed to emancipate his slave at all;
if so, on what conditions; and what is to be the political status
of the freed man, depend, not on the will of the master, but on
the will of the State, upon which the political status of all its
native-born inhabitants depends. Under the Constitution of the United
States, each State has retained this power of determining the political
status of its native-born *586 inhabitants, and no exception thereto
can be found in the Constitution. And if a master in a slaveholding
State should carry his slave into a free State, and there emancipate
him, he would not thereby make him a native-born citizen of that
State, and consequently no privileges could be claimed by such emancipated
slave as a citizen of the United States. For, whatever powers the
States may exercise to confer privileges of citizenship on persons
not born on their soil, the Constitution of the United States does
not recognize such citizens. As has already been said, it recognizes
the great principle of public law, that allegiance and citizenship
spring from the place of birth. It leaves to the States the application
of that principle to individual cases. It secured to the citizens
of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in every
other State. But it does not allow to the States the power to make
aliens citizens, or permit one State to take persons born on the
soil of another State, and, contrary to the laws and policy of the
State where they were born, make them its citizens, and so citizens
of the United States. No such deviation from the great rule of public
law was contemplated by the Constitution; and when any such attempt
shall be actually made, it is to be met by applying to it those
rules of law and those principles of good faith which will be sufficient
to decide it, and not, in my judgment, by denying that all the free
native-born inhabitants of a State, who are its citizens under its
Constitution and laws, are also citizens of the United States.
It has sometimes been urged that colored persons are shown not
to be citizens of the United States by the fact that the naturalization
laws apply only to white persons. But whether a person born in the
United States be or be not a citizen, cannot depend on laws which
refer only to aliens, and do not affect the status of persons born
in the United States. The utmost effect which can be attributed
to them is, to show that Congress has not deemed it expedient generally
to apply the rule to colored aliens. That they might do so, if though
fit, is clear. The Constitution has not excluded them. And since
that has conferred the power on Congress to naturalize colored aliens,
it certainly shows color is not a necessary qualification for citizenship
under the Constitution of the United States. It may be added, that
the power to make colored persons citizens of the United States,
under the Constitution, has been actually exercised in repeated
and important instances. (See the Treaties with the Choctaws, of
September 27, 1830, art. 14; with the Cherokees, of May 23, 1836,
art. 12 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, art. 8.)
**144 I do not deem it necessary to review at length the legislation
*587 of Congress having more or less bearing on the citizenship
of colored persons. It does not seem to me to have any considerable
tendency to prove that it has been considered by the legislative
department of the Government, that no such persons are citizens
of the United States. Undoubtedly they have been debarred from the
exercise of particular rights or privileges extended to white persons,
but, I believe, always in terms which, by implication, admit they
may be citizens. Thus the act of May 17, 1792, for the organization
of the militia, directs the enrolment of ‘every free, able-bodied,
white male citizen.‘ An assumption that none but white persons are
citzens, would be as inconsistent with the just import of this language,
as that all citizens are able-bodied, or males.
So the act of February 28, 1803, (2 Stat. at Large, 205,) to
prevent the importation of certain persons into States, when by
the laws thereof their admission is prohibited, in its first section
forbids all masters of vessels to import or bring ‘any negro, mulatto,
or other person of color, not being a native, a citizen, or registered
seaman of the United States,‘ &c.
The acts of March 3, 1813, section 1, (2 Stat. at Large, 809,)
and March 1, 1817, section 3, (3 Stat. at Large, 351,) concerning
seamen, certainly imply there may be persons of color, natives of
the United States, who are not citizens of the United States. This
implication is undoubtedly in accordance with the fact. For not
only slaves, but free persons of color, born in some of the States,
are not citizens. But there is nothing in these laws inconsistent
with the citizenship of persons of color in others of the States,
nor with their being citizens of the United States.
Whether much or little weight should be attached to the particular
phraseology of these and other laws, which were not passed with
any direct reference to this subject, I consider their tendency
to be, as already indicated, to show that, in the apprehension of
their framers, color was not a necessary qualification of citizenship.
It would be strange, if laws were found on our statute book to that
effect, when, by solemn treaties, large bodies of Mexican and North
American Indians as well as free colored inhabitants of Louisiana
have been admitted to citizenship of the United States.
In the legislative debates which preceded the admission of the
State of Missouri into the Union, this question was agitated. Its
result is found in the resolution of Congress, of March 5, 1821,
for the admission of that State into the Union. The Constitution
of Missouri, under which that State applied for admission into the
Union, provided, that it should be the duty *588 of the Legislature
‘to pass laws to prevent free negroes and mulattoes from coming
to and settling in the State, under any pretext whatever.‘ One ground
of objection to the admission of the State under this Constitution
was, that it would require the Legislature to exclude free persons
of color, who would be entitled, under the second section of the
fourth article of the Constitution, not only to come within the
State, but to enjoy there the privileges and immunities of citizens.
The resolution of Congress admitting the State was upon the fundamental
condition, ‘that the Constitution of Missouri shall never be construed
to authorize the passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed
in conformity thereto, by which any citizen of either of the States
of this Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the
privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under
the Constitution of the United States.‘ It is true, that neither
this legislative declaration, nor anything in the Constitution or
laws of Missouri, could confer or take away any privilege or immunity
granted by the Constitution. But it is also true, that it expresses
the then conviction of the legislative power of the United States,
that free negroes, as citizens of some of the States, might be entitled
to the privileges and immunities of citizens in all the States.
**145 The conclusions at which I have arrived on this part of
the case are:
First. That the free native-born citizens of each State are citizens
of the United States.
Second. That as free colored persons born within some of the
States are citizens of those States, such persons are also citizens
of the United States.
Third. That every such citizen, residing in any State, has the
right to sue and is liable to be sued in the Federal courts, as
a citizen of that State in which he resides.
Fourth. That as the plea to the jurisdiction in this case shows
no facts, except that the plaintiff was of African descent, and
his ancestors were sold as slaves, and as these facts are not inconsistent
with his citizenship of the United States, and his residence in
the State of Missouri, the plea to the jurisdiction was bad, and
the judgment of the Circuit Court overruling it was correct.
[Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393, 15 L.ed 691]
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884):
between citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization is clearly
marked in the provisions of the constitution, by which 'no person, except
a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time
of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office
of president;' and 'the congress shall have power to establish an uniform
rule of naturalization.' Const. art. 2, 1; art. 1, 8. By the thirteenth
amendment of the constitution slavery was prohibited. The main object
of the opening sentence of the fourteenth amendment was to settle the
question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout
the country and in this court, as to the citizenship of free negroes,
(Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393;) and to put it beyond doubt that all
persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or
naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien
power [including a state], should be citizens of the United States and
of the state in which they reside. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
73; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 , 306.
This section contemplates
two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization.
The persons declared [112 U.S. 94, 102] to
be citizens are 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The evident meaning of
these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to
the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their
political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance.
And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do
to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot
become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually,
as by proceedings under the naturalization acts; or collectively, as
by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired. Indians
born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of,
and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indiana tribes, (an alien
though dependent power,) although in a geographical sense born in the
United States, are no more 'born in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof,' within the meaning of the first section of
the fourteenth amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign
government born within the domain of that government, or the children
born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers
of foreign nations. This view is confirmed by the second section of
the fourteenth amendment, which provides that 'representatives shall
be apportioned among the several states according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed.' Slavery having been abolished, and the persons formerly
held as slaves made citizens, this clauses fixing the apportionment
of representatives has abrogated so much of the corresponding clause
of the original constitution as counted only three-fifths of such persons.
But Indians not taxed are still excluded from the count, for the reason
that they are not citizens. Their absolute exclusion from the basis
of representation, in which all other persons are now included, is wholly
inconsistent with their being considered citizens. So the further provision
of the second section for a propor- [112 U.S. 94, 103] tionate reduction of the basis of the representation of any
state in which the right to vote for presidential electors, representatives
in congress, or executive or judicial officers or members of the legislature
of a state, is denied, except for participation in rebellion or other
crime, to 'any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one
years of age and citizens of the United States,' cannot apply to a denial
of the elective franchise to Indians not taxed, who form no part of
the people entitled to representation.
It is also worthy
of remark that the language used, about the same time, by the very congress
which framed the fourteenth amendment, in the first section of the civil
rights act of April 9, 1866, declaring who shall be citizens of the
United States, is 'all persons born in the United States, and not subject
to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.' 14 St. 27; Rev.
St. 1992. Such Indians, then, not being citizens by birth, can only
become citizens in the second way mentioned in the fourteenth amendment,
by being 'naturalized in the United States,' by or under some treaty
or statute. The action of the political departments of the government,
not only after the proposal of the amendment by congress to the states
in June, 1866, but since the proclamation in July, 1868, of its ratification
by the requisite number of states, accords with this construction. While
the amendment was pending before the legislatures of the several states,
treaties containing provisions for the naturalization of members of
Indian tribes as citizens of the United States were made on July 4,
1866, with the Delawares, in 1867 with various tribes in Kansas, and
with the Pottawatomies, and in April, 1868, with the Sioux. 14 St. 794,
796; 15 St. 513, 532, 533, 637.
v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)]
Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U.S 135 (1892):
"Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution,
says: 'Every citizen of a state is ipso facto a citizen of the [143 U.S. 135, 159] United States.' Section
1693. And this is the view expressed by Mr. Rawle in his work on
the Constitution. Chapter 9, pp. 85, 86. Mr. Justice CURTIS, in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 576, expressed the opinion
that under the constitution of the United States 'every free person,
born on the soil of a state, who is a citizen of that state by force
of its constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United States.'
And Mr. Justice SWAYNE, in The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
126, declared that 'a citizen of a state is ipso facto a citizen
of the United States.' But in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393,
404, Mr. Chief Justice TENEY, delivering the opinion of the court,
said: 'The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens,' are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the
political body who, according to our republican institutions, form
the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call
the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people,
and a constituent member of this sovereignty. ... In discussing
this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which
a state may confer within its own limits and the rights of citizenship
as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because
he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a state, that
he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the
rights and privileges of the citizen of a state, and yet not be
entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other
state; for, previous to the adoption of the constitution of the
United States, every state had the undoubted right to confer on
whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him
with all its rights. But this character, of course, was confined
to the boundaries of the state, and gave him no rights or privileges
in other states beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations
and the comity of states. Nor have the several states surrendered
the power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting
the constitution of the United States. Each state may still confer
them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon any class
or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the
sense in [143 U.S. 135, 160] which that
word is used in the constitution of the United States, nor entitled
to sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities
of a citizen in the other states. The rights which he would acquire
would be restricted to the state which gave them. The constitution
has conferred on congress the right to establish a uniform rule
of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has
always been held by this court to be so. Consequently no state,
since the adoption of the constitution, can, by naturalizing an
alien, invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen
of a state under the federal government, although, so far as the
state alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the
rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities
which the constitution and laws of the state attached to that character.'
"The fourteenth amendment reads: 'All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.'
In The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, it was held by this
court that the first clause of the fourteenth article was primarily
intended to confer citizenship on the negro race, and, secondly,
to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and citizenship
of the states; and it recognized the distinction between citizenship
of a state and citizenship of the United States by those definitions;
that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states embrace
generally those fundamental civil rights for the security and establishment
of which organized society was instituted, and which remain, with
certain exceptions, mentioned in the federal constitution, under
the care of the state governments, while the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States are those which arise out of the
nature and essential character of the national [143
U.S. 135, 161] government, the provisions of its constitution,
or its laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof; and that it
is the latter which are placed under the protection of congress
by the second clause of the fourteenth amendment.
"In Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761, 762, Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL
declared that 'a citizen of the United States, residing in any state
of the Union, is a citizen of that state;' and the fourteenth amendment
embodies that view."
v. State of Nebraska, 143 U.S 135 (1892)]
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed.
words 'in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,'
in the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution,
must be presumed to have been understood and intended by the congress
which proposed the amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted
it, in the same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief
Justice Marshall in the wellknown case of The Exchange, and as the equivalent
of the words 'within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United
States,' and the converse of the words 'out of the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States,' as habitually used in the naturalization acts.
This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word 'jurisdiction,'
in the last clause of the same section of the fourteenth amendment,
which forbids any state to 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.' It is impossible to construe
the words 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' in the opening sentence, as less comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,'
in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons
'within the jurisdiction' of one of the states of the Union are not
'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.'"
fourteenth amendment came before the court in the Slaughter-House Cases,
16 Wall. 36, 73, at December term, 1872, -- the cases having been brought
up by writ of error in May, 1870 (10 Wall. 273); and it was held that
the first clause was intended to define citizenship of the United States
and citizenship of a state, which definitions recognized the distinction
between the one and the other; that the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the states embrace generally those fundamental civil rights
for the security of which organized society was instituted, and which
remain, with certain exceptions mentioned in the federal constitution,
under the care of the state governments; while the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States are those which arise out of the nature
and essential character of the national government, the provisions of
its constitution, or its laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof;
and that it is the latter which are placed under the protection of congress
by the second clause. "
Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, in analyzing
the first clause, observed that "the phrase 'subject to the jurisdiction
thereof' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers,
consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign states, born within the
eminent judge did not have in mind the distinction between persons charged
with diplomatic functions and those who were not"
section [in Elk v. Wilkins] contemplates two sources of citizenship,
and two sources only, --birth and naturalization. The persons
declared to be citizens are all persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The evident
meaning of these last words is, not merely subject to some respect or
degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject
to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate
allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one
case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons
not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time
of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either
individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively,
as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired."
be 'completely subject' to the political jurisdiction of the United
States is to be in no respect or degree subject to the political jurisdiction
of another government. [including state governments]."
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," and
"naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,"
mean born or naturalized under such circumstances as to be completely
subject to the jurisdiction,--that is, as completely as citizens of
the United States, who are, of course, not subject to any foreign poser,
and can of right claim the exercise of the power of the United States
on their behalf wherever they may be."
power of naturalization, vested in congress by the constitution, is
a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away. 'A naturalized
citizen,' said Chief Justice Marshall, 'becomes a member of the society,
possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the
view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution
does not authorize congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The
simple power of the national legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule
of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far
as respects the individual.”
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649; 18 S.Ct. 456; 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898)]
Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)
citizen is indeed made a citizen under an act of Congress, but the
act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights
of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution,
on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize
Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of
the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization,
and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the
individual. The constitution then takes him up, and, among other
rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the Courts of the
United States, precisely under the same circumstances under which
a native might sue. He is *828 distinguishable
in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the constitution
makes the distinction. The law makes none.”
v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S.
Background, from The Great IRS Hoax, Section 3.10.10 (ver. 3.33):
Below is the text of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
Section 2. Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive
and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
Section 3. No
person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the
United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.
But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
Section 4. The
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not
be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection
or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation extended privileges
of citizenship to mere inhabitants, with this phrase:
"... the free
inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives
from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of free citizens in the several states"
The Articles of Confederation uses phrases in which nouns
are not capitalized proper nouns, and never use the preposition
- "states in this union"
- "free inhabitants"
- "free citizens"
The US Constitution omits references to free, and uses phrases with
proper capitalized nouns, and often use the preposition "of":
- "Citizen of the United States"
- "Inhabitant of that State"
- "Resident within the United States"
- "People of the several States"
- “residents of the same state”
The 14th amendment did
not create a new type of "citizenship" or in any way adversely affect
our civil rights but it simply extended citizenship to people of
all races and creeds rather than just to whites. Some people
mistakenly believe that the Fourteenth Amendment Section 1 created
a new inferior type of citizenship analogous to ownership.
In fact, this is not the case, as we will explain exhaustively later
in section 4.11
Equal protection under
the law? Lawyers will tell you that the 14th amendment was
the great equalizer. They will tell you that your rights to
equal protection under the law come from the 14th amendment.
They will then ask you why you would question such strong protections?
Compare the following
two quotes that acknowledge equal protection under the law:
- The 14th Amendment section 1, "... nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law... "
- The 5th Amendment "... nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law..."
The US Supreme Court
in 1878 case of Davidson v. New Orleans stated that your Constitution
is not redundant. They mean different things.
Here is how the California
Supreme Court describes the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
in Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43 (1872):
“The history and
aim of the Fourteenth Amendment is well known, and the purpose had
in view in its adoption well understood. That purpose
was to confer the status of citizenship upon a numerous class of
persons domiciled within the limits of the United States [the federal
United States], who could not be brought within the operation of
the naturalization laws because native born, and whose birth, though
native, had at the same time left them without the status of citizenship.
These persons were not white persons, but were, in the main, persons
of African descent, who had been held in slavery in this country,
or, if having themselves never been held in slavery, were the native-born
descendents of slaves. Prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment it was settled that neither slaves, nor those
who had been such, nor the descendants of these, though native and
free born, were capable of becoming citizens of the United States.
(Dread Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393). The Thirteenth Amendment,
though conferring the boon of freedom upon native-born persons of
African blood, had yet left them under an insuperable bar as to
citizenship; and it was mainly to remedy this condition that the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.” [emphasis added]
Here is what some state courts have said about this amendment:
"I cannot believe that any court
in full possession of all its faculties, would ever rule that the
(14th) Amendment was properly approved and adopted." State v. Phillips,
540 P.2d. 936; Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d. 266. [The court in this
case was the Utah Supreme Court.]
Further, in 1967, Congress tried to repeal the 14th Amendment
on the ground that it is invalid, void, and unconstitutional. CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD -- HOUSE, June 13, 1967, pg. 15641.
The portion of the
14th Amendment that draws the most attention within the freedom
community reads in pertinent part:
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside....The validity of the public
debt of the United States...shall not be questioned."
The words “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” were further
clarified in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) as follows,
and note that “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” includes people
born in a state of the Union:
impossible to construe the words 'subject to the jurisdiction
thereof,' in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment],
as less comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,'
in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold
that persons 'within the jurisdiction' of one of the states of the
Union are not 'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’”
[U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)]
In Powe v. U.S., 109
F2d 147, 149 (1940) the court determined what the term `citizen'
means in federal statutes. Notice that the term `citizen',
when used in federal laws, excludes State citizens:
"... a construction
is to be avoided, if possible, that would render the law unconstitutional,
or raise grave doubts thereabout. In view of these rules it
is held that `citizen' means `citizen of the United States,'
and not a person generally, nor citizen of a State ..."
Why did the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment word it the way they did? Following
the end of the Civil War in 1865, several rebellious southern states
refused to pass laws allowing blacks to have citizenship in the
state, and if they couldn’t be state citizens, then they also couldn’t
be U.S. nationals, vote, or serve on juries. This meant that
even though blacks technically were free, they had no rights.
The Fourteenth Amendment was an attempt to remedy mainly this situation
by conveying the privileges of nationality and “citizen” status
to blacks. If you go back and look at the Fourteenth Amendment,
section 1, you will see how this was accomplished.
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside.”
Congress’ plan was to naturalize all the blacks
into being citizens of the federal United States**
and then force the states to treat them like citizens of the state
they resided in by virtue of them being “U.S. citizens”. The
other part of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment confirms this:
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Since Congress was empowered by Article 1, Section 8, Clause
4 of the Constitution
an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;”
then they had the Constitutional authority to naturalize the
blacks to be federal/U.S.** citizens, even though they weren’t state
citizens. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 on April
9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 collectively naturalized blacks so they could
be protected from state government abuses of their natural rights.
“By the act
of April 9, 1866, entitled 'An act to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and furnish means for their
vindication,' (14 St. 27,) it is provided that 'all persons born
in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States.' This, so far as we are aware, is the first general enactment
making persons of the Indian race citizens of the United States.
Numerous statutes and treaties previously provided for all the individual
members of particular Indian tribes becoming, in certain contingencies,
citizens of the United States. But the act of 1866 reached Indians
not in tribal relations. Beyond question, by that act, national
citizenship was conferred directly upon all persons in this country,
of whatever race, ( excluding only 'Indians not taxed,') who were
born within the territorial limits of the United States, and were
not subject to any foreign power.” [Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94 (1884)]
The most frequent confusion we
see within the freedom community over the issue of Fourteenth Amendment
citizenship is misunderstanding of the differences between “United
States” in the Constitution and “United States” in federal statutes.
In the Constitution, the term means the states of the Union, while
in federal statutes, it refers to what we call the “federal zone”
or federal United States. This is a direct result of the fact
that the federal government has no police powers within states of
the Union, as we will point out later in section 4.9. The
government contributes to this confusion by using terms on their
forms and in their court rulings that they refuse to define or which
they define ambiguously. To prevent this problem, you can
simply define the terms you are using on any form by attaching a
definition of all terms to every federal form you submit.
Otherwise, we can guarantee that what you put on the form will be
misconstrued by the public servant reading it, usually to the injury
of your rights.
Unfortunately, there was an unwanted side effect to the Fourteenth
Amendment much later on because long after black slavery was eliminated
in the southern states following the Civil War, our greedy elected
officials used confusion over citizenship terms used in the 14th Amendment to obtain federal jurisdiction over everyone in the country, and that is where they got the nexus to tax us all
and circumvent the Constitutional limitations on direct taxation
found in 1:9:4 and 1:2:3 of the Constitution! They did this
by deceiving lawyers and people to believe that a “citizen of the
United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as a “U.S.
citizen” or “citizen of the United States” under federal statutes
and “acts of Congress”. The greedy politicians just couldn’t
keep their hands out of your pocket, could they? In order
to spread this kind of financial slavery, they relied on the ignorance
of an ill-informed populace to spread the myth that everyone was
a “U.S. citizen”, instead of a “national”, and that is where our
troubles began, because this created a new pecking order that took
away our Constitutional rights in the context of federal income
taxes. This made us all second class federal “U.S. citizens”
subject to “acts of Congress” instead of “Natural Born Sovereign
Because of the differences in meaning
of the term “United States” in the Constitution and “United States”
in federal statutes, you must be careful how you describe your citizenship.
We’ll get into that in much more detail later in section 4.11 and
following. For now, however, we must understand what a “citizen
of the United States” is under federal statutes, and particularly
under 8 U.S.C. §1401, keeping in mind that “United States” in that
context and as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(38) and 8 C.F.R
§215.1(f) means only the federal United States.
A “citizen of the United States” under federal statutes can be any
one of the following types of people:
- Persons who are actually "nationals" but who volunteer
or elect to be treated as U.S. citizens, which fits the
vast majority of persons in this country at this time.
These people live in the 50 states and outside of federal enclaves
in those states, but are treated by the federal government as
federal territory or property (slaves).
- Persons who were born on federal property subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States and who are living
on federal property. The only time these people
can have an occasion to invoke the protection of the 14th Amendment is when the federal property they are living in is
part of a federal enclave within a state that comes under both federal and state law under either the Buck
Act (4 U.S.C. §105 through 4 U.S.C. §113).
- People who are federal property/territory (slaves).
These people can properly be described as “federal property”
or “territory over which the United States is sovereign” coming
under article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
You thought the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery, didn’t
you? Well it didn’t outlaw voluntary slavery, and
that is what you become if you elect to be a “U.S. citizen”.
If you closely examine the citizenship application forms used
by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS):
then you will find that the sneaky federal government doesn’t
even mention a word about “U.S. nationals” on their form N-400,
which is entitled “Application for Naturalization”. If you
call them up like we did and ask them how to become a “U.S. national” instead of the taxable “U.S. citizen” they desperately
want you to be and what you should put on the form in order to guarantee
that, they will refuse to directly answer your question and run
you in circles hoping you’ll just give up!
If you research the terms "resident" and "legal residence", you
find that it is the nexus that binds us all to the state and federal
enforcement of commercial law statutes today. "Resident" is the
short form of "Resident Alien" and is used in State statutes to
mean someone who exhibits actual presence in an area belonging to
one nation while retaining a domicile/citizenship status within
another foreign nation [The United States/District of Columbia].
The federal income tax under Title 26, in fact, defines the term
“individual” as either an alien or a nonresident alien and does
not even refer to citizens!
The term "legal residence" further indicates that these two terms
may be applied either to a geographical jurisdiction, or, a political
jurisdiction. An individual may reside in one or the other, or in
both at the same time. In California, Government Code, section 126,
sets forth the essential elements of a compact between this State
and the federal government allowing reciprocal taxation of certain
entities, and provide for concurrent jurisdiction within geographical
If you would like to
learn more about how the Fourteenth Amendment was changed from a
mechanism to eliminate slavery to a mechanism to introduce federal
slavery, we recommend the following two fascinating books:
- Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Raoul Berger, Second Edition,
1997, Liberty Fund, Inc.; 8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite 300;
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250-1684; ISBN 0-86597-143-9 (hardcover).
- The Red Amendment, 2001 Edition, by L.B. Bork,
People’s Awareness Coalition, POB 313; Kieler, Wisconsin [ 53812
Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914 (1918)
... citizens of the District of Columbia [see
8 U.S.C. 1401] were not granted the privilege of
litigating in the federal courts on the ground of diversity
of citizenship. Possibly no better reason
for this fact exists than such citizens were
not thought of when the judiciary article
[III] of the federal Constitution was drafted. ... citizens
of the United States** ... were also not thought of; but in
any event a citizen of the United States** , who is not
a citizen of any state, is not within the language of the [federal] Constitution.
[Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914 (1918)]
State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380; 6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
"A person who is a citizen of the United States** is necessarily
a citizen of the particular state in which he
resides. But a person may be a
citizen of a particular state and not a citizen of the United
States**. To hold otherwise would be to deny
to the state the highest exercise of its sovereignty,
-- the right to declare who are its citizens. "
[State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380; 6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis
Pope v. Williams, 98 Md. 59, 56 A. 543, 66 L.R.A. 398, 103 Am.St.Rep. 379, affirmed in 193 U.S. 621, 48 L.ed. 817, 24 S.Ct. 573
A person residing within the District of Columbia or in one of
the territories may be a citizen of the United States, but not one
of any of the states.
[Pope v. Williams, 98 Md. 59, 56 A. 543, 66 L.R.A. 398, 103 Am.St.Rep.
379, affirmed in 193 U.S. 621, 48 L.ed. 817, 24 S.Ct. 573. ]
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)
In this case the privilege or immunity claimed does not rest upon
the individual by virtue of his national citizenship, and hence
is not protected by a clause which simply prohibits the abridgment
of the privileges or immunites of citizens of the United States.
Those are not distinctly privileges or immunities of such citizenship,
where everyone has the same as against the Federal government, whether
citizen or not.
The Fourteenth Amendment, it must be remembered, did not add
to those privileges or immunities. The Sauvinet Case is an authority
in favor of the contention that the amendment [176
U.S. 581, 597] does not preclude the states by their
constitutions and laws from altering the rule as to indictment by
a grand jury, or as to the number of jurors necessary to compose
a petit jury in a criminal case not capital.
The same reasoning is applicable to the case of Kennard v. Louisiana
ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 , L. ed. 478, although that case was decided with
special reference to the 'due process of law' clause.
In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 , 34 S. L. ed. 519, 524, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
930, it was stated that it was not contended and could not be that
the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was intended to
apply to the states. This was said long after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and also subsequent to the making of the claim
that by its adoption the limitations of the preceding amendments
had been altered and enlarged so as in effect to make them applicable
to proceedings in the state courts.
In Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 , 29 L. ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580, it was held
that the Second Amendment to the Constitution, in regard to the
right of the people to bear arms, is a limitation only on the power
of Congress and the national government, and not of the states.
It was therein said, however, that as all citizens capable of bearing
arms constitute the reserved military force of the national government
the states could not prohibit the people from keeping and bearing
arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource
for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from
performing their duty to the general government.
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 , 36 S. L. ed. 450, 456, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep.
693, it was stated that as a general question it has always been
ruled that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States does not apply to the states.
In Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U.S. 490 , 37 L. ed. 252, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394, it was said
that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution operates exclusively
in restraint of Federal power, and has no application to the states.
We have cited these cases for the purpose of showing that
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States do
not necessarily include all the rights protected by the first eight
amendments to the Federal Constitution against the [176 U.S. 581, 598] powers of the Federal government.
They were decided subsequently to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and if the particular clause of that amendment, now under
consideration, had the effect claimed for it in this case, it is
not too much to say that it would have been asserted and the principles
applied in some of them.
[Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)]