The federal government on a number of occasions has committed fraud in attempting to deny that its jurisdiction is limited to the federal zone in the case of Subtitle A income taxes.  For instance, section 40.14[2] of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Tax Division, Criminal Tax Manual (DOJTDCTM) at the following address on our website:

denies the claim generally that the Federal government has jurisdiction only inside the federal zone.  Here is the quote from that section:

40.14[2] District Court Jurisdiction of Title 26 Offenses 

Despite protestors' claims to the contrary, it is clear that United States District Courts have jurisdiction over criminal offenses enumerated in the Internal Revenue Code, notwithstanding want of a statute within Title 26 conferring such jurisdiction. Generally, this is based on the reasoning that 18 U.S.C. § 3231 gives the district courts original jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws of the United States" and the Internal Revenue Code defines offenses against the laws of the United States. United States v. Huguenin, 950 F.2d 23, 25 n.2 (1^st Cir. 1991); United States v. Isenhower, 754 F.2d 489, 490 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Eilertson, 707 F.2d 108, 109 (4^th Cir. 1983); United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 934 (5^th Cir. 1991); Salberg v. United States, 969 F.2d 379, 384 (7^th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287, 293 n.5 (7^th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rosnow, 977 F.2d 399, 412 (8^th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Dewey v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1596 (1993); United States v. Przybyla, 737 F.2d 828, 829 (9^th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 629 (10^th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2022 (1991) (citing cases); United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11^th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 (1988). See also United States v. McMullen, 755 F.2d 65, 67 (6^th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985). The argument that the United States has jurisdiction only over Washington, D.C., federal enclaves and territories, and possessions of the United States has similarly been rejected. See Ward, 833 F.2d at 1539.

[emphasis added]

We agree 100% with their conclusions based on the way they are stated because their jurisdiction depends on the subject matter of the suit.  We make that very clear in our article entitled “Authorities on Jurisdiction of Federal Courts”.  We show in that article, for instance, that there are clear matters over which the federal government and the federal courts retain jurisdiction outside of the federal zone and inside the 50 states and there is a Constitutional basis for this jurisdiction.  Furthermore, in section 11.3.9 of the Great IRS Hoax we quote from the U.S. Attorney Manual Section 662 to show that those subject matters for which the federal government does have jurisdiction inside the 50 states and outside the federal zone include:

1.        Use of mail. (see U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 7 and 18 U.S.C. §1341)

2.        Federal insurance (see 18 U.S.C. §2113)

3.        Interstate commerce (see U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 and 18 U.S.C. §2314)

4.        Slavery (see U.S. Constitution, Amendment 13 and 18 U.S.C. §1581)

5.        Excise taxes (duties, imposts, etc) on foreign commerce under Subtitles D and E of the Internal Revenue Code (see U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3)

6.    Contracts and between private individuals and the federal government, coming under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution.  This would include contracts to procure "social insurance", such as Social Security.  See Resignation of Compelled Social Security Trustee

However, the DOJTDCTM citation above and the underlying Ward case appears suspicious because:

1.        It cites only one case and no other judicial precedents or authorities, constitutional clauses, or statutes as authority.  The judge was legislating from the bench in this case, which is clearly illegal.  Only the legislative branch can legislate.

2.        It does not specify that the case technically only applies in the case of the 11^th circuit court, because each circuit mainly goes by its own precedents and not those of other circuits.  You will notice that throughout the DOJTDCTM, they cite authorities from each circuit because each circuit is different, but then don’t qualify the conclusions in this case by saying it can only be applied in the 11^th Circuit.

3.        The section did not state whether the litigant was "domiciled" or where he was located when the alleged tax evasion occurred.  Was he inside or outside the federal zone, for instance?  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), the law applicable is the law where the party is domiciled.  The only exception is if he is acting in a representative capacity, such as if he is acting as a "public official".  See Why your Government is a Thief Or You Are a "Public Official" for Income Tax Purposes (OFFSITE LINK)

4.        The section does not identify the specific subject matter [that is, what type of tax is being litigated] referred to, and if it did, it would be a void judgment because the subject matter was income taxes under Subtitle A only which DO indeed only apply within the federal zone;

Without answers to the above questions, the case would appear to be a void judgment and certainly can’t be applied generally to everyone or specifically to all Subtitle A tax crimes without such information, but the DOJ wants you to think otherwise because it benefits them financially.  This is how judges illegally expand their jurisdiction: by making vague and overly general rulings that don’t cite precedent and without going into the specific circumstances of the case or the specific reasons for their ruling.  This is also how the DOJ colludes with these corrupt judges in expanding federal jurisdiction:  citing cases that are unconstitutionally vague but which say what benefits the government.  If the court had indicated the circumstances of the case and their reasons, their fraud and extortion would be clearly evident, which is why they didn’t.  Imprecise language and general rather than specific rulings once again result in the violation of due process that typifies the entire fraudulent and illegally enforced income tax system we have today.

The same comments above apply to the ruling itself, which we looked up on VersusLaw (http://www.versuslaw.com) and repeat below for your benefit:

United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 12/16/1987)

[1]      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[2]      No. 87-3271

[3]      1987.C11.40056 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 833 F.2d 1538

[4]      December 16, 1987

[5]      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

ARTHUR D. WARD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

 [6]      Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

[7]      Lowell H. Becraft, Jr., for Appellant.

[8]      Robert W. Merkle, USA; Bruce Hinshelwood, AUSA, for Appellee.

[9]      Hill, Fay and Kravitch, Circuit Judges.

[10]     Author: Per Curiam

[11]     Arthur D. Ward was convicted of three counts of tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201), and two counts of making false statements or claims to a federal agency. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Ward makes three arguments on this appeal. First, he suggests that the United States has jurisdiction over only Washington, D.C., the federal enclaves within the states, and the territories and possessions of the United States. Secondly, he interprets the term "individual" within the Internal Revenue Code to apply only to those individuals located within this jurisdiction of the United States. Ward reaches this twisted conclusion by misinterpreting a portion of the Income Tax Code. The 1913 Act defined the words "state" or "United States" to "include" United States territories and the District of Columbia; Ward asks this court to interpret the word "include" as a term of limitation, rather than of definition. Finally, Ward maintains that the only persons expressly and statutorily liable for income tax are the withholding agents of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.

[12]     We find each of appellant's contentions to be utterly without merit. The district court properly denied Ward's motions for acquittal, and properly refused to instruct the jury as to Ward's theory of his defense. The opinion of the district court is AFFIRMED.

[Emphasis added]

If you would like to examine this ruling for yourself, click here.

Note that this is the ONLY case the DOJ hangs its hat on in denying that federal jurisdiction under Subtitle A only applies within the federal zone.  Remember, however, that the Supreme Court has never ruled in this manner on such issues or it would have been cited as precedent in this case, and that even the IRS’ own Internal Revenue Manual in section 4.10.7.2.9.8 says that cases below the Supreme Court such as the one above do not apply generally to all taxpayers, but only to the single taxpayer litigating the case. 

IRM, 4.10.7.2.9.8 (05/14/99):  Importance of Court Decisions

“Decisions made at various levels of the court system are considered to be interpretations of tax laws and may be used by either examiners or taxpayers to support a position.

Certain court cases lend more weight to a position than others. A case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court becomes the law of the land and takes precedence over decisions of lower courts. The Internal Revenue Service must follow Supreme Court decisions. For examiners, Supreme Court decisions have the same weight as the Code.

Decisions made by lower courts, such as Tax Court, District Courts, or Claims Court, are binding on the Service only for the particular taxpayer and the years litigated. Adverse decisions of lower courts do not require the Service to alter its position for other taxpayers.”

Therefore, the above case, at least in the case of income taxes, cannot and should not be cited as a precedent by the Department of Justice.  They did it anyway in the case of the DOJTDCTM because it benefits them financially, even though the case appears to be a void judgment because of its lack of specificity and lack of any evidence of jurisdiction identified by the judge in the ruling.

Copyright Family Guardian Fellowship