SOURCES:

1. Non-Resident Non-Person Position, Form #05.020, Section 5.1.
2. Great IRS Hoax, Section 4.5.2.

Many people are blissfully unaware that there are actually two mutually exclusive political and legal jurisdictions within United States the country.  Your citizenship status determines which of the two jurisdictions you are a member of and you have an option to adopt either.  This book describes how to regain the model on the right, the “Federal government”, which we also call the “United States of America” throughout this book.  We have prepared a table to compare the two and explain what we mean.  The vast majority of Americans fall under the model on the left, and their own ignorance, fear, and apathy has put them there.  The model on the left treats everyone as part of the federal corporation called the “United States”, which is how the law defines it in 28 U.S.C. §3002(15)(A).  This area is also called “the federal zone” throughout this book.  The “United States” first became a federal corporation in 1871 and you can read this law for yourself right from the Statutes at Large:

http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/16Amend/SpecialLaw/DCCorpStatuesAtLarge.pdf

Congress legislates for two separate legal and political and territorial jurisdictions:

1. The states of the Union under the requirements of the Constitution of the United States.  In this capacity, it is called the “federal/general government”.
2. The U.S. government, the District of Columbia, U.S. possessions and territories, and enclaves within the states.  In this capacity, it is called the “national government”.  The authority for this jurisdiction derives from  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution.  All laws passed essentially amount to municipal laws for federal property, and in that capacity, Congress is not restrained by either the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.  We call the collection of all federal territories, possessions, and enclaves within the states “the federal zone” throughout this document.

The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the above when it said:

“It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. The preliminary inquiry in the case now before the Court, is, by virtue of which of these authorities was the law in question passed?”
[Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265; 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)]

James Madison, one of our founding fathers, described these two separate jurisdictions in Federalist Paper #39, when he said:

First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.

That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.

The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

PUBLIUS.
[Federalist Paper #39, James Madison]

Based on Madison’s comments, a “national government” operates upon and derives its authority from individual citizens whereas a “federal government” operates upon and derives its authority from states.  The only place where the central government may operate directly upon the individual through the authority of law is within federal territory.  Hence, when courts use the word “national government”, they are referring to federal territory only and to no part of any state of the Union.  The federal government has no jurisdiction within a state of the Union and therefore cannot operate directly upon the individual there.

“It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 318H247 U.S. 251, 275 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation.“ 
[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 319H298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]

_______________________________________________________

The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. ‘To secure these rights,’ says the Declaration of Independence, ‘governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.’ The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these ‘unalienable rights with which they were endowed by their Creator.’ Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States. It is no more the duty or within the power of the United States to punish for a conspiracy *554 to falsely imprison or murder within a State, than it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder itself.

The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add any thing *555 to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another. The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.
[U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 1875 WL 17550 (U.S.,1875)]

These two political/legal jurisdictions, federal territory v. states of the Union, are separate sovereignties, foreign, and “alien” in relation to each other and the Constitution dictates that these two distinct sovereignties  MUST remain separate because of the Separation of Powers Doctrine:

“§79. This sovereignty pertains to the people of the United States as national citizens only, and not as citizens of any other government. There cannot be two separate and independent sovereignties within the same limits or jurisdiction; nor can there be two distinct and separate sources of sovereign authority within the same jurisdiction. The right of commanding in the last resort can be possessed only by one body of people inhabiting the same territory,' and can be executed only by those intrusted with the execution of such authority.”
[Treatise on Government, Joel Tiffany, p. 49, Section 78;
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/TreatiseOnGovernment/TreatOnGovt.pdf]

The vast majority of all laws passed by Congress apply to the latter jurisdiction above: the federal zone.  The Internal Revenue Code actually describes the revenue collection “scheme” for these two completely separate political and legal jurisdictions and the table below compares the two.  In the capacity as the “national government”, the I.R.C. in Subtitles A (income tax), B (inheritance tax), and C (employment tax) acts as the equivalent of a state income tax for the municipal government of the District of Columbia only.  In the capacity of the “federal government”, the I.R.C. in subtitle D acts as an excise tax on imports only.  The difference between the “national government” and the “federal/general government” is discussed in section 4.7 of the Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302, if you would like to review:

Table 5: Two jurisdictions within the I.R.C.

The “plenary” jurisdiction described above means exclusive sovereignty which is not shared by any other sovereignty and which is exercised over territorial lands owned by or ceded to the federal government under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.  Here is a cite that helps confirm what we are saying about the “plenary” word above:

"In dealing with the meaning and application of an act of Congress enacted in the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution to tax income and to grant exemptions from that tax [in its own territories and possessions ONLY but NOT in the states of the Union], it is the will of Congress which controls, and the expression of its will, in the absence of language evidencing a different purpose, should be interpreted 'so as to give a uniform application to a nation-wide scheme of taxation'. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 , 53 S.Ct. 74, 77 . Congress establishes its own criteria and the state law may control [in federal territories and possessions] only when the federal taxing act by express language or necessary implication makes its operation dependent upon state law. Burnet v. Harmel, supra. See Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 111 , 114 S., 46 S.Ct. 48, 49; Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333 ,, 49 S.Ct. 337 ; Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356, 56 S.Ct. 289, 294 . Compare Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59 , 51 S.Ct. 49, 50 ; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 109 ,, 110 S., 51 S.Ct. 58; Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 9 ,10 S., 57 S.Ct. 330, 331."
[Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 59 S. Ct 155 (1938)]

Why is such jurisdiction “plenary” or “exclusive”?  Because all those who file IRS 1040 returns implicitly consent to be treated as “virtual residents” of the District of Columbia, over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17  of the Constitution!:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > Sec. 7701.
Sec. 7701. – Definitions

(a)(39) Persons residing outside [the federal] United States

If any citizen or resident of the United States does not reside in (and is not found in) any United States judicial district, such citizen or resident shall be treated as residing in the District of Columbia for purposes of any provision of this title relating to -

(A) jurisdiction of courts, or

(B) enforcement of summons.

Because kidnapping is illegal under 18 U.S.C. §1201, people living in states of the Union subject to the provisions above must be volunteers and must explicitly consent to participate in federal taxation by filling out the WRONG tax form, which is the 1040, and signing it under penalty of perjury.  The IRS Published Products Catalog for 2003, Document 7130  confirms that those who file IRS Form 1040  do indeed declare themselves to be “citizens or residents of the [federal] United States”, which is untrue for the vast majority of Americans:

1040A11327A   Each

U.S. Individual Income Tax Return

Annual income tax return filed by citizens and residents of the United States.  There are separate instructions available for this item.  The catalog number for the instructions is 12088U.

W:CAR:MP:FP:F:I Tax Form or Instructions

[IRS Published Products Catalog, Year 2003, p. F-15]

It is also worth noting that the term “individual” as used above is NOWHERE defined in the Internal Revenue Code and that the ONLY definition we have found describes ONLY federal “employees”, in 5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(2).  This is further exhaustively analyzed in the fascinating memorandum of law below to conclude that the main “taxpayers” under Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A are all “public officers” who work for or are instrumentalities of the national and not federal government:

Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008 http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

If American Nationals domiciled in the states of the Union would learn to file with their correct status using the form 1040NR as “nationals” and “nonresident aliens”, then most Americans wouldn’t owe anything under the provisions of 26 U.S.C. §871!  The U.S. Congress and their IRS henchmen have become “sheep poachers”, where you, a person living in state of the Union and outside of federal legislative jurisdiction, are the “sheep”.  They are “legally kidnapping” people away from the Constitutional protections of their domicile within states using deceptive forms so that they volunteer into exclusive federal jurisdiction.

Notice the use of the term “nation-wide” in the Lyeth case above, which we now know means the “national government” in the context of its jurisdiction over federal territories, possessions, and the District of Columbia and which excludes states of the Union.  They are just reiterating that federal jurisdiction over the federal zone is “exclusive” and “plenary” and that state law only applies where Congress consents to delegate authority, under the rules of “comity”, to the state relating to taxing matters over federal areas within the exterior limits of a state.

“comity.  Courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.  Recognition that one sovereignty allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial act of another sovereignty, having due regard to rights of its own citizens.  Nowell v. Nowell, Tex.Civ.App., 408 S.W.2d 550, 553.  In general, principle of "comity" is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect.  Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689, 695 .  See also Full faith and credit clause.” 
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 267]

An example of this kind of “comity” is the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§110-113 , in which 4 U.S.C. §106  delegates authority to federal territories and possessions, but not states of the Union, to tax areas within their boundaries subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.  That jurisdiction then is mentioned in the context of 5 U.S.C. §5517 as applying ONLY to federal “employees”.

The above table is confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Downes v. Bidwell, which said on the subjects covered by the table:

“Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L. ed. 98, was an action of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S. 244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power 'to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises,' which 'shall be uniform throughout the United States,' inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States [described in the Constitution]. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States. The fact that art. 1 , 2, declares that 'representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their respective numbers' furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned, but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. 'The words used do not mean that direct taxes shall be imposed on states only which are represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers.' That art. 1, 9, 4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, 'and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective states. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census or enumeration referred to.' It was further held that the words of the 9th section did not 'in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the states. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them.'”

“There could be no doubt as to the correctness of this conclusion, so far, at least, as it applied to the District of Columbia. This District had been a part of the states of Maryland and [182 U.S. 244, 261] Virginia. It had been subject to the Constitution, and was a part of the United States[***]. The Constitution had attached to it irrevocably. There are steps which can never be taken backward. The tie that bound the states of Maryland and Virginia to the Constitution could not be dissolved, without at least the consent of the Federal and state governments to a formal separation. The mere cession of the District of Columbia to the Federal government relinquished the authority of the states, but it did not take it out of the United States or from under the aegis of the Constitution. Neither party had ever consented to that construction of the cession. If, before the District was set off, Congress had passed an unconstitutional act affecting its inhabitants, it would have been void. If done after the District was created, it would have been equally void; in other words, Congress could not do indirectly, by carving out the District, what it could not do directly. The District still remained a part of the United States, protected by the Constitution. Indeed, it would have been a fanciful construction to hold that territory which had been once a part of the United States ceased to be such by being ceded directly to the Federal government.”

[. . .]

“Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect [182 U.S. 244, 279] that the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct. Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government' (art. 4, 4), by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,' Congress did not hesitate, in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights.”
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

We will now compare these two jurisdictions in all major aspects:

Table 1:  Two Political Jurisdictions within our Country