SOURCE:  IRS Humbug, Frank Kowalik, pp. 23-24.

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When Congress passed section 213 of the Revenue Act of 1918, Federal judges were not willing to be made a party to the Federal Government's kickback schemes and avoided impairment of their employment contracts by using their judicial power [see Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) and Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1924)], expressed in opinions.  In the Miles v. Graham, at page 509, the Justices said of the 1918 Act:

...No judge is required to pay a definite percentage of his salary, but all are commanded to return, as a part of "gross income", the compensation received as such" from the United States.  From the "gross income" various deductions and credits are allowed, as for interest paid, contributions or gifts made, personal exemptions varying with family relations, etc., and upon the net result assessment is made.  The plain purpose was to require all judges to return their compensation as an item of "gross income," and to tax this as other salaries.  This is forbidden by the Constitution.

In this opinion, the Justices were describing the return of income, or kickback, and its enforcement with regard to existing employment agreements.  The statement made that this is forbidden by the Constitution was certainly correct, the Justices just neglected to say in positive, direct and clear language that it actually applied to all Federal government employees.  Treating all salaries in this manner, including that of the judges, is "forbidden by the Constitution."

The Justices again claimed only the exemption of their salaries from this statute because of special status during their term of office.  In stating the kickback is not a fixed amount, but an amount that depends upon the deductions and credits allowed, they confirmed the prediction of Justice Taney in his letter of 1863 that the compensation agreed to "may in the same way" [under the pretence of law] "be reduced from time to time at the pleasure of the legislature..."