The following pleading was prepared and submitted by one of our readers, John Searcy, who acted in pro per. This pleading was used to prosecute a judge for violation of rights. The case was dismissed by the presiding judge without justification.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
Northern Division
Batesville
, Arkansas
John E. Searcy III ) Case No.
Plaintiff, )
-vs- )
Charles E. Clawson Jr., individually and in ) Verified Complaint
his official capacity as Judge of the Chancery ) for Civil Rights Violations
Court of Van Buren County, Arkansas, Third )
Division, Twentieth Judicial District )
Defendant. )
)
Comes now the Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, for his verified Complaint for civil rights violations against the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., and states the following;
I. Jurisdiction and Venue
The Plaintiff claims federal jurisdiction pursuant to Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution, which extends federal jurisdiction to cases arising under the United States Constitution. The Plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, for violations of certain protections guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These violations were committed by the Defendant under color of law in his capacity as a Judge in the Chancery Court of Van Buren County, Arkansas, Third Division, Twentieth Judicial District. Also, this District Court obtains jurisdiction over this type of action via 28 U.S.C.§§ 1331 and 1343. Venue is appropriate in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C.§ 1391 (b), because Defendant Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr. resides here, and the events giving rise to this Complaint occurred here.
II. The Parties
1. The Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, is a natural person residing at Highway 65S, in Dennard, Arkansas.
2. The Defendant, Charles E. Clawson Jr., is a Circuit/Chancery Judge presiding in the Third Division of the Twentieth Judicial District of Arkansas. The Defendant resides in Conway, Arkansas.
III. Statement of the Facts
1. On June 17, 1996, Neill Reed and Emmett Davenport, of North Little Rock, Arkansas, purchased my property, which was seized by the Internal Revenue Service over an alleged income tax debt. The IRS District Director for the Arkansas-Oklahoma District conveyed the property to the above-named persons via quitclaim deed. The property at issue is located in Van Buren County, Arkansas, and is described as;
The Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (SE 1/4 SE 1/4)
Section Twenty-Five (25), Township Thirteen (13) North, Range
Fifteen (15) West, containing 40 acres, more or less.
The above-named persons subsequently conveyed, via quitclaim deed, an undivided one-third (1/3rd) interest in the property at issue to Hurley Whitwell Realty Co., Inc., also of North Little Rock, Arkansas.
2. On June 23, 1997, Neill Reed, Emmett Davenport, and Hurley Whitwell Realty Co., Inc., filed a "complaint of petition to quiet title, and to extinguish lien, claim or other mortgages" in the Chancery Court of Van Buren County, Arkansas, Third Division. This complaint contained allegations concerning my alleged income tax liability, and the alleged propriety of IRS collection procedures pursued against me. However, this complaint failed to establish the Chancery Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over me. Quitclaim deeds, allegedly executed by IRS officials, were attached to this complaint, however, these deeds were not supported by either affidavits or testimony as to their validity. Over the next two years, I filed numerous, detailed pleadings in this matter which established facts concerning the fraudulent nature of the petitioners' alleged claims to my property. During this same two-year period, the petitioners produced no evidence of law or fact, or affidavits, which would support their alleged claims, and empower the Chancery Court to act. In April of 1999, I received notice that this case (No. E97-198) would move to pretrial hearing on September 29, 1999, and a bench trial on October 26, 1999. On August 3, 1999, I filed a motion to dismiss and counterclaim. Through two years of pleadings, the petitioners had failed to meet the burden of proving their allegations and claims. I sought to prove, in my motion to dismiss, that by federal law and procedure, the petitioners could have no claim to my property. The petitioners failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, there was no issue for the Chancery Court to try, which required the immediate dismissal of the case.
3. At the pretrial hearing, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., stated that my Motion to Dismiss was "premature" and that this action would proceed to trial on October 26, 1999. I immediately filed a motion for clarification, in which I sought some explanation as to why my motion to dismiss and counterclaim was premature, in light of the fact that the petitioners had repeatedly failed to establish the validity of their alleged claims. I received no answer to this motion. At trial, the petitioners introduced irrelevent testimony and documentary evidence concerning their purchase of my property, and testimony concerning the chain of title of the property at issue, the fact of which I did not contest. When my opportunity to present my case arose, I sought to introduce evidence and testimony challenging the alleged claim that the petitioners had purchased from the IRS. I was prevented, by Judge Clawson, from properly conducting my defense. As I attempted to obtain testimony from a material witness regarding the factual nature of IRS claims and procedures pursued against me, Judge Clawson prohibited me from extracting testimony concerning the very basis of IRS claims made against me. I was not allowed to enter numerous documents into evidence, which would have established the fraudulent nature of IRS claims made against me. This can be contrasted with the wide latitude given, by Judge Clawson, to the attorney for the petitioners, wherein he was allowed to enter numerous, off-point documents into evidence. I was not allowed to interrogate a representative of one of the petitioners, Hurley Whitwell Realty Co., Inc.. All of this was done over my vehement objections. Judge Clawson then summarily decreed that the title to my property be quieted in the petitioners.
4. Judge Clawson's decree, filed on November 12, 1999, contained no finding of fact or conclusion of law, which would support his decree, nor was the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Chancery Court established and proven. In this decree, Judge Clawson claimed some “continuing jurisdiction” in Case No. E97-198, to grant the petitioners a writ of assistance, if necessary. I timely filed a motion for new trial and a motion to amend the judgment, in which I again reminded Judge Clawson of the federal law controlling in this matter, and I also brought forward Arkansas law which ran counter to the procedures pursued by the petitioners in Case No. E97-198. I also pointedly demanded that Judge Clawson submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to support his decision. Judge Clawson summarily denied these motions without comment. It is from Judge Clawson's behavior, from the initiation of Case No. E97-198 through post-trial motions, that I bring this civil rights complaint.
IV. Deprivation of Constitutional Rights and Privileges
(42 U.S.C.§ 1983)
Acts committed by Defendant Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 2 through 4
a.) The action of the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., wherein he allowed frivolous, vexatious litigation to proceed to trial, violated the constitutionally protected right to due process of law of the Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
b.) The action of the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., wherein he actively impeded the defense of the Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, at trial, and wherein he prohibited the Plaintiff from entering necessary documents into evidence, and wherein he prevented the Plaintiff from confronting one of his accusers, violated the Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected right to due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
c.) The actions of the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., wherein he failed to apply clear mandates of both federal and state law to the matter before him, and wherein he failed to afford the Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, a new trial, and wherein he failed to amend his judgment, after he received due notice of federal law and Arkansas law through post trial motions, violated the Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected right to due process of law, and to the equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
d.) The action of the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., wherein he deprived the Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, of his due process property interest, based upon a standard of proof too lax to make reasonable assurance of accurate fact finding, violated the Plaintiffs constitutionally protected right to due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
e.) Having no excuse as to knowledge of the law and fact involved in Case No. E97-198, the actions of the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., represent a clear case of bias against the Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, a violation of the Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected right to due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
V. Relief Sought
A. Monetary Damages
The Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, seeks monetary damages in the amount of $100,000.00, for constitutional violations committed by the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., completely outside of his jurisdictional authority.
B. Injunctive Relief
The Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, seeks a permanent injunction against the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., in regard to any action he may take to enforce his inequitable and unlawful decree of November 12, 1999 (i.e. Writ of Assistance, etc.). Such action would cause immediate and irreparable harm to the Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III.
C. Declaratory Relief
The Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, prays that this Court declare the behavior and acts of the Defendant, Judge Charles E. Clawson Jr., as delineated in this Complaint, to be inequitable, unlawful, and unconstitutional.
VI. Conclusion
The Plaintiff, John E. Searcy III, demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable. The Plaintiff further asks that he be awarded legal costs, and such other and further relief as this Court would deem just and proper.
Dated: Respectfully submitted,
John E. Searcy III,
Plaintiff, Pro Se
P.O. Box 127
Dennard, Arkansas 72629
Telephone No. 501-745-4876
State of Arkansas )
County of Van Buren)
VERIFICATION
I, John E. Searcy III, do hereby state under oath that the information contained in the
foregoing Complaint is correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Dated this day of , 2001.
John E. Searcy III
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public, this day of 2001.
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Notary Public
My
Commission Expires:
Seal: