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The Tax Court Scam, Form #05.039 (OFFSITE LINK)-SEDM

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Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1983)

“But when Congress creates a statutory right [a “privilege” in this case, such as a “trade or business”], it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.”
[Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1983)]

United States v. Jenkins 734 F.2d 1322, 1325-1326 (9th Cir. 1983)

The Constitution grants Congress the authority over federal enclaves, by providing that Congress has the power

to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the District of Columbia], and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for Erection of Forts ... and other needful Buildings.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The Congressional power under clause 17 is plenary. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 1676, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). When Congress legislates with respect to the District of Columbia and federal enclaves it acts as a state government with all the powers of a state government. See id.; Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263, 83 S.Ct. 426, 437, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963).

In Palmore, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973), the Supreme Court considered "whether a defendant charged with a felony under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure and salary under Art. III of the Constitution." Id. at 390, 93 S.Ct. at 1672. The Court held that under clause 17 Congress could provide that such a defendant be tried before a non-Article III judge. Id. at 390-91, 93 S.Ct. at 1672-73.

Because clause 17 does not distinguish between the District of Columbia and other federal enclaves, we find Palmore 1326 *1326 indistinguishable from the instant case and controlling. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. at 263, 83 S.Ct. at 437 ("The power of Congress over federal enclaves that come within the scope of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, is obviously the same as the power of Congress over the District of Columbia"). In addition, the reasoning of Palmore is fully applicable here. Under clause 17 Congress acts as a state government with total legislative, executive and judicial power. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397, 93 S.Ct. at 1676; see Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2873-74 (discussing the rationale of Palmore). The Constitution does not require that all federal criminal law be enforced before Article III courts. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 400, 93 S.Ct. at 1677; see Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382-83, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 1230-31, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977). Thus, the requirements of Article III are consistent with the establishment by Congress of non-Article III courts to enforce federal criminal laws in special geographic areas where, pursuant to clause 17, it functions as a state government. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 407-08, 93 S.Ct. at 1681-82; see Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S.Ct. at 2874 (emphasizing Congress's unique power under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, to legislate in certain geographic areas).

Under the rationale and holding of Palmore, we conclude that the Constitution does not require that a defendant charged with violation of a criminal statute enacted pursuant to Congress's power under clause 17 be tried before an Article III judge. Thus, Jenkins's Article III objection to his trial by magistrate fails.

[United States v. Jenkins 734 F.2d 1322, 1325-1326 (9th Cir. 1983)]

Tax Court Rule 13: Jurisdiction

RULE 13. JURISDICTION

(a) Notice of Deficiency or of Transferee or Fiduciary Liability Required: Except in actions for declaratory judgment, for disclosure, for readjustment or adjustment of partnership items, for administrative costs, or for review of failure to abate interest (see Titles XXI, XXII, XXIV, XXVI, and XXVII), the jurisdiction of the Court depends (1) in a case commenced in the Court by a taxpayer, upon the issuance by the Commissioner of a notice of deficiency in income, gift, or estate tax or, in the taxes under Code chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44 (relating to the excise taxes on certain organizations and persons dealing with them), or in the tax under Code chapter 45 (relating to the windfall profit tax), or in any other taxes which are the subject of the issuance of a notice of deficiency by the Commissioner; and
(2) in a case commenced in the Court by a transferee or fiduciary, upon the issuance by the Commissioner of a notice of liability to the transferee or fiduciary. See Code secs. 6212, 6213, and 6901.

(b) Declaratory Judgment, Disclosure, Partnership, Administrative Costs, or Review of Failure To Abate Interest Actions: For the jurisdictional requirements in an action for declaratory judgment, for disclosure, for readjustment or adjustment of partnership items, for administrative costs, or for review of failure to abate interest, see Rules
210(c), 220(c), 240(c), 270(c), and 280(b).

(c) Timely Petition Required: In all cases, the jurisdiction of the Court also depends on the timely filing of a petition. See Code sections 6213, 7502; with respect to declaratory judgment actions, see Code sections 7428, 7476, and 7478; with respect to disclosure actions, see Code sections 6110; with respect to partnership actions, see Code sections 6226 and 6228; and with respect to review of failure to abate interest actions, see Code section 6404(h).
(d) Contempt of Court: Contempt of Court may be punished by fine or imprisonment within the scope of Code section 7456(c).
(e) Bankruptcy and Receivership: With respect to the filing of a petition or the continuation of proceedings in this Court after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, see 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) and Code section 6213(f)(1). With respect to the filing of a petition in this Court after the appointment of a receiver in a receivership proceeding, see Code section 6871(c)(2).

Tax Court Background:

The Feds cleverly renamed an administrative dept within the IRS to a “Tax Court.” Now after you are fried in this bogus “court,” they can claim you have received the final step of your due-process rights, which includes a hearing before an independent tribunal. Of course, it is laughable to think of Tax Court as independent, esp. since it formerly was just another department in the IRS agency. The only people who win in this “court” are those who live a total cash existence, having no accounts, W-4’s or 1099’s.

Justice Scalia delivers a scathing dissenting opinion in the case of Freytag vs. Commissioner (1991) on this Tax Court subject.

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=501&invol=868

The Tax Court is indistinguishable from my hypothetical Social Security Court. It reviews determinations by Executive Branch officials (the Internal Revenue Service) that this much or that much tax is owed - a classic executive function. For 18 years its predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals, did the very same thing, see H. Dubroff, The United States Tax Court 47-175 (1979), and no one suggested that body exercised “the judicial power.”

We held just the opposite:

The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an executive or administrative board, upon the decision of which the parties are given an opportunity to base a petition for review to the courts after the administrative inquiry of the Board has been had and decided.” Old [501 U.S. 868, 912] Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929) (Taft, C.J.).

Though renamed “the Tax Court of the United States” in 1942, it remained “an independent agency in the Executive Branch,” 26 U.S.C. 1100 (1952 ed.), and continued to perform the same function