CITES BY TOPIC:  taxpayer


One need not argue that one is not a "taxpayer"--in fact this and the strawman etc. is a listed "frivolous position". It is an IRRELEVANT argument/position because they are not dealing with "you" in the first place---the STRAWMAN with a SSN is the "taxpayer". The living being has little choice but to accept this STRAWMAN with SSN "taxpayer" structure for the purposes of having a bank account and a job, and for dealing with the IRS.

The taxpayer and SSN are used under undue influence of the payer, if not outright threat duress or coercion. Typically one is not offered the option of NOT furnishing SSN or NOT having this STRAWMAN involved in the business. You need the STRAWMAN just to have a place to deposit your paycheck. Employers used to pay their workers in cash. This STRAWMAN crap was designed by the bank-sters. Very few employers pay their workers in cash today. This whole SCAM could be avoided with an employer who pays in cash for work performed and does not involved the STRAWMAN or the SSN in the transacted business.

The coerced use of the "taxpayer" structure is nothing more than an unwelcome infringement on private business by an ignorant/presumptuous EMPLOYER or PAYER, setting unfair conditions that most payees are not in any position to refuse.

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)14:


The term ''taxpayer'' means any person subject to any internal revenue tax.

PDF Your Rights as a Nontaxpayer-IRS pamphlet (OFFSITE LINK)

PDF Your Rights as a Taxpayer-IRS pamphlet (OFFSITE LINK)

PDF Who are "taxpayers" and who needs a "Taxpayer Identification Number"? (OFFSITE LINK)

"Taxpayer" v. "Nontaxpayer": Which one are you?--excellent article

26 U.S.C. §1313:  Definitions

(b) Taxpayer

Notwithstanding section 7701(a)(14), the term ''taxpayer'' means any person subject to a tax under the applicable revenue law.

26 U.S.C. §6651 Notes:

''(a) Prohibition. - The officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service - ''(1) shall not designate taxpayers as illegal tax protesters (or any similar designation); and ''(2) in the case of any such designation made on or before the date of the enactment of this Act (July 22, 1998) - ''(A) shall remove such designation from the individual master file; and ''(B) shall disregard any such designation not located in the individual master file. ''(b) Designation of Nonfilers Allowed. - An officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service may designate any appropriate taxpayer as a nonfiler, but shall remove such designation once the taxpayer has filed income tax returns for 2 consecutive taxable years and paid all taxes shown on such returns. ''(c) Effective Date. - The provisions of this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act (July 22, 1998), except that the removal of any designation under subsection (a)(2)(A) shall not be required to begin before January 1, 1999.'

[26 U.S.C. §6651 Notes]

State ex rel. Bolens v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456 (1912)

These propositions, if correct, and we believe they are, demonstrate very clearly that there can be no such thing as a taxpayer's action (as that action is known in the circuit courts) brought in the supreme court within the original jurisdiction. The philosophy of the taxpayer's action in the circuit court is that the taxpayer is a member [***70]  of a municipal corporation, who, by virtue of his contributions to the funds of the municipality, has an interest in its funds and property of the same general quality as the interest of a stockholder in the funds of a business corporation, and hence when corporate officers are about to illegally use or squander its funds or property he may appeal to a court of equity on behalf of himself  [*501]  and his fellow stockholders (i. e. taxpayers) to conserve and protect the corporate interests and property from spoliation by its own officers.

The taxpayer himself is the actual party to the litigation, and represents not the whole public, nor the state, nor even all the inhabitants of his municipality, but a comparatively limited class, namely, the citizens who pay taxes. In short, he sues for a class.

No such thing is known in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this court. In actions brought within that jurisdiction the state is the plaintiff and sues to vindicate the rights of the whole people.

The Bolens case cannot, therefore, be held to come within the original jurisdiction of this court, if it be a mere taxpayer's action.

This conclusion, however, by no means [***71]  leads to the result that the original jurisdiction may not properly be used at the instance and upon the relation of a private individual to stay by appropriate writ the expenditure of the state's funds for purposes expressly or by necessary implication forbidden by the constitution. Such use of funds by a state officer is certainly as much a breach of duty and an injury to the state as the refusal to pay out funds which have been lawfully appropriated, or the failure to obey the provisions of general election laws, but in such case the action is the action of the state as truly as if brought by the attorney general, not the action of the tax-paying relator.

If this be true, we can see no logical escape from the conclusion that, where state officials are about to spend the state's money in executing an unconstitutional law, the state may prevent the threatened misapplication of its funds by the same means. This seems to us the only logical basis upon which the case of State ex rel. Raymer v. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W. 1133, can rest.

But it must be recognized that such a power is extreme.  [*502]  To arrest the hand of a state officer as he is about to carry [***72]  out the command of the legislature is indeed a serious step, one not to be taken summarily or without profound consideration. As the power is great, it should be exercised with a wisdom and discretion commensurate with its greatness. No trivial grounds should impel the court to permit its exercise. This court will certainly not feel obliged in every case where there is a threatened expenditure of state funds under a law of doubtful constitutionality to allow an action of this nature to be brought in the name of the state, but will feel entirely free to leave the question of constitutionality to be settled as it may arise in ordinary litigation. The defiance of express or implied constitutional commands may be so flagrant and patent as to make the exercise of this great power appear justifiable, if not absolutely necessary, and in such case it will be exercised courageously. This court will, however, judge of the exigency in each case as it arises, and will endeavor to guard the great power from being used in trifling cases or to accomplish ulterior purposes.

In the present case we go no further than to state these general principles. We do not find it necessary to decide whether the [***73]  alleged illegal expenditure of funds alone presents a case of such exigency as to justify the use of the original jurisdiction of this court to prevent such expenditure. There are other and more important features in the present case which in our judgment present a proper case for the exercise of the original jurisdiction.

The law which is attacked here, if it be valid, makes a radical change in the present system of taxation over the whole state.

[. . .]

After the uniform holdings here, through many important adjudications, that public money in the public treasury, is a subject of trust for all the people for public purposes and dis-bursable, only, pursuant to valid legislation, and that every taxpayer is a cestui que trust having sufficient interest in preventing abuse of the trust to be .recognized in the field of this court’s prerogative jurisdiction as a relator in proceedings to set sovereign authority in motion by action in the name of *543the state for prevention or redress/ any suggestions to tbe contrary, however well supported as an original proposition, might well have but a passing notice. The same is true of the question of whether an action against a state officer to prevent disbursement of public money in the enforcement of an invalid act of the legislature is against the state in any proper sense. It has been held ovqr and over again, in terms or in effect, that such an action is to be regarded as against the person in his individual, not his official capacity, and so not against the state,' — so held very recently most significantly by the supreme court of the United States. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 12328 Sup. Ct. 441, followed here in Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193116 N. W. 885.

[State ex rel. Bolens v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456 (1912)]

United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995)

"From the statute's use of the term "taxpayer," rather than "person who paid the tax," the Government concludes that only a "taxpayer" may file for administrative relief under § 7422, and thereafter pursue a refund  [**1617]  action under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)6 Then, to show that Williams is not  [*534]  a "taxpayer," the Government relies on HN5 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a)(14), which defines "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." According to the Government, a party who pays a tax is not "subject to" it unless she is the one assessed.

LEdHN[3B] [3B]

 [****15]  The Government's argument fails at both statutory junctures. First, the word "taxpayer" in § 6511(a) -- the provision governing administrative claims -- cannot bear the weight the Government puts on it. This provision's plain terms provide only a deadline for filing for administrative relief, 7 not a limit on who may file. To read the term "taxpayer" as implicitly limiting administrative relief to the party assessed is inconsistent with other provisions of the refund scheme, which expressly contemplate refunds to parties other than the one assessed. Thus, in authorizing the Secretary to award a credit or refund "in the case of any overpayment," 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a) describes the recipient not as the "taxpayer," but as "the person who made the overpayment." Similarly, in providing for credits and refunds for sales taxes and taxes on tobacco and alcohol, 26 U.S.C. § 6416(a) and 26 U.S.C. § 6419(a) describe the recipient as "the person who paid the tax."

 [*535]  [****16]  LEdHN[1D] [1D]Further, even if, as the Government contends, only "taxpayers" could seek administrative relief under § 6511, the Government's claim that Williams is not at this point a "taxpayer" is unpersuasive. Section 7701(a)(14), defining "taxpayer," informs us that "when used in [the Internal Revenue Code], where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, . . . the term 'taxpayer' means any person subject to  [***617]  any internal revenue tax." 8 That definition does not exclude Williams. The Government reads the definition as if it said "any person who is assessed any internal revenue tax," but these are not Congress' words. The general phrase "subject to" is broader than the specific phrase "assessed" and, in the tax collection context before us, we think it is broad enough to include Williams. In placing a lien on her home and then accepting her tax payment under protest, the Government surely subjected Williams to a tax, even though she was not the assessed party.

 [****17]  In support of its reading of "taxpayer," the Government cites our observation in Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 52, 84 L. Ed. 1067, 60 S. Ct. 800 (1940), that "the taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself." The Government takes this language out of context. We were not interpreting the term "taxpayer" in the Internal Revenue Code, but deciding whether a state tax scheme was consistent with federal law. In particular, we were determining whether Colorado had imposed its service tax on a bank's customers (which was consistent with federal law) or on the bank itself (which was not). Though the bank collected and paid the tax, its incidence fell on the customers. Favoring substance over form, we said: "The person liable for the tax [the bank], primarily, cannot always be said to be the real taxpayer.  [*536]  The taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for  [**1618]  the tax itself." Ibid. As a result, we determined that the tax had been imposed on the customers rather than the bank. If Colorado Nat. Bank is relevant at all, it shows our preference for commonsense inquiries over formalism -- a preference that works against the Government's technical argument  [****18]  in this case.


LEdHN[1E] [1E]As we have just developed, HN8 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) clearly allows one from whom taxes are erroneously or illegally collected to sue for a refund of those taxes. And 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a), with similar clarity, authorizes the Secretary to pay out a refund to "the person who made the overpayment." The Government's strained reading of § 1346(a)(1), we note, would leave people in Williams' position without a remedy. See supra, at 529, n. 1This consequence reinforces our conclusion that Congress did not intend refund actions under § 1346(a)(1) to be unavailable to persons situated as Lori Williams is. Though the Government points to three other remedies, none was realistically open to Williams. Nor would any of the vaunted remedies be available to others in her situation. See, e. g., Martin v. United States, 895 F.2d 992 (CA4 1990)Barris v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 696 (WD Pa. 1994)Brodey v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 44 (Mass. 1991) (all ordering refunds of amounts erroneously  [****19]  collected to the people who paid those amounts).

If the Government has not levied on property -- as it has not levied on Williams' home -- the owner cannot challenge such a levy under 26 U.S.C. § 7426. Nor would an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1) to quiet title  [***618]  afford meaningful relief to someone in Williams' position. The first lien on her property, for nearly $ 15,000, was filed just six months before the closing; and liens in larger sum -- over $ 26,000, out of $ 41,937 -- were filed only 11 days before the closing. (Williams did not receive actual notice of any of the liens until barely a week before the closing.) She simply did not have  [*537]  time to bring a quiet title action. She urgently sought to sell the property, but a sale would have been difficult before a final judgment in such litigation, which could have been protracted. In contrast, a refund suit would allow her to sell the property and simultaneously pay off the lien, leaving her free to litigate with the Government without tying up her real property, whose worth far exceeded the value of the Government's liens.

Nor may Williams and persons similarly  [****20]  situated rely on § 6325(b)(3) for such an arrangement. This provision permits the Government to discharge a lien on property if the owner sets aside a fund that becomes subject to a new lien; the parties then can litigate the propriety of the new lien after the property is sold. However, § 6325(b)(3) and its implementing regulation render this remedy doubtful indeed, for it is available only at the Government's discretion. See § 6325(b)(3) ("The Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge [of a federal tax lien] of any part of the property subject to the lien if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to an agreement with the Secretary, the proceeds of such sale are to be held, as a fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as such liens and claims had with respect to the discharged property.") (emphasis added); 26 CFR § 301.6325-1(b)(3) (1994) ("A district director [of the Internal Revenue Service] may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a [tax lien] if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to a written agreement with the district  [****21]  director, the proceeds of the sale are held, as a fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as the lien or claim had with respect to the discharged property.") (emphasis added).

LEdHN[3C] [3C]So far as the record shows, the Government did not afford Williams an opportunity to substitute a fund pursuant to  [*538]  § 6325(b)(3)9 This omission is not surprising,  [**1619]  for on the Government's theory of who may sue under § 1346(a)(1), the Government had scant incentive to agree to such an arrangement with people caught in Williams' bind. Under § 6325(b)(3), the Government does not receive cash, but another lien (albeit one on a fund). In contrast, if the Government resists a § 6325(b)(3) agreement, it is likely to get cash immediately: property owners eager to remove a tax lien will have to pay, as did Williams. If they may not sue under § 1346(a)(1), their payment is nonrefundable. An agreement pursuant to § 6325(b)(3) thus dependent on the district director's grace cannot sensibly be described as available to Williams.

LEdHN[3D] [3D]

 [****22]   [***619]  LEdHN[4] [4]We do not agree with the Government that, if § 1346(a)(1) authorizes some third party suits, the levy, quiet title, and separate-fund remedies become superfluous. Section 1346(a)(1) is a postdeprivation remedy, available only if the taxpayer has paid the Government in full. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 4 L. Ed. 2d 623, 80 S. Ct. 630 (1960). The other remedies offer predeprivation relief. 
The levy provision in 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a)(1) is available "without regard to whether such property has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary." Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 2410 allows a property owner to have a lien discharged without ever paying the tax. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6325(b)(3), the lien on the property is removed in exchange for a new lien, rather than a cash payment.


Finally, the Government urges that allowing Williams to sue will violate the principle that parties may not challenge  [*539]  the tax liabilities of others. According to the Government, undermining this principle will lead to widespread abuse: In particular, parties will volunteer to pay the tax liabilities  [****23]  of others, only to seek a refund once the Government has ceased collecting from the real taxpayer.

LEdHN[1F] [1F]Although parties generally may not challenge the tax liabilities of others, this rule is not unyielding. A taxpayer's fiduciary may litigate the taxpayer's liability, even though the fiduciary is not herself liable. See 26 CFR § 301.6903-1(a) (1994) (the fiduciary must "assume the powers, rights, duties, and privileges of the taxpayer with respect to the taxes imposed by the Code"); ibid. ("The amount of the tax or liability is ordinarily not collectible from the personal estate of the fiduciary but is collectible from the estate of the taxpayer . . . ."); 15 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 58.08 (1994) (refund claims for decedents filed by executor, administrator, or other fiduciary of estate). Similarly, certain transferees may litigate the tax liabilities of the transferor; if the transfer qualifies as a fraudulent conveyance under state law, the Code treats the transferee as the taxpayer, see 26 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(1)(A); 5 J. Rabkin & M. Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 73.10, pp. 73-82 to 73-87 (1992), so the  [****24]  transferee may contest the transferor's liability either in tax court, see 14 Mertens, supra, § 53.50, or in a refund suit under § 1346(a)(1)See id., § 53.55. Furthermore, the Court has allowed a refund action by parties who were not assessed, albeit under a different statute. See Stahmann v. Vidal, 305 U.S. 61, 83 L. Ed. 41, 59 S. Ct. 41 (1938) (cotton producers could bring a refund action for a federal cotton ginning tax if they had paid the tax, even though the tax was assessed against ginners rather than producers).

LEdHN[1G] [1G]LEdHN[5A] [5A]The burden on the principle that a party may not challenge the tax liability of another is mitigated, moreover, because Williams' main challenge is to the existence of a lien against her property, rather than to the underlying assessment on  [*540]  her husband. 
That is, her primary claim is not that her husband never  [***620]  owed the tax 10 -- a matter  [**1620]  that, had she not paid these taxes herself under the duress of a lien, would not normally be her concern. Rather, she asserts that the Government has attached a lien on the wrong property, because the house belongs to her rather than to him -- a scenario which leaves her "subject to" the tax in a meaningful and  [****25]  immediate way.

LEdHN[5B] [5B]

LEdHN[1H] [1H]We do not find disarming the Government's forecast that allowing Williams to sue will lead to rampant abuse. The Government's posited scenario seems  [****26]  implausible; it is not clear what incentive a volunteer has to pay someone else's taxes as a way to help that person evade them. Nor does the Government report that such schemes are commonplace among the millions of taxpayers in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, Circuits that permit persons in Williams' position to bring refund suits. Furthermore, our holding does not authorize the host of third party challenges the Government fears. Williams paid under protest, solely to gain release of the Government's lien on her property -- a lien she attacked as erroneously maintained. We do not decide the circumstances, if any, under which a party who volunteers to pay a tax assessed against someone else may seek a refund under § 1346(a).

 [*541]  * * *

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is


[United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995)]

[EDITORIAL: "Taxpayer" is anyone who files for refund of either overpaid taxes OR taxes taken from those who are NOT assessed any tax and for which there was an overpayment.]

PDFLong v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236 (1922)

"The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress does not assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws..."

[Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236 (1922)]

Rothkamm v. United States, 802 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 2015)

“Following Williams, Congress did not revise § 7701(a)(14), so the Supreme Court’s interpretation stands. Thus, under § 7701(a)(14), the word “taxpayer” means not only the person against whom a tax is assessed (here, Rothkamm’s husband) but also the person who actually pays the tax (here, Rothkamm herself). Pursuant to § 7701(a), that definition applies throughout Title 26 “where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof.””

[Rothkamm v. United States, 802 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 2015)]

Brodey v. U.S., 788 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D. Mass. 1991)

“I cannot find any support for the government’s narrow reading of the term “taxpayer” from the statutory definition in § 7701(a)(14) or elsewhere in the Code. “The literal language of the pertinent statutes does not help the court, the `taxpayer’ — `non-taxpayer’ dichotomy not being found therein.” Economy Plumbing Heating Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 585, 596, 200 Ct.Cl. 31 (1972) (dissenting opinion). Nor has the government advanced any convincing reasons why it should not refund amounts erroneously paid to the people who paid them. The government should be setting an example of fair dealing in regard to taxes. In my opinion for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) Ms. Brodey was a “taxpayer” because she reasonably believed that she was paying a tax for which she was liable. Accordingly she is entitled to sue for a refund.”

[Brodey v. U.S., 788 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D. Mass. 1991)]

[EDITORIAL: "Taxpayer" includes anyone who erroneously paid a tax but for whom no tax was lawfully assessed,]

Sandrow v. U.S., 832 F. Supp. 918, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1993)

The government relies on cases which hold that § 1346(a)(1) applies only to "taxpayers" who overpay their own taxes, and thus a person who pays taxes owed by another is effectively a volunteer or donor without standing to seek a refund. 3 The typical plaintiff in these cases held to lack standing under this theory is a third party who comprehends that he is not liable for a tax but decides to satisfy the obligation of another to achieve some net economic benefit, or someone who is not even directly involved in the payment transaction. Seee.g.Lac Courte Oreilles Chippewa Indians v. U.S., 845 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1988) (purchaser wishing to retain trucks advances funds to vendor to [**7]  pay federal excise tax owed by manufacturer); Snodgrass v. U.S., 834 F.2d 537 (5th cir. 1987) (wife seeks refund of tax owed and paid by husband from common funds to release lien so joint property could be sold -- distinguishing her from one who is "threatened … with personal liability" or "seizure of property"); Busse v. U.S., 542 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff pays tax owed by former spouse to remove lien on property awarded her by divorce court -- distinguishing her from refund claimant "believing himself to be at least potentially liable" for tax); First National Bank of Emlenton v. U.S., 265 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1959) (bank sues for proceeds of tax sale by IRS of third party's property on which bank held mortgage). 4

In cases highly analogous to the instant one [**8]  courts have held that similarly situated plaintiffs had standing to maintain refund actions. To read a statute literally is not to construe it broadly. Section 1346(a)(1) allows one from whom taxes are erroneously collected to sue for a refund. Martin v. U.S., 895 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1990)Taxes collected from a person who does not owe them are "erroneously collected." Id. In Martin the plaintiff was held to have standing to sue to recover a payment for business taxes owed by and assessed against her former spouse to secure clear title to property she acquired in a divorce settlement.

In David v. U.S., 551 F. Supp. 850 (C.D. Cal. 1982) the plaintiff sued for a refund of sums he paid for FICA taxes assessed against a corporation of which he was an officer and majority shareholder. Plaintiff made these payments because he erroneously "assumed that since he was an officer of the corporation he would be personally liable." The government argued that plaintiff lacked standing because he was not a taxpayer since he was not assessed or actually liable for these taxes. The Court found that plaintiff was not a volunteer [**9]  or donor when he paid taxes "he was under the impression that he was personally liable for" and held that since he was not actually liable, in accepting his payment the IRS "wrongfully collected the taxes." Id. at 853-54.

In Brodey v. U.S., 788 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1991) a corporate officer and shareholder sued for a refund of her payment of taxes assessed against the corporation for which "she erroneously assumed that she was personally liable." The Court held that she had standing to do so under § 1346(a)(1)The Court determined that a plaintiff enjoys the status of a "taxpayer" for purposes of § 1346(a)(1) if: (1) he believed the taxes he was paying were taxes he owed personally; (2) his belief in his personal liability was reasonable under all the circumstances; and, (3) he paid the taxes with no intention that the payment be a donation for the benefit of a third party. Id. at 57See also Schoenherr v. U.S., 566 F. Supp. 1365, 1367 (E.D. Wisc. 1983) (applying reasonable belief test to plaintiff who paid taxes assessed against corporation of which he was [**10]  receiver  [*921]  for which he erroneously believed he was personally responsible). 5

The court appreciates that it is the mission of the IRS to obtain and retain for the treasury every dollar possible. Ultimately, however, the touchstone for the dealings of the government with our citizens should be fairness and reasonableness. When the government seeks to collect delinquent corporate taxes from someone it believes or assumes may be liable as a "responsible person" therefor, it is not fair or reasonable for the government to accept payment and thereafter declare [**11]  that the payor was not a responsible person but a non-taxpayer volunteer without standing to seek a refund. Someone to whom the IRS directs rather intimidating, if standard, demand letters as "a person required to collect, account for and pay" a referenced tax should not be required to guess at his peril whether or not he may ultimately be determined not to be responsible for such payment.

[Sandrow v. U.S., 832 F.Supp. 918, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1993)]

[EDITORIAL: "Taxpayer" includes anyone who erroneously paid a tax but for whom no tax was lawfully assessed,]

PDF Botta v. Scanlon, 288 F.2d. 504, 508 (1961)

"A reasonable construction of the taxing statutes does not include vesting any tax official with absolute power of assessment against individuals not specified in the statutes as a person liable for the tax without an opportunity for judicial review of this status before the appellation of 'taxpayer' is bestowed upon them and their property is seized..."

[Botta v. Scanlon, 288 F.2d. 504, 508 (1961)]

PDF Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U.S., 470 F.2d. 585 (1972)

“Revenue Laws relate to taxpayers [officers, employees, and elected officials of the Federal Government] and not to non-taxpayers [American Citizens/American Nationals not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government].  The latter are without their scope.  No procedures are prescribed for non-taxpayers and no attempt is made to annul any of their Rights or Remedies in due course of law.”

[Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U.S., 470 F.2d. 585 (1972)]

Great IRS Hoax, section 5.3.1: "Taxpayer" v. "Nontaxpayer"

C.I.R. v. Trustees of L. Inv. Ass'n, 100 F.2d. 18 (1939):

"And by statutory definition, 'taxpayer' includes any person, trust or estate subject to a tax imposed by the revenue act.  ...Since the statutory definition of 'taxpayer' is exclusive, the federal courts do not have the power to create nonstatutory taxpayers for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Revenue Acts..."

[C.I.R. v. Trustees of L. Inv. Ass'n, 100 F.2d. 18 (1939)]

Rowen v. U.S., 05-3766MMC. (N.D.Cal. 11/02/2005)

Specifically, Rowen seeks a declaratory judgment against the United States of America with respect to "whether or not the plaintiff is a taxpayer pursuant to, and/or under 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14)." (See Compl. at 2.) This Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment "with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986," a code section that is not at issue in the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201; see also Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 536-537 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of claim for declaratory relief under §2201 where claim concerned question of tax liability). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the instant action is hereby DISMISSED.

[Rowen v. U.S., 05-3766MMC. (N.D.Cal. 11/02/2005)]

Passeri v. State, B271821, at *9, (2017 Cal. Ct. App. Unpublished 7823, Nov. 15, 2017)

It is a long established, constitutionally enshrined, and virtually impregnable rule that an unwilling taxpayer must pay any disputed tax before filing suit to challenge its validity. The rule is firmly rooted in public policy, and may not be circumvented by creative litigation ostensibly designed for other purposes. Here, Micaela Passeri sued the State Board of Equalization purportedly to vindicate her rights under the Harris-Katz California Taxpayers' Bill of Rights. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 7080 et seq. (hereafter Taxpayers' Bill of Rights).)1 However, because the only grievance of which she complains is subjection to a tax she has not paid and claims she does not owe, the trial court concluded the lawsuit was intended to circumvent the bar against prepayment tax disputes. It therefore sustained the state's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. [*2]  We affirm.

[. . .]

“Passeri argues the bar against a prepayment tax dispute does not apply because she does not dispute the tax itself, merely her status as the taxpayer, and does not seek to enjoin collection of the tax as against Maison Saint Marie, the true taxpayer. The argument is without merit. A "tax" is a vectored obligation, an "enforced proportional contribution[] from persons and property." (Black's Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014).) A tax thus has two components—the amount charged and the person against whom it is charged, and its validity depends both on a correct amount and a proper assessee. To contest either is to dispute the validity of the "tax." Here, by contending Maison Saint Marie, not she, is the proper retailer, Passeri disputes the validity of the tax itself.”

[Passeri v. State, B271821, at *9, (2017 Cal. Ct. App. Unpublished 7823, Nov. 15, 2017)]


1. Courts cannot enforce "public policy" against the public. They can only enforce statutes and the constitution against those domiciled or physically present in or voluntarily and intentionally doing business withinh within their exclusive legislative jurisdiction.

2. If courts ARE enforcing public policy, then this is an admission that they are not constitutional courts in the Judicial branch, but franchise courts acting in a purely political capacity in the Executive Branch against public officers ONLY, and in an Article I or Article IV capacity, just like Tax Court.

3. If they enforce "public policy" in a political capacity against those not lawfully WITHIN the executive branch, then they are criminally:

3.1 Impersonating a public officer by treating you as one.
3.2 Simulating legal process against a nonresident.
3.3 Soliciting a bribe from the defendant disguised as a "tax" to treat them AS IF they are a public officer. 18 U.S.C. §210
3.4 Engaging in a conspiracy to get you to illegally impersonate an executive branch officer or employee.
3.5 Engaging in criminal identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §912 and 4 .U.S.C. §72.

In the above case, if the Plaintiff invoked the benefit of a statute, then she was in receipt of government rights and property, and thereby became the property subject of "public policy", which in this case was the entire title of statutes she quoted from. See:

Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and not Private Persons, Form #05.037]

Albert E and Henrietta R. Radinsky v. U.S., 622 F.Supp. 412 (1984)

From Albert E. and Henrietta R. Radinsky, Plaintiffs v. United States of America, Defendant U.S. District Court, Dist. Colo., No. 84-M-2324, 8/14/85, 622 FSupp 412

The IRS insists that only “taxpayers” have recourse against the United States under 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), and that the plaintiffs are not “taxpayers” because no tax has been assessed. “The United States agrees that taxpayers do have recourse against the United States under 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1). But in this case, the plaintiffs are not taxpayers.” (Defendant’s motion for summary judgment at 2). The government is wrong on both counts. First, the statute provides federal district court jurisdiction for a civil action to recover any tax, penalty, or sum alleged to have been wrongfully collected under the internal revenue laws. There is no requirement that the plaintiffs be taxpayers challenging some assessment.

The government’s interpretation of the statute would make “sum” superfluous. In the course of holding that §1346(a)(1) requires full payment of an assessment before an income tax refund suit can be maintained in federal district court, the Supreme Court has noted:

". . . We believe that the statute more readily lends itself to the disjunctive reading which is suggested by the connective “or.” That is, “any sum,” instead of being related to “any internal-revenue tax” and “any penalty,” may refer to amounts which are neither taxes nor penalties. Under this interpretation, the function of the phrase is to permit suit for recovery of items which might not be designated as either “taxes” or “penalties” by Congress or the Courts. Flora v. United States [60-1 ustc ¶9347 ], 362 U.S. 145, 149 (1960).

Accepting the argument that the amount in question is not a tax or penalty, this action is clearly maintainable to recover a “sum.” Therefore plaintiffs who are not “taxpayers” as defined by the United States in this action, i.e. persons who are challenging an assessment, can indeed use §1346(a)(1). The plaintiffs have standing to bring this action since they were the target of the IRS’s collection efforts. Second, it is too late for the government to argue that the plaintiffs are not taxpayers. Everything in the record indicates that the IRS attempted to collect, and succeeded in collecting, the disputed money as a “tax.” The February 1984 letter received by the Radinskys, attached as exhibit “E” to the complaint, after reciting the plaintiffs’ “Taxpayer identification number” stated (emphasis added) Dear Taxpayer We have previously written to you about the Federal tax shown below. It is overdue and you should pay the total amount due immediately. . . .

We have enclosed a copy of Publication 568A, The Collection Process (Income Tax Accounts), which provides information about our collection procedures and your rights in relation to them. Your attention is specifically directed to our Enforced Collection policy on page 2.

Additionally, Exhibit D attached to the complaint is a “STATEMENT OF ADJUSTMENT TO YOUR ACCOUNT AND BILL FOR TAX DUE”. The statement noted that the plaintiffs had no balance due before the adjustment. After the “adjustment” they owed $5,444.00 for an “erroneous credit” and $2,380.20 interest. The IRS always treated this matter as the recovery of tax. The United States cannot argue that because an assessment was erroneous, or an assessment was never made, a person from whom the IRS has collected money cannot employ §1346(a)(1) for the semantic reason that only individuals correctly assessed can be “taxpayers.”

[Albert E and Henrietta R. Radinsky v. U.S., 622 F.Supp. 412 (1984)]

United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d. 934 (1986)


"Studley contends that she is not a "taxpayer" because she is an absolute, freeborn and natural individual. This argument is frivolous. An individual is a "person" under the Internal Revenue Code and thus subject to 26 U.S.C. § 7203. United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.1981).[3]"


[3] We note that this argument has been consistently and thoroughly rejected by every branch of the government for decades. Indeed advancement of such utterly meritless arguments is now the basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise them.

[United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d. 934 (1986)]
[NOTE: They didn't prove she was a statutory "indivdiual", meaning an ALIEN under 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(3), and she wasn't]