|CITES BY TOPIC: due process|
Requirement for Due Process of Law, Form #05.045 (OFFSITE LINK)-SEDM
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 500:
Due Process Under the Federal Constitution, Lucius McGehee (OFFSITE LINK)
Tax Deposition Questions and evidence (derived from We The People Questions) related to Due Process of Law:
"This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property [418 U.S. 539, 558] interests. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The requirement for some kind of a hearing applies to the taking of private property, Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914), the revocation of licenses, In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), the operation of state dispute-settlement mechanisms, when one person seeks to take property from another, or to government-created jobs held, absent "cause" for termination, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 171 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 206 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 -654 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)."
Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996
Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process:
Authorities on Failure of Government Agencies to follow their own internal procedures:
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)
The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This language "comes to us on faded parchment," California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), with a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture. There are indications that a right of confrontation existed under Roman law. The Roman Governor Festus, discussing the proper treatment of his prisoner, Paul, stated: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the [487 U.S. 1012, 1016] charges." Acts 25:16. It has been argued that a form of the right of confrontation was recognized in England well before the right to jury trial. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. Pub. L. 381, 384-387 (1959).
Most of this Court's encounters with the Confrontation Clause have involved either the admissibility of out-of-court statements, see, e. g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), or restrictions on the scope of cross-examination, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). Cf. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 -19 (1985) (per curiam) (noting these two categories and finding neither applicable). The reason for that is not, as the State suggests, that these elements are the essence of the Clause's protection - but rather, quite to the contrary, that there is at least some room for doubt (and hence litigation) as to the extent to which the Clause includes those elements, whereas, as Justice Harlan put it, "[s]imply as a matter of English" it confers at least "a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial." California v. Green, supra, at 175. Simply as a matter of Latin as well, since the word "confront" ultimately derives from the prefix "con-" (from "contra" meaning "against" or "opposed") and the noun "frons" (forehead). Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of confrontation when he had Richard the Second say: "Then call them to our presence - face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak . . . ." Richard II, Act 1, sc. 1.
We have never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 748 , 749-750 (1987) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For example, in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899), which concerned the admissibility of prior convictions of codefendants to prove an element of the offense [487 U.S. 1012, 1017] of receiving stolen Government property, we described the operation of the Clause as follows: "[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved against an accused . . . except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases." Similarly, in Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911), we described a provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights as substantially the same as the Sixth Amendment, and proceeded to interpret it as intended "to secure the accused the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination." More recently, we have described the "literal right to `confront' the witness at the time of trial" as forming "the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause." California v. Green, supra, at 157. Last Term, the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987), stated that "[t]he Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination."
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of face-to-face encounter between witness and accused serves ends related both to appearances and to reality. This opinion is embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity in part to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as "essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). What was true of old is no less true in modern times. President Eisenhower once described face-to-face confrontation as part of the code of his hometown of Abilene, Kansas. In Abilene, he said, it was necessary to "[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you [487 U.S. 1012, 1018] disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry. . . . In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow." Press release of remarks given to the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League, November 23, 1953, quoted in Pollitt, supra, at 381. The phrase still persists, "Look me in the eye and say that." Given these human feelings of what is necessary for fairness, 2 the right of confrontation [487 U.S. 1012, 1019] "contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails." Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it. A witness "may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that man is." Z. Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty 35 (1956), quoted in Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 375 -376 (1956), (Douglas, J., dissenting). It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person "to his face" than "behind his back." In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly. The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions. Thus the right to face-to-face confrontation serves much the same purpose as a less explicit component of the Confrontation Clause that we have had more frequent occasion to discuss [487 U.S. 1012, 1020] - the right to cross-examine the accuser; both "ensur[e] the integrity of the factfinding process." Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S., at 736 . The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a witness of standing in the presence of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very phenomenon it relies upon to establish the potential "trauma" that allegedly justified the extraordinary procedure in the present case. That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant. Kulko v. California Superior Court,, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).”
[World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)]
(1) Rule I.
An exaction by the U.S. Government, which is not based upon law, statutory or otherwise, is a taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, an Appeals representative in his or her conclusions of fact or application of the law, shall hew to the law and the recognized standards of legal construction. It shall be his or her duty to determine the correct amount of the tax, with strict impartiality as between the taxpayer and the Government, and without favoritism or discrimination as between taxpayers.
Unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary -
The question is not whether the Wisconsin law is a wise law or unwise law. Our concern is not what philosophy Wisconsin should or should not embrace. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 . We do not sit as a super-legislative body. In this case the sole question is whether there has been a taking of property without that procedural due process that is required by the Fourteenth Amendment. We have dealt over and over again with the question of what constitutes "the right to be heard" (Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 ) within the meaning of procedural due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 . In the latter case we said that the right to be heard "has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether [395 U.S. 337, 340] to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." 339 U.S., at 314 . In the context of this case the question is whether the interim freezing of the wages without a chance to be heard violates procedural due process.
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, see McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 , does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modern forms. We deal here with wages - a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system. We turn then to the nature of that property and problems of procedural due process.
A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a taking which may impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support. Until a recent Act of Congress, 4 304 of which forbids discharge of employees on the ground that their wages have been garnished, garnishment often meant the loss of a job. Over and beyond that was the great drain on family income. As stated by Congressman Reuss: 5
"The idea of wage garnishment in advance of judgment, of trustee process, of wage attachment, or whatever it is called is a most inhuman doctrine. It compels the wage earner, trying to keep his family together, to be driven below the poverty level."Recent investigations of the problem have disclosed the grave injustices made possible by prejudgment garnishment whereby the sole opportunity to be heard comes after the taking. Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of [395 U.S. 337, 341] the House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs who held extensive hearings on this and related problems stated:
"What we know from our study of this problem is that in a vast number of cases the debt is a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person who is trapped in an easy credit nightmare, in which he is charged double for something he could not pay for even if the proper price was called for, and then hounded into giving up his pound of flesh, and being fired besides." 114 Cong. Rec. 1832.The leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is enormous. The creditor tenders not only the original debt but the "collection fees" incurred by his attorneys in the garnishment proceedings:
"The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and who is usually in need of money, is in no position to resist demands for collection fees. If the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt and collection charges in order to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he will often sign a new contract of `payment schedule' which incorporates these additional charges." 6Apart from those collateral consequences, it appears that in Wisconsin the statutory exemption granted the wage earner 7 is "generally insufficient to support the debtor for any one week." 8
The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning [395 U.S. 337, 342] family to the wall. 9 Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing (cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 ) this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process.
This question is, as we believe, substantially answered by the reasoning of the opinion in the Hurtado Case, 110 U.S. 516, 535 , 28 S. L. ed. 232, 238, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292. The distinct question was there presented whether it was due process of law to prosecute a person charged with murder by an information under the state Constitution and law. It was held that it was, and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit such a procedure. In our opinion the right to be exempt from prosecution for an infamous crime, except upon a presentment by a grand jury, is of the same nature as the right to a trial by a petit jury of the number fixed by the common law. If the state have the power to abolish the grand jury and the consequent proceeding by indictment, the same course of rea- [176 U.S. 581, 603] soning which establishes that right will and does establish the right to alter the number of the petit jury from that provided by the common law. Many cases upon the subject since the Hurtado Case was decided are to be found gathered in Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262 , 42 L. ed. 461, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 384 , 42 S. L. ed. 780, 788, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 , 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77, 44 L. ed. --; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83 , 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 44 L. ed. --.
Trial by jury has never been affirmed to be a necessary requisite of due process of law. In not one of the cases cited and commented upon in the Hurtado Case is a trial by jury mentioned as a necessary part of such process.
In Re Converse, 137 U.S. 624 , 34 L. ed. 796, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191, it was stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere with the power of a state to protect the lives, liberty, and property of its citizens, nor with the exercise of that power in the adjudications of the courts of a state in administering process provided by the law of the state.
In Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692 , 34 L. ed. 816, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224, it was held that no state can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law, without violating the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and that due process of law, within the meaning of the Constitution, is secured when the laws operate on all alike, and no one is subjected to partial or arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.
In Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 467 , 35 S. L. ed. 225, 226, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577, it was said 'that by the Fourteenth Amendment the powers of states in dealing with crime within their borders are not limited, except that no state can deprive particular persons, or class of persons, of equal and impartial justice under the law; that law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice is due process, and when secured by the law of the state the constitutional requirement is satisfied; and that due process is so secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 , 28 S. L. ed. 232, 238, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292, and cases cited.' See also, for statement [176 U.S. 581, 604] as to due process of law, the cases of Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 , 24 L. ed. 616; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 707 , 28 S. L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663.
The clause has been held to extend to a proceeding conducted to judgment in a state court under a valid statute of the state, if such judgment resulted in the taking of private property for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, under the conditions mentioned in the cases herewith cited. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 , 41 L. ed. 985, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 169 U.S. 557 , 42 L. ed. 853, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445.
It has also been held not to impair the police power of a state. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 , 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375.
"No conflict exists between constitutional requisites and exaction of the highest moral standards from those who would practice law. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238 -239. Certainly lawyers and courts should be particularly sensitive of, and have a special obligation to respect, the demands of due process. This special awareness, however, does not alter our essential function or duty. In reviewing state action in this area, as in all others, we look to substance, not to bare form, to determine [373 U.S. 96, 107] whether constitutional minimums have been honored."
[Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963)]
Due process of law is violated when the government vindictively attempts to penalize a person for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.
[United States v. Conkins, 9 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1993)]
We can hardly find a denial of due process in these circumstances, particularly since it is even doubtful that appellee's burdens under the program outweigh his benefits. It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.
FN30 s 7 of the amendment of May 26, 1941 provided that a farm marketing quota should not be applicable to any farm on which the acreage planted to wheat is not in excess of fifteen acres. When the appellee planted his wheat the quota was inapplicable to any farm on which the normal production of the acreage planted to wheat was less than 200 bushels. s 335(d) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by 54 Stat. 232, 7 U.S.C.A. s 1335(d).
FN31 ss 6, 10(c) of the amendment of May 26, 1941.
[Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942)]
The article below contains the following relevant/important citations of case law pertaining to common IRS situations which Thurston Bell has excerpted.
The actual case of Goldberg v. Kelly is available at http://www.laws.findlaw.com/US/397/254.html or a copy of it locally at this site Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) for your reference.
It is a fact that the Goldberg case was about Welfare Benefits being cut off, but the ultimate argument before the court was about the applicability of the standards of DUE PROCESS OF LAW to Administrative Actions of the Government. Importantly, this article reveals that the standards of due process of law apply to all Administrative Actions of the Government, Federal and State.
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard". Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394 (1914). The hearing must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552(1965). In the present context these principles require…timely and adequate notice detailing reasons…, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting arguments and evidence… These rights are important in cases...challenged…as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases."
"In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. E.g., ICC v. Lousiville & N.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913) 503 US L.Ed 2nd 391(1992), Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 474,496-497 (1959)" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (emphasis added)
"Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While it is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is more important where the evidence consists of testimony of individuals…"
"We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. This court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out…in all types of cases where administrative...actions were under scrutiny." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474. 496-497 (1959)
These case citations and the argument regarding the components of Administrative Due Process of Law plainly apply to "all types of cases where administrative...actions were under scrutiny." This was the principle and premise that I used to explain to an old friend of mine how it is that I connected a case on Welfare to IRS.
There is no doubt that these components of due process of law are embodied and given substance in American law by the 1st, 5th, and 6th Amendments to the Constitution. I think that it would be impossible for anyone to contend anything to the contrary. The following provision of Federal Regulation clearly reveals that the Secretary of the Treasury testifies to the fact that the 5th Amendment applies to the IRS:
Rule I. An exaction by the U.S. Government, which is not based upon law, statutory or otherwise, is a taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
So it is nakedly apparent that the Amendments to the Constitution apply to the IRS, and we know that none of the three Amendments mentioned above have been repealed or amended, therefore the only way out for the IRS is to somehow provide that the standards of due process of law, which would appear to be more important since we bear the burden of proof, apply to us and our cases before the IRS.
Below is exactly why it is that we should seek for the IRS to provide:
presentment of copies of all evidence used by the government
as the elements of these rights were cited in the above U.S. Supreme Court cases. Without them my question to the IRS, the District Counsel, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, the President, the Congress, the District Director, and the Federal Judiciary is,
"How then are we expected to bear or shift the burden of proof?"
Without these components of due process of law applying to all branches of the Government, especially where it is that Judicial Due Process prior to the taking of property is barred by statute, the concept of the requirement for Due Process of Law as required in the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States becomes arbitrary and capricious, and the Societal/Social contract Between the People and the People and their Government is null and void.
If the Contract is going to be held in tact by the Courts then this following case is very important when you face collections of the government in the face of Denial of Due Process of Law:
“If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an individual’s possessions can be returned to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be awarded him for wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of due process has already occurred. This Court [the Supreme Court] has not embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 556,.Ct. 1208 (1972)
There are many who will read this article in the future who believe and have long held that the Societal/Social Contract is dead. Still, these people have failed to come forward with a simplistic argument as this one which would prove that belief as a simple inescapable fact.
Here I give you the foundations for that argument. I hope that they are simple enough for the common man to understand so that they will see that we have not yet exhausted our redress of grievance against the IRS determinations as well as the apparent lawlessness of our Courts. We have not yet done so, because nobody has made it this simple, and thus the actions of such people who are just one step from becoming the next Russell Weston Jr. (the accused Capitol Hill Gun-Man) are just as Mr. Weston's, and that is an individual's attempt to tear asunder the Societal/Social Contract that is only apparently dead, and not conclusively dead by all evidence, argument, and fact.
It is my goal to force the Courts to either uphold our Social Contract, or for them to Publicly and Nakedly declare it to be dead, by forcing them to answer the question about how it is that we are to have hope of bearing or shifting burden of proof without presentment of the evidence against us as well as the other components provided above.
If you or I dare to take action against the apparently active Social Contract at this time we will be criminals.
Yet, if the Supreme Court and Federal Courts refuse to provide remedy and redress of grievance, or even rule that due Process is not applicable to IRS matters due to the Anti-Injunction Act of 1863 and codified at 26 USC § 7421, and ignores the fact that the 1st, 5th, and 6th Amendments have not been repealed or amended to bar administrative due process of law in keeping with the standards of due process of law, then the Court, the final defender and Fiduciary of the Social and Societal Contract will be the one who will make the fact of the demise and disposition of the Contract clear, and they will be the final word. Their decision will be a legal and valid determination, from there the individual will be free and forced to choose his or her personal course of action.
The record to date shows that the IRS is not interested in providing the components of due process of law for us to make our defense and carry or shift the burden of proof, it is now time to bring this violation of the Contract to the Feet of the High Court, and make them rule not on Taxes, but on Due Process of Law, the Foundation of our Rule of Law and Nation pursuant to American Jurisprudence:
"The guaranty of due process of law is one of the most important to be found in the Federal Constitution or any of the Amendments; Ulman v. Mayor, etc. of Baltimore, 72 Md 587, 20 A 141, affd 165 US 719, 41 L Ed 1184, 17 S Ct 1001. It has been described as the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice, Brock v. North Carolina, 344 US 424, 97 L Ed 456, 73 S Ct 349 and it has been said that without it the right to private property could not be said to exist, in the sense in which it is known to our laws. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 US 139, 57 L Ed 1427, 33 S Ct 1033."
There we have it, without due process of law, there is no private property, including the rights that come with property. There is also no right to the property of your person, your land, your home. This also means that Commerce is finished, as there is no property actual, physical, real, or intellectual that can be protected from marauders, thieves, visigoths, or vandals. So business better start getting involved, as they are next.
Without due process of law all lawyers are out of work, the foundations of the courts are undermined, they have no power, and the Law of the Jungle rules, the Societal Contract is Officially Dead, and the Courts ruling will be the Death Certificate.
It might be true already that the Law of the Jungle Rules, but we have to make the U.S. Supreme Court prove it.
When this happens we can all quote Axel Rose from the Rock Band Guns and Roses..."Welcome to the Jungle.. we've got fun and games!"
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