|FLAWED TAX ARGUMENTS TO AVOID|
This article provided courtesy of
constitutional attorney Larry Becraft
Gal. 4:16: "Am I therefor made your
enemy because I tell you the truth?"
This section introduces some of the bogus theories that patriots and tax protester groups have come up with over the years that will clearly get people into trouble. You should avoid these costly and time consuming pitfalls in any of your dealings with the IRS or in court.
The purpose of this file is simply educational. I've noticed too many innocents who today believe certain legal arguments popular years ago, but which were litigated by ill prepared, desperate people and lost. To continue going down such dead end roads and to follow these dead arguments will only result in disaster.
Furthermore, there are lots of self proclaimed "legal gurus" writing books and conducting seminars all around the country. These gurus espouse their views and personal opinions which they pretend are "the law." Everyone has a right to express their personal opinions, but most of these "opinions" are being marketed as "the law." There are publications on the Net suggesting the United States is still a part of Great Britain, a "missing 13th amendment" still exists, and our society is legally based upon contract; there are arguments that a birth certificate means something more sinister than birth certificate, etc. While these works and arguments may be interesting, most are pure fiction composed of personal opinions parading as "the law." Too many people get into trouble following these fairy tales.
But do not think that by posting this information I believe that all is lost and there are no important legal issues left. To the contrary, I have a very long list of solid legal issues which need to be litigated and these are issues which will further our "freedom" cause. For example, even though I post below the losses regarding my favorite issue, the money issue, there are some good issues left, but they will be raised only in the best of circumstances and the best of cases. Some of these other issues are explained on my web site. But I am protecting these remaining issues from destruction by the desperate who grab an issue and throw it in court; these folks have no plans nor skills to engage in the legal battle, and they slaughter our good issues on the altar of stupidity.
In the seventies and early eighties, advocates of the specie provisions in Art. 1, §10, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution made a concerted effort to educate people about this constitutional provision, consequently people (mostly those who were desperate and ill prepared) acting pro se began litigating the issue. The courts have rendered the following adverse decisions on this issue:
Adverse Federal Decisions:
1. Koll v. Wayzata State Bank,
397 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1968)
Adverse State Decisions:
1. Chermack v. Bjornson, 302
Minn. 213, 223 N.W.2d 659 (1974)
I wish to ultimately win this issue, but to do so will require experienced legal scholars who know what they are doing. The only person in America who should be in charge of money issue litigation is Dr. Edwin Vieira; see one of his articles posted to my main page. One of the goals of The Wallace Institute is to raise sufficient funds to turn Dr. Vieira loose to litigate this issue and win.
Back in 1982 or 1983, somebody started circulating the argument that the IRS was a private corporation which had been created in Delaware in 1933. If it was created only in 1933, then why do we have the following appropriations for this agency found in acts of Congress a decade before 1933:
42 Stat. 375 (2-17-22); 42 Stat. 454 (3-20-22); 42 Stat. 1096 (1-3-23); 43 Stat. 71 (4-4-24); 43 Stat. 693 (12-5-24); 43 Stat. 757 (1-20-25); 43 Stat. 770 (1-22-25); 44 Stat. 142 (3-2-26); 44 Stat. 868 (7-3-26); 44 Stat. 1033 (1-26-27); 45 Stat. 168, 1034 (1928); 68 Stat. 86, 145, 807 (1954).
This is indeed a frivolous argument and has properly been rejected by the courts; see Young v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 141, 147 (N.D. Ind. 1984). The real issue is whether the IRS has been created by law.
Some contend that the Secretary of the Treasury is in reality a foreign agent under the control of the IMF; this argument has been rejected by the courts.
1. United States v. Rosnow,
977 F.2d 399, 413 (8th Cir. 1992)
Some contend we are for tax purposes non-resident aliens; again, this argument has been rejected by the courts.
1. United States v. Sloan,
939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991)
This argument was rejected in Richey v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 634 N.E. 2d 1375 (Ind. 1994), along with other popular arguments of that date. However, David Gould still thinks it is a marvelous legal argument.
At one time, some asserted that when an agent of the government inflicted damage upon somebody, the proper response should be filing a Form 1099 against the agent because the agent was "enriched" by the damage so inflicted. Parties doing this went to jail.
1. United States v. Yagow,
953 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1992)
Of course, today we have essentially the same thing in the format of filing common law liens. More than enough people have gone to jail with such lunacy. Recently Roger Elvick, who went to jail for doing this, has again incorporated into his "redemption process" this same scheme.
Back in 1983 and 1984, Carol Landi popularized an argument that the land patent was the highest and best form of title and that by updating the patent in your own name, you could defeat any mortgages. This contention violated many principles of real property law and when Carol started trying to get patents for most of the land in California brought up into her own name, she went to jail. Others who have raised this crazy argument lost the issue.
1. Landi v. Phelps, 740 F.2d
710 (9th Cir. 1984)
A popular argument currently circulating is that a mere notice of levy is not equal to a levy and thus may not be used for tax collection purposes. The courts have not accepted this idea.
1. United States v. Eiland,
223 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1955)
Perhaps there are some remaining methods to prevail on this argument, but serious damage has already been done.
Back in the early nineties, Hartford Van Dyke promoted the theory that "commercial law" was the foundation for all law around the world. Based upon Hartford's contention regarding commercial law, he developed the idea that an "affidavit of truth" submitted "in commerce" could create a lien which simply had to be paid. Hartford claimed that his findings were well known everywhere and that this lien process had been used for thousands of years. I obtained his memo regarding this argument and went to the law library. His contention that this "principle" manifested itself in the law was wrong; I could find nothing which supported this argument. This theory was a complete fabrication.
Did others act upon Hartford's ideas anyway? Leroy Schweitzer of the Montana Freemen took Hartford's ideas to heart and claimed that he created liens against public officials. Based upon these liens, Leroy started issuing sight drafts drawn upon some "post office" account and started passing them out to many gullible people who believed that such drafts were required to be paid by the feds. Not only did Leroy get into deep trouble, so did many who got drafts from him. There have been lots of people who have been prosecuted, convicted and jailed for using drafts allegedly justified by this crazy theory.
One of the most recent prosecutions of someone for using one of Leroy's drafts is Pete Stern, a patriot from North Carolina. Several years ago, Pete issued some of these drafts to the IRS. Pete has been one of the most vocal advocates of the UCC argument, "we are Brits," nom de guerre, etc. While I like Pete, still he has followed crazy arguments. Pete's federal criminal case is filed in the Western District of North Carolina and you may visit the clerk's web site by clicking here. Once you get to this page, look on the left side of the page to the sidebar and click on the case information section called "docket/image." When that page comes up, insert Pete's case number of 2:1999cr00081 and his name. His file will come up and you can read all the pleadings. Is he using for his own defense the arguments he advocates?
As best I can tell, the popular "UCC" argument has its origins in Howard Freeman's flaky theories, Hartford's work and the "improvements" made by Leroy. The UCC argument is one of the most legally baseless ideas I have ever encountered, yet organizations like "Wrong Way Law" and people like Jack Smith continue to promote it. Here are some published cases which have correctly rejected this lunacy:
1. Jones v. City of Little Rock,
314 Ark. 383, 862 S.W.2d 273, 274 (1993)(In reference to traffic tickets,
the court stated, "The Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to any of
A substantial part of the UCC argument was "developed" by Howard Freeman. Freeman contended that some super secret treaty back in 1930 put this and other countries around the world in "bankruptcy" with the "international bankers" being the "creditor/rulers." Once these banker/rulers were ensconced in power, they needed some way to "toss out the old law" based upon the common law, and erect commercial law as the law which regulated and controlled everything. Roosevelt and his fellow conspirators then set to work and developed a plan to achieve the destruction of the "common law" and the erection of commercial law. This was accomplished by the decision in the Erie Railroad case in 1938. According to this theory, Erie RR banished the common law, leaving in its place only commercial law via the UCC. Freeman also alleged that lawyers were informed of this "takeover" by the "international bankers" and that they were required to take a secret oath to not tell the American people about the takeover. Of course, as the direct result of this change in the law from common law to commercial law, no court could ever cite a case decided prior to 1938.
But there are the tremendous flaws in this argument. I do not challenge the fact that big international bankers are economically powerful and that such power enables them to secure favorable legislation. However I do disagree with the "secret treaty" contention. Back in the 1930s and indeed all the way up to about 1946, all treaties adopted by the United States were published in the U.S. Statutes at Large. As a student of treaties, I looked for this secret treaty and could not find it and I had access to complete sets of all books containing treaties, especially those in the Library of Congress in DC. The major premise of this argument is this contention regarding the secret treaty, which even the proponents of the argument cannot produce. Their argument, "I cannot produce this secret treaty, but believe me anyway," simply is unacceptable to me as I want proof.
The advocates of this argument also contend that the Erie RR case was the one which banished the common law and erected commercial law in its place. The problem with this contention is that Erie RR does not stand for this proposition. This was a personal injury case; Thompkins was injured while walking along some railroad tracks as a train passed. Something sticking out of the train hit Thompkins and injured him, hence his suit for damages. Please read this case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which stands for the proposition that federal courts must follow the common law of the state where the injury occurred. How this case is alleged to declare the exact opposite escapes me, but in any event, Erie RR does not support the contention of the UCC advocates.
To prove that Erie RR changed the law, it is alleged that no court can cite a case decided prior to 1938. This is perhaps the simplest contention to disprove, achieved just by reading cases (which apparently the UCC activists do not do). All my life I have read cases which cited very old cases and I have never seen such a sharp demarcation where the courts did cite pre-1938 cases before 1938 and then ceased afterwards. Here are just a few post-1938 cases which cite pre-1938 cases, the constitution, the Federalist Papers and lots of other old authority:
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
Printz and Mack v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997)
When you scan these cases, please note the parentheses like "(1997)" above for Richard Mack's case. This denotes the year any particular case was decided. You can easily see that these recent cases do in fact cites cases decided as far back as 1798. The contention that pre-1938 cases are not cited is nothing but lunacy, believed by folks like Dave DeReimer, a "redemption process" advocate.
This argument also contends that the state of this nation were placed in "bankruptcy" via the "secret treaty." If this were true, why did the Supreme Court decide in 1936 that states and their subdivisions could not bankrupt? See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936).
Finally, I must inform you that neither I nor any other lawyer I know has ever taken the "secret oath" as alleged by this argument. When I was sworn in as an Alabama lawyer in September, 1975, it was on the steps of the Alabama Supreme Court down in Montgomery in front of God, my parents and everybody else. I swore to uphold and protect the United States and Alabama Constitutions. Nothing in that oath could remotely be the alleged "secret oath." I have also been admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Circuits; I did not take the "secret oath" when I was admitted to practice before these courts, nor when I was admitted to practice before several U.S. district courts. I have not taken any other oath and I know that the only oath most other lawyers have taken is the same. But, I do not doubt that some lawyers are members of other secret societies who may have taken oaths of which I am unaware.
My advice is that if you hear anyone making some argument about the UCC, run away as fast as you can. The argument is crazy.
The Code of Federal Regulations contains a separate volume which lists various statutes and the regulations which implement those statutes. This particular publication is not an exclusive list nor is it an admission made by the government that there are no regulations for Title 26, U.S.C. Parties making this argument have suffered defeat.
1. United States v. Cochrane,
985 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993)
A currently popular argument is that the gold fringed flag indicates the admiralty jurisdiction of the court. Naturally, pro ses have made this argument and lost.
1. Vella v. McCammon, 671
F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 1987)(the argument has "no arguable basis
in law or fact")
These courts have been declared non-existent.
1. Kimmel v. Burnet County Appraisal Dist., 835 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.App. 1992).
According to a book written by Berkheimer, a "nom de guerre" is a war name symbolized by a given name being written in capital letters. The argument contends that because of events in 1933, we have been made "enemies" and government indicates our status as enemies by the nom de guerre. If this is true, then why have the styles of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court since its establishment been in caps? This argument has gotten lots of people in trouble. For example, Mike Kemp of the Gadsden Militia defended himself on state criminal charges with this argument and he was thrown into jail. I have not even seen a decent brief on this issue which was predicated upon cases you can find in an ordinary law library.
In any event, several courts have rejected this argument:
1. Jaeger v. Dubuque County,
880 F.Supp. 640 (N.D.Iowa 1995)
More recently, Jon Roland of The Constitution Society web site wrote the following about this argument:
Typographic Conventions in Law
One of the persistent myths among political dissidents is that such usages as initial or complete capitalization of names indicates different legal entities or a different legal status for the entity. They see a person's name sometimes written in all caps, and sometimes written only in initial caps, and attribute a sinister intent to this difference. They also attach special meanings to the ways words may be capitalized or abbreviated in founding documents, such as constitutions or the early writings of the Founders.
Such people seem to resist all efforts to explain that such conventions have no legal significance whatsoever, that they are just ways to emphasize certain kinds of type, to make it easier for the reader to scan the documents quickly and organize the contents in his mind.The nom de guerre position is one rabidly advocated by Wrong Way Law. It is all based upon hype and emotions; the speakers who advocate this argument know how to push the emotional "hot buttons" at patriot pep rallies. I have reviewed the "best" briefs regarding this issue and they are all trash. Yet I continue to see people call themselves "John, of smith," "John: Smith," etc., and I just simply conclude that such parties have attended a Wrong Way Law seminar and have accepted a pack of lies. Further, it is remarkable that all the people who believe this idea have never checked it out; they just accept it because some patriot guru claimed it was correct.
One of the files on my web page contains a good memo explaining the titles of the Code and why they were adopted. But against this explanation, people still run around asserting a contrary and groundless position; see Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985)(stating that "Congress's failure to enact a title into positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable"); United States v. Zuger, 602 F. Supp. 889, 891-92 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding that "the failure of Congress to enact a title as such and in such form into positive law . . . in no way impugns the validity, effect, enforceability or constitutionality of the laws as contained and set forth in the title"), aff'd without op., 755 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 805 (1985); Young v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141, 149 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (asserting that "even if Title 26 was not itself enacted into positive law, that does not mean that the laws under that title are null and void"); Berkshire Hathaway Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 780, 784 (1985) (averring that the I.R.C. "is truly 'positive law'"), aff'd, 802 F.2d 429 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
The "Zip Code" contention was first started by the now deceased Bob Wangrud and he later promoted that crazy "bill or particulars" argument which had no substance. Later, he promoted another crazy idea that the federal district courts are not courts at all. In a recent e-mail before his death, Wangrud alleged:
"I have never seen Becraft challenge the non-judicial Federal Courts are not authorized by the Constitution for the United States." [sic: the whole sentence is "sic" as well as "sick"]Mr. Wangrud castigated those who didn't follow his legal views and brilliant legal theories.
Was Mr. Wangrud correct when he proclaimed that the US district courts are non-judicial? Your attention is directed to Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1997), involving a fellow who believed in the UCC "Refusal for Fraud" argument. He also raised Wangrud's issue which was addressed as follows:
"Smith's final contention of error involves his complaint that the district court should have responded to his argument that by captioning its documents ‘UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,' the court below was functioning as a ‘territorial' court rather than as an Article III court. Smith has raised this argument at every stage of this litigation, but he has yet to clarify his point. As best we can determine, Smith has cobbled together stray quotations from various sources to claim that a federal district court can function either as a ‘territorial' court under Article I or as a ‘constitutional' court under Article III. Without giving any credence to Smith's bizarre argument, and despite our inability to see how Smith's distinction would matter in this case, we hold that the United States District Court for the District of Colorado was fully empowered under Article III to consider Smith's constitutional claims.XVI. Implementing regulations:
United States v. Hartman, 915 F.Supp. 1227 (M.D.Fla. 1996): argument regarding implementing regs and the cross references in CFR index held frivolous.
Stafford v. CIR, TCM 1997-50.
In McLaughlin v. CIR, 832 F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987), this argument was held to be without merit:
Several years ago, some folks developed an argument that "we are still subjects of the British crown" and started promoting it. You are free to believe that argument which will waste your time. Here is a simple refutation of that argument:
1. The Articles of Confederation provided as follows:
3. The courts have not been silent regarding the effect of the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Peace. For example, the consequences of independence was explained in Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526-27 (1827), where the Supreme Court stated:
"Each declared itself sovereign and independent, according to the limits of its territory.
"[T]he soil and sovereignty within their acknowledged limits were as much theirs at the declaration of independence as at this hour."
"The rule as to the point of time at which the American antenati ceased to be British subjects, differs in this country and in England, as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace in 1783. Our rule is to take the date of the Declaration of Independence."
Notwithstanding the fact that English and American courts long ago rejected this argument, I still encounter e-mail from parties who contend that this argument is correct. For example, just recently I ran across this note which stated:
"In other words, the interstate system of banks is the private property of the King... This means that any profit or gain anyone experienced by a bank/thrift and loan/employee credit union ?? any regulated financial institution carries with it ?? as an operation of law ?? the identical same full force and effect as if the King himself created the gain. So as an operation of law, anyone who has a depository relationship, or a credit relationship, with a bank, such as checking, savings, CD's, charge cards, car loans, real estate mortgages, etc., are experiencing profit and gain created by the King ?? so says the Supreme Court. At the present time, Mr. Condo, you have bank accounts (because you accept checks as payment for books and subscriptions), and you are very much in an EQUITY RELATIONSHIP with the King."This note also alleged that George Mercier, who wrote an article apparently popular among those who believe the "contract theory" of government, was a retired judge, which is false. Just because you read it on the Net does not make it true.
One of the advocates of this flaky idea is David Gould ("Goul") who has a web site named "The Amazing Vision of David Gould," where he promotes this trash. In the summer of 1999, Goul joined a couple of e-mail lists which I receive and started blasting this theory in a series of e-mail notes. According to Goul, one of the reasons "we are Brits" is because the King of England via a treaty in 1782 loaned the United States funds to engage in the war against him; Goul maintains that the fact that the King was loaning money to us to fight him really shows that even today we are still subjects of the Crown. In reply, I pointed out that the treaty he mentions was really a French treaty where the United States borrowed money for the Revolution from the King of France, not the King Great Britain. I sent out a series of e-mail notes which refuted everything that Goul declared and it did not take long before Goul stopped his nonsense.
However, my belief that I had corrected Goul and educated him about an incorrect legal argument proved erroneous. I have examined his web site recently and he has only become more virulent in his argument that we are Brits. Clearly, Goul is not only crazy and a fit candidate for the nut house, but he is also deliberately lying to people; he is a "liaryer." What makes him particularly dangerous is the fact that he blends religion with his arguments. I absolutely dislike people who combine Christianity with false legal arguments; I dislike people who hold my religion up to disrepute by associating it with nutty ideas.
A popular belief promoted in the freedom movement is the concept or idea that the United States is a foreign sovereign as regards the states. How this idea got started is beyond me because the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts have concluded otherwise; see Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876)("The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States"); Severson v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 88 P.2d 344, 347 (Ok. 1939)(quoting Claflin); Bowles v. Heckman, 64 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind. 1946)(quoting Claflin); Kersting v. Hardgrove, 48 A.2d 309, 310 (N.J. 946)(summarizes Claflin); Harrison v. Herzig Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Ky. 445, 161 S.W.2d 908, 910 (1942)(quoting Claflin); Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467, 471 (1945)(quoting Claflin and further stating "the several States of the Union are neither foreign to the United States nor are they foreign to each other").
There are lots of theories which float through the freedom movement and people are very prone to accept any contention or position without question or investigation. But if they fail to check out the sources upon which they rely, they run the risk of believing something which has no foundation and will not work in court.
In Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 (1892), the U.S. Supreme Court stated as follows:
"Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, says: 'Every citizen of a state is ipso facto a citizen of the United States.' Section 1693. And this is the view expressed by Mr. Rawle in his work on the Constitution. Chapter 9, pp. 85, 86. Mr. Justice Curtis, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 576, expressed the opinion that under the constitution of the United States 'every free person, born on the soil of a state, who is a citizen of that state by force of its constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United States.' And Mr. Justice Swayne, in The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 126, declared that 'a citizen of a state is ipso facto a citizen of the United States.' "See also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
There is an argument (promoted by David Goul) floating around the freedom movement that the "law" is copyrighted, which is utterly crazy. The "law" is owned by the public and cannot be copyrighted. Back in 1834, two reporters for the U.S. Supreme Court got involved in a legal battle regarding the cases of the Supreme Court. In Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 668, 33 U.S. 591 (1834), the Supreme Court declared that "no reporter ... can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court". Decisions of the courts belong to the public and nobody can copyright those decisions.
West Publishing Company, one of the largest publishers of legal materials, knows that it cannot copyright cases. It places in its electronic versions of the cases the following caveat:
952 F.Supp. 647, McCann v. Greenway, (W.D.Mo. 1997)
"Copyright (c) West Group 1998
No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
As shown above, public documents belong to the public and cannot be copyrighted. When any court decides any case, anyone may go obtain a copy of that decision. I can get any decision, you can and West Publishing can. I may, you may and West does publish those cases. I could start my own company publishing these cases and making them available to whoever would buy them. However, I doubt that I would stay in business long against West. It has hundreds of people employed by it who get these cases, read them, and make little "headnotes" about various legal points in the cases. It publishes these cases in nicely bound books. It takes the "headnotes" it generates for these cases and puts them into a legal encyclopedias which group all "headnotes" of all cases in specific categories. Using West, studying and finding "law" has been made a lot easier.
West also has a competitor, Lawyers Co-op. The federal government publishes acts of Congress in a set of books called the Statutes at Large ("Stat."). In large university libraries, you can find the Statutes at Large. However, the feds also publish the United States Code, which is simply stated the Statutes at Large organized in a more methodical fashion via titles. You can find the "true blue" (but it is really red in color) U.S. Code in many libraries. However, since the Code is a public document, anybody can copy it. Here, West and Lawyers Co-op are fierce competitors, with one publishing USCA and the other USCS. Both contain accurate reprints of the various uncopyrightable sections and titles of the official U.S. Code. However, West employs hundreds of people who read and categorize cases. West puts summaries of many cases at the end of sections of the U.S. Code, so when you engage in legal research, cases regarding a specific statute are there at your fingertips. Lawyers Co-op does the same thing. All of this other writing in these versions of the Code was created by these companies and this is the material which is copyrighted in these books.
I never use the official U.S. Code and neither does anyone else. It just sits up there on the top shelf in our local law library gathering dust. The reason nobody uses the official version is because of the absence of the handy research materials like case summaries and other references. If I have a conspiracy case, I pull USCS, turn to Title 18, U.S.C., §371, and start reading the very refined annotations at the end of the section which quickly point you to the relevant cases. It wasn't always this way, however. Years ago, the states officially published their own legal materials, cases and codes and West was the competitor. As time passed, West acquired dominant market share because its books were superior. Legislatures would appropriate funds for official case books, which were often large, expensive books with large print. West published smaller books with smaller print and its publications were obviously cheaper. Why would anyone buy from the state its publication of the cases when (for probably the same price) you could buy from West its regional reporter containing cases not only from your own state but also several others? In short, free enterprise beat the socks off the government. Today, many states just let West do all the publishing of cases. Of course, anyone could compete against West.
But West is not fearful of copyright infringement from the public at large. I violate the copyright laws every time I go to the law library and so does everyone else. The law schools are perhaps the biggest violators and law students copy away at copyrighted materials. West does not care, in fact it wants everyone using its products. It fears, however, another competitor like Lexis. Lexis back in the early 80s started putting cases on computer, but it used West's page numbers from its case volumes. West sued and won for infringement, the court holding that the only thing West could copyright were its own page numbers from its books as well as the headnotes it wrote for the cases. As a result, West and Lexis formed a partnership and now cases are on CD. Formerly to buy all of West's Supreme Court Reporter, it would have cost you several thousands of bux. Now, two discs with all Supreme Court cases can be bought for a couple hundred bux. Private enterprise has thus run circles around government.
There is a "new" theory floating around the movement which is absolutely crazy, yet it is promoted as "the hot new solution." This new theory has its origins with a fellow named Roger Elvick, who has been involved with some con jobs in the past; see Bye v. Mack, 519 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1994). Roger Elvick was years ago "into" the idea of sending forms 1099 to the IRS for its agents who stole your constitutional rights. This was a part of his "redemption process" back then and if you wish to learn about what happened to one party who followed Elvick's advice, read United States v. Wiley, 979 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1992). Many others who followed Elvick's advice also went to jail; see United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 1994)("He voluntarily made the decision to purchase and use Roger Elvick's 'redemption program,' and he admitted that he did not pay any of the purported recipients any of the amounts reflected on the 1099 Forms. Because he knew he never paid the individuals, he could not have believed that the forms, which he signed under penalties of perjury, were in fact true and correct. The evidence also established that appellant acted corruptly in pursuing the retaliation scheme, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7212(a)"). Roger was convicted for this activity; see United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1993).
While there, Roger developed this new argument. In essence, he contends that everyone's birth certificate constitutes ownership in "America, Inc." and we all have stock in this corporation, which stock is represented by these birth certificates (see Lodi v. Lodi, 173 Cal.App.3d 628, 219 Cal.Rptr. 116 (1985), where similar arguments were rejected; and Dose v. United States, 86 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9773 (N.D.Iowa 1986)("Petitioner... informs the Court of [his] 'notorious recission of [his] social security number' and recission of his birth certificate, which documents had previously made him a 'member of Corporate America (commune)' converting him into 'a slave of the commune subject to the regulation and control of the Federal Government'... the fact that Dose has attempted to rescind his social security number and birth certificate by sworn affidavit is irrelevant...")). According to Roger, the big banks and other financial institutions regularly trade in these birth certificates, buying and selling them to others. Of course according to this new argument, you can do the same thing.
From here, the argument goes down hill and becomes even more bizarre. I know precisely what are the major features of this argument because I have read the course material and even viewed a video tape of one meeting where this issue was discussed; this contention is utterly crazy. However, many people are studying this new issue and even issuing "sight drafts" based on this argument. But the promoters of this argument like Elvick, Wally Peterson, Ron Knutt and Dave DeReimer are really selling federal indictments. You are free to "buy into" this scheme, but be ready to face criminal charges, the maximum term of imprisonment of which is 25 years.
Here is late breaking news, an e-mail, regarding the law enforcement activity against the redemption advocates:
January 11, 2000 - @:25 PM, EDTSo what is going to happen? I bet that those who advocated using "acceptance for value" to refuse criminal process like an indictment or information will be charged with obstruction of justice, and they will be tied into a giant conspiracy of those who told others to send in drafts drawn on the U.S. Treasury. This stupidity will just be another instance where the freedom movement will be held up to the press and the rest of America as a bunch of crackpots, nuts and fruitcakes, and "dangerous" ones at that.
Have people already gotten into trouble already by using the "redemption process" sight drafts? Hyla Clapier is a sweet, little old lady from Idaho. She was convinced last year by the redemptionists to try to buy a car with one of those "redemption process" sight drafts drawn on the U.S. Treasury. Her effort brought her an indictment, trial and conviction. If you wish to study the details of her case, simply read her docket sheet posted on the U.S. District Court of Idaho's web site. In late April, 2000, I received a call from an Ohio newspaper reporter and was informed that a man in his local community had attempted to buy 8 Cadillacs with those sight drafts. I was also informed that the man was being prosecuted for several felonies. Is the "redemption process" sight draft effort anything but another crackpot idea? I think so.
There are certain very fundamental flaws within this argument which are as follows:
Flaw 1: The birth certificate is not the basis for the creation of credit in this country.
Economic texts and a wide variety of other materials plainly demonstrate the manner by which credit ("money") is created in this country: a bank (or central bank like the Fed) extends credit in exchange for the receipt of some note or other financial obligation made by either a private party or government. At the federal level, the Federal Reserve extends credit to the U.S. Treasury simply by book keeping entry made in favor of the United States when the Fed buys obligations of the United States. In contrast, a birth certificate is not a note or other debt instrument, contrary to what Roger Elvick, Ron Knutt, Wally Peterson or idiots like Dave DeReimer may contend. Simply stated, a birth certificate is not a note, bond or other financial obligation, and it is not sold to financial institutions, contrary to the blatant lies of the "liaryer" promoters of this argument. In short, the birth certificate is not the foundation for the credit used as money today.
Why don't you ask the advocates of this argument to produce some reliable documentation that birth certificates are the basis of credit in this country rather than the instruments mentioned above? It is simply foolish to rely on the word of Roger Elvick. It is even more foolish to believe anything that DeReimer declares.
Flaw 2: The birth certificate cannot be, as a matter of law, a guarantee of debt.
A debt is created by a debtor making a promise to pay a creditor a specified amount of money over a specified period of time. Merchandise purchased on credit involves the buyer delivering a promissory note to the seller wherein he promises to pay a specific periodic amount with interest until the debt is paid. When a borrower obtains a loan, he delivers a promissory note to the lender. A promissory note by definition requires the payment of certain specific amounts of funds to the holder of that note. Is a birth certificate a promissory note? It simply cannot be because the party named therein has no obligation to make any payment of anything to some alleged holder thereof (and traffic tickets, indictments, IRS documents and letters, etc., also are not commercial instruments).
But ignoring for the moment this major fatal flaw, presume for purposes of argument that a birth certificate is indeed a promissory note. The redemption advocates claim that the "straw man" is liable to pay some unspecified amount to some unspecified creditor who holds the financial instrument known as a birth certificate (I have been unable to learn from the advocates the name of the ephemeral creditor). They further argue that the "counterpart" of the "straw man," you, must answer for this debt of the "straw man." This is legally impossible. I view such an argument as evidence of lunacy.
The "statute of frauds" originates from the common law and every state today has a general "statute of frauds." For example, here in Alabama, we have a "statute of frauds" found in Ala. Code §8-9-2, which states that "every special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another" must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. This same type of requirement appears in our version of the UCC, Ala. Code §7-2-201, which requires contracts for the sale of goods of more than 500 bux to be in writing and subscribed by the party liable. Precisely where is your agreement to answer for the debt of the straw man? If such an agreement exists, have you signed that agreement making you legally liable to pay that debt of the straw man? The truth of the matter is that such a signed agreement does not exist. But without your signature to a guarantee making you liable for this debt, you cannot legally be liable.
The advocates of this insanity further contend that the international banks which hold these birth certificates as security for some unknown financial obligation have a claim against you for your whole life, unless of course you "redeem your straw man" by perfecting your claim against him by filing a Form UCC-1 financing statement. Can you really be legally responsible for some debt for the rest of your life? Again, our statute of frauds found at Alabama Code §8-9-2 requires that "every agreement which, by its terms, is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof" must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. The redemptionists assert that whenever a child is born and his birth certificate is filed in DC and later bought by some big bank, that creditor owns you for the rest of your life. We all know that the average life expectancy of a baby is longer than a single year. Just where is this agreement signed by you (apparently on the day you were born) which cannot by its very terms be performed within a single year? Have you ever signed such an agreement? The truth of the matter is that every aspect of this redemption theory flies in the face of the statute of frauds.
Flaw 3: Our bodies and our labor are not articles of commerce.
The "redemption process" advocates contend that via our birth certificates, we have pledged our bodies and the labor of our lifetimes to those creditors who hold these birth certificates; in essence, our labor is commerce according to this theory. The purchase of these birth certificates is allegedly performed in Washington, DC. However, at this place where federal law clearly applies, federal law declares via 15 USC, §17, that "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." Does this "redemption" argument not plainly conflict with federal law?
Flaw 4: The 1935 Social Security Act did not create an account for everyone born in this country in the amount of approximately $630,000.
In review of the material I have been provided regarding this argument, it is plainly alleged that whenever anyone is born in this country, a sum of approximately $630,000 is deposited into some account at the US Treasury or the Social Security Administration and that this account was created by the 1935 Social Security Act. This contention is utterly false as may be seen simply by reading the act which is posted to the SSA web site.
Flaw 5: The above named account is not the "Treasury direct account."
Neither the original Social Security Act nor any amendment to it created an account known as the "Treasury direct account." However, there is such an account established by Treasury for those who routinely purchase US notes and bonds. A description of this account may be found at 31 C.F.R., part 357 and specifically 31 CFR § 357.20. Those who assert that everyone has such an account know nothing about such accounts. And there is no "public side" and "private side" for these accounts.
Flaw 6: You cannot write sight drafts on the Treasury of the United States via this non-existent account.
If you send any such sight draft to anyone, you will be prosecuted for violations of 18 USC §514 which provides as follows:
Sec. 514. Fictitious obligationsViolations of this statute provide for a maximum period of 25 years imprisonment.
A friend of mine from Kooskia, Idaho attended a meeting where Jack Smith of Wrong Way Law spoke regarding this new "redemption process." During a break at this meeting, my friend asked Smith to provide specific authority and documentation demonstrating that this was a bona fide argument. Smith admitted that this new argument was 100% theory.
The "redemption process" is one of the craziest arguments I have ever seen arise within this movement. Yet, people blindly accept this argument without question or investigation.
Latest News About the Redemption Process (Feb. 23, 2001):
This e-mail was received this date; it concerns one of the unfortunate followers of the process who was recently indicted:
Ballard man doubts U.S. existenceXXIII. The "three judge courts" argument:
Long ago in the case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the Supreme Court considered the question of whether the federal judiciary could decide that a law was unconstitutional, and of course the Court concluded that it and the lower courts had such power. Ever since, both state and federal courts, either at the original trial court level or on appeal, have exercised this judicial power to find state and federal laws unconstitutional.
However, Congress possesses the power to establish not only the number of federal courts, but also their jurisdiction. Back at the turn of this century, Congress perceived a problem regarding federal courts which were being confronted with certain important issues; thus it concluded that it should establish a statutory mechanism whereby a 3 judge court could be convened to decide certain important questions like the constitutionality of a state law (see act at 36 Stat. 1150, 1162). The law which was enacted declared that for certain specific types of cases, a party could request a 3 judge panel of district judges to hear and decide the case. Once a decision was made by such a 3 judge court, any appeal went directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. However, this law did not disturb in any way the power of a single federal district judge to decide the constitutionality of any federal or state law.
This law was in effect until August, 1976 when it was drastically modified by P.L. 94-381; see Senate Report 94-204. The new law just simply further limited the type of cases where a 3 judge court could be requested; those cases are those which are specified in certain other federal laws. Thus while today 3 judge courts can be convened, it can be used less frequently. But this modification to the 3 judge court did not affect the power of a single judge to declare a law unconstitutional. For example, we all know that Sheriff Richard Mack of Arizona was one of the first parties to challenge the Brady law after its adoption. His case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Roll, and this single judge held in Mack v. United States, 856 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz. 1994), that the challenged parts of the Brady law were unconstitutional:
"Pending before the Court is plaintiff Graham County Sheriff Richard Mack's complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), commonly referred to as the Brady Act. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that subsection 922(s)(2) violates the Fifth and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and will enter partial judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that basis."Another recent example of a case where a single federal judge held a law unconstitutional is Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997), where District Judge Shedd of South Carolina declared the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act unconstitutional:
"In this case of first impression the State of South Carolina and its Attorney General (‘the State') challenge the constitutionality of the ‘Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994' (‘the DPPA'), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25, which regulates the dissemination and use of certain information contained in State motor vehicle records, on the grounds that it violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. (FN1) The State seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the DPPA. The United States of America and its Attorney General (‘the United States') have filed a motion to dismiss based on their contention that (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims because of the justiciability concepts of ripeness and standing and, alternatively, (2) these claims fail on their merits because the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress' powers under both the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In turn, the State has moved for summary judgment in its favor. (FN2) After carefully reviewing this matter, the Court concludes that the DPPA is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court will deny the United States' motion to dismiss, grant the State's motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoin the enforcement of the DPPA in the State of South Carolina. (FN3)."These two cases are not the only ones which prove that single federal district judges have authority to declare laws unconstitutional and they can enjoin enforcement of those laws. Further, there are other similar cases. Clearly, the 3 judge court position is groundless and without merit. In short, it is ridiculous.
There is much talk on the Net regarding the alleged "missing" 13th amendment and a related position concerning "titles of nobility." I have followed the development of this research since it first got some notoriety years ago and my views are expressed below.
When Bill Benson and I tried to rip the 16th amendment out of the constitution, I had to immerse myself into the law of ratification of amendments. First, an amendment's ratification is a decision committed to the political branch of the government, Congress. The President and the courts play no role in the ratification process. When an amendment is proposed in the typical manner, states ratify the amendment and send notice of ratification to the Secretary of State. Once a sufficient number of states ratify, the Secretary of State proclaims its adoption. The number of states required to ratify an amendment are not limited to those in the Union at the time of the amendment's proposal. Although there is no litigated decision on the point, the accepted scholars declare that states admitted after the proposal of an amendment must likewise join in the ratification process. It seems that the courts would agree with these scholars.
In reference to the "missing" 13th amendment, I have over the years had a number of people mail me material regarding the issue, which I have studied. In order to prevail on this argument, the proponents must refuse to count states that entered the Union after this amendment was proposed; they limit the number needed for ratification to those in the Union when this amendment was proposed in 1810. But even with this invalid limitation of the number of states needed to ratify, the proponents admit that they cannot prove that Virginia ratified. All they have are published copies of constitutions of the period that include this amendment. You cannot prove that an amendment was ratified without having the actual state ratifications of sufficient number to meet the constitutional threshold (If you wish to read my brief regarding the ratification of constitutional amendments, click here). The proponents do not have this essential proof of ratification. While this issue is an interesting study, there is no substance to it.
But ignoring the problems regarding ratification of this "amendment" and presuming that it was ratified, what would it mean? The advocates of this argument claim that the term, "esquire," is a prohibited "title of nobility" within the scope of this non-ratified amendment. These people then argue as best I can tell that attorneys, having "titles of nobility," are thus agents of some monarch, apparently contending that attorneys really work for the Queen. This fits nicely into the argument made by the "we are Brits" crowd. However, I must note that I have never met an attorney who has met the Queen, let alone been paid by her; but clearly, I have never met the Queen and she certainly sends nothing to me.
To prove their position, the "esquire" proponents quote the definition of this term from Black's law dictionary, often via inaccurate quotes. Here is an accurate quote of the definition of this word from Black's law dictionary, 4th edition (the one I bought while I was in law school). According to this dictionary, this word means: "In English law. A title of dignity next above gentleman, and below knight. Also a title of office given to sheriffs, serjeants, and barristers at law, justices of the peace, and others. 1 Bl.Comm. 406; 3 Steph. Comm. 15, note; Tomlins. On the use of this term in American law, particularly as applied to justices of the peace and other inferior judicial offices, see Christian v. Ashley County, 24 Ark. 151; Com. V. Vance, 15 Serg. & R., Pa., 37." Thus, an "esquire" is lower than a knight; if a knight is not a noble, then clearly an "esquire" could not be a noble.
From Webster's 1828 American Dictionary, the word "esquire" is defined as follows: "Properly, a shield-bearer or armor-bearer, scutifer; an attendant on a knight. Hence in modern times, a title of dignity next in degree below a knight. In England, this title is given to the younger sons of noblemen, to officers of the king's court and of the household, to counselors at law, justices of the peace, while in commission, sheriffs and other gentlemen. In the United States, the title is given to public officers of all degrees, from governors down to justices and attorneys. Indeed the title, in addressing letters, is bestowed on any person at pleasure, and contains no definite description. It is merely an expression of respect." Thus from Websters, we know that in America this term denotes nothing but respect and not a "title of nobility."
The real question which should be asked of the "missing 13th amendment" crowd is this: what is a title of nobility? These advocates simply do not want you to know this meaning because their whole argument would be destroyed and the fraud they are playing exposed. In Black's law dictionary, 4th edition, the word "nobility" is defined as follows: "In English law, a division of the people, comprehending dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts and barons." This same definition then quotes Blackstone's Commentaries as authority for what is a "title of nobility":
"These had anciently duties annexed to their respective honors. They are created either by writ, i.e., by royal summons to attend the house of peers, or by letters patent, i.e., by royal grant of any dignity and degree of peerage; and they enjoy many privileges, exclusive of their senatorial capacity. 1 Bl. Comm. 396."From Webster's American Dictionary of 1828, "nobility" is defined in relevant part as follows: "The qualities which constitute distinction of rank in civil society, according to the customs or laws of the country; that eminence or dignity which a man derives from birth or title conferred, and which places him in an order above common men. In Great Britain, nobility is extended to five ranks, those of duke, marquis, earl, viscount and baron." It can't be questioned that the source for both of the above definitions is Blackstone's Commentaries because he stated at §533 of his work that the nobles "are dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts and barons." Even today, those who are students of nobility agree that there are only five ranks in the peerage.
We clearly know that in England, the nobility consists of "dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts and barons." Precisely where is a knight or even an esquire defined as being a part of the nobility? The truth is that in English law, an esquire is not a part of the nobility. But in America, the term is meaningless. Again, this "esquire" aspect of the "missing 13th amendment" argument is another example of the very bad legal scholarship emanating from the crazy group in this movement known as the "liaryers." They have "titles of stupidity."
Has this argument done damage? I know of a case up in Cincinnati styled United States v. Ed Badley, Gar Bradley and another of Ed's sons. They were indicted in the fall of 1998 for federal tax crimes and they filed pleadings which were predicated upon this "missing" 13th amendment argument. They went to trial pro se in early 1999 and used this and the "non de guerre" issue (names in CAPS) for the 3 weeks that the trial lasted. The jury was back with guilty verdicts in 45 minutes.
Further in reference to this insane argument, I offer the following which is the gist of an e-mail to me regarding this issue:
Very briefly put, the Title of Nobility Amendment (TONA) was proposed in 1810. There is absolutely nothing in the legislative history to indicate that it was written with lawyers (much less bankers) in mind; especially since most of the members of Congress who voted for it were themselves lawyers. In fact, there is very good history that indicates that it was proposed as a direct slap at a Maryland debutante, Betsy Patterson, who purportedly married Jerome Bonaparte, brother to the French emperor and later the king of Westphalia, in 1803 and became the center of mid-Atlantic high society as a result, either being called or actually encouraging people to call her the Duchess of Baltimore. By 1808 she was no longer married to Bonaparte and there might be a small doubt whether there had actually been a marriage, and she gradually slipped into obscurity.If you wish to read a good article regarding the flaws of the "missing 13th amendment" argument, please visit Jol Silversmith's webpage.
Here is my final comment about this issue. I have been engaged in a Net battle with one of the chief proponents of this argument, who has stated as follows:
"I remind you that you are defending your position by quoting English law, and in America, we are dealing with in principle with the spirit of the law. In England Esquire may not be considered a title of nobility, but in America under American principle, Esquire is a title of nobility as it is a privileged class different than the common man."This man has relied upon an old Alabama case, Horst v. Moses, to assert that a mere privilege constitutes a title of nobility. This prompted me to address his completely erroneous contention in the following manner:
Hey ......,XXV. The "Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin" Argument:
During December, 1999, I received some angry e-mail from a female in Colorado who made the argument that those "vile lawyers" had devised a way to steal the title of cars "away from the people" via the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin ("MCO"). According to her, the MCO had been developed as the way to stealthily obtain ownership of all cars in America by the "state," and this scheme was clear proof of some communist plot. Here is a part of her argument:
"Next, the deceitful lawyers dba 'the State' coerce these 'dealers' into stealing the real bill of sale, called the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin and unlawfully converting it into a 'Title', which does not convey lawful ownership of the private car. It's just another little fraud/crime they pull.According to this woman, when she bought her Chevy, she did not receive the "real" title to her car, which is the MCO. She contends that the MCO constitutes the title to her car and that her car is really owned by the state. This is a wild and groundless theory which many believe simply because they refuse to perform any research.
A manufacturer's certificate of origin is "a specified document certifying the country of origin of the merchandise required by certain foreign countries for tariff purposes, it sometimes requires the signature of the consul of the country to which it is destined." Our country ships lots of its products internationally and so does the rest of the world. This document was just simply created by international convention, primarily for tax purposes. As you can see, it is not the title of any object, not even for cars.
Federal regulations deal with this matter. For example, in 19 CFR §181.11, entitled "Certificate of Origin," the following is found:
(a) General. A Certificate of Origin shall be employed to certify that a good being exported either from the United States into Canada or Mexico or from Canada or Mexico into the United States qualifies as an originating good for purposes of preferential tariff treatment under the NAFTA.Cars are big exports for this country and the manufacturers deal with certificates of origin every day. In fact, NAFTA has provisions regarding such certificates at Art. 501, which may be viewed here.
Because car manufacturers provide such certificates for international trade, the states also demand them. In Colorado, the following statute makes a clear distinction between car titles and MCOs:
CRS §42-6-113 - New vehicles - bill of sale - certificate of title.
Upon the sale or transfer by a dealer of a new motor vehicle, such dealer shall, upon the delivery thereof, make, execute, and deliver unto the purchaser or transferee a good and sufficient bill of sale therefor, together with the manufacturer's certificate of origin. Said bill of sale shall be affirmed by a statement signed by such dealer, shall contain or be accompanied by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury in the second degree, as defined in section 18-8-503, C.R.S., shall be in such form as the director may prescribe, and shall contain, in addition to other information which the director may by rule or regulation from time to time require, the make and model of the motor vehicle so sold or transferred, the identification number placed upon the vehicle by the manufacturer for identification purposes, the manufacturer's suggested retail price, and the date of the sale or transfer thereof, together with a description of any mortgage thereon given to secure the purchase price or any part thereof. Upon presentation of such a bill of sale to the director or one of the director's authorized agents, a new certificate of title for the vehicle therein described shall be issued and disposition thereof made as in other cases. The transfer of a motor vehicle which has been used by a dealer for the purpose of demonstration to prospective customers, if such motor vehicle is a new vehicle as defined in section 42-6-102 (8), shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this section.Thus under Colorado law, it is plain that a manufacturer's certificate of origin is different from the title to a car as well as a bill of sale for the same.
The MCO argument is another crazy idea promoted by people who refuse to perform any research. When a car manufacturer builds a car, that company owns it and has title to it. "Title" to personal property like a car is not some document; it is that invisible "bundle of rights" which one has when he owns something. That "bundle of rights" excludes all other parties from possession of the property in question. When a car is purchased, the buyer delivers money to the seller and acquires title to the car, and that title means that he can exclude all other persons from possession of that car. A "bill of sale" is nothing but a document which evidences the fact that title has passed from one party to another. This "bundle of rights" can be divided, and this happens when a car is purchased via financing provided by a bank or other financial institution. When this happens, the bank has an interest in the car and that interest is protected via contractual provisions as well as a financing statement (UCC Form 1) which is filed at a designated state office to show to the rest of the world that the bank has an interest as a secured party in that vehicle. If the loan is paid, the bank's interest is extinguished; if not, it can claim possession of the car.
Certificates of title are nothing but the state's "answer" to the problem of car theft. "Certificate" means according to Black's law dictionary "a written assurance, or official representation, that some act has or has not been done, or some event occurred, or some legal formality complied with." States have enacted laws to provide for "certificates of title" for cars which are issued and given to car owners; they are nothing more than further evidence of ownership of a car and this helps reduce the incidence of car theft; but such a certificate is not "title" to a car. And neither is the MCO.
Lots of flaky arguments float around this country, and the MCO argument is just simply another one promoted by people who do not know what they are talking about.
Additional Note: The above Colorado woman, J.L.: Me..., continues to promote "off-the-wall" legal arguments. She recently stated as follows:
People need to start asking questions about how AGs can bring suits in the first place!!! First of all, when did we the people ask for 'attorney generals'? ... How can an 'AG' bring a suit when they are not the damaged party and they do not have a written contract to 'represent' any of the people in the state? See how these unAmerican attorn-eys trick you?Quite obviously, this woman knows nothing about Attorneys General. The reason that she is mad at a couple of AGs is because she was working for a company promoting a pyramid scheme which the Kansas AG shut down. In any event, in response to her blather that "Nowhere in the constitutions do I see that 'the state' should have an AG," I simply went over to the Kansas and Colorado constitutions posted at several web sites and forwarded to her the constitutional provisions which created the offices of Attorney General in these states. This woman likes to argue law, but whenever she does, she inevitably errs.
Via the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments, both the state and federal governments must provide certain fundamental procedures before life, liberty or property are taken. For those interested in this subject, reading the cases of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972), and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719 (1975), are important in understanding the views of the Supreme Court regarding the due process procedures to which the states are bound. However, one cannot ignore the fact that there are two different due process standards; one standards is applicable to us and the states, and quite another exists for Uncle Sam.
There is a popular position of late that Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970), is the "key" due process case regarding the collection of taxes. This is a very erroneous. If you wish to understand principles of due process in reference to tax matters, the cases of Phillips v. CIR, 283 U.S. 589, 51 S.Ct. 608 (1931), and CIR v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 96 S.Ct. 1062 (1976), are the ones to be read.
There is currently floating around the Net one theory of the Kennedy assassination based upon certain legal documents. According to this idea, Kennedy was assassinated because he was about ready to start issuing silver certificates; to prevent him from doing so, the "powers that be" had him killed. Please understand that what I offer below explaining the flaw of this argument does not mean that I am an apologist for the Fed or banking industry; it should be obvious from my site that I am not. I only offer these comments because this argument demonstrates just one of the completely erroneous arguments which are allegedly based upon the "law" but are not.
When Congress enacts a law, it often delegates authority to enforce and administer the law to some executive official, typically the President. Naturally, the President does not personally attend to such duties and must himself delegate to others within the Executive branch. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, was one of these acts and it permitted the President in §43 to issue silver certificates.
Public Law 673 enacted by Congress in 1950 was similar to many previous ones and it allowed the President to delegate his statutory functions to others within the Executive branch. It provided:
The President of the United States is hereby authorized to designate and empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform, without approval, ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval ratification, or other action of the President: ...Pursuant to this statutory authority, on September 19, 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 10289, which delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury lots of the statutory duties of the President. This executive order provided in part as follows:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 of the act of August 8, 1950, 64 Stat. 419 (Public Law 673, 81st Congress), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:Thereafter, this executive order listed another 8 statutory powers of the President which he was delegating to the Treasury Secretary, the substance of which is not important for this discussion. Please remember that this delegation to the Treasury Secretary was to be exercised "without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President." It should also be noted that this particular executive order did not delegate to the Treasury Secretary the authority to issue silver certificates granted to the President in the 1933 law noted above.
From 1933 until 1963, the President alone possessed the statutory authority to issue silver certificates. But then on June 4, 1963, President Kennedy amended Truman's 1951 Executive Order No. 10289 by Executive Order No. 11110. This particular order read as follows:
AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, it is ordered as follows:By this executive order, the statutory authority of the President to issue silver certificates was delegated to the Treasury Secretary. In Kennedy's administration, the Treasury Secretary was Douglas Dillon, a man from a banking family and a known established "power" in the banking community. Kennedy delegated the authority to issue silver certificates to Dillon and his successors and this power could be exercised "without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President."
The only reasonable conclusion which may be reached based upon the facts are the exact opposite of the argument made on the Net. For some 30 years, the President himself held the power to issue silver certificates. But some 5 months before his assassination, Kennedy delegated this power to Dillon, and via this order, Dillon could do as he pleased with this power. To assert that Kennedy was by Executive Order No. 11110 getting ready to issue silver certificates is contrary to the plain facts. Instead, Kennedy was surrendering this power and delegating it to the Treasury Secretary, who then (and as always) has been someone from the banking industry. There is no substance to this theory on the Net. I cannot understand how this particular order proves that Kennedy was about to issue silver certificates. Where is the proof that Kennedy was anything other than a pawn of the banking community?
Additional Note re EO 11110:
From Jim Ewart at firstname.lastname@example.org
Hi Larry:People should read Jim's book, Money.
XXVIII. United States District Court -vs- district court of the United States.
There is an argument currently making the rounds in the movement regarding a supposed distinction between the terms "United States District Court" and "district court of the United States." It appears that this contention is based in large part upon 28 U.S.C. §132, entitled "Creation and composition of district courts," which provides in part as follows:
"(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record known as the United States District Court for the district."This argument regarding the alleged difference in these two phrases has its origins in the annotations or "revision notes" to this section of the Judicial Code. In both the official US Code and the private publishers' editions of the Code (USCA and USCS), there are annotations below the section which show the origins or source of the particular section. For §132's notes, the following is shown:
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 895; Pub. L. 88-176, Sec. 2, Nov. 13, 1963, 77 Stat. 331.)
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 1, and section 641 of title 48, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions (Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, Sec. 86, 31 Stat. 158; Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 269, Sec. 1, 35 Stat. 838; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 1, 36 Stat. 1087; July 30, 1914, ch. 216, 38 Stat. 580; July 19, 1921, ch. 42, Sec. 313, 42 Stat. 119; Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 220, 43 Stat. 890; Dec. 13, 1926, ch. 6, Sec. 1, 44 Stat. 19).Advocates of this argument limit their examination of the origins of this section to "section 641 of title 48, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions," and erroneously conclude that a "United States District Court" is a territorial court like those established for Hawaii when it was a territory. This is a mistake as explained below; these advocates appear to ignore another source for §132 mentioned in these notes: "title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 1."
Long ago after the Constitution went into effect, federal courts in the original 13 states were created. As States were thereafter admitted into the Union, later acts established courts for those States. By 1868, there were thus a variety of acts scattered through the Statutes at Large which related not only to the creation of these courts, but also other matters relating to the federal courts. These acts were all consolidated into a judicial title when the Revised Statutes were adopted in 1873. That judiciary title of the Revised Statutes cannot be displayed here, so if you are curious and wish to study it, go to a law library which has the Statutes at Large.
But other States were admitted into the Union after 1873, and there were also acts of Congress which created federal courts for those States. By 1909, there were no longer any territories in the continental United States and it became particularly appropriate for all of these judiciary acts to again be consolidated. On March 3, 1911, this was done via the act published at 36 Stat. 1087. Section 1 of this act provided in pertinent part as follows:
"Sec. 1. In each of the districts described in chapter five, there shall be a court called a district court, for which there shall be appointed one judge, to be called a district judge...."The districts described in chapter 5 of this act covered all of the States, some having several judicial districts. Again if interested, please read this long act.
Have these various acts been consistent in the use of the terms "United States District Court" and "district court of the United States"? To determine that consistency, one need only examine the various acts establishing these courts for the last 200 years, and there must be several hundred such acts. Currently, the judicial districts are described in 28 U.S.C. §§81 - 131. At the end of each section, there are "revision notes" which provide the citations to the prior acts regarding the federal courts in that particular State. Review of these prior acts shows that the terms "United States District Court" and "district court of the United States" have been used interchangeably.
Here is an example. Title 28 U.S.C. §116 deals with the federal judicial districts in Oklahoma. The following are the notes to this section:
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 887; Pub. L. 89-526, Sec. 1, Aug. 4, 1966, 80 Stat. 335.)
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 182, 182a (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 101, 36 Stat. 1122; Feb. 20, 1917, ch. 102, 39 Stat. 927; June 13, 1918, ch. 98, 40 Stat. 604; Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 54, 40 Stat. 1184; June 5, 1924, ch. 259, 43 Stat. 387; Jan. 10, 1925, chs. 68, 69, 43 Stat. 730, 731; Feb. 16, 1925, ch. 233, Sec. 1, 43 Stat. 945; May 7, 1926, ch. 255, 44 Stat. 408; Apr. 21, 1928, ch. 395, 45 Stat. 440; Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 539, 45 Stat. 1518; June 28, 1930, ch. 714, 46 Stat. 829; May 13, 1936, ch. 386, 49 Stat. 1271; Aug. 12, 1937, ch. 595, 50 Stat. 625).Two of the statutes noted above were the predecessors of §116; see the acts of "Jan. 10, 1925, chs. 68, 69, 43 Stat. 730, 731." The first act read as follows:
"Chap. 68 – An Act To amend the Act establishing the eastern judicial district of Oklahoma, to establish a term of the United States District Court for the Eastern Judicial District of Oklahoma at Pauls Valley, Oklahoma.The following act also related to the very same courts:
"Chap. 69: An Act Providing for the holding of the United States district and circuit courts at Poteau, Oklahoma.It is easy to surmise why these statutes were adopted. The eastern district of Oklahoma is very large. Pauls Valley is south of Oklahoma City and Poteau is almost on the Arkansas state line. Obviously, people in these two communities wanted federal courts to at least visit those cities and conduct court, rather than those folks having to travel to some place like Muskogee. Congress responded and adopted these laws. Most likely, a Congressman from Poteau drafted the law at Chap. 69 while one from Pauls Valley drafted Chap. 68. The local folks obviously had to reserve local state courtrooms for use by the federal courts. In any event, these two laws regarding courts in the very same district used these terms interchangeably. This happens even today; see 7 USC §7468 (contains both phrases, "district court of the United States" and "United States district court"). If you wish to read more, simply perform a word search at FindLaw for "United States District Court" and "district court of the United States."
What happened with the names of the federal district courts is very easy to recount. Many single acts creating these courts back in the 19th century simply created federal "district courts" for specified States. The 1873 Revised Statutes' judiciary title also simply named these courts "district courts," and this was continued in the 1911 act. Based solely on the 1911 act, what Congress had created was just simply "district courts" located in a variety of places identified by law, i.e. "district courts" located in the various States. However, other acts of Congress identified these courts as "United States District Courts" although sometimes they were also identified generically as "district courts of the United States." The designation made by the law, just simply "district court," was not as formal as "United States District Court."
But finally in 1948 when Congress was about ready to formally adopt Title 28, the revisors obviously noted that the term "district court" was not very formal. Why refer to federal courts in the law as simply "district courts" when they quite obviously needed a formal name? When Title 28 was adopted in June, 1948, a nomenclature change was made. Whereas before federal courts had been simply called "district courts" in the various acts consolidating the judicial acts, now in this new Code they were given a formal name: "United States District Courts." If you wish to understand what the titles of the Code are and how they were created, including Title 28, read "Titles of the Code."
Some may be interested in this issue, but it clearly appears to lack any substance. As more crazy ideas arise in the Freedom Movement, I will address them.
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