In Politics and Administration, Goodnow criticized the constitutional separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and suggested instead a two-part division, between politics and administration. The traditional system, he argued, interfered with the national government's efficient operation and kept it limited in scope. His system, by contrast, would free up administration from political interference, allowing administrators wide discretion to regulate the complex modern economy without interference from politicians. Politics, he contended, was "polluted" and full of "bias," whereas administration was all about the pursuit of "truth." He was among the first to join Woodrow Wilson in calling for a powerful central bureaucracy, insulated from political control and equipped with expert authority to enact and enforce regulations.

What does this have to do with the courts today? Goodnow considered courts to be part of the administrative machinery, which distinguished his argument from many other Progressives' and makes it highly relevant to the politics of the 21st century. Administration, he claimed, involves both the "administration of government" (by agencies) and the "administration of justice" (by courts). Administration—made up of agencies and courts—is modern government's focus and the primary means by which Progressivism would be realigned, free from the impeding forms of the Constitution. As he wrote in Comparative Administrative Law (1893), the book that first drew attention to him, "the great problems of modern public law are almost exclusively administrative in character. While the age that has passed was one of constitutional, the present age is one of administrative reform."

Even though "administrative" courts and agencies are insulated from political control, Goodnow insisted that they should not be confined merely to implementing policies determined by the people's elected representatives: in interpreting the law, courts and agencies would share in its making. Courts, especially, would not simply be an umpire. Goodnow wanted the courts to be involved in pitching and batting as well. Thus he called for unelected judges who would make law through constitutional interpretation, and unelected bureaucrats who would make policy after congressional delegation to them of legislative powers.

In bringing Goodnow's long out-of-print book to us, Transaction performs a great service—a service that it has repeated with several vital Progressive-era works such as Wilson's Congressional Government and Constitutional Government in the United States, Croly's Progressive Democracy, and Walter Weyl's The New Democracy, to name a few. Other important works are expected in the near future, including The Stakes of Diplomacy by Walter Lippmann and The Business of the Supreme Court by Felix Frankfurter and James Landis. These reprints come with useful new introductions; Sidney A. Pearson's for Constitutional Government and Progressive Democracy are especially worth reading.

John A. Rohr's introduction to Politics and Administration is also quite good. Rohr capably identifies the philosophical inspiration behind Goodnow's assault on the separation of powers: the German philosopher Hegel. "Because of its grounding in the principle of separation of powers," Rohr explains, "the Constitution of the United States would present difficulties for any unity-seeking Hegelian. Goodnow was no exception." This clear-sighted observation is welcome from a writer who has made questionable arguments for the constitutionality of the administrative state. But readers can certainly benefit from Rohr's analysis of Goodnow, and especially from the renewed availability of Politics and Administration, truly a landmark work in our constitutional decline.