stija
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Furthermore, rather than vainly argue against hopelessly ignorant government workers who think those in states of the Union are NOT STATUTORY aliens (on a government form), another option is to check “Other” on the SS-5 and explain your exact status. This may be a less confrontational approach, but will result in the same CSP code sought.
That’s my point. Select ‘Other – Constitutional citizen domiciled in Alabama’ and off we go. I sent a letter to the SSA public inquiry asking what is required for this election. Still waiting. I know what is required, as i can read instructions and know the law, but i want something in writing from them confirming it before i head to the local SSA office to effectuate my election.
Neo, a U.S. citizen, a person domiciled and born in D.C. can be a nontaxpayer too. As you are aware, and i know you are, a tax status is not the determinant factor of a liability.
Now having said that, a U.S. Citizen living and working in D.C. can be a resident nontaxpayer. The issue is not what our civil statuses are man, the issue is that information returns get filed on us. Now, and follow my logic, let’s say this same U.S. Citizen in D.C. has his payer file an information return such as a W2 (pursuant to 6041) on him to the IRS and SSA. At the end of the tax year, when this poor soul files a resident form such as 1040 (or other personal statement) to explain himself, he will get a frivolous penalty assessed on him. Why? Because IRS received information returns and is doing its job–assessment and collection of income taxes on information returns gathered under the currently enacted law.
Thus frivolous penalties have NOTHING (ZERO) to do with CSP codes and SSA communicating with IRS, or viceversa, and EVERYTHING with information returns having been filed activating/starting the assessment and collection process in accordance with the IRC.
I fully understand what you are trying to do. At one point i contemplated it too. Then i realized that i neither want to participate in SS games nor can i blame the IRS for doing its job. It’s the entities that file information returns that initiate it all. Thus it matters not what your status is or what you elected when you filed. What matters is that the numbers do not match–IRS information returns say one thing and you are claiming that what they have is not income, when IN FACT anything reporting on a W2 or 1099 IS INCOME otherwise it could not be reported.
If IRS has received information returns and your claims are not congruent with what they received, you WILL GET a frivolous penalty notice NO MATTER who you are, what your code is with the SSA, or what you file to explain yourself. The IRS is JUST DOING ITS JOB.
That’s the ruse.
As far as the other issue goes–being locked out of society if completely exiting their databases–well, that’s something that we have to teach them one by one by private actions against anyone who discriminates against us based on our political choices. Soon enough, one won’t be able to do anything without being a ‘U.S. person’ and all U.S. persons have to use SSN, or other identifying numbers. Thus being a LAATW or Other on a SS-5 form really does not matter at all when the bank you will bank at will not allow you to bank there if you are not a U.S. person (a federal legal status/office) and use a federal identifying number (account # for that office).
So what’s it matter whether i am a LAATW or Other with the SSA when i go to the bank and ask them to open up an account for my Delaware corporate entity without an identifying federal number and federal legal election tied to that entity??
In other words, i show up and i want to open an acct. # for Stija LLC (delaware LLC) in Arizona without:
a. Stija LLC being a federal entity; and
b. Stija LLC not identified with federal acct # of any sort.
The bank won’t do it because, as far as they understand the laws, they have to have a TIN (or EIN, or other federal number) as ‘required’ by federal laws.
@Neo,
I see what you’re saying. Basically a first amendment choice of affiliation–or just a choice YOU have. But you chose your political affiliation long ago, when you affiliated politically with the people of your state and domiciled your house and family within its geographical location.
On their forms, you are just electing, or declaring is more accurate of a term, your civil status (commensurate with your political choices and affiliations you already made) in relation to the owner/creator of the forms and their geographical (not political) jurisdiction.
The way i see this really is that it fundamentally doesn’t matter to me if i am a federal civil status A, B, or C. It’s still a federal public status man. If one of those A, B or C choices were a nonresident alien or foreign person, then i’d like that one–but that’s not the case. It’s like saying, what kind of a federal taxpayer do you want to be: A, B, or C.
This is why the SSA claims that an American Samoan is a “U.S. Citizen for SSA purposes” in their own POMS–because it is civil citizenship and not political citizenship they are referring to.
The whole issue is that they hide a State Citizen’s eligibility for a LAATW status by not even addressing it as a possibility in their policy called POMS. They can’t address it because it is a political choice for a State Citizen. However, the Feds can appoint a civil alien status for participating franchisees who are of foreign nationality because the Feds have this authority which the State Citizens granted them in art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4.
I agree with everything but the above underlined.
The LAATW election is not a political choice but a civil choice and they can address it–they addressed it in Brushaber in T.D.2313. But they do not acknowledge it readily on their forms, publications, or website material because they dont want state citizens to see it. IF block 5 elections were purely political elections (it does have a political component for some persons), then i would agree with you that LAATW is a political choice and feds cannot address it. But that’s not the case.
For state citizens a status election on block 5 is a civil choice dependent upon their i) geographical domicile and their work eligibility may be commensurate with their ii) political status (as i’ve come to believe that these elections are two fold–evidenced by I-9 reqs for ID and work eligibility (and passport does BOTH)). One is really picking a civil status which may or may not be work eligibile (politically dependent only for state political citizens). For other state domiciliaries (pol. citizens excepted), the election is dependent upon their geographical location as well as their federal civil status granted through I:8:4 (which may be considered as their political status – foreign national with permanent residence or work authorization in the US).
They may be conflating state citizens political status on a civil status in block 5, intentionally or unintentionally, but those elections are civil and their policies and procedures are not set up to accommodate for dealing with ‘domestic’ legal aliens–such as nonresidents, noncitizens, etc. (civil of course).
Then, there’s the possibility that block 5 status election of “Other – Ca citizen and domiciliary” may be a valid option. Still waiting for a response from the SSA.
The above is my opinions based on how i understand these issues.
I think that its a dangerous presumption to conclude that the judge is thinking, or aware of the fact that this was a deliberate consent to the franchise. In fact, the plaintiffs objected on grounds that it was an inherent natural right and not a franchise privilege. Unless of course, the plaintiffs entered court through IRC statutory provisions as employers and empowered the court as such. Which is very plausible I guess…
On a different note, I disagree SSAct is a franchise. Its a simple tax, it confers no rights except a liability, and no one has any vested interest in any moneys they doled out.
My concern about the above is that some of these justices may not see the distinction between natural rights and vocational/public licensed rights. That’s all.
Well definitions for the whole SSA are at 1301. Definitions I am interested in are located in 410, which is really section 210 of the original act of 1935–or FICA taxes. What subchapter is FUCA under?? Unemployment for federal employees has been repealed.
And then there is sections 418, which i think is unconstitutional really. It makes states agree irrevocably to force a federal taxpayer office on its public offices–thus making the individual accept both an appointment to state office as well as a federal taxpayer office. WOW.
Now in my daily readings, i came across this, from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis 301 U.S. 548.
1936, c. 49, 49 Stat. 1109, 1113) and only $29,000,000 of the $49,000,000 authorized for the following year. Act of June 22, 1936, c. 689, 49 Stat. 1597, 1605. The appropriations, when made, were not specifically out of the proceeds of the employment tax, but out of any moneys in the Treasury. Other sections of the title prescribe the method by which the payments are to be made to the state (§ 302) and also certain conditions to be established to the satisfaction of the Social Security Board before certifying the propriety of a payment to the Secretary of the Treasury. § 303. They are designed to give assurance to the Federal Government that the moneys granted by it will not be expended for purposes alien to the grant, and will be used in the administration of genuine unemployment compensation laws.
The assault on the statute proceeds on an extended front. Its assailants take the ground that the tax is not an excise; that it is not uniform throughout the United States, as excises are required to be; that its exceptions are so many and arbitrary as to violate the Fifth Amendment; that its purpose was not revenue, but an unlawful invasion of the reserved powers of the states, and that the states, in submitting to it, have yielded to coercion and have abandoned governmental functions which they are not permitted to surrender.
The objections will be considered seriatim, with such further explanation as may be necessary to make their meaning clear.
First. The tax, which is described in the statute as an excise, is laid with uniformity throughout the United States as a duty, an impost or an excise upon the relation of employment.
1. We are told that the relation of employment is one so essential to the pursuit of happiness that it may not be burdened with a tax. Appeal is made to history. From the precedents of colonial days, we are supplied with
illustrations of excises common in the colonies. They are said to have been bound up with the enjoyment of particular commodities. Appeal is also made to principle or the analysis of concepts. An excise, we are told, imports a tax upon a privilege; employment, it is said, is a right, not a privilege, from which it follows that employment is not subject to an excise. Neither the one appeal nor the other leads to the desired goal.
As to the argument from history: doubtless there were many excises in colonial days and later that were associated, more or less intimately, with the enjoyment or the use of property. This would not prove, even if no others were then known, that the forms then accepted were not subject to enlargement. Cf. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union, 96 U. S. 1, 96 U. S. 9; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 158 U. S. 591; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 199 U. S. 448, 199 U. S. 449. But, in truth, other excises were known, and known since early times. Thus, in 1695 (6 & 7 Wm. III, c. 6), Parliament passed an act which granted “to His Majesty certain Rates and Duties upon Marriage, Births and Burials,” all for the purpose of “carrying on the War against France with Vigour.” See Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 603, 609, 85 N.E. 545. No commodity was affected there. The industry of counsel has supplied us with an apter illustration where the tax was not different in substance from the one now challenged as invalid. In 1777, before our Constitutional Convention, Parliament laid upon employers an annual “duty” of 21 shillings for “every male Servant” employed in stated forms of work. [Footnote 3]
Revenue Act of 1777, 17 George III, c. 39. [Footnote 4] The point is made as a distinction that a tax upon the use of male servants was thought of as a tax upon a luxury. Davis v. Boston & Maine R. Co., supra. It did not touch employments in husbandry or business. This is to throw over the argument that historically an excise is a tax upon the enjoyment of commodities. But the attempted distinction, whatever may be thought of its validity, is inapplicable to a statute of Virginia passed in 1780. There, a tax of three pounds, six shillings and eight pence was to be paid for every male tithable above the age of twenty-one years (with stated exceptions), and a like tax for “every white servant whatsoever, except apprentices under the age of twenty one years.” 10 Hening’s Statutes of Virginia, p. 244. Our colonial forbears knew more about ways of taxing than some of their descendants seem to be willing to concede. [Footnote 5]
The historical prop failing, the prop or fancied prop of principle remains. We learn that employment for lawful gain is a “natural” or “inherent” or “inalienable” right, and not a “privilege” at all. But natural rights, so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights of less importance. [Footnote 6] An excise is not limited to vocations or activities
that may be prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities pursued as of common right. What the individual does in the operation of a business is amenable to taxation just as much as what he owns, at all events if the classification is not tyrannical or arbitrary. “Business is as legitimate an object of the taxing powers as property.” Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan. 151, 154 (per Brewer, J.), 1 Pac. 288. Indeed, ownership itself, as we had occasion to point out the other day, is only a bundle of rights and privileges invested with a single name. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577. “A state is at liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all collectively, or to separate the faggots and lay the charge distributively.”Ibid. Employment is a business relation, if not itself a business. It is a relation without which business could seldom be carried on effectively. The power to tax the activities and relations that constitute a calling considered as a unit is the power to tax any of them. The whole includes the parts. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 288 U. S. 267, 288 U. S. 268.
The subject matter of taxation open to the power of the Congress is as comprehensive as that open to the power of the states, though the method of apportionment may at times be different. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.” Art. 1, § 8. If the tax is a direct one, it shall be apportioned according to the census or enumeration. If it is a duty, impost, or excise, it shall be uniform throughout the United States. Together, these classes include every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty. Cf. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 288 U. S. 403,288 U. S. 405; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 240 U. S. 12. Whether the tax is to be
classified as an “excise” is in truth not of critical importance. If not that, it is an “impost” (Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, 158 U. S. 622, 158 U. S. 625;Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soble, 7 Wall. 433, 74 U. S. 445), or a “duty” (Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 75 U. S. 546, 75 U. S. 547; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,157 U. S. 429, 157 U. S. 570; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 178 U. S. 46). A capitation or other “direct” tax it certainly is not.
“Although there have been from time to time intimations that there might be some tax which was not a direct tax nor included under the words ‘duties, imposts and excises,’ such a tax for more than one hundred years of national existence has as yet remained undiscovered, notwithstanding the stress of particular circumstances has invited thorough investigation into sources of powers.”
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 157 U. S. 557. There is no departure from that thought in later cases, but rather a new emphasis of it. Thus, inThomas v. United States, 192 U. S. 363, 192 U. S. 370, it was said of the words “duties, imposts and excises” that
“they were used comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture and sale of certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occupations and the like.”
At times taxpayers have contended that the Congress is without power to lay an excise on the enjoyment of a privilege created by state law. The contention has been put aside as baseless. Congress may tax the transmission of property by inheritance or will, though the states and not Congress have created the privilege of succession. Knowlton v. Moore, supra, p. 178 U. S. 58. Congress may tax the enjoyment of a corporate franchise, though a state and not Congress has brought the franchise into being. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 220 U. S. 155. The statute books of the states are strewn with illustrations of taxes laid on
occupations pursued of common right. [Footnote 7] We find no basis for a holding that the power in that regard which belongs by accepted practice to the legislatures of the states, has been denied by the Constitution to the Congress of the nation.
So how does one explain this? Is it maybe because employment is the wrong term or activity to describe one as being involved in? Should the term contract or lawful conspiracy for a common goal be used instead?? I understand that the state may license medical professionals or attorneys for the common good of the public to create some general standards to avoid malpractice and injury to the same, but that statement that natural rights are subject to taxation, is just either plain wrong or deceiving.
I understand that this is a suit of someone who probably agreed to being an employer employing people and perhaps lost on that issue alone, and also an employer of artificial corporate capacity, but again, that natural rights are just as easily reached by excise taxes just does not make sense to me. Maybe direct taxes, and i could see that in a way, but excises?? I just don’t get it.
Is it possible that even these justices do not get the basic and fundamental concepts and are getting it wrong sometimes?
Could it be that they are just simple skimming over the cases they reference and re-reading their opinions without looking at the facts as alleged and then misapplying them to other cases?? Like how can the Congress tax a Delaware corporation when Delaware law requires their corproate citizens to remain foreign to any United States jurisdiction other than Delaware??? Where’s the legal nexus?? Did this justice mean to say that Congress can lay an excise on the subject/activity that a state corporation decides to partake in and NOT on its privilege of corporate existence??
What the hell is going on here. This opinion, like a few others, does not make me hopeful in any way. If they did not get this back in the early days, there is no way that they will get it today.
I have located Social Security Act of 1934 as enacted. It is attached and quite revealing.
I would advise anyone to read Title II, VIII, IX and X and the DEFINITIONS for the terms of art in those titles. Each title has its own definitions.
Question: Has this SSA been repealed or amended? And if so, where would i be able to find these amendments as enacted in the statutes at large or public laws??
Thanks.
I found a nice link that explains everything one needs to know about taxation (whether through IRC or SSA). Crucial to understanding what this link actually says is understanding the fundamental principles protected by the U.S. Constitution.
Link: http://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation26.html#f569
The above link contains all the supporting case law that makes for very interesting and revealing reading.
Oh and a quick very important question, what happens to the SS employer-side funds that are paid into the Treasury by a state of the union? Are they appropriated somewhere, ear-marked, or does Congress have complete discretion on how to use these funds?
I’ve read SCOTUS decisions from 1930-40 and at that time it was neither earmarked nor appropriated buy was lumped with all the other taxes to be used by the United States as they please–to further the “general welfare” of course.
Wow…i don’t know how to quote this properly. However i try to format it, it does something else and either quotes only the first line or everything.
So there.
I was reading Title 41 definitions in section 410 and came across this:
(a) EmploymentThe term “employment” means any service performed after 1936 and prior to 1951 which was employment for the purposes of this subchapter under the law applicable to the period in which such service was performed, and any service, of whatever nature, performed after 1950….(c ) if it is service, regardless of where or by whom performed, which is designated as employment or recognized as equivalent to employment under an agreement entered into under section 433 of this title; except that, in the case of service performed after 1950, such term shall not include—….(7) Service performed in the employ of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing which is wholly owned thereby, except that this paragraph shall not apply in the case of—(A) service included under an agreement under section 418 of this title,So naturally i went to read 418…(a) Purpose of agreement
(1) The Commissioner of Social Security shall, at the request of any State, enter into an agreement with such State for the purpose of extending the insurance system established by this subchapter to services performed by individuals as employees of such State or any political subdivision thereof. Each such agreement shall contain such provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, as the State may request.(b ) DefinitionsFor the purposes of this section—(1) The term “State” does not include the District of Columbia, Guam, or American Samoa.(2) The term “political subdivision” includes an instrumentality of(A) a State,(B ) one or more political subdivisions of a State, or(C ) a State and one or more of its political subdivisions.(3) The term “employee” includes an officer of a State or political subdivision.(4) The term “retirement system” means a pension, annuity, retirement, or similar fund or system established by a State or by a political subdivision thereof.(5) The term “coverage group” means
(A) employees of the State other than those engaged in performing service in connection with a proprietary function;(B ) employees of a political subdivision of a State other than those engaged in performing service in connection with a proprietary function;(C ) employees of a State engaged in performing service in connection with a single proprietary function; or(D) employees of a political subdivision of a State engaged in performing service in connection with a single proprietary function. If under the preceding sentence an employee would be included in more than one coverage group by reason of the fact that he performs service in connection with two or more proprietary functions or in connection with both a proprietary function and a nonproprietary function, he shall be included in only one such coverage group. The determination of the coverage group in which such employee shall be included shall be made in such manner as may be specified in the agreement. Persons employed under section 709 of title 32, who elected under section 6 of the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 to remain covered by an employee retirement system of, or plan sponsored by, a State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be employees of the State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and (notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph), shall be deemed to be a separate coverage group. For purposes of this section, individuals employed pursuant to an agreement, entered into pursuant to section 1624 of title 7 or section 499n of title 7, between a State and the United States Department of Agriculture to perform services as inspectors of agricultural products may be deemed, at the option of the State, to be employees of the State and (notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph) shall be deemed to be a separate coverage group.So this confirms that a state of the union is not the state as that term is ordinarily defined for purposes of SSA. Then it also proves that states can enter into agreements with the feds to extend SSA coverage to its own state officers and employees other than those performing proprietary functions–non essential state work or occupying a state political/public office.Well this throws a small wrench into my plans, as it seems that states can REQUEST to participate but:1. I do not have anything in my possession proving that such proper request was made;2. I do not see any evidence that even if such request was made properly that the funds/taxes collected are not paid into the U.S. Treasury, thus violating the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because, as we know, these are pure taxes and not entitlements or rights of any sort and can by unilaterally changed by the Congressional decree to serve the general interests of the U.S.For the purposes of this subchapter—
Thanks but those are the court rules I speak of above. Unless it is there somewhere and I just cannot see it.
The appendix, published under the provisions of section 9 of the Internal Revenue Code, is divided into four parts. Part I consists of tables of reference to internal revenue statutes. Tables A and B have been described above. Table C cites the statutes expressly repealed, in whole or in part, together with the repealing statutes. Table D cites the statutes expressly amended or reenacted, with the amending or reenacting statutes. The derivation of the sections of the Revised Statutes relating to internal revenue is shown in table E. Mr. W. H. McClenon, of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Con-
gress, rendered indispensable aid in the preparation of these tables, as well as of the Code generally.Part II of the appendix contains the provisions of the Constitutionof the United States relating to taxation.From IRC of 1939 pdf attached – page iv Preface.Where can i find this Part II of the appendix?It is not in the pdf, and if i google IRC appendix it takes me to Tax Court rules.Help would be greatly appreciated.Let me ask you this….are you aware of any 10th Amendment case law that is more recent and more relevant than Wirtz, National League of Cities and Garcia?
I would love to peruse it and report back.
Read the quote from New York v. United States above.
Then read Wirtz, National League of Cities, and then Garcia case law.
I am not going to do your homework for you by reading the cases and quoting the relevant sections for you to see.
I did present the case law above – so do your homework as i did mine.
The SCOTUS in Wirtz, National League of Cities and Garcia explains that municipalities can be regulated by Congressional decree pursuant to art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1.
However states as states (political entities referenced in the constitution) cannot be regulated by Congressional decree in said constitutional sections.
My research shows that municipalities are corporate entities created under legislative authority granted by the states to political electors who by an election of 2/3 of the community of more than 1500 people elect to create and run these municipalities (public corporate cities/towns) for their personal goals/pursuit of happiness.
Congress CAN regulate directly these municipalities according to the above quoted case law from New York v. United States.
Is there something that anyone knows, case law or other legal evidence that can dispute that as not true?
Please provide it or the above evidence stays as conclusive – ie. Congress CAN regulate state municipalities by Congressional decree pursuant to general welfare clause of the U.S. Constitution (per Wirtz and Garcia opinions above).
Thanks.
Are municipalities and cities political subdivisions of the state – a state as a political entity, ie the people, the government and its territory?
So far my research shows that they are not considered to be “states” (of course) but rather municipal/public corporate entities run for profit basically and funded through the sales taxes. I ask, because it seems that scotus justices are under the impression that Congress can legislate for municipalities as employers under the U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl 1 (general welfare). Which i agree with but only on the premise that municipalities VOLUNTARILY agree/consent to that legislation/regulation – and not as a requirement.
Is it possible that scotus justices could be wrong on this – Congress having authority to regulate state municipalities and generally for every entity within the union EXCEPT the states as states – ie political entities protected by the 10th amendment?
I am reading Title 9 of Arizona Revised Statutes dealing with Cities and Towns and it seems that they are basically public corporations duly authorized and incorporated in the states by the actions of ‘qualified community electors’ who vote to incorporate as a town/city for their purpose. What are qualified community electors?? They are not defined anywhere…am i to assume it is political citizen authorized to vote?
9-101. Incorporation; definition
A. When two-thirds of the qualified electors residing in a community containing a population of fifteen hundred or more inhabitants or in a community within ten miles of the boundary of a national park or monument that contains a population of five hundred or more persons petition the board of supervisors, setting forth the metes and bounds of the community, and the name under which the petitioners desire to be incorporated, and praying for the incorporation of the community into a city or town, and the board is satisfied that two-thirds of the qualified electors residing in the community have signed the petition, it shall, by an order entered of record, declare the community incorporated as a city or town.
Agreed. By extension, the same argument similarly applies to citizens of a state, who are, after all, ALSO “officers of the state” as jurors and voters.
I would agree as far as we are talking about political citizens – constituents – and state corporations and other statutory citizens are NOT constituents. From my reading of New York v. United States, as the Justice O’Connor explains in his opinion, state employers can be subject to regulation by Congress – but what he omits in his opinion because not substantive to the issue presented for review, is that these employers are state public statutory citizens (corporations, trusts, etc) and NOT state employers discharging an essential political duty – such as employers discharging one of the essential duties of legislative, judicial or executive agency.
Schools, hospitals, bottling water, etc., are all cases dealing with public rights available to all private parties (one need not be a political citizen to open up a hospital or school, or even resident in the state) – should they choose to partake of these endeavours – and thus to not tax or regulate such state business endeavours is to provide an unfair advantage and discriminate against private parties involved in like activities. See below:
Most of our recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have concerned the authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws. The Court’s jurisprudence in this area has traveled an unsteady path. See Maryland v.Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968) (state schools and hospitals are subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976) (overrulingWirtz ) (state employers are not subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities ) (state employers are once again subject to Fair Labor Standards Act). See also New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946); Fry v. United States,421 U. S. 542 (1975); Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U. S. 505 (1988); Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra.
New York v. United States 505 U.S. 144, at 160
It is also a violation of most state constitutions and statutes to simultaneously be a federal officer and a state officer at the same time.
I would add that it is an impossibility – two being products/creations of two distinct political sovereigns.
The more i think about this strategically, this hypothetical case needs ONLY argue on grounds that Congressional policy in IRC does not impose a requirement on essential (read legislative, judicial, executive – state political parties/agancies) employers ANY requirement at all; and that if it did the law would in fact be unconstitutional on SOOOOO many levels – and then just enumerate a few – and explain that they need not be addressed because, as just argued, the IRC has no such requirement, and IN FACT THE IRC IS NOT THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, but state’s IMPROPER/UNCONSTITUTIONAL construction, interpretation and administration is!!
I say the above because i am afraid that if one brings other arguments that are indeed obsolete (because no need to argue beside IRC and 16th Amendment intent – clear language and intent of such langauge), one risks the opposition focusing on these IRRELEVANT other arguments and possibly confuse the court by:
1. confusing state essential employers with other state statutory employers (corp, LLCs, trusts, education, hospitals, etc)
2. misdirecting the courts attention onto a path that ACTUALLY allows taxation of such employers – see 1.
3. allow opposition to distract the court with arguments in 1. and 2. and thus avoiding the CLEAR and UNAMBIGUOUS legal evidence in IRC which collects revenue from EXISTING Congressionally created subjects/employers/domestic corp etc.
To repeat myself: THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW IS NOT WHAT CONGRESS CAN DO – BUT STATE’S MISAPPLICATION AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL BODY OF LAW. I don’t want to distract court from the real issue, by spending time on irrelevant matters and taking the court on a mental masturbatory trip into the “what if” land.
Justice Thomas, in my opinion the strictest constitutionalist and arguably the best jurist on the high court, would start with the clear language of Congressional policy – cardinal rule #1 of statutory construction/interpretation. If language clear, no need to go to rule #2.
Cardinal canon of statutory interpretation/construction # 2 says that if the language creates some ambiguity and can be construed to create doubts, the next step is to check the Congressional intent of the statute in question by perusing Congressional Record and the debates in re: to the body of law.
And i STRONGLY believe that that is the correct approach here and one need not argue any deeper – except perhaps mention that any other construction no congruent with #1 and #2 is to pervert the constitutional framework and an injustice to the document.
Does that make sense? Basically, i am afraid that if one were to start arguing more than necessary, would be to allow the opponent to focus defense on these less crucial and and unnecessary arguments.
