fg_admin
Forum Replies Created
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7. Possessions are part of US2, because they are subject to the whims of Congress. They are listed in the definition of “the States” found in 4 U.S.C. 110 and hence, are at least STATUTORY “States”. The fact that they are presently self-governing doesn’t mean they HAVE to be, or that Congress could NOT change that relation. Hence, they are part of US2. They are treated differently than territories and their people are not statutory “citizens”, but they are still part of US2 unless and until they issue their OWN passports as an independent nation.
10. As we said, please post the letter received from the SSA on the subject with personal information redacted and we will change the Resignation document. Until then, we don’t care what your opinion is. We only operate on evidence and facts.
12. Public property can only be held or used by public offices. The SSN is property of the OFFICE and not the OFFICER. Any use of the number or association with the name of a human causes the human to volunteer to represent the office. The number cannot be used or included in a voter registration, because if it is, the voter registration serves the dual purpose of a federal employment application. This is covered in:
About SSNs and TINS on Government Forms and Correspondence, Form #05.012DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/AboutSSNsAndTINs.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
The bible says Christians CAN’T have a king. That means they CAN’T have a domicile within the jurisdiction of any man-made government or any civil status under statutory law. People in the kingdom of heaven fall in this category, as do “transient foreigners” and homeless people. If you don’t like a domicile in the Kingdom of Heaven, what would you replace it with and still comply with the biblical requirement to NOT have a domicile within the jurisdiction/protection of a king or civil ruler?
13. See our earlier response. We won’t commit to the changes at this point.
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We agree that the diagrams add a lot of value. We didn’t make them, but the author did a GREAT job. The author is a frequenter of these forums, in fact.
1. We agree. A footnote might be helpful.
2. No. The Constitution forbids dividing any state or creating a state within a state. See Article 4, Section 3, clause 1
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiv3. 4 U.S.C. 105-109 is what is called the “Buck Act”. It institutes income taxes within federal territories ONLY. It does NOT impose income taxes within federal enclaves, federal possessions, or states of the Union. 26 USC 7701(a)(9) defines “United States” ONLY in its geographic sense, but the I.R.C. uses it in MORE than this sense. There are TWO senses in which “United States” is used in the I.R.C.: 1. In its geographic (territorial) sense; 2. When referencing United States as a legal person and federal corporation. 26 USC 864(c )(3) identifies “United States” within its LEGAL and not GEOGRAPHICAL context, for instance.
4. Agreed.
5. Nowhere that we have found in revenue statutes. See:
http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/Discovery/Deposition/Section%2014.htm6. Don’t know. We didn’t do the diagram.
7. Geographical definitions are found at:
http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/Discovery/Deposition/Section%2014.htm
People in outlying possessions are called “nationals but not citizens of the United States” per 8 USC 1452. See also the Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). Therefore, they SHOULD be included in US2.
8. In our opinion, the Resignation is the ONLY method we are aware of to properly and completely update one’s status and build an administrative record of the change in status. If you come up with a better way, please inform us how and why it will accomplish the same goal.
9. The sample SS-5 prefilled AMENDED form is available at:
SS-5, Form #06.031
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
Please don’t ask us questions about that form. We are NOT responsible for SEDM content.
10. Please post your response letter from SSA so that the Resignation can be improved. Until we see the evidence, we can’t and won’t act.
11. Absolutely not. The problem is that the CONTEXT for terms on the DS-11 form are NOT defined. They need to be defined so that no judge or administrator can presume a context (statutory v. constitutional) that will benefit them or bring the application unknowingly and non-consensually within federal civil jurisdiction. The way things are now, the form APPEARS to use the POLITICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL context, but those accepting the form PRESUME the STATUTORY context. This approach, which Orwell called “double think” needs to be presented by creating an administrative record that PREVENTS such abuses.
12. “Tacit declaration”, which would include an affidavit of domicile outside the statutory “United States”. This is what the Legal Notice of Change in Domicile/Citizenship does.
13. No. These are correct when applied ONLY to statutory U.S. citizens. The W-8 path could be added, or perhaps a different diagram could be provided for state citizens not occupying a public office. The diagram was created by a public officer in the national government, and this diagram fit him but not most other members. However, the diagram only describes the duties OF that public office, and not the PRIVATE business activities of the officer when off duty.
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Here is the 18 USC version of money transmission:
18 U.S.C. 1960
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1960The above code section falls under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 95, Racketeering:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-95 -
The Money Transmission Act mentioned above and sought to be enforced says the following:
California Financial Code
Section 2031.(a) No person other than a corporation or limited liability company may apply for or be issued a license.
(B ) No person other than the following may be issued a license:
(1) A corporation or limited liability company organized under the laws of this state.
(2) A corporation, other than a corporation organized under the laws of this state, that is qualified to transact intrastate business in this state under Chapter 21 (commencing with Section 2100) of Division 1 of Title 1 of the Corporations Code.
(3) A limited liability company, other than a limited liability company organized under the laws of this state, that is qualified to transact intrastate business in this state under Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 17450) of Title 2.5 of the Corporations Code, except that a limited liability company that is organized outside the United States shall not be issued a license.
(Added by Stats. 2011, Ch. 243, Sec. 4. Effective January 1, 2012.)
[SOURCE: http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml]
All that Bitcoin has to do is make sure they don’t register as a corporation.
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SOURCE: http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57588337-38/no-evidence-of-nsas-direct-access-to-tech-companies/
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No evidence of NSA’s ‘direct access’ to tech companies
Sources challenge reports alleging National Security Agency is “tapping directly into the central servers.” Instead, they say, the spy agency is obtaining orders under process created by Congress.
(Credit: Declan McCullagh)The National Security Agency has not obtained direct access to the systems of Apple, Google, Facebook, and other major Internet companies, CNET has learned.
Recent reports in the Washington Post and the Guardian claimed a classified program called PRISM grants “intelligence services direct access to the companies’ servers” and that “from inside a company’s data stream the NSA is capable of pulling out anything it likes.”
Those reports are incorrect and appear to be based on a misreading of a leaked Powerpoint document, according to a former government official who is intimately familiar with this process of data acquisition and spoke today on condition of anonymity.
“It’s not as described in the histrionics in the Washington Post or the Guardian,” the person said. “None of it’s true. It’s a very formalized legal process that companies are obliged to do.”
That former official’s account — that the process was created by Congress six years ago and includes judicial oversight — was independently confirmed by another person with direct knowledge of how this data collection happens at multiple companies. The leaked presentation slides say the program began in September 2007, only weeks after the foreign surveillance law was amended.
The legal process, the person said, is akin to how law enforcement request information in criminal investigations: the government delivers an order to obtain account details about someone who’s specifically identified as a non-U.S. individual, with a specific finding that they’re involved in an activity related to international terrorism. Both the contents of communications and metadata, such as information about who’s talking to whom, can be requested.
The Washington Post has backtracked from its initial report on PRISM. At first, the paper claimed the Silicon Valley firms “participate knowingly in PRISM operations.” But then — without explanation — the newspaper quietly removed that language last night. It also abandoned its original claim to have confirmed that the NSA is “tapping directly into the central servers” of the companies.
In a separate article published today, the New York Times cited anonymous sources that cast additional doubt on the initial reports. Each of the tech companies, the Times said, “drew a bright line between giving the government wholesale access to its servers to collect user data and giving them specific data in response to individual court orders.”
Google CEO Larry Page and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg today gave blanket denials about participating in any such program. Page — whose company is currently fighting the legality of secret court orders in two different federal courts — said “press reports that suggest that Google is providing open-ended access to our users’ data are false, period.” Zuckerberg categorically denied as “outrageous” press reports claiming his company gave any “government direct access to our servers.”
The reason the newspapers’ allegations of “direct access” by the NSA to tech companies’ systems were so explosive is that they appeared to confirm Americans’ worst fears about government and corporate overreach, and came only a day after the Guardian disclosed a separate surveillance scheme that vacuums up Verizon customers’ phone records. The Wall Street Journal subsequently reported that AT&T and Sprint were swept in as well.
Washington officials quickly confirmed that the leaked Verizon order was real. Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who heads the Senate Intelligence Committee, acknowledged that it was a surveillance program that “has been in place for the past seven years.” And Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) said the program is the “one that I have been concerned about for years.”
By contrast, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, released a statement last night saying the Guardian and Post articles about PRISM “contain numerous inaccuracies.” Clapper’s statement didn’t elaborate, however, saying only that the articles referred “to collection of communications pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.”
President Obama addressed the NSA’s program during brief remarks in San Jose, Calif. this morning. But Obama’s remarks merely offered a high-level summary of the Section 702 process: “With respect to the Internet and emails, this does not apply to U.S. citizens, and it does not apply to people living in the United States.”
When the government delivers Section 702 orders, according to a former official, companies “implement them just as though they would implement a wiretap — there’s no direct access to servers.” The order has to be for account information or an intercept directed at a specific foreign person, and “you can’t say everyone in Pakistan who searched for ‘X’… It still has to be particularized.”
Surveillance law’s Section 702
The origin of Section 702 can be traced back to President Bush’s controversial warrantless surveillance starting in 2001. After the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court limited the program’s scope, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act, which established a new procedure for foreign surveillance.
That Section 702 procedure works like this: The Justice Department must demonstrate that its surveillance will not intentionally target anyone present in the United States or any American who’s overseas. And the surveillance process must comply with the Fourth Amendment.
Section 702 also requires that the government obtain the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s approval of “targeting” and “minimization” procedures, and that the court review the agencies’ certification describing how proposed surveillance techniques will comply with the law. Judges must consider whether the targeting procedures are “reasonably designed” to exclude Americans and purely domestic surveillance.
Any company that receives a Section 702 order to assist in surveillance may challenge its legality before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. One unnamed company did just that, albeit under a slightly different earlier version of the law. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ruled against the company in 2009 (PDF), concluding there are “several layers of serviceable safeguards to protect individuals against unwarranted harms and to minimize incidental intrusions.”
Amnesty International and journalists launched a separate legal challenge to Section 702 (which is sometimes called 1881a, for its location in the law books). They argued their confidential communications with foreign correspondents would be intercepted under Section 702 in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But in February 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected their challenge by a 5-4 vote, with Justice Samuel Alito writing that their allegations were too “speculative” and the Section 702 process is subject to ongoing “oversight” and “review.”
How much oversight and review the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court actually provides is less than clear. U.S. District Judge Roger Vinson granted the administration an order allowing Verizon’s records to be vacuumed up under the Patriot Act in a way the law’s drafters never intended. The Electronic Privacy Information Center today said Vinson’s order was illegal.
A person who has worked at multiple Silicon Valley companies and helped them comply with Section 702 orders told CNET the requests to companies use wiretapping interfaces set up as part of a 1994 law called CALEA if available:
Someone shows up with a legal document that says “thou shall.” There’s no discretion. Then you implement it according to the order… There are CALEA-covered entities that would use a CALEA interface. The ones that aren’t currently covered by CALEA, they still have an obligation to produce materials under the wiretap or FISA statute.
One benefit, from the government’s perspective, is that CALEA standardizes the process of complying with wiretap requests — but it currently applies only to telephone companies and broadband providers. Apple, Google, Yahoo, Facebook on aren’t currently regulated.
The intelligence agency’s desire to have a standardized interface for Section 702 orders might explain why the FBI has been so insistent that CALEA be extended to encompass Silicon Valley companies too.
PRISM: Unclassified Web tool, not spy program
Page and Zuckerberg aren’t the only Silicon Valley notables to cast doubt on claims of NSA’s “direct access” to servers.
Mike Yang, Google’s deputy general counsel until less than a year ago, said the allegations of the company’s involvement were not credible. Yang, now at Pinterest, previously oversaw the Google products that the NSA would have been most interested in and said on Twitter yesterday: “I don’t believe it.”
Yonatan Zunger, the chief architect of Google+, wrote in a Google+ post today that: “I can tell you that the only way in which Google reveals information about users are when we receive lawful, specific orders about individuals — things like search warrants.”
Marc Ambinder, author of “Deep State: Inside The Government Secrecy Industry,” wrote this evening that PRISM is an unclassified “data processing tool” used by many NSA components. It’s not, he said, the name of a secret surveillance program.
PRISM is also the name of a data processing tool used for other intelligence purposes, meaning it may be the same utility. It stands for “Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management,” and it’s long been in common military use. An Air Force-commissioned report that predates the FISA Amendments, for instance, describes PRISM (PDF) as “Web-based collection management software.” It’s not unusual to see PRISM experience required in job postings at government contractors as well.
Stewart Baker, the NSA’s general counsel in the 1990s and now an attorney at Steptoe and Johnson, said he was not familiar with PRISM or similar government activity, but the leaked Powerpoint presentation sounds “flaky,” as do the initial reports.
“The Powerpoint is suffused with a kind of hype that makes it sound more like a marketing pitch than a briefing — we don’t know what its provenance is and we don’t know the full context,” Baker said. He added, referring to the Post’s coverage: “It looks rushed and it looks wrong.”
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RESPONSE:
Dear Larry,
1. As most attorneys do, you have added lots of heat and absolutely no light to the most important issue of citizenship. You have presented no facts directly pertinent to a PRIVATE person not subject to federal civil law which derive from the legislatively foreign domicile of such a party as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b ). All civil law cited must derive from the domicile of the party, which means no federal statutory civil law can be cited for those with a foreign domicile unless the party proves there was consensual, PURPOSEFUL availment, which you have not proven. See the International Shoe case and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC Chapter 97. Citing foreign law against a nonresident with no “purposeful availment” is an abuse of the courts for “political purposes” in violation of the separation of powers.
2. There is no financial vested interest in the position you claim we have a vested interest in. The citizenship information provided to you for rebuttal is and always has been absolutely free. It would have to be offered for sale before there could be or is a financial interest. Hence, the statement that there is a vested interest is absolutely false and fraudulent.
3. The person with a real vested interest is you, who benefits handsomely to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars when people are confused, arguing, and have to litigate expensively to resolve the confusion. There is no financial incentive for attorneys to prevent conflict, and a big DISINCENTIVE to do so. You can’t and won’t act in a preemptive mode to resolve the confusion and ensuing litigation. The way to do that is to address ALL the issues raised in the Why You are a National, Form #05.006 pamphlet. Hence, you perpetuate and protect a very profitable (for you) source of confusion. On this subject, see:
Petition for Admission to Practice
http://famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/LegalEthics/PetForAdmToPractice-USDC.pdf4. You falsely accuse us of being a “guru”. A guru is someone that people trust or rely on for a specific subject matter. Yet our Member Agreement, Form #01.001 SPECIFICALLY says that our members and readers are NOT allowed to trust ANY MAN, including us, to interpret the law and will only trust their own reading of the law. See for yourself:
4.1 Member Agreement, Form #01.001, Section 3
http://sedm.org/Membership/MemberAgreement.htm
4.2 Guide to Asking Questions, Form #09.017, Section 1
http://sedm.org/Membership/GuideToAskingQuestions.htm
How is it even possible to be a “guru” without some measure of reliance on a “man” that is forbidden by our Member Agreement? What have you been smoking, or don’t you even study the people and things you so presumptuously and ignorantly and foolishly criticize.
5. You state that the argument is “baseless” and yet it is supported by the 200 pages of research that neither you nor anyone else in over ten years of peer review has proven is incorrect in any particular. Even the last federal judge and U.S. attorney who received such arguments didn’t disagree with them and therefore agreed. We even showed you HOW to prove it incorrect: Answer the questions at the end without contradicting yourself, the rules of statutory construction, or the statutes. The only person with a baseless argument is one without evidence, and you haven’t presented the evidence (in the form of answers to questions) needed to supersede or discredit our evidence. How about:
5.1 A list of errata of Form #05.006
5.2 Answers to the questions in section 19 that disprove your assertions.
6. You attached a memorandum allegedly proving that the U.S. is NOT “foreign” in relation to the states. Even the Corpus Juris Secundum legal encyclopedia disagrees with you.
http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/ForeignState.htmYou are correct if you mean in a constitutional sense but incorrect if you mean a statutory sense. That only further proves that you intend to perpetuate the confusion of STATUTORY and CONSTITUTIONAL context that is the source of all unjust, unconstitutional, and CRIMINAL power wielded by the corrupted federal courts. The issue of being LEGISLATIVELY foreign but not CONSTITUTIONALLY foreign is already addressed in:
6.1 Flawed Tax Arguments To Avoid, Form #08.004, Sections 2 and 6.3
DIRECT LINK http://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/FlawedArgsToAvoid.pdf
6.2 Why you are a National, State national, and constitutional but not statutory Citizen, Form #05.006, Sections 2, 3, 4, 19
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyANational.pdf
When are you going to rebut the above with answers and equally persuasive arguments rather than childish name calling with the word “nasty”?
Your response is the childish response of children:
“I win. I’m plugging my ears and I’m not listening to your answer. Neener, neener, neener. If you want’ to talk with me again about this, you will have to bribe me for $250 per hour in your next planned ‘legal emergency’ because all I care about is money and not justice or social responsibility.”
We would expect much better of such an experienced and informed person. We value your feedback and lots of people will read of your childish response on a public website. Is that the best you can do, friend?
By disassociating and removing us from your email list, you have abandoned rational debate, gone into default, and admitted that you are misleading people because you can’t and won’t rebut the above issues and therefore admit they are correct per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b )(6).
If there were a good definition for “nasty” in the legal field (a word you used), it would have to be people who maliciously play word games and confusion of context to STEAL jurisdiction they do not have. This turns the public trust into a sham trust and officers of the public trust (such as attorneys) into thieves and deceivers. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia agrees:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DaoLMW5AF4Y&feature=player_embedded
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/307035-1The following information and memorandums expose how this CRIMINAL abuse happens, and you know that if you addressed it, you and most judges would be powerless and penniless. Justice Scalia admitted as much in the last video above.
1. Foundations of Freedom Video 4: Willful Government Deception and Propaganda, Form #08.018
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvnTL_Z5asc2. Flawed Tax Arguments To Avoid, Form #08.004, Sections 2, and 6.3
http://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/FlawedArgsToAvoid.pdf3. Meaning of the Words “includes” and “including”, Form #05.014
http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Includes.pdfWhen we want to talk responsibly with a legal professional such as yourself about this foundation of all the corruption in the legal field to PREVENT harm, they plug their ears because it butters their bread with stolen loot and can’t be threatened. Disgusting. Our readers will hear about this abuse.
Finally, if you are going to warn your readers about us, at least have the decency and integrity to give them the benefit of BOTH sides of the argument by providing a link to the following and telling them that you agree with it because you can’t prove it wrong:
Why You are a “national”, “state national”, and Constitutional but not Statutory Citizen, Form #05.006, Sections 2, 3, 4, 17.2
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyANational.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
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Becraft’s Response:
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As I often state, lots of people in this movement, especially the gurus, are some of the nastiest people you can ever meet, and now I conclude that this observation includes you.
I fully understand that you have a vested interest in continuing to promote the baseless “national” argument, with which I disagree. Now you make demands to which I state that you can take a hike.
Let me act like you: I hereby demand the following:
1. That you contact every person that you have mislead about this argument and admit that you have been incorrect;
2. That you tell each of them that your argument about “foreign” is contrary to decisions of the courts. See attached.
I am now deleting all contact information for you.
Larry
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ANSWER:
I read your section 17.2 and it appears to me that you are fully aware of the fact that a national is a citizen of the possessions. Why do you continue to mislead people into making claims they are nationals?
RESPONSE:You did not read it because you didn’t respond as requested.
1. We agree that a statutory “non-citizen national of the United States at birth” per 8 USC 1408 is a citizen of the possessions.
2. A statutory “national” per 8 USC 1101(a)(21) is NOT. It says the person described owes allegiance to a LOWER case state, which is LEGISLATIVELY but not CONSTITUTIONALLY foreign. Foreign states include states of the Union and possessions ONLY.
3. 8 USC 1101(a)(21)(A) and (b ) recognizes these distinctions.
4. You are only correct if by “national” you mean “non-citizen national of the United States” and NOT the “national” defined in 8 USC 1101(a)(21).
Please therefore:
1. Quit presumptuously using “national” without defining WHICH of the above contexts you mean. That only adds to the confusion.
2. Quit presuming that “citizen” as used in 8 USC 1401 is the SAME “citizen of the United States” in the fourteenth Amendment of “Citizen” in the original constitution. This once again is confusion of context and a fallacy by equivocation.
Once again, respond as indicated. Failure to deny constitutes an admission per Federal rule of civil procedure 8(b )(6). Until I get an express denial and answer that doesn’t contradict itself to the questions at the end, you are presumed incorrect.
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Below is an email addressing the above sent to Mr. Becraft on 5/27/2013 with NO response:
__________________
Larry,
Thank you for the below email.
1. Your issues have already been addressed in section 17.2 of
Why you are a “national”, “state national”, and Constitutional, but not Statutory “Citizen”, Form #05.006
DIRECT LINK: http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyANational.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
2. You are spreading disinformation on this subject. When are you going to take responsibility to deal with the above rebuttal and answer the admissions at the end of the above? You CAN’T without contradicting yourself, and therefore proving that you are not telling the truth.
We look forward to you dealing RESPONSIBLY with this issue to keep people you help from being misinformed and thereby injured by the courts.
Blessings,
Anonymous
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EDITORIAL: Another rebuttal by Becraft
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I know that the argument about “national” is circulating around, but it is wrong. To address this error, I posted the following at the Truth Attack website:
http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/index.php/law-library/jurisdiction*
*”NATIONALS”*
*In /Piqua Bank v. Knoup/, 6 Ohio St. 342, 393 (Ohio 1856), that court defined a national government and contrasted it with a federal government: “
A national government is a government of the people of a single state or nation, united as a community by what is termed the ‘social compact,’ and possessing complete and perfect supremacy over persons and things, so far as they can be made the lawful objects of civil government. A federal government is distinguished from a national government by its being the government of a community of independent and sovereign states, united by compact.” Black’s Law Dictionary quotes this case in its definition of national government. The Government of the United States is a federal government.*
*But while many may understand this difference between national and federal government, even fewer understand, in reference to human beings, who is a “national” of the United States. This short memo constitutes an introduction to this topic.*
*In the late 1800s, the United States was beginning to assert power over islands not contiguous to this country. Then, Hawaii was conquered and made a territory. With time, the same thing happened with the Virgin
Islands, the Phillippines, Puerto Rico, Swain’s Island, Guam, the Northern Marianas, and similar places. Congress began referring to citizens of those islands as persons owing a duty of allegiance to the United States or obedience to its laws; see 28 Stat. 64 <http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/28Stat64.pdf>;, 32 Stat. 694 <http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/32Stat694.pdf>.*
*Eventually in the first few decades of the 20th century, a name for these people was developed: a national. Examples of this name for these persons can be easily seen from a variety of pages appearing in the U.S. Statutes at Large:*
28 Stat. 53 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/28Stat53.pdf;
36 Stat. 328 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/36Stat328.pdf;
37 Stat. 499 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/37Stat499.pdf;
38 Stat. 692 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/38Stat692.pdf;
38 Stat. 818 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/38Stat818.pdf;
42 Stat. 106 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/42Stat106.pdf;
47 Stat. 142 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/47Stat142.pdf;
48 Stat. 454 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/48Stat454.pdf;
48 Stat. 456 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/48Stat456.pdf;
54 Stat. 4 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/54Stat4.pdf;
57 Stat. 308 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/57Stat308.pdf;
58 Stat. 101 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/58Stat101.pdf;
87 Stat. 397 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/87Stat397.pdf;
87 Stat. 635 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/87Stat635.pdf;
88 Stat. 1444 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/88Stat1444.pdf;
88 Stat. 2064 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/88Stat2064.pdf;
89 Stat. 543 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/89Stat543.pdf;
90 Stat. 269 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/90Stat269.pdf;
90 Stat. 1268 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/90Stat1268.pdf;
91 Stat. 1212 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/91Stat1212.pdf;
91 Stat. 1214 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/91Stat1214.pdf;
92 Stat. 72 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/92Stat72.pdf;
92 Stat. 1949 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/92Stat1949.pdf;
96 Stat. 2483 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/96Stat2483.pdf;
97 Stat. 661 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/97Stat661.pdf;
98 Stat. 2302 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/98Stat2302.pdf;
99 Stat. 624 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/99Stat624.pdf;
100 Stat. 1480 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/100Stat1480.pdf;
116 Stat. 2874 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/116Stat2874.pdf;
117 Stat. 2801 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/117Stat2801.pdf;
117 Stat. 2802 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/117Stat2802.pdf;
120 Stat. 80 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/120Stat80.pdf;
121 Stat. 1743 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/121Stat1743.pdf;
123 Stat. 53 http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/images/stats/123Stat53.pdf;
*Inherently, “national” means a citizen of the insular possessions. One definition of this word appears in 24 C.F.R. § 5.504 http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2010/aprqtr/pdf/24cfr5.504.pdf;, which states: “National means a person who owes permanent allegiance to the United States, for example, as a result of birth in a United States territory or possession.” In § 871-24.60 (96) of the Iowa Administrative Code, “A national is defined as a person who lives in mandates or trust territories administered by the United States and owes permanent allegiance to the United States. An alien is a person owing allegiance to another country or government.” In Washington Administrative Code § 388-424-0001, this word is defined as “a person who owes permanent allegiance to the U.S. and may enter and work in the U.S. without restriction. The following are the only persons classified as U.S. nationals:**(1) Persons born in American Samoa or Swain’s Island after December 24, 1952; and**(2) Residents of the Northern Mariana Islands who did not elect to become U.S. citizens.”*
*Often, Congress uses in legislation the phrase “citizen or national of the United States”. When this word appears in this context without definition, it means a citizen of the insular possessions. But just as
often when a federal law encompasses a citizen or national, that act may provide a specific definition. Such act may define a U.S. Person, or Citizen, as being a “citizen or national”, and in this event, the
defined word encompasses a citizen or national. *
*It is important for students of the law to “data-mine” the U.S. Statutes at Large, which are posted here http://www.truth-attack.com/jml/index.php/law-library/primary-sources-of-law;.
Please download all of these word searchable volumes and start studying. *
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Here is the case from thelaw.net
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71 S.W.2d 242
AUSTIN NAT. BANK OF AUSTIN
v.
SHEPPARD, Comptroller of Public Accounts, et al.
No. 1764-6607.
Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.
May 2, 1934.
Page 243
Original mandamus proceeding by the Austin National Bank of Austin, against George H. Sheppard, Comptroller of Public Accounts, and another.
Mandamus granted.
White, Taylor & Gardner and Black & Graves, all of Austin, and Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris, of Dallas, for relator.
James V. Allred, Atty. Gen., and Sidney Benbow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
CRITZ, Commissioner.
This is an original mandamus proceeding instituted by Austin National Bank as relator against George H. Sheppard, state comptroller, and Charley Lockhart, state treasurer, as respondents. The facts are undisputed. They are as follows:
At all times, including and since March 7, 1919, Barber Asphalt Company has been a foreign corporation, duly incorporated under the laws of West Virginia, with a permit to do business in this state. On said date the company filed with the secretary of state of this state its application for a permit to do business in Texas. This application was accompanied with a certified copy of its charter, and all amendments thereto up to this time, as required by law. On the above date the capital stock of such company was $7,000,000, and it paid to the secretary of state a filing fee or tax of $2,500. This was the maximum fee or tax required by law to be paid by foreign corporations. On payment of the above fee or tax, the secretary of state, on the date above mentioned, issued to the asphalt company a permit to do business in this state.
About March 31, 1922, the asphalt company amended its charter, and increased its capital stock from seven million to ten million dollars, and duly filed such amendment in the office of the secretary of state of West
Page 244
Virginia; whereupon that officer approved such amendment and issued his certificate showing his action.
In due time, after the filing and approval of the above amendment in West Virginia, the asphalt company tendered to the secretary of state of this state a certified copy of its amended charter, with a request that same be filed in his office as required by our law. When the amended charter was tendered to him, the secretary of state demanded an additional filing fee of $2,500, and refused to receive or file such amendment unless and until such fee was paid. The asphalt company protested the payment of such fee, and contended that it was not due to be paid under our law, and that the secretary of state was acting under a mistake of law in making the demand. The protest of the asphalt company was unavailing, and it then paid the fee.
After the happening of the above events, it was determined by our Supreme Court that: “Having received a permit to do business in the State, good for ten years, on its compliance with the statutes (Rev. Stats. 1925, ch. 19, Title 32) and having paid therefor and on the filing of subsequent amendments increasing its capital stock, fees amounting to $2500, based on amount of such original capital stock and increase, the corporation was entitled to have filed by the Secretary of State further amendments increasing such stock, without payment of further charges based on such increase. This duty of the Secretary being merely ministerial it is here enforced by mandamus.”
The above holding is quoted from the syllabus in the case of General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. McCallum, 118 Tex. 46, 10 S.W.(2d) 687.
From the above it is evident that the asphalt company was entitled to have its amendment filed without the payment of the second fee of $2,500, and the secretary of state acted under a mistake of law in refusing to file such amendment until the additional fee was paid. It is evident, therefore, that the transaction resulted in the state receiving money into its treasury that it did not own and was not entitled to receive.
It appears that the asphalt company presented its claim for the refunding to it of the above $2,500 to the claims committee of the Forty-Third Legislature. The committee approved the claim and included same in the Miscellaneous Claims Bill of that Legislature. This bill was duly passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor, and is now in effect if it is a valid act. H. B. No. 919, page 816, c. 237, Acts Reg. Sess., 43d Leg. 1933. The above claims bill contains numerous items, some of them refunding taxes of like character as this, and some making appropriations to pay claims of different characters.
After the above act became effective, the comptroller issued his warrant to cover the above appropriation drawn on the general revenue fund and payable to the asphalt company in the sum of $2,500. The asphalt company duly assigned the warrant to relator, and it is now the legal and equitable owner and holder of the same. The bank presented the warrant to the treasurer for payment, which was refused by that officer on the ground that the comptroller had instructed him not to pay same, and on the further ground that the Attorney General had advised that such warrant was invalid. This mandamus proceeding followed.
The respondents have duly answered, and contend that the appropriation on which this warrant was issued is unconstitutional, illegal, and void, for reasons which we will now discuss and decide.
Respondents contend that this warrant and the appropriation upon which it is based are unconstitutional and void because, under the undisputed facts, the Legislature has singled out the asphalt company and a number of other corporations asserting claims of a like class, and allowed their claims, while at the same time it refused to make appropriations to pay claims of the same class presented by numerous other corporations. The respondents contend that such facts render this appropriation class legislation in contravention of section 3 of article 1 of our state Constitution. We take the facts alleged to be true.
In our opinion, the above contention should be overruled. Of course, if it should be held that the Legislature has power to make an appropriation to pay this claim, it must follow that it has power to pay every other claim of the same class; but the mere fact that the Legislature may make an appropriation to pay one or more claims of a class, while at the same time it fails to appropriate money to pay other like claims, does not render the appropriation made class legislation within the meaning of section 3 of article 1 of our state Constitution.
Respondents contend that this appropriation is in violation of section 56 of article 3 of our state Constitution. That constitutional
Page 245
provision deals with local or special laws. Obviously this appropriation is not a local law. The terms “special” and “local” are used in the same sense in this constitutional provision. Lastro v. State, 3 Tex. App. 363.
Respondents contend that this appropriation is in violation of section 44 of article 3 of our state Constitution. This presents a very important question. The constitutional provision involved reads as follows: “Sec. 44. The Legislature shall provide by law for the compensation of all officers, servants, agents and public contractors, not provided for in this Constitution, but shall not grant extra compensation to any officer, agent, servant, or public contractors, after such public service shall have been performed or contract entered into, for the performance of the same; nor grant, by appropriation or otherwise, any amount of money out of the Treasury of the State, to any individual, on a claim, real or pretended, when the same shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law; nor employ any one in the name of the State, unless authorized by pre-existing law.”
So far as applicable to this case, the above constitutional provision may be read as follows: “The Legislature * * * shall not grant * * * by appropriation or otherwise, any amount of money out of the Treasury of the State, to any individual, on a claim, real or pretended, when the same shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law.”
It will be noted that the above constitutional provision applies to “any individual.” Obviously a private corporation is “any individual” within its meaning.
By its express words the constitutional provision under consideration in no uncertain terms prohibits the Legislature from appropriating state money to “any individual” unless such appropriation shall have been provided for by a “pre-existing law.” We interpret this to mean that the Legislature cannot appropriate state money to “any individual” unless, at the very time the appropriation is made, there is already in force some valid law constituting the claim the appropriation is made to pay a legal and valid obligation of the state. By legal obligation is meant such an obligation as would form the basis of a judgment against the state in a court of competent jurisdiction in the event it should permit itself to be sued. Nichols v. State, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 327, 32 S. W. 452 (writ ref.); State v. Haldeman (Tex. Civ. App.) 163 S. W. 1020 (writ ref.); State v. Wilson, 71 Tex. 291, 9 S. W. 155.
In connection with the above, the case of Kilpatrick v. Compensation Claim Board (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S. W. 164, seems to hold that a mere moral obligation will authorize an appropriation by the Legislature. No writ was applied for in that case, and it never received the sanction of this court. The Kilpatrick Case cites Weaver v. Scurry County (Tex. Civ. App.) 28 S. W. 836; Chambers v. Gilbert, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 42 S. W. 630; and State v. Elliott (Tex. Civ. App.) 212 S. W. 695. We have carefully examined these authorities, and in our opinion none of them support the holding that a mere moral obligation will support an appropriation of state money to an individual.
As already noted, the constitutional provision under discussion uses the term “pre-existing law.” It is the contention of respondents that such term means a direct “pre-existing statutory law.” Of course, if we should give this constitutional provision such a construction, we would be compelled to strike down this appropriation. Relator does not even contend that there existed any direct statutory law authorizing this appropriation at the time it was made. The relator, however, does contend that there existed at the time this appropriation was made a “pre-existing law” authorizing its payment. In regard to this matter, relator advances the proposition that the state legally owed the asphalt company the refund of this money at the time this appropriation was made under the common law. It is then pointed out that under article 1, R. C. S. of Texas, the common law is expressly made the law of decision in this state where it is not inconsistent with our Constitution and laws. It is our opinion that a common-law right is a right under a “pre-existing law” within the meaning of the constitutional provision under discussion here. State v. Elliott (Tex. Civ. App.) 212 S. W. 695 (writ ref.).
We shall now proceed to determine whether this claim was supported by “pre-existing law” at the time this appropriation was made. By this we mean we will now determine whether this claim was a legal obligation against the state at such time. In determining this question, we deem it proper to announce certain applicable rules of law. They are as follows:
(1) A person who voluntarily pays an illegal tax has no claim for its repayment.
Page 246
26 R. C. L. p. 455, § 411; City of Houston v. Feeser, 76 Tex. 365, 13 S. W. 266; Galveston City Co. v. City of Galveston, 56 Tex. 486; Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 634, 115 S. W. 361 (writ ref.), and authorities cited on page 364. This case was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, 223 U. S. 468, 32 S. Ct. 236, 56 L. Ed. 510.
(2) A person who pays an illegal tax under duress has a legal claim for its repayment. In this connection it is held in some jurisdictions that a taxpayer cannot maintain an action to recover taxes illegally exacted after the money has gone into the treasury and been paid out by the disbursing officers, but we think the sounder rule is to the contrary. 26 R. C. L. p. 454, § 410; Commonwealth v. Boske, 99 S. W. 316, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 400, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1106, and note. In such instances the money never becomes the property of the state as against the real owner.
(3) Duress in the payment of an illegal tax may be either express or implied, and the legal duty to refund is the same in both instances. 26 R. C. L. p. 457, § 413.
(4) When the statute provides that the taxpayer who fails to pay the tax shall forfeit his right to do business in the state, and have the courts closed to him, he is not required to take the risk of having his right to resort to the courts disputed and his business injured while the invalidity of the tax is being adjudicated. 26 R. C. L. p. 458.
(5) In the absence of a specific statute to the contrary, the fact that an illegal tax is or is not paid under protest is of no importance. 26 R. C. L. p. 459, § 414.
Under article 1529, R. C. S., this company was required to file with the secretary of state a certified copy of its charter. This it did. This entitled it to transact business in this state for a period of ten years from the date of such filing. Under article 3914, this company was required to pay a filing fee or tax of $2,500 when it originally filed its articles of incorporation. Under article 1537 this company was required to file with the secretary of state the amendment to its charter above described. Under article 1536 this company was compelled to file the above amendment or forfeit its right to do business in this state or to maintain suits in the courts of this state.
The fee of $2,500 paid for filing the amended charter was demanded and paid while the asphalt company’s ten-year permit to do business was in full force. It did not legally owe such fee. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. McCallum, supra. If the asphalt company had refused to pay such fee, it could not have gotten its charter amendment filed without resorting to the courts, and would have run the risk of having its right to do business in this state and its right to resort to the courts of this state called in question during the litigation. Also during such period it would have run the risk of having its business greatly hampered and injured. Under such a record we hold that the asphalt company paid this tax or fee under implied duress, and not as a volunteer. We further hold that under the rules of law above announced the state is legally liable to repay this tax so illegally demanded and collected.
Finally, we wish to say that we do not intend to intimate that the secretary of state committed any intentional wrong in exacting the payment of this fee or tax. At the time he did so the McCallum Case, supra, had not been decided by the Supreme Court, and he acted under a mistake of law, but in good faith.
The mandamus is granted as prayed for.
Opinion Adopted by the Supreme Court May 2, 1934.
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