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I don’t need to accept any of it. Once I have shown there is a fraud and a crime, I have proven the only thing I need to prove to make the entire system unenforceable.
1. Nearly all those who participate do so illegally and criminally.
2. Because their participation is criminal, anything produced in administering it is not admissible evidence under the Fruit of the Poisonous tree doctrine.
3. Without evidence, no one can be convicted of a tax crime.
I don’t care what the POLICY is or how many people do it. Its still a crime and that crime cannot be used to create even MORE criminals under the tax code or any other system that uses the SSN as evidence.
Pretty simple.
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1. That isn’t OUR document. Its an SEDM document and we ARE NOT responsible for SEDM materials. Don’t PRESUME!
2. Those who are not eligible to participate, no matter who signed them up, are in the system fraudulently, even if they later DO become eligible. These people are committing a fraud upon the United States by impersonating a public officer if they weren’t one at the time they signed up. They are also a victim of the crime at 42 USC 408(a)(8) if they were compelled to sign up.
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The above recognizes that common law, which it calls “jus gentium”, deals only with private relations not covered by the CIVIL law. Those who therefore are not members of the body politic, as it calls them, are not subject to the CIVIL law and not STATUTORY “persons”, and yet they are protected by the COMMON LAW. Any government that interacts with, regulates, or enforces against those who are not CIVIL persons is committing a trespass against PRIVATE rights, and the remedy:
1. Put them on notice that they are offering to contract for your services under the UCC, and that you are a Merchant.
2. Describe the terms of your acceptance of their offer and define them continuing to demand your response or services as THEIR acceptance of YOUR offer.
3. Beyond that point, to treat any and every such actor as a trespasser and sue them PERSONALLY and individually.
The above protocol is describe in:
Government instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030, Sections 5.1 and 5.2
DIRECT LINK :http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
Since the only method of becoming a member of the body politic is to have a domicile within it, indirectly the above is stating that DOMICILE is the only way to become a CIVIL “Person”.
They even admit that the CIVIL or municipal law does not even recognize a MAN as a person and that man and person are NOT synonymous:
The word person neither according to its accurate meaning nor in law is identical with man.
[. . .]
For it may be asserted as absolutely true, that the rights of the man are not recognized by that law which is termed the municipal. It recognizes them only as they grow out of, or are consistent with, his character as a civil person. In other words, this is the distinction between the Common Law and the law of nature. Nor is this a fanciful distinction, inasmuch as the rudest tribes, as well as the most civilized nations, have always distinguished between the rights and duties of their members, and of those who were not members of the body politic. Even after the philosophical jurists of antiquity had polished and improved the jurisprudence of aristocratic republican Rome by the philosophy of the Portico, Cicero, statesman, philosopher, and jurisconsult, exclaims with indignation against the confusion of rights of person that the age witnessed: ” In urbem nostrum est infusa peregrinitas; nunc vero etiam braccatis et transalpinis nationibus ut nullum veteris leporis vestigium appareat.”They amazingly identify the act of becoming a priest as “civil death”. Keep in mind that this is what we regard ourselves, and this ministry itself is also a religious ministry. Therefore, we are “dead to the law” or civilly dead, just as the Apostle Paul described in scripture. See Romans 7:4
Therefore, my brethren, you also have become dead to the [CIVIL STATUTORY LAW] law through the body of Christ, that you may be married to another—to Him who was raised from the dead, that we should bear fruit to God.
[Romans 7:4, Bible, NKJV
SOURCE: ]http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans+7:4&version=NKJV]Clearly, Paul as a former Sanhedrin and lawyer, understood these concepts thoroughly. If priests can be civilly dead, how come ALL Christians can’t also under the concept of equal protection and equal treatment?
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Stija,
As far as people being ineligible for Social Security, simply answer and rebut the questions:
Why You Aren’t Eligible for Social Security, Form #06.001
http://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSNotEligible.pdf
Aren’t you paying attention? We already referenced this document earlier. That evidence or discussion won’t be repeated here, and the only thing to talk about is your ANSWERS to the questions contained therein. If your answers conflict with either the law or with themselves, you can’t possibly be telling the truth or advocating a truthful position.
This isn’t OUR document, so please don’t ask us questions about it or expect us to defend it.
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1. Simply PROVIDING a number creates a prima facie but rebuttable PRESUMPTION that the activity connected to the number is “trade or business” activity and therefore “income”. However, in most cases that connection is not only false, but a criminal offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 912, impersonating a public officer. If providing the number was done under compulsion, it is also a criminal violation of 42 USC 408(a)(8).
The Trade or Business Scam, Form #05.001
http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf
2. See:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II
3. See:
Resignation of Compelled Social Security Trustee, Form #06.002, Instructions, section 4
http://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSTrustIndenture.pdf
4. See:
Non-Resident Non-Person Position, Form #05.020, Sections 7 and 18-18.3
http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/NonresidentNonPersonPosition.pdf
5. Yes. The officers of the corporation subject to the tax on their earnings connected to the office per item 1 above.
6. No. See item 4 above. The U.S. Supreme Court said in Southern Pacific v. Lowe that “income” does NOT mean “EVERYTHING THAT COMES IN”, but only earnings connected to the excise taxable activity. See:
http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/income.htm
See also:
Non-Resident Non-Person Position, Form #05.020, Section 19.7
http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/NonresidentNonPersonPosition.pdf
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 does not permit choice of law to move with the PROPERTY, but with the domicile of the FILER. Show me a rule that authorizes a change in choice of law based on loaned property.
If this case were In rem, I believe it would have to be titled “In re _________”, where the underline is the SSN. It was filed in YOUR name, and not in the in rem format.
For reference info on in rem proceedings, see:
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I think we agree on citizenship. It’s my job to disagree in order to stimulate those brain cells of yours to think both sides of the equation to produce a better outcome. I play devil’s advocate lots of time, including the above, not to be malicious, but to assure a better result.
If it doesn’t get dismissed, it will only be because the judge silently presumed this is a Rule 17(d) rather than 17(b ) action. He’d blow his cover if he admitted this presumption, so he’ll avoid the issue to keep you in the franchise cage so he can suck you dry.
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To RESIDE within the district is to have a domicile on federal territory within the exterior limits of the district. I don’t believe you have that.
You didn’t file your action as a CONSTITUTIONAL action, but a STATUTORY action under the relevant regulations. Only federal domiciliaries can invoke the “benefits and protections” of federal civil law. You invoked the protections without satisfying the domicile prerequisite. Therefore under Rule 17(b ), federal law cannot be invoked. The case therefore has to be dismissed just like the above.
You have to file it ONLY as a constitutional tort, not a statutory infraction, to have standing as a state domiciled party. You contradict yourself and I predict the case will be thrown out because of this.
Either you file as the OFFICE and invoke the franchise, or as the OFFICER, and invoke the CONSTITUTION. You didn’t do EITHER so your case will be dismissed.
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The restrictions that apply to taxes apply EQUALLY to all federal subject matters, save constitutional or common law remedies ONLY.
You admitted that this case is in admiralty, and that is the main subject matter of the Court of International Trade, in fact. Read the description for yourself:
http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/AboutTheCourt.htmlThe court deals with INTERNATIONAL trade, and that is what people in the states are involved in when they deal with the federal government while having a FOREIGN domicile as nonresidents. As you well know, the states of the Union and foreign countries are BOTH legislatively but not constitutionally alien and foreign to the national government jurisdiction. Therefore the above case applies equally to state domiciled parties, even on cases OTHER than taxes.
The U.S Supreme Court said states of the Union are “nations” under the law of nations. Therefore, this is an INTERNATIONAL case, not a case dealing with federal territory or anything “domestic”. A federal territorial domicile of the OFFICER is the only thing that could make this case “domestic”.
You can’t have “standing” without a federal domicile, unless its a constitutional issue within a state. The office you occupy has a federal domicile, but the OFFICER does not. You didn’t file the action as an officer, but a private human being. Therefore the domicile of the OFFICER and not the OFFICE trumps under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b ). If you wanted the domicile of the OFFICE, you had to file under rule 17(d) and you didn’t. The court would be acting disingenuously and KIDNAPPING your legal “person” to PRESUME that Rule 17(d) applies when you didn’t expressly invoke it.
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On the subject of your lawsuit, the following case establishes that if the filer REALLY is a non-resident alien, they cannot commence it in a District Court like you did. They have to go to the Court of International Trade, which took over the functions of the Court of Claims after this case was heard:
Taxpayer Malajalian, a resident of Beirut, Lebanon, entered the United States under a business visa on April 22, 1972, and remained as a non-resident alien until June 22, 1972, at which time he left this country. On June 20, as the taxpayer was preparing to depart for London from Logan Airport in Boston, a routine inspection of his baggage disclosed $147,595 in bills of small denomination. Notified of the discovery of this treasure-cache, the Internal Revenue Service terminated taxpayer’s tax year under 6851 of the Internal Revenue Code and made two jeopardy assessments against him totaling $131,331. When this amount was levied upon and seized out of taxpayer’s funds, still in the possession of the Customs Bureau, he filed a tax return declaring that he had no taxable income for his truncated 1972 tax year and requested a refund of the amount seized. After more than six months had passed without action on the claim by the Commissioner, taxpayer instituted suit for refund in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss on grounds of improper venue, and this appeal followed.
Section 1346 of the Judicial Code endows the district courts with jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, over civil actions against the United States for the recovery of internal revenue taxes alleged to have been erroneously assessed and collected. Section 1402(a)(1) restricts venue in actions against the United States to the district where the plaintiff resides. Since taxpayer, an alien, concededly does not reside in Massachusetts, he cannot lay venue there if 1402(a)(1) is read literally.
Recently, in a patent infringement suit against an alien, Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 710 & n. 8,92 S.Ct. 1936, 1939, 32 L.Ed.2d 428 (1972), the Supreme Court reiterated its longstanding view that ‘Congress does not in general intend to create venue gaps, which take away with one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other.’ The Court reasoned that ‘venue provisions are designed, not to keep suits out of the federal courts, but merely to allocate suits to the most appropriate or convenient federal forum.’ However, it was easier for the Court in Brunette to avoid a venue gap than it is in the instant case. First, Brunette involved construction of conflicting statutory provisions rather than the necessity to read language into a single governing provision. Second, the traditional judicial view that suits against aliens are outside the scope of venue laws does not generally carry over to suits by aliens.
Taxpayer can derive little consolation from the holding of United States v. New York & O.S.S. Co., 216 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1914), an admirality suit under the Tucker Act in which a non-resident alien was permitted to sue upon an express finding that respondent had waived its venue objection. See also Choremi v. United States, 28 F.2d 913 (D.Mass.1928). The court declined to venture an opinion as to the result that would obtain if, as in the instant case, there had been no waiver.
Taxpayer next cites a series of cases decided under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. 741-752 (1970), which has its own venue provision permitting suits against the United States in the district where libelants reside or have their principal place of business or in which the vessel or cargo charged with liability may be found. 46 U.S.C. 742 (1970). Although there is at least one case to the contrary, The Elmac, 285 F. 665 (S.D.N.Y.1922), the courts construing this provision have generally allowed non-resident aliens to bring suit in any district on grounds that otherwise they would have no forum in which to sue. See McGhee v. United States, 154 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1946); Metaxas v. United States, 68 F.Supp. 667 (S.D.Cal.1946); Middleton & Co. v. United States, 273 F. 199 (E.D.S.C.1921); Kulukundis v. United States, 132 F.Supp. 477, 132 Ct.Cl. 644 (1955). Apart from the fact that these decisions are predicated upon a special statutory provision, they are inapposite here because the taxpayer, unlike the claimants in the admiralty actions, may repair to the Court of Claims to press his suit, an alternative forum in which his alienage will pose no obstacle. 1
Legislative history of relevant statutory provisions in fact provides some evidence that Congress was aware of the venue gap existing as to tax refund suits by aliens against the United States in the district courts. Prior to 1966, an alien individual had two possible avenues open for a tax refund suit, without regard to the forum at issue here. An alien before 1966 could sue for a tax refund in the Court of Claims if the country of which he was a citizen permitted itself to be sued by citizens of the United States having claims against it. 28 U.S.C. 2502 (1970). But even without reciprocity an alien could sue the collecting director in the district court where the director resided, since suit against the collecting director is not, at least in form, a suit against the United States. See H.R.Rep. No. 1915, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966). In 1966 Congress abolished refund suits against collecting officers. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub.L. 89-713, 3(a), 80 Stat. 1108, codified at 26 U.S.C. 7422(f) (1970). By thus restricting the taxpayer to his judicial district of residence (i.e., in suits against the United States), Congress sought to prevent forum-shopping by taxpayers looking to the district where the tax collector resided. H.R.Rep. 1915, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966). Congress apparently recognized the effect this abolition would have on aliens:
‘. . . in order to preserve the right of aliens and foreign corporations to bring tax refund suits, the bill also modifies present law by permitting aliens and foreign corporations to bring such suits directly against the United States irrespective of whether the foreign country of citizenship or incorporation allows itself to be sued by U.S. citizens or corporations.’ Id.
Implicit in this statement is the awareness and conclusion that an alien not ‘residing’ in any judicial district could not sue the United States in any district court. In the view of the writers of the congressional reports, the 1966 legislation was enacted ‘only because other adequate remedies either are already available, or are being made available by this bill, for the recovery of illegal collections.’ Id. See also S.Rep. No. 1625, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966-2 Cum.Bull. 803, 807-08).
The taxpayer also adverts to several statutory provisions to support his position. Section 1402(a)(2) of the Judicial Code accords non-resident alien corporate taxpayers the privilege of bringing suit in the district where the tax return was filed. Nowhere in the meager legislative history of this provision do we find the slightest hint that Congress intended its benefits to extend to individuals. S.Rep. No. 2445, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., in U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News. 5263, 5265. In fact it was adopted in response to conflicting decisions in the federal courts concerning the residence of corporations. The legislators did recognize that the bill would cover the apparent problem of lack of venue for foreign corporations. H.R.Rep. No. 1715, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958); S.Rep. No. 2445, supra, citing [/size]Argonaut Navigation Co. v. United States, 142 F.Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y.1956)[/size]. Nor is venue proper in the district court for an alien, individual or corporate, in any other of the various types of suits brought under the Tucker Act. 7B Moore, Federal Practice 1402, at JC 598.1 (2d ed. 1974).
Finally, the taxpayer cites language in the legislative history of an amendment to the Judicial Code eliminating the $10,000 ceiling on tax refund suits in the district courts, Act of July 30, 1954, Pub.L. No. 83-559, ch. 648, 2(a), 68 Stat. 589, codified in 28 U.S.C. 2402 (1970), to the effect that all taxpayers should have the benefit of a local remedy regardless of their financial status. H.R.Rep. No. 659, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 2716, 2717. Context indicates that the innocuous use of the word ‘all’ in a committee report was not intended to effect the major revision of the law which taxpayer seeks; neither the amendment nor the report makes any reference to alienage.
The district court’s order dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
[Malajalian v. U.S., 504 F.2d 842 (C.A.1 (Mass.), 1974)]
The court contradicts itself on the one hand by calling him a “taxpayer”, which implies a domicile on federal territory, but on the other hand denying him the MAIN “benefit” of that status, which is a remedy in a territorial U.S. DISTRICT court. If they are deemed a “resident” for tax purposes, then they have to be deemed a “resident” for jurisdiction purposes in the district court. The judge is drinking Kool-Aide.My guess is that your case will be dismissed and you will have to then file it in the Court of International Trade in Washington D.C., which is the only Article III court that can rule on the subject other than the Supreme Court.
For information on why the Court of International Trade is the only correct court at the federal level, see:
Civil Court Remedies for Sovereigns: Taxation, Litigation Tool #10.002, Section 8.5
http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm
Here is one early clue, keeping in mind that after this entry appeared in the IRM, the Article III functions of the Court of Claims was transferred to the Court of International Trade:
Internal Revenue Manual, Section 35.18.10.1
(08-31-1982) District Courts
Section 1402(a)(1) of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. §1402(a)(1)) provides that if an action is brought against the United States under section 1346(a) of the Judicial Code by an entity other than a corporation, it must be brought in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides. Accordingly, where an individual resides outside of the [federal] United States (e.g., a nonresident alien), he or she may not bring a refund suit in a district court. Malajalian v. United States,504 F.2d. 842 (1st Cir. 1974). These cases may be brought only in the Court of Claims. -
Interesting. Hope this helps your case.
Obviously, the term “Legal” in the phrase “Legal alien” REALLY means STATUTORY and not CONSTITUTIONAL. Otherwise it would say “Political or constitutional alien allowed to work”. The fact that they preceded “alien” with “legal” makes their intent especially clear.
Let me also qualify that by “domiciliary” you mean FEDERAL domiciliary domiciled on federal territory not within any state of the Union.
Of 42 USC 1301(a)(1), the following phraseology is used in the definition of “State”:
Such term when used in subchapter V and in part B of this subchapter of this chapter also includes American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
SOURCE: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1301
The SS act identifies itself as a “Grant to the States”, which includes ONLY the states found in 42 USC 1301(a)(1). This is covered in:
Why You aren’t Eligible for Social Security, Form #06.001
http://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSNotEligible.pdf
Thanks for sharing.
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Stija,
Thanks. Great contribution. Megadittos. 🙂
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Rightous,
Thanks for the link, and welcome.
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Those who are outside the USA and who are permanent residents elsewhere are not protected by U.S. law or state law, because they don’t have a domicile within the jurisdiction of any local government. The U.S. Supreme Court referred to these people as “stateless” in the following case:
Petitioner Newman-Green, Inc., an Illinois corporation, brought this state law contract action in District Court against a Venezuelan corporation, four Venezuelan citizens, and William L. Bettison, a United States citizen domiciled in Caracas, Venezuela. Newman-Green’s complaint alleged that the Venezuelan corporation had breached a licensing agreement, and that the individual defendants, joint and several guarantors of royalty payments due under the agreement, owed money to Newman-Green. Several years of discovery and pretrial motions followed. The District Court ultimately granted partial summary judgment for the guarantors and partial summary judgment for Newman-Green. 590 F.Supp. 1083 (ND Ill.1984). Only Newman-Green appealed.
At oral argument before a panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Easterbrook inquired as to the statutory basis for diversity jurisdiction, an issue which had not been previously raised either by counsel or by the District Court Judge. In its complaint, Newman-Green had invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), which confers jurisdiction in the District Court when a citizen of one State sues both aliens and citizens of a State (or States) different from the plaintiff’s. In order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State. See Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 648-649 (1878); Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 112, 115 (1834). The problem in this case is that Bettison, although a United States citizen, has no domicile in any State. He is therefore “stateless” for purposes of § 1332(a)(3). Subsection 1332(a)(2), which confers jurisdiction in the District Court when a citizen of a State sues aliens only, also could not be satisfied because Bettison is a United States citizen. [490 U.S. 829]
When a plaintiff sues more than one defendant in a diversity action, the plaintiff must meet the requirements of the diversity statute for each defendant or face dismissal. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806).{1} Here, Bettison’s “stateless” status destroyed complete diversity under § 1332(a)(3), and his United States citizenship destroyed complete diversity under § 1332(a)(2). Instead of dismissing the case, however, the Court of Appeals panel granted Newman-Green’s motion, which it had invited, to amend the complaint to drop Bettison as a party, thereby producing complete diversity under § 1332(a)(2). 832 F.2d 417 (1987). The panel, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, relied both on 28 U.S.C. § 1653 and on Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as sources of its authority to grant this motion. The panel noted that, because the guarantors are jointly and severally liable, Bettison is not an indispensable party, and dismissing him would not prejudice the remaining guarantors. 832 F.2d at 420, citing Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 19(b ). The panel then proceeded to the merits of the case, ruling in Newman-Green’s favor in large part, but remanding to allow the District Court to quantify damages and to resolve certain minor issues.{2}
[Newman-Green v. Alfonso Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989)]
The ability to enlist or procure help from a government official is entirely a POLITCAL and not LEGAL matter for people in your circumstance if you are a nonresident. The Constitution, as you may know, attaches to LAND within state of the Union. Those not physically on such land, whether residents or nonresidents, cannot use it as a remedy or standing in court.
Any and all remedies must be had as a nonresident if you are a permanent resident in Malaysia. An entire book on remedies for NONRESIDENTS is:
http://books.google.com/books?id=FhE1AAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage#v=onepage&q&f=false
On the other hand, if you maintained your domicile in a constitutional state and did not change it to the foreign country, you still have standing to sue, but only under the civil statutory laws and not common law.
The last resort is therefore to return to the USA and pursue a remedy while physically present on constitutionally protected land. If you can’t do that, there is little to do as we understand it. We could be wrong and seek to be enlightened if we are.
By demanding an SSN to get additional VISA pages, indirectly they are blackmailing you into becoming a taxpayer and paying taxes on the foreign earnings of a public office called “U.S. citizen”. Only public officers can use or possess public property such as a number in connection with their otherwise EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE rights and property.
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14. That is covered in the Domicile article, section 3.
http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Remedies/DomicileBasisForTaxation.htm#9.__Choice_of_Domicile_is_a_voluntary_choice15. The administrative record of the agency that you developed by becoming a member determines the choice of law if unrebutted PRIOR to the indictment. Controlling the choice of law using the administrative record is how to prevent being treated as a statutory citizen. Yes, the hypothetical defendant always has the right to invoke the common law, but he must ensure that he does the following to prevent undermining or destroying that right:
15.1 Do not invoke any provision of the I.R.C. Subtitles A and C franchise agreement. That creates a presumption of “taxpayer” status.
15.2 Defining all terms in the context of litigation using SEDM Litigation Tools #01.002 and #01.006 and Forms 02.001.
15.3 Invoke the unrebutted status in the administrative record in all filings with the court.
16. Being connected with a civil statutory status (such as “taxpayer”) that one does not have through deceit or fraud constitutes an act of theft and slander under the common law. The purpose of slander is to undermine one’s commercial livelihood or ability to support themselves. That is what false statuses, false information returns, and false irs collection letters do: presume or enforce a status that you don’t have and can’t lawfully have, because you are not a public officer in the national but not state government. The rights STOLEN by the government are those attached to the false status one is deceptively and fraudulently associated with.
17. Proving fraud is difficult, because it requires you as the moving party to prove that the defendant or respondent KNEW they were deceiving people. The complexity of the system and the inability for even most tax attorneys to fully comprehend its implications is usually sufficient grounds to successfully protect one’s “plausible deniability”.
“We must note here, as a matter of judicial knowledge, that most lawyers have only scant knowledge of tax law.”
[Bursten v.US, 395 F 2d 976, 981 (5th Cir,. 1968)]
In most cases, they are deceiving people, but most judges won’t go beyond calling it simply an “innocent mistake”, but not fraud. Most judges, in fact, are so tainted with criminal conflict of interest (18 USC 208 and 28 USC 144/455) because they are “taxpayers”, that they would be reluctant to be honest enough to call such a deception even an “innocent mistake”.