Sovereignty- Rousas John Rushdoony. Theological perspective on soverereignty
DISCLAIMER AND LICENSE AGREEMENT
4. MEANINGS OF WORDS
4.20. Sovereign
The word "sovereign" when referring to humans or
governments means all the following:
- A human being and NOT a "government". Only human
beings are "sovereign" and only when they are acting in strict obedience
to the laws of their religion. All powers of government are delegated from the PEOPLE and are NOT "divine rights". Those powers in turn are only operative when government PREVENTS the conversion of PRIVATE rights into PUBLIC rights. When that goal is avoided or undermined or when law is used to accomplish involuntary conversion, we cease to have a government and instead end up with a private, de facto for profit corporation that has no sovereign immunity and cannot abuse sovereign immunity to protect its criminal thefts from the people.
- EQUAL in every respect to any and every government or actor in government. All governments are legal "persons" and under our Constitutional system, ALL "persons" are equal and can only become UNEQUAL in relation to each other WITH their EXPRESS and NOT IMPLIED consent. Since our Constitutional rights are unalienable per the Declaration of Independence, then we can't become unequal in relation to any government, INCLUDING through our consent.
- Not superior in any way to any human being within the jurisdiction of the courts of any country.
- Possessing the EQUAL right to acquire rights over others by the same mechanisms as the government uses. For instance, if the government encourages the filing of FALSE information returns that essentially "elect" people into public office without their consent, then we have an EQUAL right to elect any and every government or officer within government into our PERSONAL service as our PERSONAL officer without THEIR consent. See:
Correcting Erroneous Information Returns, Form #04.001.
- Subject to the criminal laws of the jurisdiction they are physically situated in, just like everyone else. This provision excludes "quasi criminal provisions" within civil franchises, such as tax crimes.
- The origin of all authority delegated to the government per the Declaration of Independence.
- Reserving all rights and delegating NONE to any and every government or government actor. U.C.C. 1-308 and its predecessor, U.C.C. 1-207.
- Not consenting to any and every civil franchise offered by any government.
- Possessing the same sovereign immunity as any government. Hence, like the government, any government actor asserting a liability or obligation has the burden of proving on the record of any court proceeding EXPRESS WRITTEN consent to be sued before the obligation becomes enforceable.
- Claiming no civil or franchise status under any statutory franchise, including but not limited to "citizen", "resident", "driver" (under the vehicle code), "spouse" (under the family code), "taxpayer" (under the tax code). Any attempt to associate a statutory status and the public rights it represents against a non-consenting party is THEFT and SLAVERY and INJUSTICE.
- Acting as a fiduciary, agent, and trustee on behalf of God 24 hours a day, seven days a week as an ambassador of a legislatively foreign jurisdiction and as a public officer of "Heaven, Inc.", a private foreign corporation. God is the ONLY "sovereign" and the source of all sovereignty. We must be acting as His agent and fiduciary before we can exercise any sovereignty at all. Any attempt by so-called "government" to interfere with our ability to act as His fiduciaries is a direct interference with our right to contract and the free exercise of religion. See:
Delegation of Authority Order from God to Christians, Form #13.007
- Capable of being civilly sued ONLY under the common law and equity and not under any statutory civil law. All statutory civil laws are law for government and public officers, and NOT for private human beings. They are civil franchises that only acquire the "force of law" with the consent of the subject. See:
Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
- Protected from the civil statutory law by the First Amendment requirement for separation of church and state because we Christians are the church and our physical body is the "temple" of the church. See: 1 Cor. 6:19.
- Responsible for all the injuries they cause to every other person under equity and common law ONLY, and not under civil statutory law.
The term "anarchy" implies any one or more of the following, and especially as regards so-called "governments". An important goal of this site is to ELIMINATE all such "anarchy":
- Are superior in any way to the people they govern UNDER THE LAW.
- Are not directly accountable to the people or the law. They prohibit the PEOPLE from criminally prosecuting their own crimes, reserving the right to prosecute to their own fellow criminals. Who polices the police? THE CRIMINALS.
- Enact laws that exempt themselves. This is a violation of the Constitutional requirement for equal protection and equal treatment and constitutes an unconstitutional Title of Nobility in violation of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution.
- Only enforce the law against others and NOT themselves, as a way to protect their own criminal activities by persecuting dissidents. This is called “selective enforcement”. In the legal field it is also called “professional courtesy”. Never kill the goose that lays the STOLEN golden eggs.
- Break the laws with impunity. This happens most frequently when corrupt people in government engage in “selective enforcement”, whereby they refuse to prosecute or interfere with the prosecution of anyone in government. The Department of Justice (D.O.J.) or the District Attorney are the most frequent perpetrators of this type of crime.
- Are able to choose which laws they want to be subject to, and thus refuse to enforce laws against themselves. The most frequent method for this type of abuse is to assert sovereign, official, or judicial immunity as a defense in order to protect the wrongdoers in government when they are acting outside their delegated authority, or outside what the definitions in the statutes EXPRESSLY allow.
- Impute to themselves more rights or methods of acquiring rights than the people themselves have. In other words, who are the object of PAGAN IDOL WORSHIP because they possess “supernatural” powers. By “supernatural”, we mean that which is superior to the “natural”, which is ordinary human beings.
- Claim and protect their own sovereign immunity, but refuse to recognize the same EQUAL immunity of the people from whom that power was delegated to begin with. Hypocrites.
- Abuse sovereign immunity to exclude either the government or anyone working in the government from being subject to the laws they pass to regulate everyone ELSE’S behavior. In other words, they can choose WHEN they want to be a statutory “person” who is subject, and when they aren’t. Anyone who has this kind of choice will ALWAYS corruptly exclude themselves and include everyone else, and thereby enforce and implement an unconstitutional “Title of Nobility” towards themself. On this subject, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the following:
"No man in this country [including legislators of the government as a legal person] is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives," 106 U.S., at 220. "Shall it be said... that the courts cannot give remedy when the Citizen has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights," 106 U.S., at 220, 221.
[United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S. Ct. 240 (1882)]
- Have a monopoly on anything, INCLUDING “protection”, and who turn that monopoly into a mechanism to force EVERYONE illegally to be treated as uncompensated public officers in exchange for the “privilege” of being able to even exist or earn a living to support oneself.
- Can tax and spend any amount or percentage of the people’s earnings over the OBJECTIONS of the people.
- Can print, meaning illegally counterfeit, as much money as they want to fund their criminal enterprise, and thus to be completely free from accountability to the people.
- Deceive and/or lie to the public with impunity by telling you that you can’t trust anything they say, but force YOU to sign everything under penalty of perjury when you want to talk to them. 26 U.S.C. §6065.
In support of the above definition of "anarchy", here is how the U.S. Supreme Court defined it:
“Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.”
[Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)]
The above requirements are a consequence of the fact that the foundation of the United States Constitution is EQUAL protection and EQUAL treatment. Any attempt to undermine equal rights and equal protection described above constitutes:
- The establishment of a state sponsored religion in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. Chapter 21B. That religion is described in: Socialism: The New American Civil Religion, Form #05.016. The object of worship of such a religion is imputing "supernatural powers" to civil rulers and forcing everyone to worship and serve said rulers as "superior beings".
- The establishment of an unconstitutional Title of Nobility in violation of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution.
[Family Guardian Disclaimer Page, Section 4: Meaning of Words; SOURCE: https://famguardian.org/disclaimer.htm]
Sovereign Power-Bouvier’s law dictionary Baldwin’s students edition 1928
[Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Balwin's Student Edition, 1928]
"The full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereignty and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, does not contemplate foreign sovereigns, nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent, sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication and will be extended to him.
A sovereign entering a foreign territory with the knowledge and license of its sovereign, that license, though containing no stipulation exempting his person from arrest, is universally understood to imply such stipulation."
[Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812)]
President Theodore Roosevelt;
Opening of the Jamestown Exposition; Norfolk, VA, April 26, 1907
“We of this mighty western Republic
have to grapple with the dangers that spring from popular self-government
tried on a scale incomparably vaster than ever before in the history
of mankind, and from an abounding material prosperity greater also
than anything which the world has hitherto seen.
As regards the
first set of dangers, it behooves us to remember that men can never
escape being governed. Either they must govern themselves
or they must submit to being governed by others. If from lawlessness
or fickleness, from folly or self-indulgence, they refuse to govern
themselves then most assuredly in the end they will have to be governed
from the outside. They can prevent the need of government
from without only by showing they possess the power of government
from within. A sovereign cannot make excuses for his failures;
a sovereign must accept the responsibility for the exercise of power
that inheres in him; and where, as is true in our Republic, the
people are sovereign, then the people must show a sober understanding
and a sane and steadfast purpose if they are to preserve that orderly
liberty upon which as a foundation every republic must rest.”
[President Theodore
Roosevelt; Opening of the Jamestown Exposition; Norfolk, VA, April
26, 1907]
Mr. Logan: "...Natural laws can not
be created, repealed, or modified by legislation. Congress should
know there are many things which it can not do..."
"It is now
proposed to make the Federal Government the guardian of its citizens.
If that should be done, the Nation soon must perish. There can only
be a free nation when the people themselves are free and administer
the government which they have set up to protect their rights. Where
the general government must provide work, and incidentally food
and clothing for its citizens, freedom and individuality will be
destroyed and eventually the citizens will become serfs to the general
government..."
[Congressional Record-Senate,
Volume 75- Part 11, June 10, 1933, Page 12522]
Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 597 (1876)
"United States government is as sovereign
within its sphere as states are within theirs. "
[Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 597 (1876) ]
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980) (Colville), we addressed the Indian tribes' authority to impose taxes on non-Indians doing business on the reservation. We held that
"[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status."
Id. at 1 447 U. S. 152. The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty, because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This power enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential services. The power does not derive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction. See, e.g., 22 U. S. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 199 (1824).
The petitioners avail themselves of the "substantial privilege of carrying on business" on the reservation. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425, 445 U. S. 437 (1980); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 311 U. S. 444-445 (1940). They benefit from the provision of police protection and other governmental services, as well as from "the advantages
Page 455 U. S. 138
of a civilized society'" that are assured by the existence of tribal government. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 447 U. S. 228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441 U. S. 445 (1979)). Numerous other governmental entities levy a general revenue tax similar to that imposed by the Jicarilla Tribe when they provide comparable services. Under these circumstances, there is nothing exceptional in requiring petitioners to contribute through taxes to the general cost of tribal government. [Footnote 5] Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 453 U. S. 624-629 (1981); id. at 453 U. S. 647 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 445 U. S. 436-437.
As we observed in Colville, supra, the tribe's interest in levying taxes on nonmembers to raise
"revenues for essential governmental programs . . . is strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services."
447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 156-157. This surely is the case here. The mere fact that the government imposing the tax also enjoys rents and royalties as the lessor of the mineral lands does not undermine the government's authority to impose the tax. See infra at 455 U. S. 145-148. The royalty payments from the mineral leases are paid to the Tribe in its role as partner in petitioners' commercial venture. The severance tax, in contrast, is petitioners' contribution "to the general cost of providing governmental services." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra, at 453 U. S. 623. State governments commonly receive both royalty payments and severance taxes from lessees of mineral lands within their borders.
Page 455 U. S. 139
Viewing the taxing power of Indian tribes as an essential instrument of self-government and territorial management has been a shared assumption of all three branches of the Federal Government. Cf. Colville, supra, at 447 U. S. 153. In Colville, the Court relied in part on a 1934 opinion of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. In this opinion, the Solicitor recognized that, in the absence of congressional action to the contrary, the tribes' sovereign power to tax
"'may be exercised over members of the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as conditions.'"
447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 153 (quoting Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14, 46 (1934)). Colville further noted that official executive pronouncements have repeatedly recognized that
"Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant interest, . . . including jurisdiction to tax."
447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 152-153 (citing 23 Op.Atty.Gen. 214 (1900); 17 Op.Atty.Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op.Atty.Gen. 174 (1855)). [Footnote 6]
Similarly, Congress has acknowledged that the tribal power to tax is one of the tools necessary to self-government and territorial control. As early as 1879, the Senate Judiciary
Page 455 U. S. 140
Committee acknowledged the validity of a tax imposed by the Chickasaw Nation on non-Indians legitimately within its territory:
"We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the right of self-government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the limits of the territory they occupy, except so far as that jurisdiction has been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress. Subject to the supervisory control of the Federal Government, they may enact the requisite legislation to maintain peace and good order, improve their condition, establish school systems, and aid their people in their efforts to acquire the arts of civilized life; and they undoubtedly possess the inherent right to resort to taxation to raise the necessary revenue for the accomplishment of these vitally important objects -- a right not in any sense derived from the Government of the United States."
S.Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess., 1-2 (1879) (emphasis added).
Thus, the views of the three federal branches of government, as well as general principles of taxation, confirm that Indian tribes enjoy authority to finance their governmental services through taxation of non-Indians who benefit from those services. Indeed, the conception of Indian sovereignty that this Court has consistently reaffirmed permits no other conclusion. As we observed in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 419 U. S. 557 (1975), "Indian tribes within
[Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)]
Senate Report 443, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Volume 3, Titled, "Election of Delegate From the District of Columbia", Page 5
". . .The United States is a representative Government. Congress meets in the Capital. Senators and Representatives come yearly to perform their legislative duties, refreshed by contact with their home people, and because thereof better able to represent their views. Each of their constituents is a sovereign citizen; he is a part of the Government, State and National; he has a voice in the selection of his officers and, either directly or indirectly through his representatives,makes and enforces all laws, State and National, affecting life, liberty, and property. . ."
[Senate Report 443, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Volume 3, Titled, "Election of Delegate From the District of Columbia", Page 5]
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
212, 221, 223 (1845)
"the United States never held any
municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in Alabama
or any of the new states which were formed ... The United States
has no Constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction,
sovereignty or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere,
except in the cases in which it is expressly granted ..."
[Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212,
221, 223 (1845)]
"the right to make
binding obligations is a competence attaching to sovereignty."
[Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935)]
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253 (1967):
"In the United States
the people are sovereign, and the government cannot sever its relationship
to the people by taking away their citizenship...The very nature of our free Government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to and does, protect every citizen of this Nation, against a congressional, forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more than to give this citizen, that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship." "
[Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967)]
Moreover, if the dissent were correct
that the sovereign acts doctrine permits the Government to abrogate
its contractual commitments in "regulatory" cases even where it
simply sought to avoid contracts it had come to regret, then the
Government's sovereign contracting power would be of very little
use in this broad sphere of public activity. We rejected a virtually
identical argument in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935),
in which Congress had passed a resolution regulating the payment
of obligations in gold.
We held that the law could not be applied to the Government's
own obligations, noting that "the right to make binding obligations
is a competence attaching to sovereignty." Id. at 353.
See also Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ("`The
United States does business on business terms'") (quoting
United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527,
534 (1926)); Perry v. United States, supra at 352 (1935) ("When
the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts,
it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals
who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference . .
. except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent")
(citation omitted); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877)
("The United States,
when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same
laws that govern the citizen in that behalf"); Cooke
v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (explaining
that when the United States "comes down from its position of sovereignty,
and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same
laws that govern individuals there").
See Jones, 1 Cl.Ct. at 85 ("Wherever
the public and private acts of the government seem to commingle,
a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in
its place, and then the question be determined whether the action
will lie against the supposed defendant"); O'Neill v.
United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (sovereign acts doctrine
applies where, "[w]ere [the] contracts exclusively between private
parties, the party hurt by such governing action could not claim
compensation from the other party for the governing action"). The
dissent ignores these statements (including the statement from Jones,
from which case Horowitz drew its reasoning literally verbatim),
when it says, post at 931, that the sovereign acts cases do not
emphasize the need to treat the government-as-contractor the same
as a private party.
Our Contract Clause cases have demonstrated
a similar concern with governmental self-interest by recognizing
that "complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness
and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest
is at stake." United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 26 (1977); see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412-413, and n. 14 (1983) (noting
that a stricter level of scrutiny applies under the Contract Clause
when a State alters its own contractual obligations); cf. Perry,
supra at 350-351 (drawing a "clear distinction" between Congress'
power over private contracts and "the power of the Congress to alter
or repudiate the substance of its own engagements").
The generality
requirement will almost always be met where, as in Deming, the governmental
action "bears upon [the government's contract] as it bears upon
all similar contracts between citizens." Deming v. United States,
1 Ct.Cl. 190, 191 (1865). Deming is less helpful, however, in cases
where, as here, the public contracts at issue have no obvious private
analogs.
[United States
v. Winstar Corp. 518 U.S. 839 (1996)]
American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 29 S.Ct. 511, 513, 213 U.S. 347, 53 L.Ed. 826, 19 Ann.Cas.
1047 (1909):
"The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign
makes law. See
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353, 51 L. ed. 834, 836,
27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526. In the case of private persons, it consistently
may assert the freedom of the immediate parties to an injury and
yet declare that certain persuasions addressed to them are wrong.
See
Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 1, 16-21, 38 L.
ed. 55, 63-65, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240;
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 130, 131, 3 L. ed. 162, 176."
[American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 29 S.Ct. 511, 513, 213 U.S. 347, 53 L.Ed. 826, 19 Ann.Cas.
1047 (1909)]
"The
rights of sovereignty extend to all
persons and things not privileged, that
are within the territory. They extend
to all strangers resident therein; not
only to those who are naturalized,
and to those who are domiciled therein, having taken up their abode
with the intention of permanent residence, but also to those whose
residence is transitory. All strangers are under the protection
of the sovereign while they are within his territory and owe a temporary
allegiance in return for that protection."
[Carlisle v. United
States, 83 U.S. 147, 154 (1873)]
[EDITORIAL: Not all sovereignty is expressed in LEGISLATIVE form. Everyone is subject to the CRIMINAL law regardless of consent (Form #05.003) or civil status (Form #13.008), but only those PRIVILEGED (Form #05.030) are subject to CIVIL legislation, which includes franchisees and foreigners visiting a foreign country. Everyone else, including natrualized americans or "nationals", are protected by the constitution and the common law in court, but not civil statutory law. This is coveredin in: Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037 (OFFSITE LINK). Domicile (Form #05.002) is a civil protection franchise that makes people surrender natural rights in exchange for CIVIL privileges. To claim a CIVIL domicile (Form #05.002), you must surrender YOUR sovereignty and become a government public officer (Form #05.042). The statutory public rights attaching to each statutory civil status (e.g. "person", "individual") are PAID FOR with the civil statutory obligations. that ALSO attach to the status. In that sense, there is a "tacit procuration"]
James Monroe, Second Inaugural
Address; March 5, 1821
“…a government which is founded
by the people, who
possess exclusively the
sovereignty…” “In this great nation there is but
one order, that
of the people, whose
power, by a peculiarly
happy improvement of the representative principle, is transferred
from them, without impairing
in the slightest degree their sovereignty, to bodies of their
own creation, and
to persons elected by themselves, in the full extent necessary for
all the purposes of free, enlightened and efficient government.
The whole system is elective, the
complete
sovereignty being
in the people, and
every officer in every department deriving his authority from and
being responsible to them for his conduct.”
[James Monroe, Second Inaugural Speech
March 5, 1821]
Bouv. Law
Dict (1870)
Strictly speaking,
in our republican form of government,
the absolute sovereignty
of the nation is in the people of the nation; and the residuary
sovereignty of each state, not granted to any of its public functionaries,
is in the people of the state.
2 Dall. 471
[Bouv. Law Dict
(1870)]
Black's Law Dictionary,
4th Ed., p 1300
As independent sovereignty, it is
State's province and duty to forbid interference by another state
or foreign power with status of its own citizens. Roberts v Roberts
(1947) 81 CA2d 871, 185 P2d 381.
[Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.,
p 1300]
Redding v Los Angeles,
81 CA.2d. 888, 185 P.2d. 430, app dismd 334 US 825, 92 L Ed 1754,68 S Ct
1338 (1947)
United States and State of California
are two separate sovereignties, each dominant within its own sphere.
[Redding v Los Angeles, 81
CA2d 888, 185 P2d 430, app dismd 334 US 825, 92 L Ed 1754,68 S Ct
1338 (1947)]
"The Government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone.
Its authority is defined and limited by the Constitution. All
powers not granted to it by that instrument are reserved to the States
or the people."
[United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
v. Chambers, 73 Ohio St. 16, 76 N.E. 91, 11 L.R.A., N.S., 1012 (1905)
"Judge Story, in his treatise on the Conflicts of Laws, lays down, as
the basis upon which all reasonings on the law of comity must necessarily
rest, the following maxims: First 'that
every nation possesses an exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory'; secondly,
'that no state or nation
can by its laws directly affect or bind property out of its own territory,
or bind persons not resident therein, whether they are natural born
subjects or others.' The learned judge then adds: 'From
these two maxims or propositions there follows a third, and that is
that whatever force and obligation the laws of one country have in another
depend solely upon the laws and municipal regulation of the latter;
that is to say, upon its own proper jurisdiction and polity, and upon
its own express or tacit consent." Story on Conflict of Laws §23."
[Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Chambers, 73 Ohio St. 16; 76 N.E.
91; 11 L.R.A., N.S., 1012 (1905)]
"The individual
may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled
to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract
is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbor to
divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation,
so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to
the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection
of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the
law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the State,
and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance
with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate
himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest
or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to
the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."
[Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906)]
81A Corpus Juris Secundum
(C.J.S.), United States §29 (2003):
Sovereignty.
"Generally, the states of the Union sustain toward each other the
relationship of independent sovereigns or independent foreign states,
except in so far as the United States is paramount as the dominating
government, and in so far as the states are bound to recognize the fraternity
among sovereignties established by the federal Constitution, as by the
provision requiring each state to give full faith and credit to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the other states..."
[81A Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), United States, §29 (2003)]
American Dictionary of the
English Language, Noah Webster 1828, Vol. II, 76.
Sovereignty.
Supreme power; supremacy; the possession of the highest
power, or of uncontrollable power.
[American Dictionary
of the English Language, Noah Webster 1828, Vol. II, 76]
Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky.
(1 Dana) 481, 501 (1833)
I shall notice one idea more in defence of the act, and only one.
It is the appeal made in the preamble to the sovereign power of
the state. I do not
admit that there is any sovereign power, in the literal meaning
of the terms, to be found any where in our systems of government.
The people possess, as it regards their governments, a revolutionary
sovereign power; but so long as the governments remain which they
have instituted, to establish justice and “to secure the enjoyment
of the right of life, liberty and property, and of pursuing happiness;”
sovereign power,?? or, which I take to be the same thing, power
without limitation, is no where to be found in any branch or department
of the government, either state or national; nor indeed in all of
them put together. The constitution of the United States expressly
forbids the passage of a bill of attainder, or ex post facto
law, or the granting of any title of nobility, by the general
or state governments. The same instrument likewise limits the powers
of the general government to those expressly granted, and places
many other restrictions upon the power of the state governments.--The
constitutions of the different states likewise contain many prohibitions
and limitations of power. The tenth article of our state constitution,
consisting of twenty eight sections, is made up of restrictions
and prohibitions upon legislative and judicial power, and concludes
with the emphatic declaration, “that every thing in this article
is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever
remain inviolate; and that all laws contrary thereto, or contrary
to this constitution, shall be void.”
These numerous limitations
and restrictions prove, that the idea of sovereignty in government,
was not tolerated by the wise founders of our systems. “Sovereign
state” are cabalistic words, not understood by the disciple of liberty,
who has been instructed in our constitutional schools. It is an
appropriate phrase when applied to an absolute despotism. I firmly
believe, that the idea of sovereign power in the government of a
republic, is incompatible with the existence and permanent foundation
of civil liberty, and the rights of property. The history of man,
in all ages, has shown the necessity of the strongest checks upon
power, whether it be exercised by one man, a few or many. Our revolution
broke up the foundations of sovereignty in government; and our written
constitutions have carefully guarded against the baneful influence
of such an idea henceforth and forever. I can not, therefore, recognize
the appeal to the sovereignty of the state, as a justification of
the act in question. Hence I conclude that the circuit
court erred in refusing to give the third instruction asked for
by the plaintiff, and in giving the first asked for by the defendant.
[Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana)
481, 501 (1833)]
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of
Moscow, Russia v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 294 N.Y.S. 648, 662,
161 Misc. 903 (1937)
"'Sovereignty' means that the decree
of sovereign makes law, and foreign courts cannot condemn influences
persuading sovereign to make the decree."
[Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow,
Russia v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 294 N.Y.S. 648, 662, 161
Misc. 903 (1937)]
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third
Revision (8th Edition)(1914), Volume 3, pp. 3096 & 3097
SOVEREIGNTY.
The union and exercise of all human power possessed in a state:
It is a combination of all power; it is the power to do everything
in a state without accountability, —to make laws, to execute and
to apply them, to impose and collect taxes and levy contributions,
to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance or of commerce
with foreign nations, and the like. Story, Const. § 207.
The artificial soul of that artificial
body, the state. Spencer.
As long as it is accurately employed
. . . it is a merely legal conception and means simply the power
of law-making unrestricted by any legal limit. But it is sometimes
employed in a political rather than a legal sense. Dicey, Engl.
Constitution.
Abstractly, sovereignty resides in
the body of the nation and belongs to the people. But these powers
are generally exercised by delegation.
When analyzed, sovereignty is naturally
divided into three great powers: namely, the legislative, the executive,
and the Judiciary; the first is the power to make new laws and to
collect and repeal the old; the second is the power to execute the
laws, both at home and abroad; and the last is the power to apply
the laws to particular facts, to judge the disputes which arise
among the citizens, and to punish crimes.
See EXECUTIVE POWER; LEGISLATIVE
POWER; JUDICIAL POWER.
Strictly speaking, in our
republican forms of government
the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation
and the residuary sovereignty of each state, not granted to any
of its public functionaries, is in the people of the state; Chisholm
v. Georgia,
2 Dall. (U. S.) 471, 1 L. Ed. 440.
In
international
law a state is considered sovereign when it is organized for
political purposes and permanently occupies a fixed
territory. It must have an organized
government capable of enforcing law and be free from all external
control. A wandering tribe of savages, or nomads, or people united
merely for commercial purposes or under control of another state
cannot be considered as a sovereign state.
Until a state becomes sovereign in the sense above described. It
is not subject to
international
law. The states of the American Union are each, in a certain
sense, sovereign in their domestic concerns, but not in international
law, and Norway is an instance of a community not sovereign in
International
law because bound in a union with Sweden. The fact of sovereignty
is usually established by general recognition of other states, and,
until such recognition is universal, no community can be considered
as sovereign; Snow, Int. Law 19. See International Law.
Every sovereign state is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory. Underhill
v. Hernandez,
168 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456.
“The transactions of independent
states between each other are governed by other laws than those
which municipal courts administer; such courts have neither the
means of deciding what is right, nor the power of enforcing any
decision which they may make.” 13 Moore, P. C. 75. And the same
is the case with their dealings with the subjects of other states;
Pollock, Torts 105.
Public agents, military or civil,
or foreign governments, whether such governments be de jure
or de facto, cannot be held responsible in any
courts of the United States for things done in their own states
in the exercise of the sovereignty thereof, in pursuance of the
directions of their governments; Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed.
577, 13 C. C. A 51, 38 L. B. A. 405. The government of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
country done within Its own territory; Underhill v Hernandez, 168
U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct 83, 42 L. Ed. 456.
Sovereignty means that the decree
of the sovereign makes law; and foreign courts can not condemn the
influences persuading the sovereign to make the decree; American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U. 5. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas 1047.
The idea of sovereignty was not associated
in the Teutonic mind with dominion over a particular portion of
the earth’s surface; it was distinctly personal or tribal; and so
was their conception of law. Taylor, Science of Jurispr. 133.
See SOVEREIGN;
STATE.
[Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, Third Revision (8th Edition) (1914), Volume 3, pp.
3096 & 3097]
Law Dictionary, James A. Ballentine,
Second Edition, 1948, p. 1216
"sovereignty
(suv’- or sovë-rãn-ti). That political authority which commands
in civil society, and orders and directs what each citizen is to
perform to obtain the end of its institution. See note to Bannock
County v. Bell, 101 Am. St. Rep. 158."
[Law Dictionary,
James A. Ballentine, Second Edition, 1948, p. 1216]
Black’s Law Dictionary 4th
Edition (1951), p. 1568.
"Sovereignty.
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any
independent state is governed; supreme political authority; paramount
control of the constitution and frame of government and its administration;
self sufficient source of political power, from which all specific
political powers are derived; the international independence of
a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal
affairs without foreign dictation; also a political society, or
state, which is sovereign and independent.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 455,
1 L.Ed. 440; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold., Tenn 325; Moore v. Shaw,
17 Cal. 218, 79 Am.Dec. 123; State v. Dixon, 66 Mont. 76, 213 P.
227. "
[Black’s Law Dictionary
4th Edition (1951), p. 1568]
Webster’s New World Dictionary,
3rd College Ed.(1988), p. 1283
"Sovereignty.
1) the state or quality of being sovereignty 2) the status,
dominion, rule, or power of a sovereign 3) supreme and independent
political authority 4) a sovereign state or governmental
unit."
[Webster’s New World Dictionary,
3rd College Ed.(1988), p. 1283 ]
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Childs
& Peterson, c1856, John Bouvier
SOVEREIGNTY. The union and exercise
of all human power possessed in a state; it is a combination of
all power; it is the power to do everything in a state without accountability;
to make laws, to execute and to apply them: to impose and collect
taxes, and, levy, contributions; to make war or peace; to form treaties
of alliance or of commerce with foreign nations, and the like. Story
on the Const. Sec. 207.
2. Abstractedly, sovereignty resides
in the body of the nation and belongs to the people. But these powers
are generally exercised by delegation.
3. When analyzed, sovereignty is
naturally divided into three great powers; namely, the legislative,
the executive, and the judiciary; the first is the power to make
new laws, and to correct and repeal the old; the second is the power
to execute the laws both at home and abroad; and the last is the
power to apply the laws to particular facts; to judge the disputes
which arise among the citizens, and to punish crimes.
4. Strictly speaking, in our republican
forms of government, the absolute sovereignty of the nation is
in the people of the nation; (q.v.) and the residuary sovereignty
of each state, not granted to any of its public functionaries, is
in the people of the state. (q.v.) 2 Dall. 471; and vide, generally,
2 Dall. 433, 455; 3 Dall. 93; 1 Story, Const. Sec. 208; 1 Toull.
n. 20 Merl. Repert. h.t.
SOVEREIGN STATE. One which governs
itself independently of any foreign power.
SOVEREIGN. A chief ruler with supreme
power; one possessing sovereignty. (q.v.) It is also applied to
a king or other magistrate with limited powers.
2. In the United States the sovereignty
resides in the body of the people. Vide Rutherf. Inst. 282.
[Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Childs
& Peterson, c1856, John Bouvier]
In January, 1776, the Massachusetts
General Court had proclaimed:
"It is a Maxim that, in every Government, there must exist, Somewhere,
a Supreme, Sovereign, absolute, and uncontrollable Power, But this Power
resides, always in the body of the People, and it never was, or can
be delegated, to one Man, or a few."
Gordon S. Wood,
The Creation of the American
Republic 1776-1787, W.W. Norton & Co., c1969, at 382:
As one Connecticut town declared in 1783; "...there is an original,
underived and incommunicable authority and supremacy, in the collective
body of the people, to whom all delegated power must submit, and from
whom there is no appeal."
[The Creation of the American
Republic 1776-1787, W.W. Norton & Co., c1969, at 382]
The Creation of the American
Republic 1776-1787, at 364
"The counties of Orange and Mecklenburg, North Carolina informed their
delegates at the North Carolina Convention of 1776; "Political power
is of two kinds, one principal and superior, the other derived and inferior...The
principal supreme power is possessed by the people at large, the derived
and inferior power by the servants they employ."
[The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at 364]
Chisholm, Ex'r. v. Georgia,
2 Dall. (U.S.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 454, 457, 471, 472) (1794)
"It will be sufficient to observe
briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England,
exist on feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as
the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person
as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being
on an equal footing with a subject, either in a Court of Justice
or elsewhere. That system contemplates him as being the fountain
of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant derives all
franchises, immunities and privileges..." at 471.
"From the differences existing between
feudal sovereignties and Government founded on compacts, it necessarily
follows that their respective prerogatives must differ. Sovereignty
is the right to govern; a nation or State-sovereign is the person
or persons in whom that resides. In Europe the sovereignty
is generally ascribed to the Prince; here it rests with the people;
there, the sovereign actually administers the Government; here,
never in a single instance; our Governors are the agents of the
people, and at most stand in the same relation to their sovereign,
in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns. Their
Princes have personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences, our
rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in the sovereignty
otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens."
at 472.
[Justice Wilson]
[Chisholm, Ex'r. v. Georgia,
2 Dall. (U.S.) 419, 1 L.ed. 454, 457, 471, 472) (1794)]
In the United States the people
are sovereign over their civil servants:
"Don't you know that when you offer yourselves to
someone to obey him as slaves, you are slaves to the one whom you obey..."
[Romans 6:16, Bible, (NIV)]
Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F.
939, 943 (1838):
"The sovereignty of a state does
not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of
its government, but in the People, from whom the government emanated;
and they may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then in
this country, abides with the constituency, and not with the agent;
and this remark is true, both in reference to the federal and state
government."
[Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F. 939,
943 (1838)]
Merrion Et. Al., DBA Merrion & Bayless, Et. Al. v. Jiccarilla Apache Tribe Et. Al., 455
U.S. 130, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d. 21, 50 U.S.L.W. 4169 pp. 144-148 (1982)
(Bold emphasis added here):
"[15] (b) Even if the Tribe's power
to tax were derived solely from its power to exclude non-Indians
from the reservation, the Tribe has the authority to impose the
severance tax. Non-Indians who lawfully enter tribal lands remain
subject to a tribe's power to exclude them, which power includes
the lesser power to tax or place other conditions on the non-Indian's
conduct or continued presence on the reservation. The Tribe's role
as commercial partner with petitioners should not be confused with
its role as sovereign. It is one thing to find that the Tribe has
agreed to sell the right to use the land and take valuable minerals
from it, and quite another to find that the Tribe has abandoned
its sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly reserved
them through a contract. To presume that a sovereign forever waives
the right to exercise one of its powers unless it expressly reserves
the right to exercise that power in a commercial agreement turns
the concept of sovereignty on its head.
[Merrion Et. Al., DBA Merrion & Bayless, Et. Al. v. Jiccarilla Apache Tribe Et. Al., 455 U.S. 130,
102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d. 21, 50 U.S.L.W. 4169 pp. 144-148 (1982). (Bold
emphasis added here)]
Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S.
6, 3 Dall. 6, 1 L.Ed. 485 (1794):
"The District Court has no jurisdiction
by the Constitution and laws of the United States (which form the
only possible source of Federal jurisdiction) for, although it is
admitted, that by the 1st and 2d sections of the 3d article of the
Constitution, and the Judicial act, the jurisdiction of the District
Court extends to all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction..."
"In Europe, the
Executive is almost synonymous with the Sovereign power of a State;
and, generally, includes legislative and judicial authority.
When, therefore, writers speak of the sovereign, it is not necessarily
in exclusion of the judiciary; and it will often be found, that
when the Executive affords a remedy for any wrong, it is nothing
more than by an exercise of its judicial authority. Such
is the condition of power in that quarter of the world, where it
is too commonly acquired by force, or fraud, or both,
and seldom by compact. In America, however,
the case is widely different. Our government is founded
upon compact. Sovereignty was, and is, in the people.
It was entrusted by them, as far as was necessary for the purpose
of forming a good government, to the Federal Convention; and the
Convention executed their trust, by effectually separating the Legislative,
Judicial, and Executive powers; which, in the contemplation of our
Constitution, are each a branch of the sovereignty. The well-being
of the whole depends upon keeping each department within its limits."
[Glass v. Sloop
Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 3 Dall. 6, 1 L.Ed. 485 (1794)]
Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9
(N.Y.) (1829):
"The people of
this State, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled
to all the rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative.
Through the medium of their Legislature they may exercise all the
powers which previous to the Revolution could have been exercised
either by the King alone, or by him in conjunction with his Parliament;
subject only to those restrictions which have been imposed by the
Constitution of this State or of the U.S."
[Lansing v.
Smith, 21 D. 89., 4 Wendel 9 (1829) (New York)]
"D." = Decennial Digest
Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (N.Y.) (1829), 21 Am.Dec. 89
10C Const. Law Sec. 298; 18 C Em.Dom. Sec. 3, 228;
37 C Nav.Wat. Sec. 219; Nuls Sec. 1`67; 48 C Wharves Sec. 3, 7.
NOTE: Am.Dec.=American Decision, Wend. = Wendell (N.Y.)
"...at the Revolution,
the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns
of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects...with none
to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow
citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty."
[Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall (U.S.) 419, 454, 1 L.Ed. 440, 471-472 (1793)]
In discussing this question, the counsel for the state of Maryland
have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the constitution,
to consider that instrument, not as emanating from the people, but
as the act of sovereign and independent states. The powers of the
general government, it has been said, are delegated by the states,
who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination
to the states, who alone possess supreme dominion. It would be difficult
to sustain this proposition. The convention which framed the constitution
was indeed elected by the state legislatures. But the instrument,
when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation,
or pretensions to it. It was reported to the then existing congress
of the United States, with a request that it might ‘be submitted
to a convention of delegates, chosen in each state by the people
thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their
assent and ratification.’ This mode of proceeding was adopted; and
by the convention, by congress, and by the state legislatures, the
instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it
in the only manner in which they can act safely, effectively and
wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention. It is true,
they assembled in their several states-and where else should they
have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think
of breaking down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding
the American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they
act, they act in their states. But the measures they adopt do not,
on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves,
or become the measures of the state governments.
From these conventions, the constitution derives its whole authority.
The government proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and
established,’ in the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained,
‘in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure
domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves
and to their posterity.’ The assent of the states, in their sovereign
capacity, is implied, in calling a convention, and thus submitting
that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty
to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not
the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state governments.
The constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation,
and bound the state sovereignties.
It has been said, that the people had already surrendered all their
powers to the state sovereignties, and had nothing more to give.
But, surely, the question whether they may resume and modify the
powers granted to government, does not remain to be settled in this
country. Much more might the legitimacy of the general government
be doubted, had it been created by the states. The powers delegated
to the state sovereignties were to be exercised by themselves, not
by a distinct and independent sovereignty, created by themselves.
To the formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the
state sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, ‘in order
to form a more perfect union,’ it was deemed necessary to change
this alliance into an effective government, possessing great and
sovereign powers, and acting directly on the people, the necessity
of referring it to the people, and of deriving its powers directly
from them, was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the
Union, then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case),
is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form,
and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted
by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit.
*32
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted
to it, would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced
by all those arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it
was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that
principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting
the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising,
and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system shall
exist. In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of
the general and state governments must be brought into view, and
the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in opposition,
must be settled.
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind,
we might expect it would be this-that the government of the Union,
though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.
This would seem to result, necessarily, from its nature. It is the
government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents
all, and acts for all. Though any one state may be willing to control
its operations, no state is willing to allow others to control them.
The nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily
bind its component parts. But this question is not left to mere
reason: the people have, in express terms, decided it, by saying,
‘this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall
be made in pursuance thereof,’ ‘shall be the supreme law of the
land,’ and by requiring that the members of the state legislatures,
and the officers of the executive and judicial departments of the
states, shall take the oath of fidelity to it. The government of
the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme;
and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the
supreme law of the land, ‘anything in the constitution or laws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'
[M'Culloch v. State,
17 U.S. 316 (1819)]
"While sovereign powers are delegated
to ... the government, sovereignty itself remains with the people.."
Yick Wo is a powerful anti-discrimination
case. You might get the impression that the legislature can write
perfectly legal laws, yet the laws cannot be enforced contrary to
the intent of the people. It's as if servants do not make rules
for their masters. It's as if the Citizens who created government
were their masters. It's as if civil servants were to obey the higher
authority. You are the higher authority of Romans 13:1. You as ruler
are not a terror to good works per Romans 13:3. Imagine that! Isn't
it a shame that your government was surrendered to those who are
a terror to good works? Isn't it a shame that you enlisted to obey
them?
[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886)]
"There is no such thing as a power
of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States ....
In this country sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress
can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution
entrusted to it: All else is withheld."
[Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421
(1884)]
"In common usage, the term 'person'
does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word
are ordinarily construed to exclude it."
[Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442
U.S. 653, 667 (1979)]
"Since in common usage the term `person'
does not include the sovereign, statutes employing that term are
ordinarily construed to exclude it."
[U.S. v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600, 604,
61 S.Ct. 742 (1941)]
". . .In common usage, the term `person'
does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily
not be construed to do so."
[U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America,
330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677 (1947)]
U.S. v. General Motors Corporation,
D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (1942):
". . .In common usage the word `person'
does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word
are generally construed to exclude the sovereign."
[U.S. v. General Motors Corporation,
D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (1942)]
Church of Scientology v. US
Department of Justice, 612 F.2d. 417, 425 (1979):
"the word `person' in legal terminology
is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope
a variety of entities other than human beings., see e.g. 1, U.S.C.
para 1."
[Church of Scientology v. US Department
of Justice, 612 F.2d. 417, 425 (1979)]
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Although the text of
the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition
. . . which it confirms." Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). That presupposition, first observed over
a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), has two parts:
first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system;
and second, that "`[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.'"
Id. at 13 (emphasis deleted), quoting The Federalist No. 81, p.
487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). See also Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority, supra, at 146 ("The Amendment is rooted in
a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain
attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity"). For over
a century, we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits
against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States." Hans,
supra, at 15.{7} [517 U.S. 55]
[. . .]
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S.
349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.) ("A
sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends")
[Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996)]
"In United States, sovereignty
resides in people... the Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power
of the People to override their will as thus declared.",
[Perry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330 (1935)]
[EDITORIAL: That's right! According to the US Supreme
Court, the people are non-persons.
This all makes sense, after all, servants
don't make rules for their masters.
In his book
Judicial Tyranny and Your Income
Tax, tax attorney Jeffrey Dickstein included the transcript of
the tax trial US v. Carl Beery, Case A87-43CR Vol. III transcript. On
page 296 of the book, you will read where the IRS claims that "an individual
is somebody with a social security number."]
"This [traditional] explanation [of
sovereign immunity] adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign
may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords
no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts.
Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a
second sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement,
express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary
decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a
matter of comity."
[United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
621, 646 (1892)]
Ohio Life
Ins. Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. 416 (1854):
"For it can never be maintained in any tribunal in this country, that the people of a State, in the exercise of the powers of sovereignty, can be restrained within narrower limits than those fixed by the Constitution of the United States, upon the ground that they may make contracts ruinous or injurious to themselves. The principle that they are the best judges of what is for their own interest, is the foundation of our political institutions.
[...]
It is equally clear, upon the same principle, that the people of a State may, by the form of government they
adopt, confer on their public servants and representatives all the
power and rights of sovereignty which they themselves possess; or
may restrict them within such limits as may be deemed best and safest
for the public interest." (See police power)
[Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt,
57 U.S. 416 (1854)]
Blackstone's Commentaries, "View of the Constitution of the United States, Section 2 - Nature of
U.S. Constitution; manner of its adoption; as annotated by St. George
Tucker, William Young Birch and Abraham Small, c1803:
"... a very great lawyer, who wrote
but a few years before the American revolution, seems to doubt whether
the original contract of society had in any one instance been formally
expressed at the first institution of a state; The American revolution
seems to have given birth to this new political phenomenon: in every
state a written constitution was framed, and adopted by the people,
both in their individual and sovereign capacity, and character.
By this means, the just distinction between the sovereignty,
and the government, was rendered familiar to every intelligent
mind; the former was found to reside in the people, and to be
unalienable from them; the latter in their servants and agents:
by this means, also, government was reduced to its elements; its
object was defined, it's principles ascertained; its powers limited,
and fixed; its structure organized; and the functions of every
part of the machine so clearly designated, as to prevent any interference,
so long as the limits of each were observed...."
[Blackstone's
Commentaries, "View of the Constitution of the United States,
Section 2 - Nature of U.S. Constitution; manner of its adoption;
as annotated by St. George Tucker, William Young Birch and Abraham
Small, c1803]
"The ultimate authority ... resides in the people alone."
[James Madison, The Federalist, No. 46.]
"What, then, is meant by the doctrine that contracts are made with reference
to the taxing power resident in the State, and in subordination to it?
Is it meant that when a person lends money to a State, or to a municipal
division of the State having the power of taxation, there is in the
contract a tacit reservation of a right in the debtor to raise contributions
out of the money promised to be paid before payment? That cannot
be, because if it could, the contract (in the language of Alexander
Hamilton) would 'involve two contradictory things: an obligation to
do, and a right not to do; an obligation to pay a certain sum, and a
right to retain it in the shape of a tax. It is against the rules, both
of law and of reason, to admit by implication in the construction of
a contract a principle which goes in destruction of it.'
The truth is, States and cities,
when they borrow money and contract to repay it with interest, are not
acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary
individuals. Their contracts have the same meaning as that of similar
contracts between private persons. Hence, instead of there being in
the undertaking of a State or city to pay, a reservation of a sovereign
right to withhold payment, the contract should be regarded as an assurance
that such a right will not be exercised. A promise to pay, with a reserved
right to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an absurdity."
Is, then, property, which consists in the promise of a State, or of
a municipality of a State, beyond the reach of taxation? We do not affirm
that it is. A State may undoubtedly tax any of its creditors within
its jurisdiction for the debt due to him, and regulate the amount of
the tax by the rate of interest the debt bears, if its promise be left
unchanged. A tax thus laid impairs no obligation assumed. It leaves
the contract untouched. But until payment of the debt or interest has
been made, as stipulated, we think no act of State sovereignty
can work an exoneration from what has been promised to the [446] creditor;
namely, payment to him, without a violation of the Constitution. 'The
true rule of every case of property founded on contract with the government
is this: It must first be reduced into possession, and then it will
become subject, in common with other similar property, to the right
of the government to raise contributions upon it. It may be said that
the government may fulfil this principle by paying the interest with
one hand, and taking back the amount of the tax with the other. But
to this the answer is, that, to comply truly with the rule, the tax
must be upon all the money of the community, not upon the particular
portion of it which is paid to the public creditors, and it ought besides
to be so regulated as not to include a lien of the tax upon the fund.
The creditor should be no otherwise acted upon than as every other possessor
of money; and, consequently, the money he receives from the public can
then only be a fit subject of taxation when it is entirely separated'
(from the contract), 'and thrown undistinguished into the common mass.'
3 Hamilton, Works, 514 et seq. Thus only can contracts with the State
be allowed to have the same meaning as all other similar contracts have.
[Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1877)]
16 American Jurisprudence
2d, Constitutional law, Sovereignty of states §281 (1999):
"The original thirteen states existed prior to the adoption of the Federal
Constitution and before that time possessed all the attributes of sovereignty.
All these attributes except those surrendered by the formation of the
Constitution and the amendments thereto have been retained. But
the sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent
of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution,
and it is subject to the restraints and limitations of the Constitution.
"New states, upon their admission into the Union, become invested
with equal rights and are subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon the states already admitted. There can be no state of the
Union whose sovereignty or freedom of action is in any respect different
from that of any other state. There can be no restriction upon
any state other than one prescribed upon all the states by the Federal
Constitution. Congress, in admitting a state, cannot restrict
such state by bargain. The state, by so contracting with Congress,
is in no way bound by such a contract, however irrevocable it is stated
to be. It is said that
subject to the restraint and limitations of the Federal Constitution,
the states have all the sovereign powers of independent nations over
all persons and things within their respective territorial limits."
[16 American Jurisprudence 2d, Constitutional law, §281 (1999)]
16A American Jurisprudence
2d, Constitutional Law, Sovereignty of states §229 (1999):
"The original thirteen states existed prior to the adoption of the Federal
Constitution and before that time possessed all the attributes of sovereignty.
83 All of these attributes except those surrendered by the formation
of the Constitution and the amendments thereto have been retained. 84
But the sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the
extent of the grants of power to the Federal Government in the Constitution,
85 and it is subject to the restraints and limitations of the Constitution.
86
New states, upon their admission
into the Union, become invested with equal rights and are subject only
to such restrictions as are imposed upon the states already admitted.
87 Under this rule, which is referred to as the "equal footing" doctrine,
88 there can be no state of the Union whose sovereignty or freedom of
action is in any respect different from that of any other state, including
those states constituting the original 13 states. 89 "
[16A
American Jurisprudence 2d, Constitutional law, §229 (1999)]
Maxims of Law Relating to
Sovereignty
“Quod meum est sine me
auferri non potest.
What is mine [sovereignty
in this case] cannot be taken away without my consent”
[Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
Unabridged, 8th Edition, pg. 2159]
“Derivativa potestas
non potest esse major primitive.
The power [sovereign
immunity in this case] which is derived cannot be greater than that
from which it is derived.”
[Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
Unabridged, 8th Edition, pg. 2131]
“Nemo potest facere per
obliquum quod non potest facere per directum.
No one can do that indirectly
which cannot be done directly.”
[Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
Unabridged, 8th Edition, pg. 2147]
“Quod per me non possum,
nec per alium..
What I cannot do in person,
I cannot do through the agency of another.”
[Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
Unabridged, 8th Edition, pg. 2159]
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