Any property subject to forfeiture [pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7301, §7302, §7303] to the United States under any provision of this title may be seized by the Secretary.

26 CFR §301.6332-1: Surrender of property subject to levy

Any person who mistakenly surrenders to the United States property or rights to property not properly subject to levy is not relieved from liability to a third party who owns the property.

26 CFR §301.6326:  Administrative appeal of the erroneous filing of notice of federal tax lien

(a) In general.

Any person may appeal to the district director of the district in which a notice of federal tax lien was filed on the property or rights to property of such person for a release of lien alleging an error in the filing of notice of lien. Such appeal may be used only for the purpose of correcting the erroneous filing of a notice of lien, not to challenge the underlying deficiency that led to the imposition of a lien. If the district director determines that the Internal Revenue Service has erroneously filed the notice of any federal tax lien, the district director shall expeditiously, and, to the extent practicable, within 14 days after such determination, issue a certificate of release of lien. The certificate of release of such lien shall include a statement that the filing of notice of lien was erroneous.

(b) Appeal alleging an error in the filing of notice of lien. For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, an appeal of the filing of notice of federal tax lien must be based on any one of the following allegations:

(1) The tax liability that gave rise to the lien, plus any interest and additions to tax associated with said liability, was satisfied prior to the filing of notice of lien;

(2) The tax liability that gave rise to the lien was assessed in violation of the deficiency procedures set forth in section 6213 of the Internal Revenue Code;

(3) The tax liability that gave rise to the lien was assessed in violation of title 11 of the United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code); or (4) The statutory period for collection of the tax liability that gave rise to the lien expired prior to the filing of notice of federal tax lien.

(c) Notice of federal tax lien that lists multiple liabilities. When a notice of federal tax lien lists multiple liabilities, a person may appeal the filing of notice of lien with respect to one or more of the liabilities listed in the notice, if the notice was erroneously filed with respect to such liabilities. If a notice of federal tax lien was erroneously filed with respect to one or more liabilities listed in the notice, the district director shall issue a certificate of release with respect to such liabilities. For example, if a notice of federal tax lien lists tax liabilities for years 1980, 1981 and 1982, and the entire liabilities for 1981 and 1982 were paid prior to the filing of notice of lien, the taxpayer may appeal the filing of notice of lien with respect to the 1981 and 1982 liabilities and the district director must issue a certificate of release with respect to the 1981 and 1982 liabilities.

(d) Procedures for appeal--

(1) Manner. An appeal of the filing of notice of federal tax lien shall be made in writing to the district director (marked for the attention of the Chief, Special Procedures Function) of the district in which the notice of federal tax lien was filed.

(2) Form. The appeal shall include the following information and documents:

(i) Name, current address, and taxpayer identification number of the person appealing the filing of notice of federal tax lien; (ii) A copy of the notice of federal tax lien affecting the property, if available; and

(iii) The grounds upon which the filing of notice of federal tax lien is being appealed.

(A) If the ground upon which the filing of notice is being appealed is that the tax liability in question was satisfied prior to the filing, proof of full payment as defined in paragraph (e) of this section must be provided.

(B) If the ground upon which the filing of notice is being appealed is that the tax liability that gave rise to lien was assessed in violation of the deficiency procedures set forth in section 6213 of the Internal Revenue Code, the appealing party must explain how the assessment was erroneous.

(C) If the ground upon which the filing of notice is being appealed is that the tax liability that gave rise to the lien was assessed in violation of title 11 of the United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code), the appealing party must provide the following:

(1) The identity of the court and the district in which the bankruptcy petition was filed; and

(2) The docket number and the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition.

(3) Time. An administrative appeal of the erroneous filing of notice of federal tax lien shall be made within 1 year after the taxpayer becomes aware of the erroneously filed tax lien. (e) Proof of full payment. As used in paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of this section, the term ``proof of full payment'' means:

(1) An internal revenue cashier's receipt reflecting full payment of the tax liability in question prior to the date the federal tax lien issue was filed;

(2) A canceled check to the Internal Revenue Service in an amount which was sufficient to satisfy the tax liability for which release is being sought; or

(3) Any other manner of proof acceptable to the district director. (f) Exclusive remedy. The appeal established by section 6326 of the Internal Revenue Code and by this section shall be the exclusive administrative remedy with respect to the erroneous filing of a notice of federal tax lien.

(g) Effective date. The provisions of this section are effective July 7, 1989. [T.D. 8250, 54 FR 19569, May 8, 1989. Redesignated at 56 FR 19948, May 1, 1991] Seizure of Property for Collection of Taxes

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705; 82 L.Ed. 2d 530 (1984):

"A 'search' occurs 'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed."

"A 'seizure' of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property." Ibid."

U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct 492 (1993):

"(a) The seizure of Good's property implicates two "`explicit Page II textual source[s] of constitutional protection,'" the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. ___, ___. While the Fourth Amendment places limits on the Government's power to seize property for purposes of forfeiture, it does not provide the sole measure of constitutional protection that must be afforded property owners in forfeiture proceedings. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 ; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , distinguished. Where the Government seizes property not to preserve evidence of criminal wrongdoing, but to assert ownership and control over the property, its action must also comply with the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 . Pp. 4-8."

"(b) An exception to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing is justified only in extraordinary situations. Id., at 82. Using the three-part inquiry set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 - consideration of the private interest affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the Government's interest, including the administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would impose, id., at 335 - the seizure of real property for purposes of civil forfeiture does not justify such an exception. Good's right to maintain control over his home, and to be free from governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing importance, cf., e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 -715, that weighs heavily in the Mathews balance. Moreover, the practice of ex parte seizure creates an unacceptable risk of error, since the proceeding affords little or no protection to an innocent owner, who may not be deprived of property under 881(a)(7). Nor does the governmental interest at stake here present a pressing need for prompt action. Because real property cannot abscond, a court's jurisdiction can be preserved without prior seizure simply by posting notice on the property and leaving a copy of the process with the occupant. In addition, the Government's legitimate interests at the inception of a forfeiture proceeding - preventing the property from being sold, destroyed, or used for further illegal activity before the forfeiture judgment - can be secured through measures less intrusive than seizure: a lis pendens notice to prevent the property's sale, a restraining order to prevent its destruction, and search and arrest warrants to forestall further illegal activity. Since a claimant is already entitled to a hearing before final judgment, requiring the Government to postpone seizure until after an adversary hearing creates no significant Page III administrative burden, and any harm from the delay is minimal compared to the injury occasioned by erroneous seizure. Pp. 8-16."

"(c) No plausible claim of executive urgency, including the Government's reliance on forfeitures as a means of defraying law enforcement expenses, justifies the summary seizure of real property under 881(a)(7). Cf. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589. Pp. 16-18."

"2. Courts may not dismiss a forfeiture action filed within the five-year statute of limitations for noncompliance with the timing requirements of 1602-1604. Congress' failure to specify a consequence for noncompliance implies that it intended the responsible officials administering the Act to have discretion to determine what disciplinary measures are appropriate when their subordinates fail to discharge their statutory duties, and the federal courts should not, in the ordinary course, impose their own coercive sanction, see, e.g., United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717 -721. Pp. 19-22."

[U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct 492 (1993)]

Soldal et. al. v. Cook County, Illinois, et al., 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538 (1992), 121 L.Ed. 2d 450:

As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried away, giving new meaning to the term "mobile home." We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Amendment was in fact [506 U.S. 56, 62]   violated is, of course, a different question that requires determining if the seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the weighing of various factors, and is not before us.

The Court if Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure only in a "technical" sense, not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion followed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests, while leaving unprotected possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court said,

"a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession and eviction with police assistance actionable under - of all things - the Fourth Amendment[, which] would both trivialize the amendment and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from the state courts to the federal courts. That trivializing, this shift, can be prevented by recognizing the difference between possessory and privacy interests." 942 F.2d, at 1077.

Because the officers had not entered Soldal's house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in the Court of Appeals' view, interfered with his liberty in the course of the eviction, the Fourth Amendment offered no protection against the "grave deprivation" of property that had occurred. Ibid.

We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects." This language surely cuts against the novel holding below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy. 7 This much [506 U.S. 56, 63]   was made clear in Jacobsen, supra, where we explained that the first Clause of the Fourth Amendment

"protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs where there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." 466 U.S., at 113 (footnote omitted).

See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 -748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 , n. 6 (1980). Thus, having concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a package did not compromise its owner's privacy, the Court in Jacobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as would be required under the view adopted by the Court of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead, adhering to the teachings of United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), it went on to determine whether the invasion of the owners' "possessory interests" occasioned by the destruction of the powder was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, supra, at 124-125. In Place, although we found that subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff" did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place's suitcase was deemed an unlawful seizure, for it unreasonably infringed "the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage." 462 U.S., at 708 . 8 Although lacking a privacy component, the property rights in both instances nonetheless were not [506 U.S. 56, 64]   disregarded, but rather were afforded Fourth Amendment protection.

[Soldal et. al. v. Cook County, Illinois, et al., 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538 (1992), 121 L.Ed. 2d 450]