Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, pp. 1304-1306:

Res.  Lat.  The subject matter of a trust or will.  In the civil law, a thing; an object.  As a term of the law, this word has a very wide and extensive signification, including not only things which are objects of property, but also such as are not capable of individual ownership.  And in old English law it is said to have a general import, comprehending both corporeal and incorporeal things of whatever kind, nature, or species.  By "res," according to the modern civilians, is meant everything that may form an object of rights, in opposition to "persona," which is regarded as a subject of rights.  "Res," therefore, in its general meaning, comprises actions of all kinds; while in its restricted sense it comprehends every object of right, except actions.  This has reference to the fundamental division of the Institutes that all law relates either to persons, to things, or to actions.

Res is everything that may form an object of rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status.  In re Riggle's Will, 11 A.D.2d 51 205 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21, 22.  The term is particularly applied to an object, subject-matter, or status, considered as the defendant in an action, or as an object against which, directly, proceedings are taken.  Thus, in a prize case, the captured vessel is "the res"; and proceedings of this character are said to be in rem.  (See In personam; In Rem.)  "Res" may also denote the action or proceeding, as when a cause, which is not between adversary parties, it entitled "In re ______".


Things (res) have been variously divided and classified in law, e.g., in the following ways: (1) Corporeal and incorporeal things; (2) movables and immovables; (3) res mancipi and res nec mancipi; (4) things real and things personal; (5) things in possession and choses (i.e., things) in action; (6) fungible things and things not fungible (fungibles vel non fungibiles); and (7) res singulę (i.e., individual objects) and universitates rerum (i.e., aggregate things). Also persons are for some purposes and in certain respects regarded as things.

Res accessoria.  In the civil law, an accessory thing; that which belongs to a principal thing, or is in connection with it.

Res adiratę. The gist of the old action for res adiratę was the fact that the plaintiff had lost his goods, that they had come into the hands of the defendant, and that the defendant, on request, refused to give them up.

Res caduca.  In civil law, a fallen or escheated thing; an escheat.

Res communes.  In the civil law, things common to all; that is, those things which are used and enjoyed by every one, evenin single parts, but can never be exclusively acquired as a whole, e.g., light and air.

Res controversa.  In the civil law, a matter controverted; a matter in controversy; a point in question; a question for determination.

Res coronę.  In old English law, things of the crown' such as ancient manors, homages of the king, liberties, etc.

Res corporales.  In the civil law, corporeal things; things which can be touched, or are perceptible to the senses.

Res derelicta.  Abandoned property; property thrown away or forsaken by the owner, so as to become open to the acquisition of the first taker or occupant.

Res fungibiles.  In the civil law, fungible things, things of such a nature that they can be replaced by equal quantities and qualities when returning a loan or delivering goods purchased, for example, so many bushels of wheat or so many dollars; but a particular horse or a particular jewel would not be of this character.

Res gesę.  Things done.  McClory v. Schneider, Tex.Civ.App., 51 S.W.2d 738, 741.  The "res gesę" rule is that where a remark is made spontaneously and concurrently with an affray, collision or the like, it carries with it inherently a degree of credibility and will be admissible because of its spontaneous nature.  Carroll v. Guffey, 20 Ill.App.2d 470, 156 N.E.2d 267, 270.  "Res gestę" means literally things or things happened and therefore, to be admissible as exception to hearsay rule, words spoken, thoughts expressed, and gest6ures made, must all be so closely connected to occurrence or event in both time and substance as to be a part of the happening.  McCandless v. Inland Northwest Film Service, Inc., 64 Wash.2d 523, 392 P.2d 613, 618.  Those circumstances which are the automatic and undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act, which may be separated from act by lapse of time more or less appreciable, and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.  The whole of the transaction under investigation and every part of it.  Res gestę is considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.  In its operation it renders acts and declarations which constitute a part of the things done and said admissible in evidence, even though they would otherwise come within the rule excluding hearsay evidence or self-serving declarations.  The rule is extended to include, not only declarations by the parties to the suit, but includes statements made by bystanders and strangers, under certain circumstances.  See Fed.Evid.Rule 803(3).

A spontaneous declaration made by a person immediately after an event and before the mind has an opportunity to conjure a falsehood.  It represents an exception to the hearsay rule and should be referred to as a spontaneous exclamation rather than res gestę.  See also Excited utterance; Verbal act doctrine.

Res gestę witness.  An eyewitness to some event in the continuum of the criminal transaction and one whose testimony will aid in developing a full disclosure of the facts surrounding the alleged comission of the charged offenses.  People v. Baskin, 145 Mich.App. 526, 378 N.W.2d 535, 537.

Res habiles.  In the civil law, things which are prescriptible; things to which a lawful title may be acquired by ordinary prescription.

Res immobiles.  In the civil law, immovable things; including land and that which is connected therewith, either by nature or art, such as trees and buildings.

Res incorporales.  In the civil law, incorporeal things; things which cannot be touched; such as those things which consist in right.  Such things as the mind alone can perceive.

Res integra.  A whole things; a new or unopened thing.  The term is applied to those points of law which have not been decided, which are untoubhed by dictum or decision.

Res inter alios acta.  See Res inter alios acta.

Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself.  Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence.  Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.  Hillen v. Hooker COnst. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 484 S.W.2d 113, 115.  Under this doctrine, when a thing which causes injury, without fault of injured person, is shown to be under exclusive control of defendant, and injury is such as in ordinary course of things does not occur if the one having such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of an explanation, that injury arose from defendant's want of care.  Lux Art Van Service, Inc. v. Pollard, C.A.Ariz., 344 F.2d 883, 886.  See also Exclusive control.

Res judicata.  A matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.  Rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.  Matchett v. Rose, 36 Ill.App.3d 638, 344 N.E.2d 770, 779.  And to be applicable, requires identity in thing sued for as well as identity of cause of action, of persons and parties of action, and of quality in persons for or against whom claim is made.  The sum and substance of the whole rule is that a matter once judicially decided is finally decided.  Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.ed.2d 308.  See also Collateral estoppel doctrine; Final decision rule; Issue preclusion.

Collateral estoppel compared.  "Res judicata" bars relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties where there is a prior judgment, whereas "collateral estoppel" bars relitigation of a particular issue or determinative fact.  Roper v. Mabry, 15 Wash.App. 819, 551 P.2d 1381, 1384.
Estoppe and res judicata distinguished, see Estoppel.

Res litigiosę.  In roman law, things which are in litigation; property or rights which constitute the subject-matter of a pending action.

Res mancipi.  See Mancipi res.

Res mobiles.  In the civil law, movable things; things which may be transported from one place to another, without injury to their substance and form.  Things corresponding with the chattels personal of the common law.

Res nova.   A new matter; a new case; a question not before decided.

Res nullius.  A property of nobody.  A thing which has no owner, either because a former owner has finally abandoned it, or because it has never been appropriated by any person, or because (in the Roman law) it is not susceptible of private ownership.

Res periit domino.  A phrase used to express that, when a thing is lost or destroyed, it is lost to the person who was the owner of it at the time.

Res privatę.  In civil law, things the property of one or more individuals.

Res publicę.  Things belonging to the public; public property; such as the sea, naviagable rivers, highways.

Res quotidianę.  Every-day matters; familiar points or questions.

Res religiosę.  Things pertaining to religion.  In Roman law, especially burial-places, which were regarded as sacred, and could not be the subjects of commerce.

Res universitatis.  In the civil law, things belonging to a community (as, to a municipality), the use and enjoyment of which, according to their proper purpose, is free to every member of the community, but which cannot be appropriated to the exclusive use of any individual; such as the public buildings, streets, etc.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, pp. 1304-1306]

Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P.2d 719 (CA. 1932)

It is universally conceded that a divorce proceeding, in so far as it affects the status of the parties, is an action in rem. 19 Cor. Jur. 22, § 24; 3 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) 3152. It is usually said that the ‘marriage status' is the res. Both parties to the marriage, and the state of the residence of each party to the marriage, has an interest in the marriage status. In order that any court may obtain jurisdiction over an action for divorce that court must in some way get jurisdiction over the res (the marriage status). The early cases assumed that such jurisdiction was obtained when the petitioning party was properly domiciled in the jurisdiction. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87, is the leading case so holding; see, also, Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366. Until 1905 the overwhelming weight of authority was to the effect that, if the petitioning party was domiciled in good faith in any state, that state could render a divorce decree on constructive service valid not only in the state of its rendition, but which would be recognized everywhere. In Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794, the United States Supreme Court apparently recognized that doctrine. In that case the parties were living together and domiciled in Kentucky. That state was the last state where the parties lived together as husband and wife. The wife left the husband and came to and became domiciled in **721 New York. She brought an action for divorce in New York, her husband defending on the ground that he had secured a divorce in Kentucky on constructive service. New York refused to recognize the validity of the Kentucky decree, on the ground that Kentucky could not in such an action affect the status of a citizen of New York. The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York decisions (82 Hun, 179, 31 N. Y. S. 977; Id. 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933, 40 L. R. A. 291, 63 Am. St. Rep. 650) and *33 held that the Kentucky decree was entitled to full faith and credit even though the wife was not served with process and not appear in the Kentucky action, and even though at the time the decree was rendered the wife was a resident of and domiciled in New York. In so holding, however, the court pointed out that the reason the Kentucky decree was entitled to full faith and credit was because Kentucky had jurisdiction over the marriage status by virtue of the fact that that state was the matrimonial domicile, i. e., the last place the parties lived together as husband and wife. Then in 1905, the United States Supreme Court decided the Haddock Case, supra. Here the parties were married and domiciled in the state of New York. The husband, without cause, abandoned his wife and went to and acquired a domicile in Connecticut. Thereafter the husband secured in Connecticut a divorce on constructive service. Several years later the wife sued for divorce in New York, and secured personal service on the husband. The husband set up as a defense the Connecticut decree. New York refused to recognize it. The Supreme Court of the United States held that although the Connecticut decree was probably good in that state, it was without binding force in New York, and was not entitled to full faith and credit. The court pointed out that the matrimonial domicile of the parties was New York, and that in such a case Connecticut had no jurisdiction over the marriage status so as to affect the status of a New York resident. New York could recognize the Connecticut decree, but it could not be compelled to do so under the full faith and credit clause. The result of this decision has been to create a hopeless conflict of authority as to the status of a foreign divorce rendered against a nondomiciled defendant on constructive service. Some courts refuse to recognize foreign decrees so rendered as against their own residents. It should be noted that Pennsylvania, the state rendering the decree involved in the instant case, is a state which refuses to grant any efficacy to a foreign decree secured on constructive service against one of its own citizens, at least where Pennsylvania is the matrimonial domicile. Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375; Duncan v. Duncan, 265 Pa. 464, 109 A. 220. Other states recognize such decrees to their full extent, permitting them to be attacked solely on jurisdictional*34 grounds. Among this latter group of states there is hopeless conflict of authority as to what constitutes a jurisdictional defect which can be collaterally attacked in a sister state. See 39 A. L. R. 603 AND 42 A. L. R. 1405, notes where the cases are exhaustively collected and commented upon.

[Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P.2d 719 (CA. 1932)]