U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464 (1919)
[1][2] These general rules are well settled: (1) That the United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself, is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12, 32 L. Ed. 354; Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439, 21 L. Ed. 696; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195, 19 L. Ed. 35; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431, 433, 18 L. Ed. 700; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212, 7 L. Ed. 108. (2) That where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U. S. 165, 174, 175, 35 Sup. Ct. 398, 59 L. Ed. 520, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 118; Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U. S. 238, 3 Sup. Ct. 184, 27 L. Ed. 920; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555, 558, 25 L. Ed. 212; Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 35, 23 L. Ed. 196. Still the fact that the right and the remedy are thus intertwined might not, if the provision stood alone, require us to hold that the remedy expressly given excludes a right of review by the Court of Claims, where the decision of the special tribunal involved no disputed question of fact and the denial of compensation was rested wholly upon the construction of the act. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 198, 19 Sup. Ct. 503, 43 L. Ed. 779; Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U. S. 124, 29 Sup. Ct. 556, 53 L. Ed. 936; McLean v. United States, 226 U. S. 374, 33 Sup. Ct. 122, 57 L. Ed. 260; United States v. Laughlin (No. 200), 249 U. S. 440, 39 Sup. Ct. 340, 63 L. Ed. 696, decided April 14, 1919. But here Congress has provided:
‘That any claim which shall be presented and acted on under authority of this act shall be held as finally determined, and shall never thereafter be reopened or considered.'
These words express clearly the intention to confer upon the Treasury Department exclusive jurisdiction and to make its decision final. The case of United States v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 268, 13 Sup. Ct. 327, 37 L. Ed. 164, strongly relied upon by claimants, has no application. Compare D. M. Ferry & Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. 550, 557, 29 C. C. A. 345.
[3] In the Babcock Case claimant insists also that section 3482 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 6390), as amended by Act of June 22, *332 1874, c. 395, 18 Stat. 193 (Comp. St. §§ 6391, 6392) affords a basis for the recovery. That section provided for reimbursement for horses lost in the military service, among other things ‘in consequence of the United States failing to supply sufficient forage.’ The 1874 amendment provided for reimbursement in any case ‘where the loss resulted from any exigency or necessity of the military service, unless it was caused by the fault or negligence of such officers or enlisted men.’ Even if these statutes were applicable to facts like those presented here, there could be no recovery; because under Act Jan. 9, 1883, c. 15, 22 Stat. 401, and Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 868, 25 Stat. 437, the right to present claims under section 3482 of the Revised Statutes as amended finally expired in 1891. See Griffis v. United States, 52 Ct. Cl. 1, 170.
The Court of Claims was without jurisdiction in either case, and the judgments are Reversed.[U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464 (1919)]
Allen v. Graham, 446 P.2d 240, 243. (Ct. App. Ariz. 1968)
The appellant poses the following questions: (1) Does the superior court have jurisdiction to review an administrative decision of the Department of Public Welfare? (2) Are extraordinary writs available to review such administrative decisions? (3) Is A.R.S. s 12-902, subsec. A unconstitutional?
A.R.S. s 12-901 et seq., provide for judicial review of ‘a final decision of an administrative agency.’ However, decisions of the State Department of Public Welfare are specifically expected therefrom. A.R.S. s 12-902, subsec. A. Judicial review of administrative decisions is not a matter of right except when authorized by law. Roer v. Superior Court, 4 Ariz.App. 46, 417 P.2d 559 (1966) and cases cited therein. In view of the exception of the State Department of Public Welfare from the Judicial Review Act, the appellant had no Right of review thereunder. Bennett v. Arizona State Board of Public Welfare, 95 Ariz. 170, 172, 388 P.2d 166 (1963). Nor does the Act creating that administrative agency or any other Act provide for judicial review of its decisions. There being *338 **242 no ‘positive enactment of law’, Roen, supra, the appellant had no Right to judicial review of the welfare agency's denial of Old Age Assistance. The trial court apparently concluded, and correctly so, that judicial review was foreclosed.
[. . .]
The State has no common law or constitutional duty to support its poor [e.g. Social Security]. Division of Aid for the Aged, etc., v. Hogan, 143 Ohio St. 186, 54 N.E.2d 781 (1944); Beck v. Buena Park Hotel Corp., 30 Ill.2d 343, 196 N.E.2d 686 (1964). Aid to needy persons is solely a matter of statutory enactment. In re O'Donnell's Estate, 253 Iowa 607, 113 N.W.2d 246 (1962); Williams v. Shapiro, 4 Conn.Cir. 449, 234 A.2d 376 (1967).
Pension and relief programs not involving contributions to specific funds by the actual or prospective beneficiaries provide only a voluntary bounty. Senior Citizens League v. Dept. of Social Security, 38 Wash.2d 142, 228 P.2d 478 (1951). Recipients or applicants have no inherent or vested right in the public assistance they are receiving or desire to receive. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law s 245; Senior Citizens League v. Dept. of Social Security, supra; Smith v. King, 277 F.Supp. 31 (M.D.Ala.1967), probable jurisdiction noted, 390 U.S. 903, 88 S.Ct. 821, 19 L.Ed.2d 869; see also, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). The term ‘property’ as used in the due process clause refers to vested rights. It has no reference to mere concessions or privileges which a State may control and bestow or withhold at will. Senior Citizens League v. Dept. of Social Security, supra; 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law s 599 c. [FN3]
FN3. In the case of Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367 (1960), the Supreme Court of the United States declined to engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of ‘accrued property rights'. A person covered by the Social Security Act was not considered to have such a ‘right’ in benefit payments as would make every defeasance of ‘accrued’ interest violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Appellant appears to take the position that a Right of appeal is essential to due process of law. Due process is not necessarily judicial process, Reetz v. People of State of Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 23 S.Ct. 390, 47 L.Ed. 563 (1903), and a Right of appeal is not essential to due process of law. Inland Navigation Co. v. Chambers, 202 Or. 339, 274 P.2d 104 (1954); Board of Education, etc. v. County Board of School Trustees, 28 Ill.2d 15, 191 N.E.2d 65 (1963); In re Durant Community School District, 252 Iowa 237, 106 N.W.2d 670 (1960); Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Fister, 376 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1964); Weiner v. State Dept. of Roads, 179 Neb. 297, 137 N.W.2d 852 (1965); Real Estate Commission v. McLemore, 202 Tenn. 540, 306 S.W.2d 683 (1957); Beck v. Missouri Valley Drainage District of Holt County, 46 F.2d 632, 84 A.L.R. 1089 (8th Cir. 1931); Reetz v. People of State of Michigan, supra.
Appellant argues that, notwithstanding welfare benefits are more gratuities, access to the courts via a Right of appeal is a constitutional requisite. We do not agree. Welfare benefits are grants by the legislature which has delegated to the Department of Public Welfare the power to determine the recipients of such grants. Under such circumstances, i.e., when the state creates rights in individuals against itself, it is not bound to provide a remedy in the courts and may withhold all remedy or it may provide an administrative remedy and make it exclusive, however mistaken its exercise. Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 56 S.Ct. 400, 80 L.Ed. 561 (1936); United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464, 63 L.Ed. 1011 (1919); Blanc v. United States, 140 F.Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y.1956).
We are cognizant of the recent decisions which require that a state, having undertaken to provide a statutory program of assistance, must do so in conformity with constitutional mandates. See, *340 **244 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F.Supp. 331 (Conn.1967); Green v. Dept. of Public Welfare of the State of Delaware, 270 F.Supp. 173 (Del.1967); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F.Supp. 65 (E.D.Pa.1967), probable jurisdiction noted, 390 U.S. 940, 88 S.Ct. 1054, 19 L.Ed.2d 1129; Smith v. King, supra; Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F.Supp. 22 (D.C.1967), probable jurisdiction noted, 390 U.S. 940, 88 S.Ct. 1053, 19 L.Ed.2d 1129. However, in each of these cases, a constitutional infirmity was found to exist because the statutory scheme for determining eligibility for benefits was predicated upon an arbitrary classification. These decisions are therefore inapposite here where no attack is directed to the constitutionality of the statutory program of assistance.
[Allen v. Graham, 446 P.2d 240, 243. (Ct. App. Ariz. 1968)]