CITES BY TOPIC:  obligation

PDF Lawfully Avoiding Government Obligations Course, Form #12.040-SEDM


PDF Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037-SEDM


PDF Why Penalties are Illegal for Anything But Government Franchisees, Employees, Contractors, and Agents, Form #05.010- Use this as an attachment in response to a federal penalty collection notice to prove that you aren't responsible to pay the assessed penalty.  Make sure you also follow the guidelines relating to SSNs in the article entitled "About SSNs/TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence"


U.S. Constitution, Thirteenth Amendment-Involuntary Servitude

U.S. Constitution, Thirteenth Amendment
Slavery And Involuntary Servitude

SECTIONS 1 AND 2. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

[U.S. Constitution, Thirteenth Amendment-Involuntary Servitude]


Common Law Maxims on "benefits"

“Cujus est commodum ejus debet esse incommodum.
He who receives the benefit should also bear the disadvantage.”

“Que sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus.
He who derives a benefit from a thing, ought to feel the disadvantages attending it. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1433.”

Commodum ex injuri su non habere debet.
No man ought to derive any benefit of his own wrong. Jenk. Cent. 161.

Invito beneficium non datur.
No one is obliged to accept a benefit against his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 69. But if he does not dissent he will be considered as assenting. Vide Assent.

Potest quis renunciare pro se, et suis, juri quod pro se introductum est.
A man may relinquish, for himself and his heirs, a right which was introduced for his own benefit. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.

Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto.
Any one may renounce a law introduced for his own benefit. To this rule there are some exceptions. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]


California Civil Code, Section 1589

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 
DIVISION 3.  OBLIGATIONS
PART 2.  CONTRACTS
CHAPTER 3.  CONSENT

1589.  A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting.

[California Civil Code, Section 1589]


Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Second Edition, Rosco Poung, 1925, p. 543

“How, then, are purely equitable obligations created? For the most part, either by the acts of third persons or by equity alone. But how can one person impose an obligation upon another? By giving property to the latter on the terms of his assuming an obligation in respect to it. At law there are only two means by which the object of the donor could be at all accomplished, consistently with the entire ownership of the property passing to the donee, namely: first, by imposing a real obligation upon the property; secondly, by subjecting the title of the donee to a condition subsequent. The first of these the law does not permit; the second is entirely inadequate. Equity, however, can secure most of the objects of the doner, and yet avoid the mischiefs of real obligations by imposing upon the donee (and upon all persons to whom the property shall afterwards come without value or with notice) a personal obligation with respect to the property; and accordingly this is what equity does. It is in this way that all trusts are created, and all equitable charges made (i.e., equitable hypothecations or liens created) by testators in their wills. In this way, also, most trusts are created by acts inter vivos, except in those cases in which the trustee incurs a legal as well as an equitable obligation. In short, as property is the subject of every equitable obligation, so the owner of property is the only person whose act or acts can be the means of creating an obligation in respect to that property. Moreover, the owner of property can create an obligation in respect to it in only two ways: first, by incurring the obligation himself, in which case he commonly also incurs a legal obligation; secondly, by imposing the obligation upon some third person; and this he does in the way just explained.”
[Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Second Edition, Roscoe Pound, 1925, p. 543]


California Civil Code, Section 22.2

California Civil Code - CIV
DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF LAW
  (Heading added by Stats. 1951, Ch. 655, in conjunction with Sections 22, 22.1, and 22.2 )

22.2.  The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the   Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State. (Added by Stats. 1951, Ch. 655.)

[California Civil Code, Section 22.2]


California Civil Code, Section 1708

California Civil Code – CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 - 3272.9]
(Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14. )
PART 3. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY LAW [1708 - 1725]
       ( Part 3 enacted 1872. )

1708.  Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of   another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.

           (Amended by Stats. 2002, Ch. 664, Sec. 38.5. Effective January 1, 2003.)

[California Civil Code, Section 1708]


California Civil Code, Section 1428

California Civil Code – CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 - 3272.9]
     ( Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14. )
PART 1. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL [1427 - 1543] ( Part 1 enacted 1872. )
TITLE 1. DEFINITION OF OBLIGATIONS [1427 - [1428.]] (Title 1 enacted 1872.)

[1428.]  Section Fourteen Hundred and Twenty-eight.

An obligation arises either from:

  One — The contract of the parties; or,

  Two — The operation of law. An obligation arising from operation of law may be enforced in the manner provided by law, or by civil action or proceeding.

       (Amended by Code Amendments 1873-74, Ch. 612.)

[California Civil Code, Section 1428]


California Civil Code, Section 1427

California Civil Code - CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 - 3272.9]
      ( Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats.   1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14. )
PART 1. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL [1427 - 1543]  ( Part 1 enacted 1872. )
TITLE 1. DEFINITION OF OBLIGATIONS [1427 - [1428.]] ( Title 1 enacted 1872.)

1427.  An obligation is a legal duty, by which a person is bound to do or not to do a certain thing.
           (Enacted 1872.)

[California Civil Code, Section 1427]


42 U.S.C. §1994: Peonage Abolished

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER I > §1994
§ 1994. Peonage abolished

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.


5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1): Public information: Agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings

TITLE 5 > PART I > CHAPTER 5 > SUBCHAPTER II > § 552
§ 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings

(a)(1) Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register  and not so published. For the purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.


26 C.F.R. §601.702(a)(2)(ii) Effect of failure to publish

26 C.F.R. §601.702 Publication and public inspection

(a)(2)(ii) Effect of failure to publish. 

Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms of any matter referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph which is required to be published in the Federal Register, such person is not required in any manner to resort to, or be adversely affected by, such matter if it is not so published or is not incorporated by reference therein pursuant to subdivision (i) of this subparagraph.  Thus, for example, any such matter which imposes an obligation and which is not so published or incorporated by reference will not adversely change or affect a person's rights.


Federal Enforcement Authority Within States of the Union, Form #05.032

Section 5: Discerning the Lawful Target of Enforcement of a Specific Statute Based on the Way it is Published

The only exceptions to the requirement for publication in the Federal Register of the statute and the implementing regulations are the groups specifically identified by Congress as expressly exempted from this requirement, as follows:

  1. A military or foreign affairs function of the United States.  5 U.S.C. §553(a)(1) .
  2. A matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.  5 U.S.C. §553(a)(2) .
  3. Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof.  44 U.S.C. §1505(a)(1).

All of the above requirements are also mentioned in 5 U.S.C. §301 (federal employees), which establishes that the head of an Executive or military department may prescribe regulations for the internal government of his department.

TITLE 5 > PART I > CHAPTER 3 > § 301
§ 301. Departmental regulations

 The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.

Based on the above, the burden of proof imposed upon the government at any due process meeting in which it is enforcing any provision is to produce at least ONE of the following TWO things:

  1. Evidence signed under penalty of perjury by someone with personal, first-hand knowledge, proving that you are a member of one of the three groups specifically exempted from the requirement for implementing regulations, as identified above.
  2. Evidence of publication in the Federal Register of BOTH the statute AND the implementing regulation which they seek to enforce against you.

[Federal Enforcement Authority Within States of the Union, Form #05.032, Section 5: Discerning the Lawful Target of Enforcement of a Specific Statute Based on the Way it is Published]


Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 25 S.Ct. 429, 49 L.Ed. 726 (1905)

"It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the 13th Amendment by direct legislation, punishing the holding of a person in slavery or in involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime.  In the exercise of that power Congress has enacted these sections denouncing peonage, and punishing one who holds another in that condition of involuntary servitude.  This legislation is not limited to the territories or other parts of the strictly national domain, but is operative in the states and wherever the sovereignty of the United States extends.  We entertain no doubt of the validity of the legislation, or its applicability to the case of any person holding another in a state of peonage, and this whether there be a municipal ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding.  It operates directly on every citizen of the Republic, wherever his residence may be."
[Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 25 S.Ct. 429, 49 L.Ed. 726 (1905)]


Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)

“That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument.  Slavery implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services [in their entirety]This amendment was said in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended primarily to abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade, when they amounted to slavery or involuntary servitude and that the use of the word ‘servitude’ was intended to prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name.” 
[Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223

OBLIGATIO. Lat. In Roman law, a legal bond which obliges the performance of something in accordance with the law of the land. Ortolan, Inst. 2, P 1179. It corresponded nearly to our word contract. The legal relation existing between two certain persons whereby one (the creditor) is authorized to demand of the other (the debtor) a certain performance which has a money value. In this sense obligatio signifies not only the duty of the debtor, but also the right of the creditor. The fact establishing such claim and debt, as also the instrument evidencing it, is termed "obligation." Mackeld. Rom. Law, O 360.

That legal relation subsisting between two persons by which one 1s bound to the other for a certain performance. The passive relation sustained by tie debtor to the creditor is likewise called an "obligation. Sometimes, also, the term "obligatio" is used for the oausa obligationis, and the contract itself is designated an "obligation." There are passages in which even the document which affords the proof of a contract is called an "obligation." Such applications, however, are but a loose extension of the term, which. according to its true idea, Is only properly employed when it Is used to denote the debt relationship, In its totality, active and passive, subsisting between the creditor and the debtor. Tomk. & J.Mod.Rom.Law, 301.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223

OBLIGATIO CIVILIS. An obligation enforceable by action, whether it derives its origin from the jw, civile, as the obligation engendered by formal contracts or the obligation enforceable by bilaterally
penal suits, or from such portion of the jus gentium as had been completely naturalized in the civil law and protected by all its remedies, such as the obligation engendered by formless contracts.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223

OBLIGATIO EX CONTRACTU. An obligation arising from contract, or an antecedent jus in personam. In this there are two stages,-first, a primary or sanctioned personal right antecedent to
wrong, and, afterwards, a secondary or sanctioning personal right consequent on a wrong. Poste's Gaius' Inst. 359.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1243

"Operation of law. This term expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a. person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or co-operation of the party himself."
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1243]


Wikipedia: Operation of Law, Downloaded 9/3/2013

Wikipedia:  Operation of Law, Downloaded 9/3/2013

The phrase "by operation of law" is a legal term that indicates that a right or liability has been created for a party, irrespective of the intent of that party, because it is dictated by existing legal principles. For example, if a person dies without a will, his heirs are determined by operation of law. Similarly, if a person marries or has a child after his or her will has been executed, the law writes this pretermitted spouse or pretermitted heir into the will if no provision for this situation was specifically included. Adverse possession, in which title to land passes because non-owners have occupied it for a certain period of time, is another important right that vests by operation of law.[1]

Events that occur by operation of law do so because courts have determined over time that the rights thus created or transferred represent what the intent of the party would have been, had they thought about the situation in advance; or because the results fulfilled the settled expectations of parties with respect to their property; or because legal instruments of title provide for these transfers to occur automatically on certain named contingencies.

Rights that arise by operation of law often arise by design of certain contingencies set forth in a legal instrument. If a life estate is created in a tract of land, and the person by whose life the estate is measured dies, title to the property reverts to the original grantor – or, possibly, to the grantor's legal heirs – by operation of law. Nothing needs to be put in writing to affirm that this will happen. Joint tenants with rights of survivorship create a similar situation. Joint tenants with rights of survivorship deeds are always taken in equal shares, and when one joint tenant dies, the other tenants equally acquire title by virtue of the terms of the conveyance itself, by operation of law.

Rights or liabilities created by operation of law can also be created involuntarily, because a contingency occurs for which a party has failed to plan (e.g. failure to write a will); or because a specific condition exists for a set period of time (e.g. adverse possession of property or creation of an easement; failure of a court to rule on a motion within a certain period automatically defeating the motion; failure of a party to act on a filed complaint within a certain time causing dismissal of the case); or because an existing legal relationship is invalidated, but the parties to that relationship still require a mechanism to distribute their rights (e.g. under the Uniform Commercial Code, where a contract for which both parties have performed partially is voided, the court will create a new contract based on the performance that has actually been rendered and containing reasonable terms to accommodate the expectations of the parties).

Because title to property that arises by operation of law is usually contingent upon proof of certain contingencies, and title records may not contain evidence of those contingencies, legal proceedings are sometimes required to turn title that arises by operation of law into marketable title.
[SOURCE: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_of_law]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223

OBLIGATIO EX DELICTO, or OBLIGATIO EX MALEFICIO. An obligation founded on wrong or tort, or arising from the invasion of a jus in rem. In this there is the second stage, a secondary or
sanctioning personal right consequent on a wrong, but the first stage is not a personal right, (jus in personam,) but a real right, (jus in rem,) whether a primordial right, right of status, or of property. Poste's Gaius' Inst. 359.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223

OBLIGATIO NATURALIS. An obligation not immediately enforceable by action; one deriving its validity from the law of nature, or one imposed by that portion of the jus gentium which is only imperfectly recognized by civil law.

These had not the binding force of the other classes, not being capable of enforcement by action, and are, therefore, not noticed by Justlnian in his classiflcation: but they had, nevertheless, a certain emcacy even in the civil law: for instance, though a debt founded upon a natural obligation could not be recovered by an action, yet if it was voluntarily paid by the debtor he could not recover It back, as he might do in the case of money paid by mistake, etc.. where no natural obligation existed. L. 38, pr. D. 12. 6;
Ortolan 2, 9 1180.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223

OBLIGATIO PRAETORIAE. The Romans considered that obligations derived their validity solely from positive law. At first the only ones recognized were those established in special cases in
accordance with the forms prescribed by the strict jus civile. In the course of time, however, the praetorian jurisdiction, in mitigation of the primtive rigor of the law, introduced new modes of
contracting obligations and provided the means of enforcing them; hence the twofold division made by ~ustikan of obligationes civiles and obligationes prcetorice. Inst. 1. 3. 13

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]

Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223

OBLIGATION. A generic word, derived from the Latin substantive "obligatio," having many, wide, and varied meanings, according to the context in which it is used. Enyeart v. City of Lincoln, 136
Neb. 146, 285 N.W. 314, 318. That which a person is bound to do or forbear; any duty imposed by law, promise, contract, relations of society, courtesy, kindness, etc. Goodwin v. Freadrich, 135
Neb. 203, 280 N.W. 917, 923. Duty. Rucks-Brandt Const. Co. v. Price, 165 Okl. 178, 23 P.2d 690. Duty imposed by law. Helvering v. British-American Tobacco Co., C.C.A., 69 F.2d 528,530. Law or duty binding parties to perform their agreement. An undertaking to perform. State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4, 97 A.L.R. 431. That which constitutes a legal or moral duty and which renders a person liable to coercion and punishment for neglecting it; a word of broad meaning, and the particular meaning intended is to be gained by consideration of its context. An obligation or debt may exist by reason of a judgment as well as an express contract, in either case there being a legal duty on the part of the one bound to comply with the promise. Schwartz v. California Claim Service, 52 Cal.App.2d 47, 125 P.2d 883, 888. Liabilities created by contract or law, Rose v. W. B. Worthen Co., 186 Ark. 205, 53 S.W.2d 15, 16, 85 A.L.R. 212; or tort. Exchange Bank v. Ford, 3 P. 449, 451, 7 Colo. 314. As legal term word originally meant a sealed bond, but it now extends to any certain written promise to pay money or do a specific thing. Lee v. Kenan, C.C.A.Fla., 78 F.2d 425, 100 A.L.R. 869. A formal and binding agreement or acknowledgment of a liability to pay a certain sum or do a certain thing. United States v. One Zumstein Briefmarken Katalog 1938, D.C. Pa., 24 F.Supp. 516, 519.

The binding power of a vow, promise, oath, or contract. or of law, civil, political, or moral, independent of a promise; that which constitutes legal or moral duty, and whlch OBLIGATION renders a person liable to coercion and punishment for neglecting
lt. Webster.

A tie which binds us to pay or do something agreeably to the laws and customs of the country in which the obligation is made. Inst. 3, 14.

Obligatlon is (1) legal or moral duty, as opposed to physical compulslon: (2) a duty incumbent upon an individual, or a specific and limited number of individuals, as opposed to a duty imposed upon the Gorld at large; (3) the right to enforce such a duty. (jus in personam,) as opposed to such a right as that of property, (jus in rent,) which avalls against the world at large: (4) a bond contalning a penalty, with a condition annexed, for the payment of money, performance of covenants, or the llke. Mozley & Whitley."Obligation" la the correlative of "right." Taking the latter word in itd polltlc~ethical sense, as a power of free action lodged In a person, "obligation" 1s the corresponding duty, constraint, or binding force which should prevent all other persona from denying, abridging, or obstructing such right, or interfering with its exercise. And the same ie itd meaning as the correlative of a "jus in rent.'' Taking"right" aa meaning a "jw in personm," (a power.
demand, claim, or privilege inherent In one person, and incident upon another,) the "obligation" is the coerclve force or control imposed upon the person of incidence by the moral law and the positive law, (or the moral law as recognized and sanctioned by the positive law,) constraining him to accede to the demand, render up the thing claimed, pay the money due, or otherwise perform what is expected of him with respect to the subject-matter of the right.

A penal bond or "writing obligatory." that is, a bond containing a penalty, with a condition annexed for the payment of money, performance of covenants, or the like, and which differs from a bill, the latter being generally without a penalty m condition, though it may be obligatory. Co.Litt. 172.

A deed whereby a man binds himself under a penalty to do a thlng. Com.Dig. Obligation (A): Taylor v. Glaser. 2 Serg. & R., Pa., 502; Denton v. Adams, 6 Vt. 40. The word has a very broad and comprehensive legal signiflcation and embraces all instruments of writing, however informal, whereby one party contracts with another for the payment of money or the delivery of specific articles.
State v. Campbell, 103 N.C. 344, 9 S.E. 410; Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Mlnn. 353, Gil. 224; Slnton v. Carter Co., 23 F. 535.

In English expositions of the Roman law, and works upon general jurisprudence. "obligation" is used to translate the Latin "obligatio." In this sense its meaning is much wider than as a technical term of English law. See Obligatio.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224

Absolute obligation. One which gives no alternative to the obligor, but requires fulfillment according to the engagement.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224

Conjunctive or alternative obligation. The former is one in which the several objects in it are connected by a copulative, or in any other manner which shows that all of them are severally comprised
in the contract. This contract creates as many different obligations as there are different objects; and the debtor, when he wishes to discharge himself, may force the creditor to receive
them separately. But where the things which form the object of the contract are separated by a disjunctive, then the obligation is alternative, and the performance of either of such things will
discharge the obligor. The choice of performing one of the obligations belongs to the obligor, unless it is expressly agreed that it shall belong to the creditor. Civ.Code La. art. 2068; Dougl. 14;
1 Ld. Rayrn. 279; Galloway v. Legan, 4 Mart. N. S. (La.) 167. A promise to deliver a certain thing or to pay a specified sum of money is an example of an alternative obligation. Civ.Code La. arts.
2063, 2066, 2067.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224

Contractual obligation. One which arises from a contract or agreement.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224

Determinate or indeterminate obligation. A determinate obligation is one which has for its object a certain thing: as, an obligation to deliver a certain horse named Bucephalus, in which case the obligation can be discharged only by delivering the identical horse. An indeterminate obligation is one where the obligor binds himself to deliver one of a certain species: as, to deliver a horse,
where the delivery of any horse will discharge the obligation.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224

Divisible or indivisible obligation. A divisible obligation is one which, being a unit, may nevertheless be lawfully divided, with or without the consent of the parties. An indivisible obligation is one which is not susceptible of division: as, for example,.if I promise to pay you one hundred dollars, you cannot assign one-half of this to another, so as to give him a right of action against me
for his share.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224

Express or implied obligation. Express or conventional obligations are those by which the obligor binds himself in express terms to perform his obligation, while implied obligations are such as
are raised by the implication or inference of the law from the nature of the transaction. Failure to meet obligations. See Failure to Meet Obligations.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224

Joint or several obligation. A joint obligation is one by which two or more obligors bind themselves jointly for the performance of the obligation. France v. France, 94 Or. 414, 185 P. 1108.
A several obligation is one where the obligors promise, each for himself, to fulfill the engagement.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pp. 1224

Moral obligation. A duty which is valid and binding in conscience and according to natural justice, but is not recognized by the law as adequate to set in motion the machinery of justice;
that is, one which rests upon ethical considerations alone, and is not imposed or enforced by positive law. Taylor v. Hotchkiss, 81 App.Div. 470, 80 N. Y.S. 1042; Bailey v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 569, 31 A. 925, 46 Am.St.Rep. 691. A duty which would be enforceable by law, were it not for some positive rule, which, with a view to general benefit, exempts the party in that particular instance from legal liability. Backhaus v. Lee, 49 N.D. 821, 194 N.W. 887, 890; Longstreth v. City of Philadelphia, 245 Pa. 233, 91 A. 667.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224-1225

Natural or civil obligation. A natural obligation is one which cannot be enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to natural justice; Blair v. Williams, 4 Litt., Ky., 41. As, for instance, when the action is barred by the act of limitation, a natural obligation still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished; Sturges v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat. 197, 4 L.Ed. 529; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 318, 337, 6 L.Ed. 606. A civil obligation is a legal tie, which gives the party with whom it is contracted the right of enforcing its performance by law. Civ.Code La. art. 1757; Poth. Obl. 173, 191.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1224-1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Obedientid obligation. One incumbent on parties in consequence of the situation or relationship in which they are placed. Ersk. Prin. 60.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Perfect or imperfect obligation. A perfect obligation is one recognized and sanctioned by positive law; one of which the fulfillment can be enforced by the aid of the law. Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124, 92 Am.Dec. 56. But if the duty created by the obligation operates only on the moral sense, without being enforced by any positive law, it is called an "imperfect obligation," and creates no right of action, nor has it any legal operation. The duty of exercising gratitude, charity, and the other merely moral duties are examples of this kind of obligation. Civ.Code La. art. 1757; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 600, 24 L.Ed. 793.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Personal or heritable obligation. An obligation is heritable when the heirs and assigns of one party may enforce the performance against the heirs of the other. Civ.Code La. art. 1997. It is personal when the obligor binds himself only, not his heirs or representatives. An obligation is strictly personal when none but the obligee can enforce the performance, or when it can be enforced only against the obligor. Civ.Code La. art. 1997. An obligation may be personal as to the obligee. and heritable as to the obligor, and it may inlike manner be heritable as to ihe obligee, and personal as to the obligor. Civ.Code La. art. 1998. For the term personal obligation, as used in a different sense, see the next paragraph.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Personal or real obligation. A personal obligation is one by which the obligor binds himself to perform an act, without directly binding his property for its performance. A real obligation is one by which real estate, and not the person, is liable to the obligee for the performance.

Thus, when an estate owes an easement, as a right of way, it is the thlng, and not the owner, who owes the easement. Another instance of a real obligation occurs when a person buys an estate which has been mortgaged, subject to the mortgage; he is not liable for the debt, though the estate Is. In these cases the owner has an interest only because he ir mized of the servient estate or the mortgaged premises, and he may discharge hlmself by abandoning or parting with the property. The obligation is both personal and real when the obligor has bound himself and
pledged his estate for the fulfllment of the obligations. In the clvil law and in Louisiana, a real obligation is one which is attached to immovable property, and it passes with such property into whatever hands the property may come, without maklng the third possessor personally responslble. Civ.Code La art. 1997.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Primary obligation. An obligation which is the principal object of the contract.

For example, the primary obligation of the seller is to deliver the thing sold, and to transfer the title to it. It is dlstlnguished from the accessory or secondary obligation to pay damages for not doing so.,, 1 Bouv.Inst. no. 702. The word "primary" and "direct, contrasted with "secondary," when spoken with reference to an obligatlon. refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation, rather than to the character and limits of the obllgation itself. Kllton v. Providence Tool Co., 27, R.I. 605,
48 A. 1039.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Primitive or secondary obligation. A primitive obligation, which in one sense may also be called a principal obligation, is one which is contracted with a design that it should itself be the first fulfilled.
A secondary obligation is one which is contracted and is to be performed in case the primitive cannot be. For example, if one sells his house, he binds himself to give a title; but if he finds he
cannot as when the title is in another, then his secondary obligation is to pay damages for nonperformance of the obligation.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Principal or accessory obligation. A principal obligation is one which arises from the principal object of the engagement of the contracting parties; while an accessory obligation depends upon or is collateral to the principal. See Poth. Obl. no. 182.

For example, In the case of the sale of a house and lot of ground, the principal obligatlon on the part of the vendor is to make title for it; the accessory obllgation is to deliver all the title-papers which the vendor has relatlng to it, to take care of the estate until it is delivered, and the like. See, further, the title Accessory Obligation.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Pure obligation. One which is not suspended by any condition, whether it has been contracted without any condition, or, when thus contracted, the condition has been accomplished. Poth. Obl.
no. 176. See simple obligation.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Simple or conditional obligation. Simple obligations are such as are not dependent for their execution on any event provided for by the parties, and which are not agreed to become void on the
happening of any such event. Conditional obligations are such as are made to depend on an uncertain event. If the obligation is not to take effect until the event happens, it is a suspensive
condition; if the obligation takes effect immediately, but is liable to be defeated when the event happens, it is then a resolutory condition. Civ.Code La. arts. 2020, 2021; Moss v. Smoker, 2 La.Ann.
989. A simple obligation is also defined as one which is not suspended by any condition, either because it has been contracted without condition, or, having been contracted with one, the condition has been fulfilled; and a conditional obligation is also defined as one the execution of which is suspended by a condition which has not been accomplished, and subject to which it has been contracted.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Single or penal obligation. A penal obligation is one to which is attached a penal clause, which is to be enforced if the principal obligation be not performed. A single obligation is one without
any penalty: as where one simply promises to pay another one hundred dollars. This is called a single bill, when it is under seal.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225

Solidary obligation. In the law of Louisiana, one which binds each of the obligors for the whole debt, as distinguished from a "joint" obligation, which binds the parties each for his separate praportion of the debt. Groves v. Sentell, 14 S.Ct. 898, 153 U.S. 465, 38 L.Ed. 785. See Solidary. OBLIGATION OF

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1225]


Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1226

OBLIGATION OF A CONTRACT. That which law in force when contract is made obliges parties to do or not to do, and remedy and legal means to carry it into effect. Harris v. Monroe Building &
Loan Ass'n, La.App., 154 So. 503, 505.

As used in C0nst.U.S. art. 1, 9 10, the term means the binding and coercive force which constrains every man to perform the agreements he has made; a force grounded in the ethical principle of fldelity to one's promises, but deriving its legal efficacy from its recognition by positive law, and sanctioned by the law's providing a remedy for the infraction of the duty or for the enforcement of the correlative right. Story, Const. g 1378; Black, Const.Prohib. 5 139; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L.Ed. 606.

The "obligation of a contract" is its binding force according to the standards of law in existence when it was made. Colby v. City of Medford, 85 Or. 485, 167 P. 487, 499. The "obligation of a contract" is the duty of performance. Hays v. Port of Seattle. D.C.Wash., 226 F. 287, 293. The term includes everything within the obligatory scope of the contract, and it includes the means of enforcement. E. J. Lander & Co. v. Deemy, 46 N.D. 273, 176 N.W. 922, 925: Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co., 94 W.Va. 504, 119 S.E. 473, 476. OBLIGATION SOLIDAIRE. This, in French law, corresponds to joint and several liability in English law, but is applied also to the joint and several rights of the creditors parties to the obligation.

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1226]