The question is not whether the Wisconsin
law is a wise law or unwise law. Our concern is not what philosophy
Wisconsin should or should not embrace. See Green v. Frazier,
253 U.S. 233 . We do not sit as a super-legislative body. In
this case the sole question is whether there has been a taking of
property without that procedural due process that is required by
the Fourteenth Amendment. We have dealt over and over again with
the question of what constitutes "the right to be heard" (Schroeder
v. New York,
371 U.S. 208, 212 ) within the meaning of procedural due process.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 . In the latter case we said that the right
to be heard "has little reality or worth unless one is informed
that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether [395
U.S. 337, 340] to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."
339 U.S., at 314 . In the context of this case the question
is whether the interim freezing of the wages without a chance to
be heard violates procedural due process.
A procedural rule that may satisfy
due process for attachments in general, see McKay v. McInnes,
279 U.S. 820 , does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process
in every case. The fact that a procedure would pass muster under
a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all
property in its modern forms. We deal here with wages - a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.
We turn then to the nature of that property and problems of procedural
due process.
A prejudgment garnishment of the
Wisconsin type is a taking which may impose tremendous hardship
on wage earners with families to support. Until a recent Act of
Congress, 4 304 of which forbids discharge
of employees on the ground that their wages have been garnished,
garnishment often meant the loss of a job. Over and beyond that
was the great drain on family income. As stated by Congressman Reuss:
5
"The idea of wage garnishment
in advance of judgment, of trustee process, of wage attachment,
or whatever it is called is a most inhuman doctrine. It compels
the wage earner, trying to keep his family together, to be driven
below the poverty level."
Recent investigations of the problem
have disclosed the grave injustices made possible by prejudgment
garnishment whereby the sole opportunity to be heard comes after
the taking. Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of [395 U.S. 337, 341]
the House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs who held extensive hearings
on this and related problems stated:
"What we know from our study
of this problem is that in a vast number of cases the debt is
a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person who is trapped
in an easy credit nightmare, in which he is charged double for
something he could not pay for even if the proper price was
called for, and then hounded into giving up his pound of flesh,
and being fired besides." 114 Cong. Rec. 1832.
The leverage of the creditor on the
wage earner is enormous. The creditor tenders not only the original
debt but the "collection fees" incurred by his attorneys in the
garnishment proceedings:
"The debtor whose wages are tied
up by a writ of garnishment, and who is usually in need of money,
is in no position to resist demands for collection fees. If
the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure
to pay the debt and collection charges in order to get his wages
back. If the debt is large, he will often sign a new contract
of `payment schedule' which incorporates these additional charges."
6
Apart from those collateral consequences,
it appears that in Wisconsin the statutory exemption granted the
wage earner 7 is "generally insufficient
to support the debtor for any one week."
8
The result is that a prejudgment
garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive
a wage-earning [395 U.S. 337, 342] family to the wall.
9 Where the taking of one's property
is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent
notice and a prior hearing (cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works,
237 U.S. 413, 423 ) this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates
the fundamental principles of due process.
[Sniadach
v. Family FInance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)]