We have adhered to the rule
that a party "generally must assert his own legal rights and interests,
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests
of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 499. This rule
assumes that the party with the right has the appropriate incentive
to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action and to do so with
the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation. See 422 U.S. at 500.
It represents a "healthy
concern that if the claim is brought by someone other than one at whom
the constitutional protection is aimed," Secretary of State of Md. v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955, n. 5 (1984), the courts might
be
called upon to decide abstract
questions of wide public significance even though other governmental
institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even
though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights,
Warth v. Seldin, supra,
at 500.
We have not treated this rule as absolute, however, recognizing that
there may be circumstances where it is necessary to grant a third party
standing to assert the rights of another. But we have limited this exception
by requiring that a party seeking third-party standing make two additional
showings. First, we have asked whether the party asserting the right
has a "close" relationship with the person who possesses the right.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991). Second, we have considered
whether there is a "hindrance" to the possessor's ability to protect
his own interests. Ibid.
We have been quite forgiving with these criteria in certain circumstances.
"Within the context of the First Amendment," for example, "the Court
has enunciated other concerns that justify a lessening of prudential
limitations on standing." Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson
Co., supra, at 956. And "[i]n several cases, this Court has allowed
standing to litigate the rights of third parties when enforcement of
the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly
in the violation of third parties' rights." Warth v. Seldin, supra,
at 510 (emphasis added) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953)); see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Beyond these
examples -- none of which is implicated here -- we have not looked favorably
upon third-party standing. See, e.g., Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,
292-293 (1999) (rejecting an attorney's attempt to adjudicate the rights
of a client). With this in mind, we turn to apply our "close relationship"
and "hindrance" criteria to the facts before us.
The attorneys in this case invoke the attorney-client relationship to
demonstrate the requisite closeness. Specifically, they rely on a future
attorney-client relationship with as yet unascertained Michigan criminal
defendants "who will request, but be denied, the appointment of appellate
counsel, based on the operation" of the statute. App. 17a, ¶37 (Complaint).
In two cases, we have recognized an attorney-client relationship as
sufficient to confer third-party standing. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); Department of Labor v. Triplett,
494 U.S. 715 (1990). In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
supra, we granted a law firm third-party standing to challenge a drug
forfeiture statute by invoking the rights of an existing client. Id.
at 624, n. 3. This existing attorney-client relationship is, of course,
quite distinct from the hypothetical attorney-client relationship posited
here.
In Department of Labor v. Triplett, supra, we dealt with the Black Lung
Benefits Act of 1972, which prohibited attorneys from accepting fees
for representing claimants, unless such fees were approved by the appropriate
agency or court. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V). An attorney,
George Triplett, violated the Act and its implementing regulations by
agreeing to represent claimants for 25% of any award obtained and then
collecting those fees without the required approval. The state bar disciplined
Triplett, and we allowed Triplett third-party standing to invoke the
due process rights of the claimants to challenge the fee restriction
that resulted in his punishment. 494 U.S. at 720-721. Triplett is different
from this case on two levels. First, Triplett falls within that class
of cases where we have "allowed standing to litigate the rights of third
parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant
would result indirectly in the violation of third parties' rights."
Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 510 (emphasis added). Second, and similar
to Caplin & Drysdale, Triplett involved the representation of known
claimants. The attorneys before us do not have a "close relationship"
with their alleged "clients"; indeed, they have no relationship at all.
We next consider whether the attorneys have demonstrated that there
is a "hindrance" to the indigents' advancing their own constitutional
rights against the Michigan scheme. Powers v. Ohio, supra, at 411. It
is uncontested that an indigent denied appellate counsel has open avenues
to argue that denial deprives him of his constitutional rights. He may
seek leave to challenge that denial in the Michigan Court of Appeals
and, if denied, seek leave in the Michigan Supreme Court. See Mich.Comp.Laws
Ann. § 770.3 (West Supp. 2004). He then may seek a writ of certiorari
in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). Beyond that, there exists both
state and federal collateral review. See Mich.Rule Crim.Proc. 6.500
(2004); 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The attorneys argue that, without counsel, these avenues are effectively
foreclosed to indigents. They claim that unsophisticated, pro se criminal
defendants could not satisfy the necessary procedural requirements,
and, if they did, they would be unable to coherently advance the substance
of their constitutional claim.
That hypothesis, however, was disproved in the Michigan courts, see,
e.g., People v. Jackson, 463 Mich. 949, 620 N.W.2d 528 (2001) (pro se
defendant sought leave to appeal denial of appointment of appellate
counsel to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court);
People v. Wilkins, 463 Mich. 949, 620 N.W.2d 528 (2001) (same), and
this Court, see Pet. for Cert. in Halbert v. Michigan, O.T. 2004, No.
03-10198 (pending request for writ of certiorari by a pro se defendant
challenging the denial of appellate counsel). While we agree that an
attorney would be valuable to a criminal defendant challenging the constitutionality
of the scheme, we do not think that the lack of an attorney here is
the type of hindrance necessary to allow another to assert the indigent
defendants' rights. See Powers v. Ohio, supra, at 411.
We also are unpersuaded by the attorneys' "hindrance" argument on a
more fundamental level. If an attorney is all that the indigents need
to perfect their challenge in state court and beyond, one wonders why
the attorneys asserting this § 1983 action did not attend state court
and assist them. We inquired into this question at oral argument but
did not receive a satisfactory answer. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29, 35-40.
It is a fair inference that the attorneys and the three indigent plaintiffs
that filed this § 1983 action did not want to allow the state process
to take its course. Rather, they wanted a federal court to short-circuit
the State's adjudication of this constitutional question. That is precisely
what they got.
[F]ederal and state courts are complementary systems for administering
justice in our Nation. Cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict,
are essential to the federal design.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. at 586. The doctrine of Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), reinforces our federal scheme by preventing
a state criminal defendant from asserting ancillary challenges to ongoing
state criminal procedures in federal court. Id. at 54-55.
In this case, the three indigent criminal defendants who were originally
plaintiffs in this § 1983 action were appropriately dismissed under
Younger. As the Court of Appeals unanimously recognized, they had ongoing
state criminal proceedings and ample avenues to raise their constitutional
challenge in those proceedings.{3} 333 F.3d at 690-691. There also was
no extraordinary circumstance requiring federal intervention. Ibid.
An unwillingness to allow the Younger principle to be thus circumvented
is an additional reason to deny the attorneys third-party standing.{4}
In sum, we hold that the attorneys do not have third-party standing
to assert the rights of Michigan indigent defendants denied appellate
counsel. We agree with the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals
that
it would be a short step from the . . . grant of third-party standing
in this case to a holding that lawyers generally have third-party standing
to bring in court the claims of future unascertained clients.{5}
333 F.3d at 709 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[Kowalsi v. Tesmer,
543 U.S. 125, 125 S.Ct. 564 (