STARE DECISIS:
Lat: to stand by that which was decided; rule by which common law courts
“are slow to interfere with principles announced in the former decisions
and often uphold them even though they would decide otherwise were the
question a new one.” 156 P. 2d 340, 345. “Although [stare decisis]
is not inviolable, our judicial system demands that it be overturned
only on a showing of good cause. Where such a good cause is not
shown, it will not be repudiated.” The doctrine is of particularly
limited application in the field of constitutional law. 298 U.S.
38, 94. See precedent.
PRECEDENT:
a previously decided case which is recognized as authority for the disposition
of future cases. At common law , precedents were regarded
as the major source of law. A precedent may involve a novel question
of common law or it may involve an interpretation of a statute.
In either event, to the extent that future cases rely upon it or distinguish
it form themselves without disapproving of it, the case will serve as
a precedent for future cases under the doctrine of stare decisis.
United States Ex. Rel. Shore
v. O'Leary, 833 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1987):
"One foundation block of our judicial system is the principle of stare
decisis which demands adherence to precedents. Decisions are made
in accord with previous authoritative decisions in similar cases emanating
from one's own circuit and from the Supreme Court. A lower court
owes deference to those above it; ordinarily it has no authority to
reject a doctrine developed by a higher court. See, e.g., Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd.,
460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (per
curiam); Perri v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 817
F.2d 448, 451 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987)."
[United States Ex. Rel. Shore v. O'Leary, 833 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1987)]
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, p. 1406:
Stare decisis. Lat. To abide by, or adhere to, decided
cases.
Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point.
Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 388, 390, 391. Doctrine
that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply
it to all future cases, when facts are substantially the same; regardless
of whether the parties and property are the same. Horne v. Moody,
Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510. Under doctrine a deliberate
or solemn decision of court made after argument on question of law fairly
arising in the case, and necessary to the determination, is an authority,
or binding precedent in the same court, or in other courts of equal
or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy.
State v. Mellenberger, 163 Or. 233, 95 P.2d 709, 719, 720. Doctrine
is one of policy, grounded on theory that security and certainty require
that accepted and established legal principle, under which rights may
accrue, be recognized and followed, through later found to be not legally
sound, but whether previous holding of court shall be adhered to, modified
or overruled is within court's discretion under circumstances of case
before it. Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 8 N.W.2d
599, 607. Under doctrine, when point of law has been settled by
decision, it forms precedent which is not afterwards to be departed
from, and, while it should ordinarily be strictly adhered to, there
are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. The
doctrine is not ordinarily departed from where decision is of long-standing
and rights have been acquired under it, unless consideration of public
policy demand it. Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 344 Pa. 556,
25 A.2d 728, 729. The doctrine is limited to actual determination
in respect to litigated and necessarily decided questions, and is not
applicable to dicta or obiter dicta. See also Precedent;
Res (Res judicata).
[Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition, p. 1406]
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