TITLE
42 > CHAPTER
21 >
SUBCHAPTER
I > Sec. 1983
Section 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken
in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively
to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
AMENDMENTS
1996 - Pub. L. 104-317
inserted before period at end of first sentence '', except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable''.
“In another, not unrelated context, Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition in Cohens
v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821), could
well have been the explanation of the Rule of Necessity; he wrote that
a court “must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot,
as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines
of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended,
we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions
may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Id.,
at 404 (emphasis added)
[U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)]
This case requires us to decide whether a state-court judge has absolute
immunity from a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for his decision
to dismiss a subordinate court employee. The employee, who had been
a probation officer, alleged that she was demoted and discharged on
account of [484 U.S. 219, 221] her sex, in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude
that the judge's decisions were not judicial acts for which he should
be held absolutely immune.
[Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988)]
“Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit -- and this is
one of the meanings that fraud bears [483 U.S. 372] in the statute,
see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.1985) -- includes
the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary
obligation. A public official
is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge,
the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals
material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. When a judge
is busily soliciting loans from counsel to one party, and not telling
the opposing counsel (let alone the public), he is concealing material
information in violation of his fiduciary obligations.”
[McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)]
TITLE 42
> CHAPTER
21 >
SUBCHAPTER
I > Sec. 1988.
Sec. 1988. - Proceedings
in vindication of civil rights
(b) Attorney's fees
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.), title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), or section 13981 of this
title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs, except that in
any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity such officer
shall not be held liable for
any costs, including attorney's
fees, unless such action was
clearly in excess of such officer's
jurisdiction.
AMENDMENTS
1996 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L.
104-317 inserted before period at end '', except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable
for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly
in excess of such officer's jurisdiction."