TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 51 > § 1116
§ 1116. Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests,
or internationally protected persons
(b) For the purposes of this section:
(1) “Family” includes (a) a spouse, parent, brother or sister,
child, or person to whom the foreign official or internationally
protected person stands in loco parentis, or (b) any other person
living in his household and related to the foreign official or internationally
protected person by blood or marriage.
(2) “Foreign government” means the government of a foreign country,
irrespective of recognition by the United States.
TITLE
28 > PART IV > CHAPTER
97 > Sec. 1603.
Sec. 1603.
- Definitions
For purposes of this chapter -
(a) A ''foreign state'', except as used in
section 1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of
a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An ''agency or instrumentality of a foreign state''
means any entity -
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor
created under the laws of any third country.
TITLE 8 > CHAPTER 12 > SUBCHAPTER I > § 1101
§ 1101. Definitions
(a) As used
in this chapter—
(14) The term “foreign state” includes outlying possessions of
a foreign state, but self-governing dominions or territories under
mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign states.
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 648:
"Foreign states.
Nations which are outside the United States. Term may also refer
to another state; i.e. a sister state.
"The term "foreign
nations," as used in the statement of the rule that the laws of foreign
nations should be proved in a certain manner, should be construed to
mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought;
and hence one state of the Union is foreign to another, in the sense
of that rule.
"A "foreign state"
within statute providing for expatriation of American citizen who is
naturalized under laws of foreign state is a country which is not the
United States, or its possession or colony, an alien country, other
than our own. Kletter v. Dulles, D.C.D.C., 111 F.Supp. 593, 598."
[Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition, p. 648]
81A Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), United States, §29 (2003):
"Generally, the states of the Union sustain toward each other the relationship
of independent sovereigns or independent foreign states,
except in so far as the United States is paramount as the dominating
government, and in so far as the states are bound to recognize the fraternity
among sovereignties established by the federal Constitution, as by the
provision requiring each state to give full faith and credit to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the other states..."
[81A Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.) legal encyclopedia, United States,
§29]
“The United States
Government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.” [N.Y. v. re Merriam 36 N.E. 505; 141 N.Y. 479; affirmed
16 S.Ct. 1073; 41 L. Ed. 287] [underlines added]
[19
Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.) legal encyclopedia, Corporations, §884]
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 498:
Dual citizenship. Citizenship in two different countries.Status
of citizens of United States who reside within a state; i.e., person
who are born or naturalized in the U.S. are citizens of the U.S. and
the state wherein they reside.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 498]
28 U.S.C. §297
TITLE 28> PART I > CHAPTER
13 > Sec. 297.
Sec. 297. -
Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states
(a) The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit
or district judge of the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge
so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted
court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official
duly authorized by the laws of the respective compact state requests
such assignment and such assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch
of the business of the respective court.
(b) The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention
by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including
transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance
in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this
subsection
§ 10. Of states
forming a federal republic.
Finally, several
sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a
perpetual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect
state. They will together constitute a federal republic: their joint
deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of each member, though
they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of
it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be
free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfil engagements which
he has voluntarily contracted.
Such were formerly
the cities of Greece; such are at present the Seven United Provinces
of the Netherlands, (13) and such the members of the Helvetic body.
[The
Law of Nations, Book I, §10, MONSIEUR DE VATTEL]
Suits by Foreign States.—The privilege
of a recognized foreign state to sue in the courts of another state
upon the principle of comity is recognized by both international law
and American constitutional law. To deny a sovereign this privilege “would manifest a want of comity
and friendly feeling.” Although national sovereignty is continuous, a suit in behalf of a national
sovereign can be maintained in the courts of the United States only
by a government which has been recognized by the political branches
of our own government as the authorized government of[p.775]the
foreign state. As the responsible agency for the conduct of foreign affairs, the State
Department is the normal means of suggesting to the courts that a sovereign
be granted immunity from a particular suit. Once a foreign government avails itself of the privilege of suing in
the courts of the United States, it subjects itself to the procedure
and rules of decision governing those courts and accepts whatever liabilities
the court may decide to be a reasonable incident of bringing the suit. The rule that a foreign nation instituting a suit in a federal district
court cannot invoke sovereign immunity as a defense to a counterclaim
growing out of the same transaction has been extended to deny a claim
of immunity as a defense to a counterclaim extrinsic to the subject
matter of the suit but limited to the amount of the sovereign’s claim. Moreover, certain of the benefits extending to a domestic sovereign
do not extend to a foreign sovereign suing in the courts of the United
States. A foreign state does not receive the benefit of the rule which
exempts the United States and its member States from the operation of
the statute of limitations, because those considerations of public policy
back of the rule are regarded as absent in the case of the foreign sovereign.
[Annotated
Constitution, Article III, Congressional Research Service]
We have held, upon full consideration, that although under existing
statutes a circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction upon
habeas corpus to discharge from the custody of state officers or
tribunals one restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution
of the United States, it is not required in every case to exercise
its power to that end immediately upon application being made for
the writ. 'We cannot suppose,' this court has said, 'that Congress
intended to compel those courts, by such means, to draw to themselves,
in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions
commenced in state courts exercising authority within the same territorial
limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation
of the Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear
the case summarily, and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law
and justice require' [R. S. 761], does not deprive the court of
discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers
conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light
of the relations existing, under our system of government, between
the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in recognition
of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be
not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound
to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. When
the petitioner is in custody by state authority for an act done
or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States,
or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof;
or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled
therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done
or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege,
protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, or order,
or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity
and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; in such and like
cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the
general government, or the obligations of this country to, or its
relations with, foreign nations, [180 U.S. 499, 502]
the courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs
of habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody
under state authority. So, also, when they are in the custody
of a state officer, it may be necessary, by use of the writ, to
bring them into a court of the United States to testify as witnesses.'
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 250 , 29 S. L. ed. 868, 871, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734;
Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516, 518 , 29 S. L. ed. 994, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 848; Re
Duncan, 139 U.S. 449 , 454, sub nom. Duncan v. McCall, 35 L. ed. 219,
222, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573; Re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 , 289, Sub nom. Wood v. Bursh, 35 L. ed. 505, 509,
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 160 , 35 S. L. ed. 971, 973, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep.
156; Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194 , 36 S. L. ed. 934, 939, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.
40; Re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 75 , 37 S. L. ed. 653, 656, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 793;
New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 96 , 39 S. L. ed. 80, 83, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30;
Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100 , 39 L. ed. 84, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34; Re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211, 216 , 39 S. L. ed. 401, 402, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
331; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 , 40 S. L. ed. 406, 412, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.
297; Iasigi v. Van De Carr, 166 U.S. 391, 395 , 41 S. L. ed. 1045, 1049, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.
595; Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290 , 42 S. L. ed. 748, 750, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.
323; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 105 , 43 S. L. ed. 91, 96, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805;
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 533 , 43 S. L. ed. 535, 543, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.
269; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184 , 44 L. ed. 124, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76.
There are cases that come within the exceptions to the general
rule. In Loncy's Case, 134 U.S. 372 , 375, sub nom. Thomas v. Loney, 33 L. ed. 949,
951, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584, 585, it appeared that Loney was held
in custody by the state authorities under a charge of perjury committed
in giving his deposition as a witness before a notary public in
Richmond. Virginia, in the case of a contested election of a member
of the House of Representatives of the United States. He was discharged
upon a writ of habeas corpus sued out from the circuit court of
the United States, this court saying: 'The power of punishing a
witness for testifying falsely in a judicial proceeding belongs
peculiarly to the government in whose tribunals that proceeding
is had. It is essential to the impartial and efficient administration
of justice in the tribunals of the nation, that witnesses should
be able to testify freely before them, unrestrained by legislation
of the state, or by fear of punishment in the state courts. The
administration of justice in the national tribunals would be greatly
embarrassed and impeded if a witness testifying before a court of
the United States, or upon a contested election of a member of Congress,
were liable to prosecution and punishment in the courts of the state
upon a charge of perjury, preferred by a disappointed suitor or
contestant, or instigated by local passion or prejudice.' So, in
Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 284 , 285 S., 43 L. ed. 699, 702, 19 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 453, 456, which was the case of the arrest of the acting governor
[180 U.S. 499, 503] of the Central Branch of the National
Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, at Dayton, Ohio, upon a charge
of violating a law of that state, the action of the circuit court
of the United States discharging him upon habeas corpus, while in
custody of the state authorities, was upheld upon the ground that
the state court had no jurisdiction in the premises, and because
the accused, being a Federal officer, 'may, upon conviction, be
imprisoned as a means of enforcing the sentence of a fine, and thus
the operations of the Federal government might in the meantime be
obstructed.' The exception to the general rule was further illustrated
in Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 466 , 467 S., 44 L. ed. 846, 849, 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 701, 704, in which the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus
was discharged by the circuit court of the United States, while
held by state officers, this court saying: 'The present case was
one of urgency, in that the appellee was an officer in the revenue
service of the United States whose presence at his post of duty
was important to the public interests, and whose detention in prison
by the state authorities might have interfered with the regular
and orderly course of the business of the department to which he
belonged.'
[State
of Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499 (1901)]
[NOTE: The federal
Courts of the United States as used above do not have the authority
to interpose in foreign countries, but only in states of the Union
for violations of the Constitution, and since they did interpose
above, and since they did so in a "foreign state" and described
that foreign state as a state of the Union, they are admitting of
no federal jurisdiction within any state of the Union]
The Indian tribes,
being within the territorial limits of the United States, were not,
strictly speaking, foreign states; but they were alien nations,
distinct political communities, with whom the United States might and
habitually did deal, as they thought fit, either through treaties made
by the president and senate, or through acts of congress in the ordinary
forms of legislation. The members of those tribes owed immediate allegiance
to their several tribes, and were not part of the people of the United
States. They were in a dependent condition, a state of pupilage, resembling
that of a ward to his guardian. Indians and their property, exempt from
taxation by treaty or statute of the United States, could not be taxed
[112 U.S. 94, 100] by any state. General acts of congress
did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest
an intention to include them. Const. art. 1, 2, 8; art. 2, 2; Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515; U. S.
v. Rogers, 4 How. 567; U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; Case of the Kansas
Indians, 5 Wall. 737; Case of the New York Indians, Id. 761; Case of
the Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; U. S. v. Whisky, 93 U.S. 188 ; Pennock v. Commissioners, 103 U.S. 44 ; Crow Dog's Case, 109 U.S. 556 ; S. C. 3 SUP. CT. REP. 396; Goodell v. Jackson, 20
Johns. 693; Hastings v. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293.
[Elk
v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)]
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