The
term 'District Courts of the United States,' as used in the rules, without
an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance.
It describes the constitutional courts created under article 3 of the
Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly
speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States. We have
often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar
to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not
make it a 'District Court of the United States.' Reynolds v. United
States,
98 U.S. 145 , 154; The City of Panama,
101 U.S. 453 , 460; In re Mills,
135 U.S. 263, 268 , 10 S.Ct. 762; McAllister v. United States,
141 U.S. 174, 182 , 183 S., 11 S.Ct. 949; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
174 U.S. 445, 476 , 477 S., 19 S.Ct. 722; Summers v. United States,
231 U.S. 92, 101 , 102 S., 34 S.Ct. 38; United States v. Burroughs,
289 U.S. 159, 163 , 53 S.Ct. 574. Not only did the promulgating
order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic
and proper sense, but the omission of provision for the application
of the rules to the territorial courts and other courts mentioned in
the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended.
[Mookini v. United State, 303 U.S. 201 (1938)]
It is apparent that Gibbs delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power. But even if it be assumed that the District Court in the present case had constitutional power to decide the respondent's lawsuit against the petitioner,[10] it does not follow that the decision of the Court of Appeals 372*372 was correct. Constitutional power is merely the first hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a federal court has jurisdiction over a particular controversy. For the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389, 401; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182, 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245.
That statutory law as well as the Constitution may limit a federal court's jurisdiction over nonfederal claims[11] is well illustrated by two recent decisions of this Court, Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, and Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291. In Aldinger the Court held that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a county, even if that claim was alleged to be pendent to one against county officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. In Zahn the Court held that in a diversity class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (3), the claim of each member of the plaintiff class must independently satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount set by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a), and rejected the argument that jurisdiction existed over those claims that involved $10,000 or less as ancillary to those that involved more. In each case, despite the fact that federal and nonfederal claims arose from a "common nucleus of operative fact," the Court held that the statute conferring jurisdiction over the federal claim did not allow the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonfederal claims.[12]
*373 The Aldinger and Zahn cases thus make clear that a finding that federal and nonfederal claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact," the test of Gibbs, does not end the inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear the nonfederal claims along with the federal ones. Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order to determine whether "Congress in [that statute] has . . . expressly or by implication negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal claim. Aldinger v. Howard, supra, at 18.
[Owen Equipment Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)]