Types of civil law:
There are two types of civil law: See
Coopers Industries Inc. v. Leatherman Industries, Inc. No. 99-2035.
- Compensatory:
You are fined and penalized unless and until you do or don't do
something. The fine or punishment stops when the behavior
or absence of behavior stops.
- Punitive.
Also called quasi-criminal. Civil penalty for past conduct.
Moral condemnation.
See also:
Although compensatory damages and punitive damages are typically
awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, they serve distinct
purposes. The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that
the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful
conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §903, pp. 453-454 (1979);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U. S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The latter, which have been described as "quasi-criminal," id.,
at 19, operate as "private fines" intended to punish the defendant
and to deter future wrongdoing. A jury's assessment of the extent
of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination,
whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its
moral condemnation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are not compensation
for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries
to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence");
Haslip,
499 U. S., at 54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[P]unitive
damages are specifically designed to exact punishment in excess
of actual harm to make clear that the defendant's misconduct was
especially reprehensible").5
Justice O'CONNOR, joined by Justice STEVENS, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, observed:
We conclude that the punitive damages assessed by the jury against
Pacific Mutual were not violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is true, of course, that under Alabama
law, as under the law of most States, punitive damages are imposed
for purposes of retribution and deterrence. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 470 So.2d 1060, 1076 (Ala. 1984). They have been described
as quasi-criminal. See Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). But this
in itself does not provide the answer. We move, then, to the points
of specific attack.
Justice O'CONNOR, dissenting.
Compounding the problem, punitive damages are quasi-criminal
punishment. Unlike compensatory damages, which serve to allocate
an existing loss between two parties, punitive damages are specifically
designed to exact punishment in excess of actual harm to make clear
that the defendant's misconduct was especially reprehensible. Hence,
there is a stigma attached to an award of punitive damages that
does not accompany a purely compensatory award. The punitive character
of punitive damages means that there is more than just money at
stake. This factor militates in favor of strong procedural safeguards.
[Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co.. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)]
2. For the purposes of applying the Due Process Clause to a State's
proceedings, state law provides strong guidance, but is not dispositive,
as to the classification of the proceeding or the relief imposed
as civil or criminal. The critical features are the substance of
the proceeding and the character of the relief that the proceeding
will afford. With regard to contempt cases, the proceeding and remedy
are for civil contempt if the punishment is remedial and for the
complainant's benefit. But if for criminal contempt the sentence
is punitive, to vindicate the court's authority. Thus, if the relief
provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial if the defendant
stands committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act
required by the court's order, and is punitive if the sentence is
limited to unconditional imprisonment for a definite period. If
the relief provided is a fine, it is remedial when it is paid to
the complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court, though
a fine that is payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant
can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the act required
by the court's order. These distinctions lead to the fundamental
proposition that criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone
who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution
requires of criminal proceedings, including the requirement that
the offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Pp. 631-635.
Instead, the critical features are the substance of the proceeding
and the character of the relief that the proceeding will afford.
"If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for
the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt
the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court."
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). The character of the relief imposed
is thus ascertainable by applying a few straightforward
[485 U.S. 624, 632] rules. If
the relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial
if "the defendant stands committed unless and until he performs
the affirmative act required by the court's order," and is punitive
if "the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period."
Id., at 442. If the relief provided is a fine, it is remedial when
it is paid to the complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the
court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also
remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by
performing the affirmative act required by the court's order. These
distinctions lead up to the fundamental proposition that criminal
penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded
the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal
proceedings, including the requirement that the offense be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e. g., Gompers, supra, at 444; Michaelson
v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co.,
266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924). 5
The Court has consistently applied these principles. In Gompers,
decided early in this century, three men were found guilty of contempt
and were sentenced to serve 6, 9, and 12 months respectively. The
Court found this relief to be criminal in nature because the sentence
was determinate and unconditional. "The distinction between refusing
to do an act commanded, - remedied by imprisonment until the party
performs the required act; and doing an act forbidden, - punished
by imprisonment for a definite term; is sound in principle, and
generally, if not universally, affords a test by which to determine
the character of the punishment." [485
U.S. 624, 633] Gompers,
221 U.S., at 443 . In the former instance, the conditional nature
of the punishment renders the relief civil in nature because the
contemnor "can end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment
by doing what he had previously refused to do." Id., at 442. In
the latter instance, the unconditional nature of the punishment
renders the relief criminal in nature because the relief "cannot
undo or remedy what has been done nor afford any compensation" and
the contemnor "cannot shorten the term by promising not to repeat
the offense." Ibid.
The distinction between relief that is civil in nature and relief
that is criminal in nature has been repeated and followed in many
cases. An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it
is "solely and exclusively punitive in character." Penfield Co.
v. SEC,
330 U.S. 585, 593 (1947). A conditional penalty, by contrast,
is civil because it is specifically designed to compel the doing
of some act. "One who is fined, unless by a day certain he [does
the act ordered], has it in his power to avoid any penalty. And
those who are imprisoned until they obey the order, `carry the keys
of their prison in their own pockets.'" Id., at 590, quoting In
re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (CA8 1902). In Penfield, a man was found
guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a court order to produce
documents. This Court ruled that since the man was not tried in
a proceeding that afforded him the applicable constitutional protections,
he could be given a conditional term of imprisonment but could not
be made to pay "a flat, unconditional fine of $50.00." Penfield,
supra, at 588. 6 See
[485 U.S. 624, 634] also United
States v. Rylander,
460 U.S. 752 (1983); Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33 (1941); Fox v. Capital Co.,
299 U.S. 105 (1936); Lamb v. Cramer,
285 U.S. 217 (1932); Oriel v. Russell,
278 U.S. 358 (1929); Ex parte Grossman,
267 U.S. 87 (1925); Doyle v. London Guarantee Co.,
204 U.S. 599 (1907); In re Christensen Engineering Co.,
194 U.S. 458 (1904); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324 (1904).
Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364 (1966), adheres to these same principles. There
two men were adjudged guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a
court order to testify under a grant of immunity. Both were sentenced
to two years of imprisonment, with the proviso that if either answered
the questions before his sentence ended, he would be released. The
penalties were upheld because of their "conditional nature," even
though the underlying proceeding lacked certain constitutional protections
that are essential in criminal proceedings. Id., at 365. Any sentence
"must be viewed as remedial," and hence civil in nature, "if the
court conditions release upon the contemnor's willingness to [comply
with the order]." Id., at 370. By the same token, in a civil proceeding
the court "may also impose a determinate sentence which includes
a purge clause." Id., at 370, n. 6 (emphasis added). "On the contrary,
a criminal contempt proceeding would be characterized by the imposition
of an [485 U.S. 624, 635] unconditional
sentence for punishment or deterrence." Id., at 370, n. 5.
7
[Hicks
v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988)]
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