This article is being presented to all people who call
themselves "persons" when in a legal setting. The word
"person" is not, in legal terms or political terms, what one
wants to be. Also, as you will see the term "people" in
political terminology is very bad for one who loves freedom. Such as in
the phrase "We the People." This will quell and settle, once and
for all, all the arguments that are flying around about the term citizen
and person, that never is settled. This will also upset people that use
the term Pro Se or Propria Persona. I have rung the bell many times since
1990 and still people persist, to their own detriment, to use these terms
and tacitly admit they are a "person." This will undoubtedly set
some guru’s back a piece that preach citizenship of a state is what you
want to be. It will also set back some guru’s who preach 14thamendment,
and that blacks were not persons until the 14th Amendment was
conceived. The History here will show why their arguments are flawed. Of
course this will inflame those guru’s to know end. But this is not
directed to them but to all you "MEN" and "WOMAN"
out there that don’t know what to call your selves when addressing any
government in a political and legal position. I just gave you the terms to
use as you are a physical man or woman reading this, are you not? The
artificial you, with a name spelled in all Capital letters, cannot read
but has to have a representative. That representative is you, the real
live natural MAN or WOMAN and not a "PERSON," is that not
correct? Don’t know how to answer this, do you? Well don’t be dismayed
for you will after reading this. The truth is here for all to see. I
suspect that Men and Women are so brainwashed by the spin doctors, and
guru’s that have never studied this, will have a hard time believing
this. This comes from a Law book used to teach in Law Schools across the
Country. But you will not find it being taught in this modern era, because
to do so would put a very bad crimp in government's control over the
masses of people calling themselves "persons."
Do not think that after reading this you can go into
any court and they will say, my gosh you are right we have no control over
you. Just the opposite will be true and they can ask at least three
questions that will stop you cold in your tracks and they will walk all
over you like flies on a cow patty, because you will stammer and not be
able to answer them. At that point they will know that you don't know the
correct argument and you lose and BAD CASE LAW will be set. The next MAN
that come in with a correct understanding will lose right off the bat
because of the bad case law that you have set. I have seen this hundreds
of times in the patriot community when someone with a little knowledge is
very dangerous to other freedom loving MEN when jumping into water they
think is two feet deep only to find it 1000 feet deep and no way to get
The material below comes from a 13 volume set of Law
books. This is from Vol. XIII AMERICAN LAW
AND PROCEDURE. JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS. By James De Witt
Andrews LL.B. (Albany Law School), LL.D. (Ruskin University) from La Salle
University. I have bolded the footnotes as they may be mixed within some
paragraphs, to separate them from the main text so it is not confusing.
Starting at the end of section 63;
Jeremy Bentham, in his remarks in reference to the
inexact use of language by Blackstone in pages 47 and 49 of
the Commentaries, says:
leading terms are made to chop and change their several significations,
sometimes meaning one thing, sometimes another, at the
upshot perhaps nothing, and this in the compass of a paragraph, one may
judge what will be the complexion of the whole context" (31)."
64. The legal conception of leading words.
Inasmuch as the word person, man, thing, property, rights, wrongs and
actions are leading terms constituting the designation of departments of
the corpus juris, it will be impossible to obtain clear conceptions of
subjects connected with these words until an understanding is agreed upon
as to the sense in which these terms are used. If we arrive at the meaning
of these words intended by Blackstone and make the same clear, we will
have a better idea of his method and perhaps a better opinion of it, and
at the same time will be able to show the distinction between the same
words in the Roman, the English and in American law.
Blackstone apparently uses the Roman word persona as
synonymous with the English word "person," and the latter word
interchangeably with "individual" and "man," whereas
he might have avoided all confusion by a closer adherence to that which he
professed to follow.
65. The word "person" defined. Gaius
says "De Juris divisione" [the divisions of the law] immediately
preceding his division of the law; then follows, "De conditione
hominm" [meaning the condition or status of men]. In the Institutes
"De jura personarum" precedes the expression "all our law
relates either to persons, or to things, or to actions,... The words
persona and personae did not have the meaning in the Roman which attaches
to homo, the individual, or a man in the English; it had peculiar
reference to artificial beings and the condition or status of
33. Professor John Austin’s view.—"Many
of the modern civilians have narrowed the Import of the term ‘person’
as meaning a physical or natural person. They define a person thus:
‘homo, cure statu sue censlderatus;, a qauman being, invested with the
condition of status., And, In this definition, they use the term status in
a restricted sense, as including only those conditions which comprise
rights and as excluding conditions which are purely onerous and
burthensome, or which consist of duties merely. According to this
definition, human beings who have no rights are not persons, but things,
being classed with other things which have no rights residing in
themselves, but are merely the subjects of rights residing in others.
Such, in the Roman law, down to the age of the Antonlnes, was the position
of the slave." Austin’s Jur., vol 1, 358.
The signification in Our Jurisprudence .... The
word ‘Person,’ in its primitive and natural sense, signifies the mask
with which actors, who played dramatic pieces in Rome and Greece, covered
their heads. These pieces were played in public places. and afterwards in
Such vast amphitheaters that it was impossible for a man to make himself
heard by all the spectators. Recourse was had to art; the head of each
actor was enveloped with a mask, the figure of which represented the Part
he was to play, and it was so contrived that the opening for the emission
of his voice made the sounds clearer and more resounding, vox personabat,
when the name persona was given to the instrument or mask which
facilitated the resounding of his voice. The name persona was afterwards
applied to the part itself which the actor had undertaken to play, because
the face of the mask was adapted to the age and character of him who was
considered as speaking, and sometimes it was his own portrait. It is in
this last sense of personage, or of the part which an individual plays,
that the word persona is employed in jurisprudence, in opposition to the
word man, homo. When we speak of a person, we only consider the state of
the man, the part he plays in society, abstractly, without considering the
1 Bouvier’s Institutes, note 1.
Austin’s Jur., 362.
See 4 Harv. Law Rev., 101,
Austin’s Jur., 363.
The word "homo" corresponds to the English
word "man," and, as the Romans expressed it, "unus homo
sustinet plures personas;" i.e., one man has many persons, or
sustains many status, or many different conditions (34) AUSTINS JUR.,
Austin says: "The term ‘person’ has two
meanings, which must be carefully distinguished. It denotes a man or human
being; or it signifies some condition borne by a man (35 See Harvard Law
Revues 101). A person (as meaning a man) is one or individual, but a
single or individual person (meaning a man) may sustain a number of
persons (meaning condition or status)" (36 Austins Jur., 363).
Notice that this meaning is not so broad as that given
by Ortolan. It does not include artificial persons. Again, he says:
"As throwing light on the celebrated distinction between jus rerum
and jus personarum, phrases which have been translated so absurdly by
Blackstone and others,--rights of persons and rights of things, jus
personarum did not mean law of persons, or rights of persons, but law of
status, or condition. A person is here not a physical or individual
person, but the status or condition with which he is invested. It is a
remarkable confirmation of this that Gauis, in the margin purporting to
give the title or heading of this part of the law, has entitled it thus:
De conditione hominum; and Theophilus, in translating the Institutes of
Justinian from Latin into Greek, has translated jus personarum . . .
diviso personarum; understanding evidently by persona . . . not an
individual or physical person, but the status, condition or character
borne by physical persons. This distinctly shows the meaning of the phrase
jus per sonarurn, which has been involved in impenetrable obscurity by
Blackstone and Hale. The law of persons is the law of status or condition;
the law of things is the law of rights and obligations considered in a
general manner, or as distinguished from these peculiar collections of
rights and obligations which are styled conditions and considered apart.
A moment’s reflection enables one to see that man and
person cannot be synonymous, for there cannot be an artificial man, though
there are artificial persons. Thus the conclusion is easily reached that
the law itself often creates an entity or a being which is called a
person; the law cannot create an artificial man, but it can and frequently
does invest him with artificial attributes; this is personality, which we
see and by which we are affected.
The law does not distinguish between men except by
their personality, as king or magistrate, or as parent or husband or wife,
etc. While the idea may be difficult for the tyro to grasp, the
personality, i.e., this condition or status of a many is entirely the
creation of the law. By nature all men are created free and equal, i.e.,
of equal rank, equal rights; but the law does not look upon all men as
equal, though in the law of the United States all men have equal civil
The question is asked, Who is that man? The reply would
be, that is the king or lord so and so, or the chief justice or the
president or governor. But what is the name of this personage? The name
indicates the man, the title, rank or legal standing of the person.
The word "persons" denoted certain conditions
of rank or status with which a man was clothed by law. To adopt the
language of the same author, "the term ‘person,’ as denoting a
condition or status, is therefore equivalent to character (40). It
signified, originally, a mask worn by a player, and distinguished the
character which he represented from the other characters in the play. From
the mask which expressed the character, it was extended to the character
itself. From characters represented by players, or from dramatic
characters, it Was further extended by a metaphor to conditions or as
status. For men, as subjects of law, are distinguished conditions, just as
players, perform by their respective conditions, just as players,
performing a play are distinguished by the several persons which they
respectively enact or sustain" (41). As we shall see, the word had a
still broader meaning.
"A slave," says Holland, "having, as
such, neither rights or liabilities, had in Roman law, strictly speaking,
no ‘status,’ ‘caput,’ or ‘persona.’ On the day of his
manumission, says Modesfinus, ‘incipit stature habere.’ Before
manumission, as we read in the Institutes, ‘nullurn caput habuit’"
The following is the explanation given by Mr. Sandars
in Ms translation of the Institutes:
word persona had, in the usage of the Roman law, a different meaning from
that which we ordinarily attach to the word ‘person.’ Whoever or
whatever was capable of having, and being subject to, rights, was a
persona. All men possessing a reasonable will would naturally be personae;
but not all those who were, physically speaking, men, were personae.
Slaves, for instance, were not in a position to exercise their reason and
will, and the law, therefore refused to treat them as personae."
the other hand, many personae had no physical existence. The law clothed
certain abstract conceptions with an existence, and attached to them the
capability of having and being subject to rights. The law, for instance,
spoke of the state as a persona· It was treated as being capable of
having the rights and of being
39 See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 368.
40 Hale nowhere speaks of status, but uses the term
"character" or "capacity." See note 60. below.
them. These rights really belonged to the men who composed the state, and
they flowed from the constitution and position of associated individuals.
But, in the theory and language of law, the rights of the whole community
were referred to the state, to an abstract conception interposed between
these rights and the individual members of society. So, a corporation, or
an ecclesiastical institution, was a persona, quite apart from the
individual personae who formed the one and administered the other. Even
the riscus, or the imperial treasury, as being the symbol of the abstract
conception of the emperor's claims, was spoken of as a persona. The
technical term for the position of an individual regarded as a legal
person was status" (44).
Ortolan’s explanation of personality.(45) The
substance of the above was undoubtedly taken from Ortolan’s treatment of
the subject as given in his History of the Roman Law, which is submitted
because it is clear and concise:
word ‘person’ (persona) does not in the language of the law, as in
ordinary language, designate the physical man. This word in law has two
acceptations: In the first, it is every being considered as capable of
having or owing rights, of being the active or passive subjects of rights.
say every being, for men are not alone comprised therein. In fact, law by
its power of abstraction creates persons, as we shall see that it creates
things, which do not exist in nature.
Thus, it erects into persons the state, cities,
communities, charitable or other institutions, even purely material
objects, such as the fiscus, or inheritance in abeyance, because it makes
of them beings capable of having or owing rights. In the inverse sense,
every man in Roman law is not a person. For example, slaves were
considered as the property of the master, especially under the rigorous
system of primitive legislation, because they are the object and not the
subject of law. This, however, did not prevent the Romans from including
them in another sense in the class of persons.
"We shall therefore have to discriminate between
and to study two classes of person: physical or natural persons, for which
we find no distinctive denomination in Roman jurisprudence except the
expressions taken from Ulpian, singularis persona; that is to say, (46)
the man-person; and abstract persons, which are fictitious and which have
no existence except in law; that is to say, those which are purely legal
conceptions or creations.
"In another sense, very frequently employed, the
word ‘person’ designates each character man is called upon to play on
the judicial stage; that is to say, each quality which gives him certain
rights or certain obligations-for instance, the person of 43 Slaves were
not persons in the United States until after the abolition of slavery
1 Hammond’s B]k. 334, note.
44 Sandars’ Justinian, Introduction, P. 26.
45 Ortolan’s History of the Roman Law is among the
best. It is, unfortunately, not easily obtained.
father; of son as subject to his father; of husband or
guardian. In this sense the same man can have several personae at the same
time. The last two paragraphs embrace all that Austin gives us in the
quotation given above.
From what we have seen, the following conclusion may be
drawn: The words persona and status were not synonymous, though very
nearly so. The word "person" had two meanings:
Every being, artificial or natural, capable of having or owing rights.
Second. The characters, capacities, qualities or
positions which the law ascribed to certain men as individuals—that is,
rank, condition, capacity-status.
term for the second meaning, namely, the position, quality, character
which a man bears, is status.
Status is not
so broad as person, but always related to physical men.
A slave had
no rights, no rank, no standing, no capacity, and consequently no status.
This applies, of course, only to the earlier days of Roman law, for
subsequently slaves were given a standing as men.
In the earlier days of Roman law," says Sandara "no one would
have conceived this to be unnatural" (48). In
the days of Gaius, it seems, slaves are treated as persons, for he says:
"Persons are freemen or slaves" (49).
In England all men were persons, and were divided into
certain classes or ranks by virtue of which they had especial characters,
capacities, rights, privileges and immunities; for instance, the right of
magistracy’ as king, as lord, etc. These were artificial. In human
societies men have certain standing, position, capacity, according as they
are sovereign or subjects, parents and children, husband and wife, or
We have seen something of the etymology of the word,
also its meaning and application as used in the :Roman law. We know that
the word "person" is a familiar one in English literature, both
in England and America. We are endeavoring to ascertain whether in the
English language we have a right to oppose persons to things for the
Purpose of classification of rules of law, and if thereby we convey
We know that all laws emanate from persons and also
that they operate against or upon persons(50); that is, all law certainly
from laws, and that the principle of classification adopted is the
difference in the objects to which the rules relate.
There can be found in the Commentaries of Blackstone no
definition of the word person, nor any explanation of the meaning
46 Does not this equal "individuals?" See
10 Harvard Law Rev., 101.
47 Ortholan’s History of Roman Law, 567-68.
48 Sandals’ Justinian, Int., 27; Austin’s Jur.,
lect. 12, P.358 49 Galus, 1-9; Austin’s Jur., 358.
addresses persons. So of rights. We know that rights
belong to persons, and that in that sense there cannot be the rights of
things. It should be borne in mind that we are endeavoring to classify the
body of laws, and not the rights which are resultant intended to be
ascribed to the word "person,"and the word is there used
indiscriminately in the popular and legal sense, interchangeably with
"man" and "individual," and also to designate
artificial beings capable of having rights; and there is not the slightest
hint that in using the Roman expressions there is any change intended from
the Roman idea of the word "person," though he does treat under
the rights of persons what he styles absolute rights, which would be
called "things" in Roman law.
§ 66. Scope of the word "thing." Of
things (51), which is the subject of the second book, Blackstone
says: "The objects of your inquiry in this second book will be the
jura rerum, or those rights which a man may acquire in and to such
external things as are unconnected with his person." Why not say
unconnected with him, himself? These are what the writers in natural
law style the "rights of dominion or property." This is the only
definition given of the words "property" ‘or
"thing;" that is, the jura rernm equals those rights which a man
may acquire in and to external thlngs. Otherwise put, the rights of things
are rights which a man may acquire in and to things unconnected with his
person; and these are what writers in natural law style property; yet in
the treatment of this subject the learned commentator treats the subject
of contracts, the main feature of which is its obligation, or, in other
words, the power which the law affords one person of enforcing it by . . .
We now go further into the book and this is what it has
to say about you people who want so much to be a part of the body politic
and want the Constitution as your God and then claim that you are free
from the tether of government. IT AIN'T GONNA HAPPEN AND YOU HAVE BEEN
SUCKERED IN HOOK, LINE AND SINKER WHEN CLAIMING SO AND ARE COMPLETELY
DOMINATED BY THEM.
50. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 332; 92’
ld. 554; United States v. Harris, 106 id. 629; Civil Rights
Cases, 109 id. 3. A state may in a sense fall under the designation, and
laws be directed against states; but as the state acts by individuals, in
the same manner it is operated upon through individuals.
51. Observe the word "chose," which will be
explained hereafter. Its meaning has an important bearing on the modified
meaning of both "person" and "things." Vol. XII 12
§ 104. The people: Identity. In the United
States the people are brought on the stage as an acting political entity,
acting, it is true, always through representatives. As expressed by
Wilson, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence: "In
free states the people form an artificial person or body politic, the
highest and noblest that can be known" (1 Wilson’s Works).
By "the people" of a state is meant all of
the (members) which compose that state and are integral parts of it,
together making a body politic (2 Penhollowv Doane, 3 Dall. 55, 93).
[PEOPLE, THIS IS A STRAIGHT OUT ADMIRALTY CASE IN CASE
YOU DIDN'T KNOW AS IT DEALT WITH LAW MERCHANTS, YOU KNOW THEM AS CORPORATE
The people as a corporate unit form an artificial
person or body politic; thus constituted they form a moral person".
"It is this person we call a state. (4 1 Wilson’s Works 321-325: 2
Wilson’s Works 321)"
is no distinction between the people and the state" (5 Penhollow v
Doane, 3 Dall 93).
It must not be forgotten that, in using the expression
"the people," there is a distinction between the population of
the nation, as individuals, and the same population organized under a
constitution. By "the people," in this connection, we intend a
body politic, a corporate unity. Because of the quality of singleness we
may properly use the pronoun "it," though, this is not usual. It
is hard for the citizen to lose sight of the individuals in the body; but
correctly viewed, as drops of water lose their forms as drops when they
mingle with the whole and become not drops, but one body, even so the
citizen in his political capacity loses the civil capacity of an
individual when viewed as a part of that great unit "the
It is the whole mass, and not a majority of the
individuals composing it, which constitutes the people, and the people are
to be regarded, not as an unorganized mob, but as a corporate unity
composing a society (6). There are dicta to the effect that the
people, when spoken of in the political sense, means only those persons
having the right to vote, that is, the electors; and it is at the same
time said that in the electors is vested the sovereignty (7). Thus
stated, the idea does not, as we shall see, properly obtain, and is
contrary to the principles of American institutions (8). Voters are
but parts of the machinery of government (9). In the constitution
"the people, is sometimes used to indicate persons or individuals. So
in all provisions in reference to unreasonable seizures and searches. In
such provision it is identical with the use in Blackstone.
6. Jameson, Const. Con. (4th ed.), pp.
q8, 19, notes: Von Holst’s Con.
Law, 48, 49; Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 92.
distinction was taken at the bar between a state and the people of the
state. It is a distinction I am not capable of comprehending. By a state
forming a republic (speaking of it as a moral person), I do not mean the
legislature of the state, the executive of the state, or the judiciary,
but all the citizens who compose the state, and are, if I may so express
myself, integral parts of it; all together forming a body politic. The
great distinction between monarchies and republics (at least our republic)
in general is, that in the former the monarch is considered as the
sovereign, and each individual of his nation as a subject to him, though
in some countries with many important special limitations. This, I say, is
generally the ease, for it has not been so universally. But in a republic,
all the citizens as such, are equal, and no citizen can rightfully
exercise any authority over another but in virtue of a power
constitutionally given by the whole community, and such authority, when
exercised, is In effect an act of the whole community, which forms such
body politic. In such governments, therefore, the sovereignty resides in
the great body of the people, but it resides in them not as so many
distinct individuals, but in their political capacity only. Thus A., B.,
C., and D. are citizens of Pennsylvania, and as such, together with all
the citizens of Pennsylvania, share in the sovereignty of the state.
Suppose a state to consist exactly of the number of 100,000 citizens, and
it were practicable for them all to assemble at one time and in one place,
and that 99,999 did actually assemble. The state would not be in fact
assembled. Why? Because the state in fact is composed of all the citizens,
not of a part only, however large the part may be, and one is
wanting." Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 93.
Cooley’s Const. Lira. 40, citing Blair v. Rldgely, 41 Mo. 63; 97 Am:Dec.
.8. Wilson’s Works, App’x A, IX 566; McOrary on
Elections (4th ed.), sec 13.
9. State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 498.
§105. Capacity. Power. Sovereignty. We may now
examine the powers of the people, and in the course of this examination
but little time need be spent upon theory or metaphysical discussion of
what ought to be the law governing the matter, but will, as far as
possible, be conferred to the practical, visible facts.
The discussion of the capacities of that person we term
"the people" necessarily involves the discussion of What is
termed sovereignty. Let no one suppose that this question is an
impracticable one and that it has no further.
I END THIS
SECTION HERE --GO TO THE NEXT SECTION 132 AND-- STARTING AT THE END OF THE
PAGE WHICH CONTAINS WHAT I WANT YOU TO SEE.
"To fully appreciate the idea of sovereignty and
the federal court has appellate jurisdiction of a suit by a state against
an individual (13). The palpable injustice of the rule has led to several
ingenious devices to avoid its application (14), such for example as the
assignment of the cause of action to a person competent to sue, (e.g. a
state), which, however, must be a real assignment (15).
The sufficient reason for the rule is found in the
expression, "it is the written law"; the motive for it throws no
light on its application (16).
§ 133. An individual contracts with a state at his
It is now well settled that there is no judicial remedy in
favor of an individual against a state to compel the performance of a
contract (17), though it is settled that a state can pass no law impairing
the obligation of a contract once made (18). The only security for state
loans rests on the plighted faith of the state as a political community;
that is, upon the same basis as contracts with independent governments
(19). States are not, like nations, independent of each other, and are not
permitted to allow the use of state names for the purpose of enforcing
claims really owned by individuals.
As to torts and injuries: It is no answer to a tort or
an active infringement of a right or a threatened injury that the action
was taken or is proceeding under supposed official duty or by virtue of
official power: such cases are not damnum absque injuria."
There you have it people. I did not highlight anything
in the main text that was not already there or italicized. This is
devastating against the Government of State and Federal. Do you want to
find out how corrupt "your" government is? Well after this hits
the net the Government will pull from the shelves of all the libraries and
law schools where some of these volumes might be, just as Hitler did to
the German people so they would not learn the truth. What makes you think
this country’s slime balls, called government officials and the lawyers
that run this country,--count the number of executive and legislative
persons there are that are lawyers,-- are any different? They are not. In
those countries it was brutality, here it is legality with words, but the
results are the same, -- complete control of the Men and Women. But of
late it has become apparent that brutality is showing its ugly head
starting with IRS, ATF and DEA abuse of the people under the directives of
upper level "persons" that legally can’t throw enough men and
women in jail fast enough.
I’ll tell you that the law professors know this and
they taught it. They can’t teach it now , by government dictate. Lawyers
are only taught what the establishment wants taught. The legal profession
has so much moral turpitude oozing from their pores that compared to a
chicken house that hasn't been cleaned in a month, on a 100 degree day,
make it smell like a bed of roses.
As Shakespeare said very eloquently, "The first
thing we do is hang all the lawyers." Yes, and Virginia Colony was
correct back in the 1700’s that the practice of lawyering was an offense
punishable by death. They sure dropped the ball on that one.
So the problem at hand is that every statute is written
with the term "person" in mind. Why, you ask? Well as I quoted
in my book "The New History of America," the case of Cruden
v Neale, where the court states a principle of natural
law so clear that it cannot be twisted by any lawyer, that man is only
bound by the laws of nature. Here is what the court stated;
When a change of government takes place, from a monarchial to a republican
government, the old form is dissolved. Those who lived under it, and did
not choose to become members of the new, had a right to refuse their
allegiance to it, and to retire elsewhere. By being a part of the society
subject to the old government, they had not entered into any engagement to
become subject to any new form the majority might think proper to adopt.
That the majority shall prevail is a rule posterior to the formation of
government, and results from it. It is not a rule binding upon mankind in
their natural state. There, every man is independent of all laws, except
those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by
his fellowmen without his consent." CRUDEN v. NEALE, 2 N.C. 338
(1796) 2 S.E. 70.
By this very principle espoused by the court you cannot
be made to "retire elsewhere" because, if anything, you retire
from the corporate STATE and live upon the land of the Lord in the
geographical place called North Carolina rather than the State of North
Carolina. Go back and look at the Hamilton case where they said that you
"* * * shall take an oath of abjuration and allegiance, or depart out
of the State." Let them keep their corporate State; depart out of it.
Isn't that what the Bible tells you "Come out of her?" What do
you need it for? To continually be robbed by legal plunder? Not that they
are going to stop if you do, because maybe, just maybe, the masses will
wake up and want out also, thereby destroying the State’s power over
You see, the whole game is to control you by making
you, the man, into a artificial entity called a "person." In
ordinary street language you can use the term person. But the minute you
step into ANY legal arena you CANNOT use the term "person." For
to do so the other artificial person, the State, can come after another
artificial character. As the court stated above "man" is not
bound by other men’s laws unless he consents. You consent when you
answer to any statute containing any reference to person. The clever
trick is that the statute 26 USC 7701(a) of the IRC is the definition part
and it says "person" means; an individual, partnership,
corporation, association. Notice that all terms defining the word
"person are corporate fictions. BUT, you say, individual is not a
corporate fiction because am I not an individual? Yes you are in average
common street terms, but in the legal arena "individual is
corporate or artificial by legal definition, because
"individual," in and of itself is defining an artificial thing
as a "person." So how can it be a natural man? It goes
against all reason and logic. The IRC Code Statute only pertains to man,
who as stated above by the Professor, takes on the artificial character
and becomes a "person" by legal definition. Therefore he is
subject to all the legal disabilities that come with the term person and
that means being subject to all the laws of the parent corporation. The
parent corporation is the United States, the State is the artificial child
and you are the artificial grand child. That is the best way to describe
it so you can start to equate terms and meanings.
In Anderson’s Business law on the Uniform Commercial
Code, I think around the sixth edition, it states that when a statute
refers to artificial beings, natural people are not to be included. So, 26
USC 7701 (a) (1) uses all artificial characters to describe the artificial
"person" and individual. By all reason and logic it has to be an
artificial term. Just like a third grade reader shows 5 pictures and asks
which one does not belong. The pictures are, a baseball, a bat, a base, a
glove and a football uniform. You circle the football uniform as not
fitting the idea, but the football clothes is a uniform, the same as
baseball clothes is a uniform. Only one uniform fits the scheme while the
other is left out, but both are uniforms. The same as individual. It is a
"leading word" as the professor stated and has to be further
defined the same as individual or person has to be defined. Did not the
professor state the term individual and person are one in the same? Did he
not also state that it is well settled in law that "person" is
always an artificial person? Refresh your memory by finding that part of