Here is an example of an actual, public-record Motion for Recusal for Cause. It is dangerous to try such a motion unless there is a high probability of success (such success is unlikely, because judges rarely admit that their brethren are biased or prejudiced). If the motion is denied, one is stuck with not only a Bad Judge, but an angrier one.
DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE, STATE OF COLORADO
Case No. 85DR1167
_________________________________________________________________
MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE STEINHARDT
_________________________________________________________________
In re the Marriage of
David L. Rose Petitioner
and,
Mary L. Rose Respondent
_________________________________________________________________
Comes now petitioner, David L. Rose, pro-se and moves
to recuse the Honorable Joyce Steinhardt for the reasons that the
said judge is biased and prejudiced against the petitioner and
for the further reason that she is biased and prejudiced against
males seeking custody, and for the further reason that she is
biased and prejudiced against children in the context of custody
cases, all as more particularly appears in the Affidavit of Bias
and Prejudice submitted herewith.
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully moves and prays that
the Honorable Joyce Steinhardt remove and disqualify herself as
judge, or that the instant motion be heard by a judge other than
Judge Steinhardt pursuant to the doctrine of Johnson v. District
Court, 674 P.2d 952 (1984), to the end that another judge be
assigned to hear and try all matters in the instant case.
This is the 22nd. day of July 1987
___________________________________
David L. Rose
Pro-se
(Address)
Aurora, Colorado 80015
(303) (phone)
VERIFICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF COLORADO )
: ss.
COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE )
Before me, the undersigned authority, personally came
and appeared the affiant named below, who, being first duly sworn
upon oath, deposed and said that he has read the above and
foregoing document and knows the contents thereof, and that all
statements of fact contained therein are true.
This is the 22nd. Day of July 1987,
_________________________________
AFFIANT
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this _____ day of
July 1987.
________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC
Address of notary:
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that the above foregoing MOTION was mailed
postage pre-paid by placing the same in a stamped envelope and
placed in the United States mail, to the respondents last
attorney of record and to the GAL.
xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxx
Littleton, CO 80121
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Littleton, CO 80123
Mailed this date__________________________.
----------------------------------------
David L. Rose
DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE, STATE OF COLORADO
Case No. 85DR1167
_________________________________________________________________
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE
_________________________________________________________________
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
David L. Rose Petitioner
and,
Mary L. Rose Respondent
_________________________________________________________________
Comes now Petitioner, David L. Rose, pro-se, who, being
first duly sworn, states that he believes the Honorable
Steinhardt is biased and prejudiced against him personally, and
against fathers seeking custody, and against fathers seeking
significant involvement with their children and against children.
Petitioner is past president of Fathers For Equal Rights of
Colorado, Executive Vice-President of The National Congress for
Men, and editor of Fathers Network a magazine for Fathers
involved in discriminatory divorces and has been an outspoken
critic of Judge Steinhardt.
The petitioner has been vocal in denouncing the decisions
and the attitude of the Honorable Judge Steinhardt and has made
these proclamations public.
The petitioner has initiated an independent evaluation of
the Honorable Steinhardt's record in custody matters and has
determined that her record clearly shows an extreme PREJUDICE
against men and against pro-se litigants.
The effect of this exercise of petitioner's right to freedom
of speech is to so prejudice Judge Steinhardt, an avowed
advocate of feminist rights, against him that he cannot obtain a
fair trial in her court.
The judge has been unnecessarily harsh on the petitioner in
this matter an it has appeared to at least two other witnesses to
her conduct that she has acted in a prejudicial fashion toward
the petitioner. (Exhibits attached). Further the court has
imposed such impossible financial burdens on the petitioner
Accordingly, affiant moves and prays that the Honorable Joyce
Steinhardt be disqualified from further proceedings in this
matter.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
This is the 22nd. day of July, 1987.
VERIFICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF COLORADO )
ss.
COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE )
Before me, the undersigned authority, personally came
and appeared the affiant named below, who, being first duly sworn
upon oath, deposed and said that he has read the above and
foregoing document and knows the contents thereof, and that all
statements of fact contained therein are true.
This is the 22ND. day of July 1987, at Denver, Colorado.
__________________________________
AFFIANT
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 15th day of
July 1987, at Denver, Colorado. My commission expires _________
----------------------------------
NOTARY PUBLIC
Address of notary:
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE, STATE OF COLORADO
Case No. 85DR1167
_________________________________________________________________
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE STEINHARDT
_________________________________________________________________
In re the Marriage of:
David L. Rose Petitioner
and,
Mary L. Rose Respondent
_________________________________________________________________
This motion by David L. Rose, Pro-se to recuse Judge
Steinhardt is governed by Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 97.
The question is not whether the Honorable Joyce
Steinhardt is impartial in fact, but rather whether reasonable
men might question her impartiality under all circumstances.
United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979).
Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before
a judge other than Judge Steinhardt, at which hearing he may
adduce evidence to show that Judge Steinhardt is prejudiced
against outspoken advocates of equal rights for fathers,
including the petitioner.
The instant motion must be heard by a judge other than
Judge Steinhardt. The case of Johnson v. District Court, 674
P.2d 952 (Colo. 1984) is apposite. In that case, the Supreme
Court said:
Where an attorney for one of the litigants
signs a verified affidavit alleging conduct
and statements on the part of a trial judge
which, if true, shows bias and prejudice or
the appearance of bias or prejudice on the
part of the trial judge, it is an abuse of
discretion if that judge does not withdraw
from the case, even though he or she believes
the statements are false or that the meaning
attributed to them by the party seeking
recusal is erroneous. In such a case, the
judge should not pass upon the truth or
falsity of the facts alleged in the affidavit,
but only upon the adequacy of the motion as a
matter of law.
In another case as reported in the Colorado Lawyer; Wright
vs. District Court, 16 Colorado Lawyer 541, March 1987 the court
ruled that:
The fact that Judge Goldsmith in his own mind
does not believe that he is prejudiced against
Wright and his firm does not prevent
disqualification if the motions and affidavits
reflect prejudice and an appearance of
impropriety.
The Supreme Court went on to say:
Once facts have been set forth that create a
reasonable inference of a "bent of mind" that
will prevent the judge from dealing fairly
with the party seeking recusal, it is
incumbent upon the trial judge to recuse
himself. See People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589,
595 (Colo. 1981); C.J.C. Canon 3(C)(1). A
trial judge must accept the affidavits filed
with the motion as true, even though the judge
believes that the statements contained in the
affidavits are false or that the meaning
attributed to them by the party seeking
recusal is erroneous. Johnson v. District
Court, 674 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1982).
C.R.C.P. 97 provides:
"A judge shall be disqualified in an action in which he is
interested or prejudiced, or has been of counsel for any party,
or is or has been a material witness, or is so related or
connected with any party of his attorney as to render it improper
for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
A judge may disqualify himself on his own motion for any of said
reasons or any party may move for such disqualification and a
motion by a party for disqualification shall be supported by
affidavit. Upon the filing by a party of such a motion all other
proceedings in the case shall be suspended until a ruling is made
thereon. Upon disqualifying himself, a judge shall notify
forthwith the chief judge of the district who shall assign
another judge in the district to hear the action. If no other
judge in the district is available or qualified, the chief judge
shall notify forthwith the court administrator who shall obtain
from the Chief Justice the assignment of a replacement judge."
We said in Johnson v. District Court, 674 P.2d 952 (Colo.
1984):
"Ordinarily, the question of whether a judge
should be disqualified in a civil case is a
matter within the discretion of the trial
court. In re Marriage of Mann, 655 P.2d 814
(Colo. 1982). However, where an attorney for
one of the litigants signs a verified
affidavit alleging conduct and statements on
the part of a trial judge which, if true, show
bias or prejudice or the appearance of bias
or prejudice on the part of the trial judge,
it is an abuse of discretion if that judge
does not withdraw from the case, even though
he or she believes the statements are false or
that the meaning attributed to them by the
party seeking recusal is erroneous. In such a
case, the judge should not pass upon the truth
or falsity of the facts alleged in the
affidavit, but only upon the adequacy of the
of the motion as a matter of law. 'The motion
and supporting affidavit speak for themselves
and the only question involved is whether the
facts alleged are sufficient to compel the
judge to disqualify himself.' Kovacheff v
Langhart, 147 Colo. 339, 343-44, 363 P.2d 702,
705 (1961). The motion and affidavits are
legally adequate if they 'state facts from
which it may reasonably be inferred that the
judge has bias or prejudice that will prevent
him from dealing fairly' with the party
seeking recusal. People v. Botham, 629 P.2d
589, 595 (Colo. 1981)."
Because the act of appearing Pro-se, installs and grants an
individual under the constitution of the United States and the
constitution of the State of Colorado, full authority to act as
an officer of the court in all matters both civil and criminal,
it therefore stands to reason that an affidavit signed by an
individual, pro-se and substantiated by others who were witness
to the event, should bear up as having the same weight as an
affidavit signed by an attorney for a litigant.
It therefore stand to reason that:
"A judge must grant a motion for
disqualification if the motion and supporting
affidavits state facts from which it
reasonably may be inferred that the judge has
a bias or prejudice that will prevent him from
dealing fairly with the party seeking recusal.
The judge must accept the affidavits filed
with the motion as true even though the judge
believes that the statements contained in the
affidavits are false."
Respectfully it is submitted that the Honorable Joyce
Steinhardt must be disqualified from the above numbered and
entitled action.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd., day of July 1987.
______________________________________
David L. Rose
(address).
Aurora, Colorado 80015
(303) (phone)
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
(same as first example)
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