I’m a (Corporation) Sole Man!

by Alfred Adask

In the previous article (“Withdrawing From Social Security”), did you notice that the affidavit’s author characterized himself as “Corporation Sole” in his mailing address? This may be another important element of self-characterization needed to distance yourself from corporate government’s jurisdiction.

I’m still fuzzy on the “corporate sole” concept. However, I think it’s important, so I’ll share the few clues and conjecture I currently enjoy.

First, consider the definition of “King” in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed.):

King. English law. The British government; the Crown.

“In modern times it has become usual to speak of the Crown rather than of the King, when we refer to the King in his public capacity as a body politic. We speak of the property of the Crown, when we mean the property which the King holds in right of his Crown. So we speak of the debts due by the Crown, of legal proceedings by and against the Crown, and so on. The usage is one of great convenience, because it avoids a difficulty which is inherent in all speech and thought concerning corporations sole, the difficulty, namely, of distinguishing adequately between the body politic and the human being by whom it is represented and whose name it bears.” John Salmond, Jurisprudence 341-42 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947) [Emph. add.]

Note that the King’s “corporate sole” includes two capacities: 1) the “body politic” (the public capacity); and 2) the “human being”. This duality is remarkably similar to the “evil twin”/“strawman” theories which propose that “Alfred Adask” and “ALFRED ADASK” are two related but distinctly different legal entities.

Further, within the King’s corporate sole, his “human being” represents his “body politic” (public capacity). This representation is very similar to theories advanced in AntiShyster Volume 10 No. 3 concerning fiduciary relationships.
Thus, it’s possible that the duality we sense in “Alfred” and “ALFRED” might be explained as the two aspects of a corporate sole. In other words, perhaps by virtue of a corporate sole, “Alfred” is the human being who represents “ALFRED” (the body politic/public capacity).

O K, if “Alfred” and “ALFRED” are tangled up in a corporate sole, how’d it happen? Isn’t there a requirement that every corporation be specifically chartered by the state? I don’t recall ever establishing a corporate sole, so how could I be bound up in one?

Some believe the answer to that question goes back to our Declaration of Independence (1776 A.D.) and the Treaty of Paris (1783 A.D.).

When Thomas Jefferson and the founders declared that “all men are created equal,” they weren’t merely talking about plumbers, roofers and accountants. They meant that all men – including kings and popes – were equal. That being so, if the king was entitled to enjoy the dual capacity of a corporation sole, then it followed that all men (including you and me), were also entitled to enjoy that dual capacity.

If everyone was entitled by the Declaration to act as a “corporation sole,” some believe that capacity “naturally” attaches to each of us from the moment birth or perhaps even from conception. Thus, no state-approved corporate charter may be necessary. Perhaps you have (or “are”) a “corporation sole” simply by virtue of being born in the USA.

In 1783, the Treaty of Paris concluded the Revolutionary War and reestablished peace between Great Britain and the (several) United States. Article 1 of that Treaty reads:

“His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free sovereign and independent states, that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety, and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof.”

In 1783, the common definition of “state” was an association of people rather than a territory or corporation. Based on that definition, some contend that when King George recognized each of the several “United States” to be “free, sovereign and independent” he conveyed that sovereign capacity to every member of those “states”.

This contention seems unlikely. After all, why would King George concede that every politician, tradesman and rag-picker in the several United States were his equal?
Well, maybe King George didn’t realize the legal implications of the treaty. I suspect that “states” like those in the United States (where all men were equal and there was therefore no single “sovereign” ruler) were a brand new invention, an new political concept, previously unknown to the European monarchies.

For example, when England fought France and later agreed to peace, the treaty was not between the people (state) of England and the people (state) of France. The treaty was strictly between the sovereigns, the two kings of those countries acting as individuals. In a sense, the “people” were simply the kings’ pawns.

Being used to negotiating only with other individual sovereigns, how could the sovereign of the English monarchy sign a treaty with “states” where “all men were created equal” and thus had no single sovereign ruler? Having no experience at reaching agreements with “kingless” states, King George may have unwittingly verified that each member of the several states were equally “sovereign”.

Alternatively, King George may have thought that without real Kings, the several United States were a political farce that couldn’t possibly last for long. It’s unlikely but conceivable that he knowingly verified the sovereign status of all members of the several United States as a kind of sly joke – in a sense, believing that if “too many cooks spoil the soup,” just wait to you see how too many “kings” would spoil the “colonies”.

Whatever the true explanation, some believe that either the 1776 Declaration, the 1783 Treaty of Paris, or perhaps some other instrument we’ve yet to uncover, provided a legal foundation for automatically granting (or at least entitling) every member of the several United States to act as a “corporate sole”.

The truth remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, the concept of “corporate sole” outlined in Black’s definition of “King” proves that the hypothesis that “Alfred” and “ALFRED” are two different entities (or perhaps “capacities”) is not impossible or even unreasonable. If King George had two legal capacities (body politic and human being), it follows that you and I might also have two capacities.

Further, according to Black’s, using the word “Crown” to signify
George’s public capacity and using “King” to signify his human capacity, is a,

“... great convenience, because it avoids a difficulty which is inherent in all speech and thought concerning corporations sole, the difficulty ... of distinguishing adequately between the body politic and the human being by whom it is represented and whose name it bears.” [Emph. add.]

Here they admit that there’s been an historic “difficulty” in distinguishing between a corporation sole’s body politic and human being. The English solved this difficulty (at least for monarchs) by designating his body politic as the “Crown” and his human capacity as the “King”. If you wanted to relate to George III on a man-to-man, private capacity, you called him “King”. If you wanted to relate to him in his official, public capacity, you’d call him the “Crown”. That solution worked fine for a country that apparently had very few “corporations sole”. Thus, only two words (“Crown” and “King”) might be necessary to distinguish between the two capacities of the monarch’s “corporation sole”.

But how could you distinguish between the two capacities among millions of individuals if they were all entitled to act as corporations sole? Obviously, it would serve no purpose to call everyone “Crown” who acted as a body politic (public capacity), nor would it make sense to call everyone “King” who acted as a human being (private capacity). You’d need an identifier that could easily distinguish between each person’s capacities as a body politic and as a human being and still retain some clue to each person’s unique identity.

Do you suppose that someone solved the “difficulty” of distinguishing between the ambiguous capacities of a corporation sole by identifying a person who acted in his “human” capacity with a capitalized name (“Alfred”) while identifying that same person acting in his public, “body politic” capacity as “ALFRED” ...?

When I stop to think about it (especially in light of Black’s definition of “King”), I can’t imagine a more convenient or logical solution. Use capitalized, proper names (“Alfred”) to signify acting in the human capacity; use upper-case versions of the same name (“ALFRED”) to signify acting in the public/ “body politic” capacity. Generally speaking, this solution allows us to uniquely identify both the person and the capacity in which that person acts in any given transaction. It’s simple and arguably brilliant.

This implies that the hypothesis that “Alfred” and “ALFRED” identify two different entities (or capacities) is not the least bit farfetched, and not only sensible but probably valid.

Questions remain. Are each of us “automatically” granted a corporation sole when we’re born – perhaps by virtue of our birth certificates? Or are we merely entitled to act as a corporation sole at some later date if we fill out the proper papers (Social Security Application?) and essentially “charter” one for ourselves?
Also, if corporations (being artificial entities, legal fictions and therefore lies) raise some peculiar spiritual questions, does a good Christian want to use a corporation sole? Can a true Christian act as a corporate sole?

And if we’re trying to escape the clutches of corporate government, why would we want to use a corporation sole to do so? That strategy seems at least a bit hypocritical, and perhaps even counter-productive. After all, it’s possible that by using any kind of corporation, we might implicitly subject ourselves to corporate government.

I don’t know the answers to any of those questions.

But I have a hunch that the author of the affidavit in the previous article may identify himself as “corporation sole” in order to preserve his liberty to decide which capacity he wants to use when he responds to his mail. In other words, so long as government writes to the “corporation sole,” perhaps the man who opens the mail can respond to government in either his capacity as a “body politic” or as a “human being”.

For example, if government writes to “ALFRED” and I (“Alfred”) receive that letter, I (“Alfred”) am presumed to be acting as fiduciary for “ALFRED”. As fiduciary, I (“Alfred”) am therefore bound by whatever rules and regulations apply to that artificial entity/body politic (“ALFRED”). But if government were instead compelled to write to me as “corporation sole,” I might have the option of responding as either “Alfred” (the private man) or as fiduciary for “ALFRED” (the artificial entity or “body politic”). Alternatively, by forcing government to admit that I act as a corporate sole, I might defeat the government’s presumption that I always act on behalf of “ALFRED” and thereby avoid being automatically subjected to rules and regulations that apply to “ALFRED” rather than “Alfred”.

Whatever the answers to these questions, the dual capacities of a corporation sole are not only undeniable but also too similar to the previously observed duality between “Alfred” and “ALFRED” to be ignored. It is possible that there may be an explanation other than corporation sole to explain the perceived differences between “Alfred” and “ALFRED”. However, given that the corporation sole concept is so well established in law and history, it seems unlikely that our legal system would invent yet another “dual-capacity” legal en-

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tity. Why reinvent the wheel?

Thus I begin to suspect that the legal distinctions between “Alfred” and “ALFRED” may be explained as manifestations of a corporation sole.

More research must be done but, clearly, the concept of corporation sole deserves our attention.

I hope those of you who have or find further information on the corporation sole will forward it to my email at adask@gte.net. As more information is uncovered, I’ll publish it here in the AntiShyster.

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