Willamette Iron Bridge v. Hatch

The case of Willamette Iron-Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888,) has been considered pivitol in activating Congress to awaken the dormant Commerce Clause regarding navigation. The State of Oregon had authorized a bridge that was claimed to constitute a public nuisance in obstructing the navigability of the Willamette River. The plaintiff's relied on a clause in the Oregon Admissions Act, declaring 'that all the navigable waters of said state shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of said state as to all other citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor.' 11 St. 383.

The Court ruled that in the absence of federal legislation, the State authorization must stand. Declared Justice Bradley:

"The power of congress to pass laws for the regulation of the navigation of public rivers, and to prevent any and all obstructions therein, is not questioned. But until it does pass some such law, there is no common law of the United States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers, unless it be the maritime law, administered by the courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."

"It is obvious that if the clause in question does prohibit physical obstructions and impediments in navigable waters, the state legislature itself, in a state where the clause is in force, would not have the power to cause or authorize such obstructions to be made without the consent of congress. But it is well settled that the legislatures of such states do have the same power to authorize the erection of bridges, dams, etc., in and upon the navigable waters wholly within their limits, as have the original states, in reference to which no such clause exists. It was so held in Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, in reference to a dam in the Chippewa river, in Wisconsin; in Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; in reference to a bridge without a draw, erected on the American river, in California, which prevented steam-boats from going above it; and in Hamilton v. Railroad Co., 119 U.S. 280, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206, relating to railroad bridges in Louisiana,-in all which cases the clause in question was in force in the states where they arose, and in none of them was said clause held to restrain in any degree the full power of the state to make, or cause to be made, the erections referred to, which must have been more or less obstructions and impediments to the navigation of the streams on which they were placed..... In Hamilton Railroad Co. it was said: 'Until congress intervenes in such cases, and exercises its authority, the power of the state is plenary. When the state provides for the form and character of the structure, its directions will control, except as against the action of congress, whether the bridge be with or without draws, and irrespective of its effect upon navigation;'..."

"...What the people of the old states wished to secure was the free use of the streams and carrying places in the north-west territory, as fully as it might be enjoyed by the inhabitants of that territory themselves, without any impost or discriminating burden. The clause in question cannot be regarded as establishing the police power of the United States over the rivers of Oregon, or as giving to the federal courts the right to hear and determine, according to federal law, every complaint that may be made of an impediment in, or an encroachment upon, the navigation of those rivers. We do not doubt that congress, if it saw fit, could thus assume the care of said streams, in the interest of foreign and interstate commerce; we only say that, in our opinion, it has not done so by the clause in question. And although, until congress acts, the states have the plenary power supposed, yet, when congress chooses to act, it is not concluded by anything that the states, or that individuals, by its authority or acquiescence, have done, from assuming entire control of the matter, and abating any erections that may have been made, and preventing any others from being made, except in conformity with such regulations as it may impose. It is for this reason, namely, the ultimate (though yet unexerted) power of congress over the whole subject-matter, that the consent of congress is so frequently asked to the erection of bridges over navigable streams. It might itself give original authority for the erection of such bridges when called for by the demands of interstate commerce by land; but in many, perhaps the majority, of cases, its assent only is asked, and the primary authority is sought at the hands of the state."

As stated by Justice White in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981):

"...legislative history supports the view that the [Rivers and Harbors Appropriation] Act was designed to benefit the public at large by empowering the Federal Government to exercise its authority over interstate commerce with respect to obstructions on navigable rivers caused by bridges and similar structures. In part, the Act was passed in response to this Court's decision in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888). There the Court held that there was no federal common law "which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers." Id., at 8. Although Willamette involved private parties, the clear implication of the Court's opinion was that in the absence of specific legislation no party, including the Federal Government, would be empowered to take any action under federal law with respect to such obstructions. The Act was intended to enable the Secretary of War to take such action. See 21 Cong. Rec. 8603, 8605, and 8607 (1890); see also United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 663-664 (1973); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 227-229 (1966); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485-488, 499-500 (1960).