Vested Rights

As stated in Chitty's Prerogatives of the Crown, page 132:

"It is a principle of law, that the king is bound by his own and his ancestors' grants; and cannot, therefore, by his mere prerogative, take away vested rights, immunities or privileges."

Barring specific reservation and subject to pre-established servitudes, a government land patent to an individual vests legal title and right to the located property to the extent it was held by the State or United States. It is considered in the nature of a compact and is an executed contract. It is a covenant that cannot be resumed, annulled or later modified by the grantor through legislation or otherwise. (A right vested, cannot be divested. Cited, 2 Dall. 297, 304; 9 Cranch 52; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 136.)

By such grant, the property interest of the grantor is extinguished. The title passed through land patents is "absolute," (e.g. Roman - absolutum et directum dominium,) subject or subordinate only to the legitimate exercise of the police and eminent domain powers delegated by the body politic to government.

The early cases of Fletcher v. Peck, New Jersey v. Wilson, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward established that the States could not "impair the obligation of contracts" by attempting to repeal or modify private acts, such as land patents or corporate charters, which had already created vested rights. (It should be noted that the "privileges and immunities" of public franchises, as an authorized encroachment upon public right, were construed strictly to the limits of the charter, subordinate to eminent domain and police powers of government - See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors, 36 US 420 (1837).

In U S v. TITLE INSURANCE & TRUST CO., 265 U.S. 472 (1924,) the Court cited the case of Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 3 Wall. 332, (page 334 [18 L. Ed. 42]) as ruling in matters of patented title:

'Where questions arise which affect titles to land, it is of great importance to the public that, when they are once decided, they should no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change. Legislatures may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they affect the future only; but where courts vacillate, and overrule their own decisions on the construction of statutes affecting the title to real property, their decisions are retrospective, and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change.'

It was also established in English law that whenever a grant was made, it also included whatever was necessary for taking and enjoying the property. (Source arguments Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors, 36 US 420 (1837):

"...The general rule of law is thus laid down in Co. Litt. 56 a, 'When the law doth give anything to one, it giveth impliedly whatsoever is necessary for the taking and enjoying the same.' Case of the Mines, 1 Plowd. 317. 'For the ore of gold and silver is the king's; and if it is, the law gives him means to come to it, and that is by digging; so that the power of digging is incidental to the thing itself.' If one grant to another all the minerals in a certain parcel of land; the grantee has a right to go upon the land, and dig, and carry away the ores.

"In one thing, all things following shall be included: lessee of land has a right of way on lessor's land; grantee of trees, growing in a close, may come upon the land to cut them, etc.. Finch 45, Rule 100. The grant of a thing carries all things included, without which the thing granted cannot be had. Hob. 234; also Saunders's Case, 5 Co. 12; Lifford's Case, 11 Ibid. 52; and 1 Wms. Saund. 322."