Administrative Agencies

Scope of Authority

As Justice Miller declared U S v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882):

"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."

As was said by Alexander Hamilton:

"[E]very act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid."

The early Supreme Court case of Kendall v. U.S. Ex Rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838) was among the first to establish that, although the Administration may impose duties of a political nature upon an executive office, the departmental agency, itself, is a creature of Congress, derives its power solely from the delegation of authority by Congress and its actions are subject to Congressional supervision and restricted by the control of the law as enacted by Congress. As stated by Justice Thompson:

"It was urged at the bar, that the postmaster general was alone subject to the direction and control of the President, with respect to the execution of the duty imposed upon him by this law, and this right of the President is claimed, as growing out of the obligation imposed upon him by the constitution, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. This is a doctrine that cannot receive the sanction of this court. It would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its support in any part of the constitution; and is asserting a principle, which, if carried out in its results, to all cases falling within it, would be clothing the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the administration of justice..."

"The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power. But it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that department is under the exclusive direction of the President. Such a principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be claimed by the President.

"There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President..."

As stated by Chief Justice Taney in his concurring opinion:

..."The office of postmaster general is not created by the constitution; nor are its powers or duties marked out by that instrument. The office was created by act of congress; and wherever congress creates such an office as that of postmaster general, by law, it may unquestionably, by law, limit its powers, and regulate its proceedings; and may subject it to any supervision or control, executive or judicial, which the wisdom of the legislature may deem right...."

In Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559, 1944, the Court stated:

"When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted...," 321 U.S., at 309.

In Quaker Oats Co. v. Fed. Security Administrator, 129 F. 2d 76, 80, 7th Cir., 1942; reversed on other grounds at 318 U.S. 218, 63 S. Ct. 589, 1943, the Court stated:

"We assume there could be no dissent from the proposition that an administrative agency has only such authority in administration of a Congressional enactment as is expressly conferred, or as may be reasonably implied."

Restated in Board of Comm. of Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund v. Clay, 214 Ga. 70, 102 S.E.2d 575 (1958), the Court said:

"The powers of all public officers are defined by law...where the law creates an office, one holding the office has no authority to perform any act not legitimately within the scope of such authority," 102 S.E.2d, at 577.

In Flavell v. Dept. of Welfare, City and County of Denver, 355 p.2d, 941, Colo., 1960, the Court stated:

"It follows that a collateral attack may be made here for 'acts or orders [of administrative officers or agencies] which do not come clearly within the powers granted or which fall beyond the purview of the statute granting the agency or body its powers [such orders] are not merely erroneous, but are void'..."They [officers or agencies] are without power to act contrary to the provisions of the law or the clear legislative intendment, or to exceed the authority conferred on them by statute," 355 P.2d, at 943.

Again, the Court echoed these principles in Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 9th Cir., 1974:

"[A]n administrative agency is a creature of statute, having only those powers expressly granted to it by Congress or included by necessary implication from the Congressional grant," 494 F.2d, at 683.