Nuisance In Law
The Court recognized that a trade or property use, although traditionally considered beneficial to the community and not categorically injurious to the public, could constitute a "nuisance in fact" by virtue of location among other properties with incompatible uses. The Court upheld the right of the legislature to declare these as statutory nuisances or "nuisances in law."
In Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), a municipality had statutorily declared a categorical property trade/use within a neighborhood zone to be a "nuisance in law," subject to prohibition/regulation. The plaintiff argued that his individual use was not a traditional "nuisance per se" and had not been proven to constitute a "public nuisance." The municipality, in its justification of the need for regulation, relied upon generic arguments that would tend to support a claim of public nuisance, in effect, establishing a bridge between actual public nuisance and prohibitory statutory nuisance. The Court acknowledged the bridge stating that the use at issue was both "nuisance in fact and law," thus recognizing the legislative right to declare, prohibit and regulate categorical nuisances under the police powers as applies to a defined location - or "zoning." The Court stated:
"Defendants demurred, upon the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court overruled the demurrer and granted a temporary restraining order. Defendants answered, denying the material averments of the bill, and asserting that the ordinance was passed in good faith for the purpose of promoting the health and prosperity of the citizens, and in the belief that said livery stables in said district were conducive to sickness and inconvenience and ill health to the citizens, and were damaging to the property in that vicinity; also, 'that said district composes the greatest shopping district in the entire state of Arkansas; that it contains the largest and best hotels in the state, and the district encompasses the most valuable real estate in the entire state; that said stable business is conducted in a careless manner, and that it is nothing unusual in connection with said sale stables to have from fifty to one hundred head of horses and mules driven through the principal streets to said stables; that there is always an offensive odor coming from said stables, to the great detriment of the tenants in the property adjoining and the shoppers who go within this district, and hotel guests; that said stables being in such densely populated part of the city produce disease, making that section extremely unwholesome,' etc."...
"Therefore the argument that a livery stable is not a nuisance per se, which is much insisted upon by plaintiffs in error, is beside the question. Granting that it is not a nuisance per se, it is clearly within the police power of the state to regulate the business, and to that end to declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law, provided this power is not exerted arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimination, so as to infringe upon rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. For no question is made, and we think none could reasonably be made, but that the general subject of the regulation of livery stables, with respect to their location and the manner in which they are to be conducted in a thickly populated city, is well within the range of the power of the state to legislate for the health and general welfare of the people. While such regulations are subject to judicial scrutiny upon fundamental grounds, yet a considerable latitude of discretion must be accorded to the lawmaking power; and so long as the regulation in question is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated in the particular district, the district itself not appearing to have been arbitrarily selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is a deprivation of property without due process of law, or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. Slaughter-House Cases,, 16 Wall. 36, 62, 21 L. ed. 394, 404; Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667, 24 S. L. ed. 1036, 1038; Barbier V. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30, 28 S. L. ed. 923, 924, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 708, 28 S. L. ed. 1145, 1146, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136, 38 S. L. ed. 385, 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 188, 44 S. L. ed. 725, 728, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 87, 54 S. L. ed. 673, 676, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318, 321, 37 Am. Rep. 564; Re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 148, 19 N. W. 723; St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 253, 20 L.R.A. 721, 22 S. W. 470."
A later Court in Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) stated:
..."It may be admitted as being a correct statement of the law as held by the California supreme court that, notwithstanding the grant of the permit, and even after the erection of the works, the city might still, for the protection of public health and safety, prohibit the further maintenance and continuance of such works, and the prosecution of the business, originally harmless, may become, by reason of the manner of its prosecution or a changed condition of the community, a menace to the public health and safety. In other words, the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may, in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population, or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good. North Western Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,, 97 U.S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U.S. 672, 29 L. ed. 524, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. But the exercise of the police power is subject to judicial reviews, and property rights cannot be wrongfully destroyed by arbitrary enactment. It was averred that the works would be so constructed as not to interfere with the health or safety of the people. No reasonable explanation for the arbitrary exercise of power in the case is suggested."...
