State Determined Riparian Ownership

Justice Shiras Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896):

"In Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 662, 11 Sup. Ct. 210, where a similar question arose, and where it was claimed that the fact that the title was derived by a grant from the United States afforded a reason for decision, Mr. Justice Fields states the question as follows:

'The courts of the United States will construe the grants of the general government without reference to the rules of construction adopted by the states for their grants; but whatever rights or incidents attach to the ownership of property conveyed by the government will be determined by the states, subject to the condition that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the grants or the use and enjoyment of the property by the grantee. As an incident of such ownership, the rights of the riparian owner, where the waters are above the influence of the tide, will be limited according to the law of the state, either to low or high water mark, or will extend to the middle of the stream.'

"The language of Barney v. Keokuk was cited with approval, and the conclusion reached was that the law of the state, as construed by its supreme court, was decisive of the controversy. The question was again presented in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 372, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 838, and, after a review of the cases, Mr. Justice Bradley stated the conclusion as follows:

'We do not think it necessary to discuss this point further. In our judgment, the grants of the government for lands bounded on streams and other waters, without any reservation or restriction of terms, are to be construed as to their effect according to the law of the state in which the lands lie.'

Justice Hughes Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912):

"The established doctrine is invoked that the title to the soil under navigable waters within their territorial limits, and the extent of riparian rights, are governed by the laws of the several states, subject to the authority of Congress under the Constitution of the United States. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 10 L. ed. 997; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. ed. 565; Weber v. State Harbor, 18 Wall. 57, 21 L. ed. 798; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338, 24 S. L. ed. 224, 228; Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669, 34 S. L. ed. 819, 820, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210; St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226, 242, 34 S. L. ed. 941, 947, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382, 402 S., 35 L. ed. 428, 433, 440, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 452 S., 36 L. ed. 1018, 1036, 1042, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 40, 47, 38 S. L. ed. 331, 346-348, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comrs, 168 U.S. 349, 365, 42 S. L. ed. 497, 503, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157.  

As stated by Chief Justice Taft in Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas v. U.S. 260 U.S. 77 (1922):

"We said in Oklahoma v. Texas, decided May 1, 1922:

'Where the United States owns the bed of a nonnavigable stream and the upland on one or both sides, it, of course, is free when disposing of the upland to retain all or any part of the river bed; and whether in any particular instance it has done so is essentially a question of what is intended. If by a treaty or statute or the terms of its patent it has shown that it intended to restrict the conveyance to the upland or to that and a part only of the river bed, that intention will be controlling; and, if its intention be not otherwise shown, it will be taken to have assented that its conveyance should be construed and given effect in this particular according to the law of the state in which the land lies. Where it is disposing of tribal land of the Indians under its guardianship the same rules apply.' In government patents containing no words showing purpose to define riparian rights, the intention to abide the state law is inferred. Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 384, 11 S. Sup. Ct. 808, 813 (35 L. Ed. 428), said:

'In our judgment, the grants of the government for lands bounded on streams and other waters, without any reservation or restriction of terms, are to be construed as to their effect according to the law of the state in which the lands lie.'