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Navigable Waters  of  the  U.S.

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Federal powers under the Commerce Clause were initially determined to apply only to the "naviagble waters of the United States," which were differentiated from navigable waters that were solely internal to the States.

Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824,) first stated:

"...in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power, if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations, is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a State.

"This principle is, if possible, still more clear, when applied to commerce 'among the several States.' They either join each other, in which case they are separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which case other States lie between them. What is commerce 'among' them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading expedition between two adjoining States, commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third?..."

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This was rephrased as a foundational definition by Justice Field in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870):

"...they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. If we apply this test to Grand River, the conclusion follows that it must be regarded as a navigable water of the United States. From the conceded facts in the case the stream is capable of bearing a steamer of one hundred and twenty-three tons burden, laden with merchandise and passengers, as far as Grand Rapids, a distance of forty miles from its mouth in Lake Michigan. And by its junction with the lake it forms a continued highway for commerce, both with other States and with foreign countries, and is thus brought under the direct control of Congress in the exercise of its commercial power."

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Justice Shiras reviewing prior cases defining "navigable waters of the United States" in Levoy v. U S, 177 U.S. 621 (1900) concluded:

"...It is a safe inference from these and other cases to the same effect which might be cited, that the term, 'navigable waters of the United States,' has reference to commerce of a substantial and permanent character to be conducted thereon. The power of Congress to regulate such waters is not expressly granted in the Constitution, but is a power incidental to the express 'power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;' and with reference to which the observation was made by Chief Justice Marshall, shall, that 'it is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or affect other states.' Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 194, 6 L. ed. 69.

"While, therefore, it may not be easy for a court to define the size and character of a stream which would place it within the category of 'navigable waters of the United States,' or to define what traffic shall constitute 'commerce among the states,' so as to make such questions sheer matters of law, yet, in construing the legislation involved in the case before us, we may be permitted to see that it was not the intention of Congress to interfere with or prevent the exercise by the state of Louisiana of its power to reclaim swamp and overflowed lands by regulating and controlling the current of small streams not used habitually as arteries of interstate commerce."

" The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

'What is a navigable water of the United States? It is a navigable water which, either of itself, or in connection with other water, permits a continuous journey to another state. If a stream is navigable, and from that stream you can make a journey by water, by boat, by one of the principal methods used in ordinary commerce, to another state from the state in which you start on that journey, that is a navigable water of the United States. It is so called in contradistinction to waters which arise and come to an end within the boundaries of the state. . . . But, if from the water in one state you can travel by water continuously to another state, and the water is a navigable water, then it is a navigable stream of the United States. . . . If it was navigable, and connected with waters that permitted a journey to another state, then it is a navigable water of the United States...'

"If these instructions were correct, then there is scarcely a creek or stream in the entire country which is not a navigable water of the United States. Nearly all the streams on which a skiff or small lugger can float discharge themselves into other streams or waters flowing into a river which traverses more than one state, and the mere capacity to pass in a boat of any size, however small, from one stream or rivulet to another, the jury is informed, is sufficient to constitute a navigable water of the United States.

"Such a view would extend the paramount jurisdiction of the United States over all the flowing waters in the states, and would subject the officers and agents of a state, engaged in constructing levees to restrain overflowing rivers within their banks, or in regulating the channels of small streams for the purposes of internal commerce, to fine and imprisonment, unless premission be first obtained from the Secretary of War. If such were the necessary construction of the statutes here involved, their validity might well be questioned. But we do not so understand the legislation of Congress. When it is remembered that the source of the power of the general government to act at all in this matter arise out of its power to regulate commerce with foreign countries and among the states, it is obvious that what the Constitution and the acts of Congress have in view is the promotion and protection of commerce in its international and interstate aspect, and a practical construction must be put on these enactments as intended for such large and important purposes."

 

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