Modification of Maritime Law

Through The Commerce Clause

In other early cases, the superior federal power of Congress to license vessels and promulgate rules regarding their operation on navigable waters of the United States was established upon the basis of the "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution of the United States:

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States declares [Congress shall have the power] "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the indian tribes."

In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824,) it was established that the word "commerce" included "navigation." The power to "regulate," in the Commerce Clause, was the power "to prescribe the rule by which commerce [navigation] is to be governed." Chief Justice Marshall gives examples of such "rules" as: the granting of license, ("permission, or authority") to conduct a particular maritime trade - such as "coasting" or fishing, subject to certain duties, (prescribed by maritime law or those pertaining to the safety and comfort of passengers.)

Justice Bradley, in The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall,) stated that the maritime law referenced by the Constitution was intended "to [be] a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states." He further summized that:

"It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that the law should forever remain unalterable. Congress undoubtedly has authority under the commercial power, if no other, to introduce such changes as are likely to be needed." [See also: The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall,) 557, 564 (1871); Moore v. American Transp. Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 1, 39 (1861); Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).]

Although the question of "admiralty" jurisdiction itself was later determined to rest upon the "admiralty grant" of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States, combined with the so-called "second prong" of the "necessary and proper clause," early determinations rested jurisdictional authority upon the Commerce Clause.