"...In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the partition allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people..."

"First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in government are to be introduced.

"On examining the first relation, it appears on one hand that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation; but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act therefore establishing the Constitution, will not be a national but a federal act.

"That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors, the act of the people as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration that it is to result neither from the action of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the several States. It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no other wise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States, would bind the minority; in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes; or by considering the will of a majority of the States, as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules has been adopted. Each State in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation then the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal and not a national Constitution.

"The difference between a federal and a national Government as relates to the operation of the Government is supposed to consist in this, that in the former, the powers operate on the political bodies composing the confederacy, in their political capacities; In the latter, on the individual citizens, composing the nation, in their individual capacities..."

"But if the Government be national with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of a national Government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens; but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful Government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national Legislature. Among communities completely united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general [national] and partly in the municipal [State] Legislatures. In the former case [a consolidated national government], all local [State] authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controuled, directed or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter [confederacy] the local or municipal authorities form distinct independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject within their respective spheres to the general [national] authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation then the proposed Government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects..."

"If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like the authority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established Government. Were it totally federal on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential for every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the Convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national, and advances towards the federal character: in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the federal and partakes of the national character."

"The proposed Constitution therefore is in strictness neither a national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of both. In its foundation, it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national: in the operation of these powers. it is national, not federal: In the extent of them again, it is federal, not national: And finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national."