Admiralty or State Jurisdiction

In an early Supreme Court case, U. S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S. 336 (Wheat) (1818,) a dispute arose as to whether a murder committed on a ship in Boston Harbor was under admiralty law by the federal district court or in the State courts. The ship was determined to be "lying at anchor in the main channel of Boston harbors in waters of a sufficient depth at all times of tide for ships of the largest class and burden, and to which there is at all times a free and unobstructed passage to the open sea or ocean."

In the 1790 "act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," ch. 9, 8th sec. it had been declared that "if any person shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder, etc. he shall on conviction suffer death,' and that 'if any person or persons shall, within any fort, etc. or in any other place or district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons, on being thereof convicted shall suffer death...'

In conjunction with the clause "out of the jurisdiction of any state," Chief Justice Marshall stated:

"To bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the courts of the union, it must have been committed in a river, etc. out of the jurisdiction of any state. It is not the offence committed, but the bay in which it is committed, which must be out of the jurisdiction of the state...."

Marshall concluded that the place of the crime was "unquestionably within the original territory of Massachusetts. It is then within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, unless that jurisdiction has been ceded by the United States..."

"Can the cession of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction be construed into a cession of the waters on which those cases may arise.

"This is a question on which the court is incapable of feeling a doubt. The article which describes the judicial power of the United States is not intended for the cession of territory or of general jurisdiction. It is obviously designed for other purposes. It is in the 8th section of the 2d article, we are to look for cessions of territory and of exclusive jurisdiction. Congress has power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this district, and over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings.

"It is observable, that the power of exclusive legislation (which is jurisdiction) is united with cession of territory, which is to be the free act of the states. It is difficult to compare the two sections together, without feeling a conviction, not to be strengthened by any commentary on them, that, in describing the judicial power, the framers of our constitution had not in view any cession of territory, or, which is essentially the same, of general jurisdiction.

"It is not questioned, that whatever may be necessary to the full and unlimited exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is in the government of the union. Congress may pass all laws which are necessary and proper for giving the most complete effect to this power. Still, the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant of power, adheres to the territory, as a portion of sovereignty not yet given away. The residuary powers of legislation are still in Massachusetts....if two citizens of Massachusetts step into shallow water when the tide flows, and fight a duel, are they not within the jurisdiction, and punishable by the laws of Massachusetts? If these questions must be answered in the affirmative, and we believe they must, then the bay in which this murder was committed, is not out of the jurisdiction of a state, and the circuit court of Massachusetts is not authorized, by the section under consideration, to take cognizance of the murder which had been committed."

"The third section enacts, 'that if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any other place, or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death.'

"Although the bay on which this murder was committed might not be out of the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, the ship of war on the deck of which it was committed, is, it has been said, 'a place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,' whose courts may consequently take cognizance of the offence."

"The objects with which the word 'place' is associated, are all, in their nature, fixed and territorial. A fort, an arsenal, a dock-yard, a magazine, are all of this character. When the sentence proceeds with the words, 'or in any other place or district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,' the construction seems irresistible that, by the words 'other place' was intended another place of a similar character with those previously enumerated, and with that which follows. Congress might have omitted, in its enumeration, some similar place within its exclusive jurisdiction which was not comprehended by any of the terms employed to which some other name might be given; and, therefore, the words 'other place,' or 'district of country,' were added; but the context shows the mind of the legislature to have been fixed on territorial objects of a similar character."

"...Upon these reasons the court is of opinion, that a murder committed on board a ship of war, lying within the harbour of Boston, is not cognizable in the circuit court for the district of Massachusetts; which opinion is to be certified to that court."