Most of the United States, (with the exception of Louisiana,) "received" the legacy of English Common Law as fundamental law. It was understood by early jurists that the Common Law continued as an organic part of the American federal Constitution. However, it was established early in American history that under certain circumstances, common law could be overridden by explicit legislative statute to reflect the American system of government or local idiosyncrasies of geography or established custom.

[The following information is based largely upon a reading of William E. Nelson's, Americanization of the Common Law - The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830, Harvard University Press, c1975.]

The doctrine of precedent allowed a cause of action to be reduced to a series of elementary problems requiring solution; a set of basic rules of law to be applied to a novel and unique set of facts. Under British colonial rule, arguments of law presented to juries consisted of paraphrasing or quoting British authorities, cases and texts as applicable to the current question. For when "Usage had been uninterrupted, and the Construction of the Law thereby established," the courts "would make no innovation" [Watts v. Hasey, Quincy 194, 195 (1765)] but would follow the old rule.

The English "constitution" was perceived to have been embodied in the vague and, for the most part, unidentifiable precedents and principles of common law origin. These imposed ambiguous restrictions on the power of the Crown and Parliament to make or change law. After independence, American constitutions were viewed as a written charter by which the people delegated only limited power to various institutions of government. A constitution sorted out limited powers and defined jurisdictions, while reserving the remaining power from government in the individual. The people alone were considered to have the power and jurisdiction to change constitutional law regarding these delegated and reserved powers.

Following the Revolutionary War and the adoption of the "reception statutes," the power to modify, or even repeal the common law, was gradually perceived as falling within the jurisdiction of the legislature. This view can be noted in the post-revolutionary phasing out of statutory preambles, used during the colonial period. If the legislation produced any significant change in the substantive law, the preamble sought to justify that change by claiming that the new statute was a mere extension of doctrine consistent with the common law's fundamental principles. However, preambles became increasingly infrequent, particularly following the adoption of the Massachusetts State constitution in 1780. Legislation came to rest solely on a "be it enacted" clause, as a naked assertion of sovereign legislative power through a representative government. In 1780, the first of several special committees was appointed in Massachusetts to draft law reform bills for legislative enactment. These focussed primarily upon procedural reform.

Although procedural law has experienced considerable modernization in America, the "rules of law" that frame the parameters of individual rights in relationship to others and to government remain largely consistent with inherent English Common Law principles and established precedent. The legacy of this "unwritten constitution" stands as a silent sentinel against arbitrary encroachment upon the freedom of the individual by popular opinion and "public policy" asserted through statute by political legislative majorities.