4.    Of Note...

Apparently members of the common law court movement have no problem with ignoring the concept of separation of powers—they have on a number of occasions filed documents intended to command that their state legislatures rethink longstanding statutes. Kidding aside, members of the movement attempt to take public participation to a fascinating new level, a sort of "if you can't join them, join them" philosophy in which the movement tries to bring about social change by literally commanding those in power to bring it about. Following are some examples of this odd trend.

Colorado Findings of Fact and Redress for Grievances

(To be heard April 29 by Colorado State Legislature, 1:30 p.m.. Old Supreme Court Chambers committee room on second floor, north end of Colorado State Capitol, Denver.)

Country of Colorado Our One Supreme Court

Common Law Venue; Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Outside the

District of Columbia

In Fremont County, Colorado Republic

People, for Colorado Republic,                                      )

ex rel,                                                                              )  "IN LAW"

Demandant, Plaintiff,                                                     )

                                                                                        )

vs.                                                                                    )  “IN LAW”

                                                                                        )

STATE OF COLORADO,                                             )  Redress Of Grievance

“its” political subdivisions and                                       )  Grievance

officers thereof, et al                                                       )

Respondents, Defendants                                               )  Case – Colorado 95-1

Specifically To:                                                              )

                                                                                        )

                                                                                        )

                                                                                        )  Petition de Droit

                                                                                        )  and

                                                                                        )  Command To Show Cause

                                                                                        )

                                                                                        )

PRAECIPE

(Summons)

I, Alvin Jenkins, special appointed clerk, in and for Colorado Republic, hereby under the order and authority of the People for the several counties, command the above named defendants to show lawful cause and place into evidence by signed affidavit. Lawful documentation of the "Emergency Government" described in the attached pages ____through ____. This Colorado Common Law Assembly has concluded, "In Law", that no authority or necessity exists for an "Emergency Government" and that such a government is operating against the best interest and will of the Sovereign People, the "state" in fact. Affidavits of response must be sent to the above Clerk of Court address within 60 days of day served, exclusive of day received. If no Lawful evidence to the contrary is received, these facts stated as Truth and this Assembly of the Sovereign People shall continue "in Law" to remove this bondage from us. _____________________________ Special Appointed Clerk

Country of Colorado Republic              )

                                                               ) ss: Affidavit of Return

In and for the several counties               )

I, _______________________, special appointed private courier, attest and acknowledge that I did serve upon above specifically named defendant by Contract via insured RRR Mail # _____________ this Praecipe and Attached Exhibits.

 

AFFIDAVIT

I, Alvin Jenkins, special appointed Clerk of the Court, for the term, hereby Attest and Acknowledge that the following is True, Correct, and Certain, in relation to the record of proceedings that are in my possession for safe-keeping, but open to the public for review.

1. War & Emergency Powers Special Report

2. Constitution: Fact or Fiction

3. Working Paper 9405

A. Colorado Legislative Acts

B. Kevin Tebedo Testimony

C. Colorado Legislative Acts

D. Jury List

E-l. Colorado Constitution

E-2. 10th Amendment Resolution

I, Alvin Jenkins, attest; 1) that the above is as recorded within the Case Jacket in my possession and open for review upon request, and 2) the attached _____ pages are True, Correct, and Certain copies of the Original Petition for Redress of Grievance by the Common Law Assembly.

Attest: __________________________

Alvin Jenkins

COUNTY OF BACA                          )

                                                             ) ss:

STATE OF COLORADO                   )

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ____ day of October, 1995.

Witness my hand and official seal.

My Commission Expires: ________________

_____________________________________ Notary Public

._____________________________________ Address

Country of Colorado

Our One Supreme Court

Common Law Venue; Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Outside the District of Columbia In Fremont County, Colorado Republic People, in and for the              )

United States of America, ex rel,                                         )

Plaintiff,                                                                                )

Governor Roy Romer,                                                          )

Attorney General Gail Norton                                              )

Colorado State Senators                                                       )

Colorado State Representatives                                            )     Colorado 95-1

Colorado Supreme Court Judges                                          )

Colorado Court of Appeals Judges                                       )

Colorado District Court Judges                                            )

All County Court Judges                                                      )

All County Commissioners                                                  )

All State Agencies                                                                )

All Elected or Appointed Officials                                       )

et al,                                                                                       )

Defendant[s].                                                                         )

Petition de Droit and

Command To Show Cause

Why the Emergency Statutes of the state should not be terminated, along with the War and Emergency Powers of the United States.

[...]

[     The "Colorado Common Law Jury" issued 18 "findings of fact," quoting at length from such sources as the Constitution, the Congressional Record, Communications of the President of the United States, among others, in support of its argument that neither the Federal Government nor the Legislature of Colorado had any authority to pass restrictive laws consistent with "emergency conditions" essentially in the period following the great depression.] [...]

II. CONCLUSIONS

1) The Colorado Common Law Jury concludes that the original Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, passed by Congress during World War I, was valid and constitutional. Congress was within it's constitutional authority. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 states:

"The Congress shall have Power to declare War, grant Letters of Manqué and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."

2) The Colorado Common Law Jury further concludes that Executive Order 2039, of March 6. 1933 and Executive Order 2040 of May 9, 1933 are invalid and unconstitutional; and further all Executive Orders, Proclamations, statutes, judgments, etc. made thereunder, and made thereafter, are likewise invalid and unconstitutional, for the following reasons:

a. Pursuant to Stoehr v. Wallace decided Feb. 28, 1921, which stated: "The Trading With the Enemy Act, original and as amended, is strictly a war measure and finds its sanctions in the provision empowering Congress 'to declare War, grant Letters of Manqué and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water . . .'."

3) The Colorado Common Law Jury concludes that in his inaugural address of March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt acknowledged that no invasion or rebellion had taken place. Roosevelt proceeded by asking for:

"... broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe."

4) The Executive Order 2039 of March 6, 1933 was amended and in its final form included the American people and their transactions the same as "enemy" and made them subject to all the War-time Executive Orders, Rules, Regulations, Licenses etc.

5) The Colorado Common Law Jury not only concludes that there was an Act of "Fraud" perpetrated against the American people, but also an Act of Treason, under Article III, Section 3 of the United States Constitution.

Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.

6) The Colorado Common Law Jury conclusion is further supported by Senate Report 93-549, which states in part A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency rule. For 40 years, freedoms and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees, been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency.

and further states: "there is no present need for the United States Government to continue to function under emergency conditions." and further states:

"In the view of the Special Committee, an emergency does not now exist. Congress, therefore, should act in the near future to terminate officially the states of national emergency now in effect."

7) The Colorado Common Law Jury's conclusions are further supported by Working Paper 9405 by Walker F. Todd, writing for the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Coming "straight from the horse's mouth" -- Todd describes it as a "large-scale peacetime intervention," See page 2, Working Paper 9405. and further:

Hoover later wrote: "I had consulted our legal advisors as to the use of a certain unrepealed war power over bank withdrawals and foreign exchange. Most of them were in doubt on the ground that the lack of repeal was probably an oversight by the Congress, and under another law, all the war powers were apparently terminated by the peace. Secretary [or the Treasury Ogden] Mills and Senator Glass held that no certain power existed.

8) The Colorado Common Law Jury makes the conclusion that the overwhelming evidence is: that the War and Emergency Power Act was enacted at a time when the country was at peace and was not under threat of invasion and not in a state of rebellion, which is the controlling factor in this case.

9) The Colorado Common Law Jury further concludes that pursuant to the Kentucky Resolution, which spelled out the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to four specifics, i.e.: "1.) to punish treason; 2.) counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United states;

3.) felonies committed on the high sea, and; 4.) offences against the law of nations." and further; that Congress had no other criminal jurisdiction, other than what was delegated to them by the Constitution, and further; the Colorado Common Law Jury concludes that the War and Emergency Power is synonymous with the Alien and Sedition Acts described in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798; and further it is a matter of Res judicata. Whereto fore, Executive Order 2039 of March 6, 1933, and Executive Order 2040, and all statutes, orders, judgments, etc., passed thereunder are all void and having no authority, whatsoever.

10) In Colorado HE 89-1181 has been unconstitutionally used to usurp the right of the people to redress government through initiative and referendum.

11) In Colorado the "safety clause" found on most legislation is a fraudulent usurpation of the people's right of referendum.

12) In Colorado the repeal of anti-trust laws establishes a corporate government that conflicts with its interest and obligation in protecting the rights of the people of Colorado.

13) The Colorado Common Law Jury concludes that since March 9, 1933 the United States of America has been impoverished; during the past 45 years we have slipped from the wealthiest, most powerful nation on earth, to the world's greatest debtor nation, in imminent danger of catastrophic economic collapse, and further concludes that the exercise of War and Emergency Powers has impoverished the American and deprived Americans of unalienable rights, and have worked contrary to the safety, health, liberty and general welfare of the American people. The Colorado Common Law Jury on behalf of the People, in and for Colorado Republic, hereby Command the defendants to Show Cause why the Emergency Statutes passed within this state should not be terminated, along with the War and Emergency Powers of the United States. If the defendants should fail in any way to Show Cause, then this Finding of Fact and Conclusions by Our Court of First and Last Resort shall become a Superseding Judgment, and upon failure of the public to properly protest said judgment, it shall become. Case Res judicata. The Court is instructed to issue all necessary documents. I/we the Jurats of the Colorado Common Law Jury hereby attest and acknowledge that the above Finding of Facts and Conclusions are true, correct, certain, reliant and necessary to the well-being of the people of our Colorado Republic.

Our Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law by our Colorado Common Law Jury is not reviewable by any other Court of the United States than in accordance to the rules of Common Law, per the seventh amendment to our National Constitution, nor subject to trespass by the judicial power of the United States as per the eleventh amendment to our National Constitution.

So agreed to and done this 19th day of August, 1995.

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

______________________________________________________________________ Per

curiam Per curiam curiam Per curiam

 

United States of America                         )

                                                                 ) ss:

Country of Colorado State                       )

I, _________________________, duly appointed, commissioned, and privately bonded National officer, hereby attest and acknowledge that the signatures of the above jurats are the ones chosen by the People of the several states, and that the jury was presented with testimony and the facts, pertaining to the necessity of the termination of the non-constitutional War and Emergency Powers, being perpetrated upon the American People. On this _____ day of June, 1995. __________________________

Notarial Officer Fee: ____________

 



 


STATE OF INDIANA     )      IN THE MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURTS

                                          )       CRIMINAL DIVISION ROOM NO. 15

COUNTY OF MARION  )       CAUSE NO. 49F14 9505 CM06 3632

 

STATE OF INDIANA, )

Plaintiff,              )

) Filed April 25, 1996 (cited in NY Times June 1997)

v.                                             )

LINDA THOMPSON,           )

J.D.                                         )

Defendant.                              )

AMICUS CURAE BRIEF

RE: INDIANA CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE I SECTION 19

Comes now, R. J. Tavel, J.D., Indiana state coordinator for the Fully Informed Jury Association, Inc., [a not-for-profit educational organization organized pursuant to IRC §501(c)(3) headquartered in Helmville, Montana with affiliate chapters in all 50 states of the United States] who, in support of the continued vitality of the concept of jury nullification found in the body of our state's constitution [Ind. Const. art. I, sec. 19], here submits, by way of his amicus curae brief, that then Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard was speaking to this Criminal Court when he observed: "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." [22 In. L. R. 575 (1989) quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)].

The provision of jury nullification in the body of our constitution is not anomalous or even singular in its prescription since Article I Section 3 provides that no law may "interfere with the rights of conscience." Indeed, just as section 9 thereof affirms the rights of expression in language much more comprehensive than the first amendment to the U. S. Constitution, the very provision of all Hoosiers" right to "due process" is more explicitly stated as a "guarantee that all courts shall be open and that every person shall have a remedy." These are not accidents or mere happenstance. Quite to the contrary, they are the result of great deliberation and are meant to stand as the fundamental provisions underlying the consent of the people to be governed by the state [1 Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana 1850 394 (1850)].

The state's attempt to cast the issue in terms of "legislating" is disingenuous, without merit in the case at bar and, further, does not square with Indiana history. Our Indiana Supreme Court has held, in a long line of cases, e.g., from the case of MacDonald v. State, [63 Ind. 544 (1878)] through that of the Indiana Court of Appeals in State v. Tyson, (lad. App., 1993) 619 N.E.2d 276, that, far from "legislating," the jurors "are oath-bound to find the facts honestly and accept the law faithfully as both exist, and . .. return a verdict which you find just and proper..." (Tyson, supra., at 299).

It is this last quoted phrase that is the operative concept underlying all of the foregoing writings in all of the aforementioned documents. Article I section 19 of the Indiana constitution is riot a grant of right from the state, it is a recognition of right, a God-given, unalienable right drawn from the command of Deuteronomy 16:20: "Justice, justice shall you pursue."

It is in "good conscience" that jurors pass upon the circumstances of a defendant. Legislation, being the last pronouncement of the community standard by our General Assembly, is sometimes out of step or behind the times, since the community standard is forever evolving. Fully informed jurors, by their verdicts, send legislators non-political democratic feedback about the laws they have enacted, which is essential for the proper functioning of our constitutional Republic. Most importantly, fully informed jurors act as the fourth and final check on the unrestrained often oppressive crush of government prosecutions brought at the whim of state officials for no valid reason concerning public safety but rather for petty, personal, political reasons that have no place in a court of law [see, e.g.. In Bushell's case, Vaughn. 135,124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), wherein Justice Vaughn found that the jurors who acquitted William Penn of unlawful assembly "against full and manifest evidence" and "against the direction of the court in matter of law" could not be fined or imprisoned; and see, J. Alexander, A Brief Narration of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger (1963). For many years following the Zenger case, it was generally recognized in American jurisprudence that juries in criminal cases had the "right" to decide the law, as well as the facts, and juries were so instructed (see, e.g., Skidmore v. Baltimore O.R. Co., 167 F2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1948).]

Last year, California's "trial of the century," People v. Oranthal James Simpson, has rekindled the fire and controversy surrounding jury nullification, just as New York's People v. Goetz raised the debate in 1988. While journalists and jurists alike proclaimed these to be "public-policy" verdicts, they were examples of jury nullification, and the majority of states have made provision for this right and power:

I. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR JURY NULLIFICATION:

The Constitutions of Maryland (Art. XXin, entire), Indiana (Art. I, sec. 19), Oregon (Art. I, sec. 16), and Georgia (Art. I sec. 1, para. 11, subsec. A), currently have provisions guaranteeing the right of jurors to "judge the law"; that is, to nullify the law. For example, the Georgia Constitution says: "In criminal cases, the defendant shall have a public and speedy trial.-.and the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts." Attorneys in Georgia and Indiana are able to request nullification instructions from the judge to the jury and generally receive them, and are sometimes able to argue the law. Twenty states currently include jury nullification provisions in their Constitutions under their sections on freedom of speech, specifically with respect to libel and sedition cases:

Alabama (Art. I, Sec. 12); Colorado (Art. II, sec. 10); Connecticut (Art. I, sec. 6);

Delaware (Art. I, sec. 5); Kentucky (Bill of Rights, sec. 9); Maine (Art. I, sec. 4);

Mississippi (Art. 3, sec. 13); Missouri (Art. 1, sec. 8); Montana (Art. II, sec. 7); New Jersey (Art. I, sec. 6); New York (Art. I, sec. 8); North Dakota (Art. I, sec. 4); Pennsylvania (Art. I, sec. 7); South Carolina (Art. I, sec. 16); South Dakota (Art. VI, sec. 5); Tennessee (Art. I, sec. 19); Texas (Art. I, sec. 8); Utah (Art. I, sec. 15); Wisconsin (Art. I, sec. 3); Wyoming (Art. I, sec. 20). Of these, Texas, Delaware, Kentucky, North Dakota and Tennessee say that the jury is the judge of the law in libel and sedition cases, "as in all other cases." [Source: Alan W. Scheflin, "Jury Nullification: the Right to Say No", Southern California Law Review, 45, p. 204 (1972). This list has been updated to 1996.]

When there is division amongst the states on an important issue, trial judges often look to federal authorities for guidance, and such is instructive in this case. Modem Federal Jury Instructions (Sands, Siffert, Loughlin & Reis, Instruction 4-2) suggests that juries should be told that it is their "duty to acquit the defendant" if they harbor a reasonable doubt, however, rather than instruct juries that they have a corresponding "duty to convict," i.e., "must" convict if they are satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the treatise recommends that juries be advised that they "should vote to convict: if the government has carried its burden (leaving a jury to conclude that it has the authority to nullify even in the absence of a reasonable doubt) [and our own federal district courts agree on this prerogative of the jury, see also, e.g.. United States v. Will L. Dawson, and Derrick Termail Willis, Criminal Cause Numbers: IP 95-0064M-01-02, citing approvingly Beaver v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1957) to the effect that "Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution provides that 'in all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.' However, jurors should be bound by their conscience and their oaths, and not act arbitrarily, capriciously, upon a whim or prejudice.] While logic would seem to dictate that a corollary obligation be imposed on jurors, it is reversible error to charge that the jury must explain their doubts ever since the ordeal of Edward Bushell and the Penn jury hereinabove.

HUGO BLACK, a great believer in the Jury system, used to tell this story-Years ago, in the foot-hills of Alabama, a tenant-farmer was charged criminally with stealing a cow from his landlord, and was brought to trial. As was frequently the case in rural America, the Jurors selected for the trial were acquainted with everyone, including the accused and his victim. Each juror knew that the farm's landlord was a nasty bastard who tormented his neighbors, while frequently treating the town's orphans and widows with derision. By the same token, the tenant-farmer was the salt of the earth, beloved by everyone. But still, the evidence of his guilt was indisputable. After the evidence was in and the jury retired to deliberate, it quickly returned to the courtroom to announce its verdict: "If the accused returns the cow, we find him not guilty." The judge was infuriated. His anger heightening, he commanded the jury to return to the jury room to deliberate —shrilly chastising them for their flagrantly "arrogant" and "illegal" verdict. Not a moment passed when they re-appeared in the tense courtroom to trumpet their new verdict: "We find the accused not guilty - and he can keep the cow."

The American Jury, Justice Black reminds his listeners, is effectively omnipotent in rendering an acquittal. What hits home in Justice Black's story is the deeply held American notion that juries often perform an independent role in a system in which the people - not prosecutors, judges or lawyers - have the last word. In the end, if the jury wishes to let the defendant keep the cow, that is what will happen. Respectfully submitted:

R. J. Tavel, J.D.

R. J. Tavel, J.D., #-——

Indiana State coordinator, F.I.J.A., Inc.

Founder, Liberty's Educational Advocacy Forum

c/o 4000 North Meridian Street, Suite 6D

Indianapolis, Indiana 46208-4025

317/923-3399

END