26 U.S.C. §7001:
TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 72 > Subchapter A > Sec. 7001.
Sec. 7001. - Collection of foreign items
(a) License
All persons undertaking as a matter of business or for profit the collection of foreign payments of interest or dividends by means of coupons, checks, or bills of exchange shall obtain a license from the Secretary and shall be subject to such regulations enabling the Government to obtain the information required under subtitle A (relating to income taxes) as the Secretary shall prescribe.
(b)
Penalty for failure to obtain license
For penalty for failure to obtain the license provided for in this section, see section 7231
Bouvier's Dictionary of Law, Sixth Edition (A. D. 1856)
"LICENSE, International law. An authority given by one of two belligerent parties, to the citizens or subjects of the other, to carry on a specified trade."
[Bouvier's Dictionary of Law, Sixth Edition (A. D. 1856)]
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958)
"It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official -- as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official -- is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms."
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1067
LICENSE. Certificate or the document itself which gives permission. Aldrich v. City of Syracuse, 236 N.Y.S. 614, 617, 134 Misc. ,698. Permission or authority. Independent School Dist.,
Class A. No. 1, Cassia County v. Pfost, 51 Idaho 240, 4 P.2d 893, 897; Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569, 571; Platt v. Bender, La.App., 178,So. 678, 682.Authority or liberty given to do or forbear any act. Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569, 571. Leave to do thing which licensor could prevent. Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corporation, C.C.A.N.Y.. 42 F.2d. 116, 118. Permission by some competent authority to do some act which, without such permission, would be illegal. State ex re]. Zugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio.St. 23, 196 N.E. 664: Solberg v. Davenport, 211 Iowa, 612, 232 N.W. 477. 480: Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. State Board of Equalization. 110 Mont 5, 99 P.2d.. 229, 234. Permission to do a particular thing, to exercise a certain privilege or to carry on a particular business or to pursue ascertain occupation. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, Cal.App., 160 P.2d. 37. 39. 40. Permission to do something which without the license would not be allowable. City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566, 567. Great Atlantic & Paciflc Tea Co. v. City of Lexington, 256 Ky. 595, 76 S.W.2d. 894, 896. Privilege from state or sovereign. M. Itzkowitz & Sons v. deraghty. 247 N.Y.S. 703, 704, 139 Misc. 163; Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 128 F.2d 280, 289. Revocable certificate of convenience and necessity. Ex parte Lockhart. 350 Mo. 1220. 171 S.W.2d 660, 666. To "license" means to confer right or power which does not exist without it. Inter-City Coach Lines v. Harrison, 172 Ga 390 157 S.E. 673, 676; S. S. Kresge Co. v. City of Bluefield, 117 W.Va 17, 183 S.E. 601, 602.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1067]
Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942)
We can hardly find a denial of due process in these circumstances, particularly since it is even doubtful that appellee's burdens under the program outweigh his benefits. It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.
FN30 s 7 of the amendment of May 26, 1941 provided that a farm marketing quota should not be applicable to any farm on which the acreage planted to wheat is not in excess of fifteen acres. When the appellee planted his wheat the quota was inapplicable to any farm on which the normal production of the acreage planted to wheat was less than 200 bushels. s 335(d) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by 54 Stat. 232, 7 U.S.C.A. s 1335(d).FN31 ss 6, 10(c) of the amendment of May 26, 1941.[Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942)]
In re Meador,
1 Abb.U.S. 317, 16 F.Cas. 1294, D.C.Ga. (1869)
And here a thought suggests itself. As the Meadors, subsequently to the passage of this act of July 20, 1868, applied for and obtained from the government a license or permit to deal in manufactured tobacco, snuff and cigars, I am inclined to be of the opinion that they are, by this their own voluntary act, precluded from assailing the constitutionality of this law, or otherwise controverting it. For the granting of a license or permit-the yielding of a particular privilege-and its acceptance by the Meadors, was a contract, in which it was implied that the provisions of the statute which governed, or in any way affected their business, and all other statutes previously passed, which were in pari materia with those provisions, should be recognized and obeyed by them. When the Meadors sought and accepted the privilege, the law was before them. And can they now impugn its constitutionality or refuse to obey its provisions and stipulations, and so exempt themselves from the consequences of their own acts?
These internal revenue or tax laws were characterized as being not only repugnant to the constitution, but also unreasonably burdensome. With the most minute attention I examined those portions of the acts of July 13, 1866, and July 20, 1868, presented for my consideration; and carefully sought to ascertain *1300 whether they were in conflict with any of the provisions of the constitution. My conclusion on that question has been expressed. I do not concur with counsel, that these laws are unreasonably burdensome. But even if they are, nay, even if they are oppressive, and unjust modes are employed for their enforcement, the remedy lies with congress, and not with the judiciary. By enacting these laws congress has exercised the constitutional power of taxation, and the courts have no power to interfere. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. [29 U. S.] 514; Extension of Hancock Street, 18 Pa. St. 26; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258; Livingston v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 8 Wend. 85; In re Opening Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649; Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525. In McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. [17 U. S.] 316, 430, Chief Justice Marshall said, that it was unfit for the judicial department to ‘inquire what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power.’
[In re Meador, 1 Abb.U.S. 317, 16 F.Cas. 1294, D.C.Ga. (1869)]
Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927)
"the acceptance of a license, in whatever form, will not impose upon the licensee an obligation to respect or to comply with any provisions of the statute . . . that are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States."
[Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927)]
Emslie v. State Bar of Cal., 11 Cal.3d. 210 (1974)
(14) HN11 "The State Bar Act is designed to provide a procedure whereby those attorneys at law who prove recreant to their trust may be removed from the ranks of the profession. The public, as well as the legal profession and the courts must be protected from those who do not measure up to their responsibilities. [****21] Government largely depends upon the stability of the courts and, to a considerable extent, upon the integrity of the members of the legal profession. CA(15) (15) The purpose of disbarment proceedings is not to punish the individual but to determine whether the attorney should continue in that capacity" ( Dudney v. State Bar (1937) 8 Cal.2d 555, 563 [66 P.2d 1199]); "in short to reform the offender or else remove him from practice" ( Hill v. State Bar (1935) 2 Cal.2d 622, 625 [42 P.2d 629]). The principal objective is to protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice. ( Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 688 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288, 499 P.2d 968]; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 790-791, fn. 1 [51 Cal.Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521].)
[Emslie v. State Bar of Cal., 11 Cal.3d. 210 (1974)]
Merriam-Webster Dictionary: Recreant
Recreant: Adjective
1 : crying for mercy : COWARDLY
2 : unfaithful to duty or allegiance
Recreant: noun
1 : COWARD
2 : APOSTATE, DESERTER
[Merriam-Webster Dictionary: Recreant][EDITORIAL: A licensed attorney who places allegiance to the court above that of his/her client ALSO qualifies as a "recreant" because they have conflicting allegiance. "No man can serve two masters" as Jesus said in Matt. 6:24 and Luke 16:13. This is ESPECIALLY true in cases where you are litigating against the government or a public servant. Attorney licensing revocation should be PROHIBITED in such cases but never is. This conflict of interest on the part of ALL licensed attorneys is why you should avoid ever hiring one to begin with. It is also why attorneys cannot argue your constitutional rights on your behalf. Only YOU can!
"The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot be claimed by attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person." [Bold added.]
[United States v. Johnson et al., 76 F.Supp. 538 (1947)]
What we have concluded is that any profession where they continue to practice on you means you are never anything more than a Guinea pig. We request a return call when they FINALLY have figured it out and are ready for game time and not still practicing.]
Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)
The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.’ Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 12 S.Ct. 400, 402, 36 L.Ed. 176. Compare Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L.Ed. 1067; Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15, 42 S.Ct. 422, 66 L.Ed. 814.
**483 2. The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’ *347 Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 355, 28 L.Ed. 899;FN5 Abrams v. Van Schaick, 293 U.S. 188, 55 S.Ct. 135, 79 L.Ed. 278; Wilshire Oil Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 100, 55 S.Ct. 673, 79 L.Ed. 1329. ‘It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’ Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295, 25 S.Ct. 243, 245, 49 L.Ed. 482.
FN5 E.g., Ex parte Randolph, 20 Fed.Cas. pages 242, 254, No. 11,558; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 553, 9 L.Ed. 773; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96, 25 L.Ed. 550; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 462-464, 51 S.Ct. 522, 75 L.Ed. 1154.
3. The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’ Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, supra. Compare Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, Inc., 275 U.S. 164, 169-172, 48 S.Ct. 66, 72 L.Ed. 218.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 29 S.Ct. 451, 53 L.Ed. 753; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538, 31 S.Ct. 485, 55 L.Ed. 570. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53, 29 S.Ct. 33, 53 L.Ed. 81.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.FN6 *348 Tyler v. Judges, etc., 179 U.S. 405, 21 S.Ct. 206, 45 L.Ed. 252; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99, 100, 51 S.Ct. 392, 75 L.Ed. 861. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 42 S.Ct. 274, 66 L.Ed. 499, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
FN6 E.g., Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160, 161, 27 S.Ct. 188, 51 L.Ed. 415, 9 Ann.Cas. 736; Corporation Commission v. Lowe, 281 U.S. 431, 438, 50 S.Ct. 397, 74 L.Ed. 945; Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123, 42 S.Ct. 434, 66 L.Ed. 852; Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 167, 48 S.Ct. 502, 72 L.Ed. 833, 62 A.L.R. 45; Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 547, 54 S.Ct. 830, 78 L.Ed. 1411.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.FN7 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581, 8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527; Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 411, 412, 37 S.Ct. 609, 61 L.Ed. 1229; St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Construction Co., 260 U.S. 469, 43 S.Ct. 178, 67 L.Ed. 351.
FN7 Compare Electric Co. v. Dow, 166 U.S. 489, 17 S.Ct. 645, 41 L.Ed. 1088; Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641, 648, 19 S.Ct. 64, 43 L.Ed. 316; Leonard v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 198 U.S. 416, 422, 25 S.Ct. 750, 49 L.Ed. 1108.
7. ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’**484 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598.FN8
FN8 E.g., United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407, 408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401, 36 S.Ct. 658, 60 L.Ed. 1061, Ann.Cas.1917D, 854; Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 41 S.Ct. 271, 65 L.Ed. 597; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 217, 42 S.Ct. 281, 66 L.Ed. 566; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390, 44 S.Ct. 391, 68 L.Ed. 748; Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17, 18, 45 S.Ct. 446, 69 L.Ed. 819, 39 A.L.R. 229; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466, 471, 472, 46 S.Ct. 341, 70 L.Ed. 688; Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346, 48 S.Ct. 194, 72 L.Ed. 303; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 276 U.S. 594, 48 S.Ct. 105, 72 L.Ed. 206; Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577, 49 S.Ct. 426, 73 L.Ed. 851, 61 A.L.R. 906; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 288 U.S. 14, 40, 53 S.Ct. 266, 77 L.Ed. 588.
[Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)]