CITES BY TOPIC:  citizenship

EXPATRIATION FROM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

EXPATRIATION FROM STATE OF CALIFORNIA

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Citizenship

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 108 S.Ct. 2260 (U.S.Va.,1988)

Article IV, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that the “Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” The provision was designed “to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.” Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869). See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 1162, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948) (the Privileges and Immunities Clause “was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy”). The Clause “thus establishes a norm of comity without specifying the particular subjects as to which citizens of one State coming within the jurisdiction of another are guaranteed equality of treatment.” Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660, 95 S.Ct. 1191, 1194, 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975).

While the Privileges and Immunities Clause cites the term “Citizens,” for analytic purposes citizenship and residency are essentially interchangeable. See United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1026, 79 L.Ed.2d 249 (1984). When examining claims that a citizenship or residency classification offends privileges and immunities protections, we undertake a two-step inquiry. First, the activity in question must be “ ‘sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation’ ... as to fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause....” Id., at 221-222, 104 S.Ct., at 1029, quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1863, 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). For it is “ ‘[o]nly with respect to those “privileges” and “immunities” bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity’ that a State must accord*65 residents and nonresidents equal treatment.” Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S., at 279, 105 S.Ct., at 1276,  quoting Baldwin, supra, 436 U.S., at 383, 98 S.Ct., at 1860. Second, if the challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a protected privilege, we will invalidate it only if we conclude that the restriction is not closely related to the advancement of a substantial state interest. Piper, supra, 470 U.S., at 284, 105 S.Ct., at 1278. Appellants assert that the residency requirement offends neither part of this test. We disagree.
[Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 108 S.Ct. 2260 (U.S.Va.,1988)]

United Bldg. and Const. Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 104 S.Ct. 1020 (U.S.N.J.,1984)

We cannot accept this argument. We have never read the Clause so literally as to apply it only to distinctions based on state citizenship. For example, in Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 419-420, 72 S.Ct. 428, 431-432, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952), the Court held that the Alaska Territory had no more freedom to discriminate against those not residing in the Territory than did any State to favor its own citizens. And despite some initial uncertainty, compare Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78-79, 40 S.Ct. 228, 231-232, 64 L.Ed. 460 (1920), and Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 246-247, 19 S.Ct. 165, 168-169, 43 L.Ed. 432 (1898), with Douglas v. New York, Haven R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 386-387, 49 S.Ct. 355, 356, 73 L.Ed. 747 (1929), and La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 469-470, 39 S.Ct. 160, 161-162, 63 L.Ed. 362 (1919), it is now established that the terms “citizen” and “resident” are “essentially interchangeable,” Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662, n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 1191, 1195, n. 8, 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), for purposes of analysis of most cases under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See **1027 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524, n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 2486, n. 8, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 397, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 1162, 92 L.Ed.1460 (1948). A person who is not residing in a given State is ipso facto not residing in a city within that *217 State. Thus, whether the exercise of a privilege is conditioned on state residency or on municipal residency he will just as surely be excluded.

[United Bldg. and Const. Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 104 S.Ct. 1020 (U.S.N.J.,1984)]

Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 337 (1885) [inserts added]

““Citizenship” and “residence”, as has often been declared by the courts, are not convertible terms. ... “”The better opinion seems to be that a citizen of the United States is, under the amendment [14th], prima facie a citizen of the state wherein he resides , cannot arbitrarily be excluded therefrom by such state, but that he does not become a citizen of the state against his will, and contrary to his purpose and intention to retain an already acquired citizenship elsewhere.  The amendment [14th] is a restraint on the power of the state, but not on the right of the person to choose and maintain his citizenship or domicile”“.
[Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 337 (1885) [inserts added] ]

Rogers v. Bellei,  401 U. S. 815;  28 L.Ed.2d 499;  91 S.Ct. 1060 (1971)

"Except as modified by statute, the place of birth governs citizenship status".
[Rogers v. Bellei,  401 U. S. 815;  28 L.Ed.2d 499;  91 S.Ct. 1060 (1971)]

Tax Deposition Questions:  Section 14, Citizenship

3C American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d, section 2689, Legal Encyclopedia:

3C Am Jur 2d §2689, Who is born in United States and subject to United States jurisdiction 

"A person is born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, for purposes of acquiring citizenship at birth, if his or her birth occurs in territory over which the United States is sovereign, even though another country provides all governmental services within the territory, and the territory is subsequently ceded to the other country."

3C American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d, pages 204-208: Proving, Obtaining, or Losing Citizenship; Citizenship Documents (283 KBytes)

Tells how to prove you are a non-Citizen U.S. national 

Invisible Contracts: The Citizenship Contract, by George Mercier

Slaugherhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872):

“The first of these questions is one of vast importance, and lies at the very foundations of our government. The question is now settled by the fourteenth amendment itself, that citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country; and that State citizenship is secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United States and the citizen's place of residence. The States have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, [83 U.S. 36, 113]  and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right. He is not bound to cringe to any superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. And when the spirit of lawlessness, mob violence, and sectional hate can be so completely repressed as to give full practical effect to this right, we shall be a happier nation, and a more prosperous one than we now are. Citizenship of the United States ought to be, and, according to the Constitution, is, a surt and undoubted title to equal rights in any and every States in this Union, subject to such regulations as the legislature may rightfully prescribe. If a man be denied full equality before the law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizenship as a citizen of the United States.”
[Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)]

Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874):

“There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the fourteenth amendment 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' are expressly declared to be 'citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' But, in our opinion, it did not need this amendment to give them that position. Before its adoption the Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision. There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an [88 U.S. 162, 166]  association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance.” 
[Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 166-168 (1874)]

Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325; 49 S.Ct. 884; 83 L.Ed 1320 (1939):

"As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. 1 And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law, on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents, does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law. As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, at citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.

[...]

To cause a loss of that citizenship in the absence of treaty or statute having that effect, there must be voluntary action and such action cannot be attributed to an infant whose removal to another country is beyond his control and who during minority is incapable of a binding choice.

Petitioners stress the American doctrine relating to expatriation. By the Act of July 27, 1868,8 Congress declared that 'the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people'. Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance. 9 It has no application to the removal from this country of a native citizen during minority. In such a case the voluntary action which is of the essence of the right of expatriation is lacking. That right is fittingly recognized where a child born here, who may be, or may become, subject to a dual nationality, elects on attaining majority citizenship in the country to which he has been removed. But there is no basis for invoking the doctrine of expatriation where native citizen who is removed to his parents' country of origin during minority returns here on his majority and elects to remain and to maintain his American citizenship. Instead of being inconsistent with the right of expatriation, the principle which permits that election conserves and applies it.

[...]

    'The term 'dual nationality' needs exact appreciation. It refers to the fact that two States make equal claim to the allegiance of an individual at the same time. Thus, one State may claim his allegiance because of his birth within its territory, and the other because at the time of his birth in foreign territory his parents were its nationals. The laws of the United States purport to clothe persons with American citizenship by virtue of both principles.'

    "And after referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const., and the Act of February 10, 1855, R.S. 1993, 8 U.S.C.A. 6, the instructions continued: [307 U.S. 325, 345]   'It thus becomes important to note how far these differing claims of American nationality are fairly operative with respect to persons living abroad, whether they were born abroad or were born in the United States of alien parents and taken during minority to reside in the territory of States to which the parents owed allegiance. It is logical that, while the child remains or resides in territory of the foreign State claiming him as a national, the United States should respect its claim to allegiance. The important point to observe is that the doctrine of dual allegiance ceases, in American contemplation, to be fully applicable after the child has reached adult years. Thereafter two States may in fact claim him as a national. Those claims are not, however, regarded as of equal merit, because one of the States may then justly assert that his relationship to itself as a national is, by reason of circumstances that have arisen, inconsistent with, and reasonably superior to, any claim of allegiance asserted by any other State. Ordinarily the State in which the individual retains his residence after attaining his majority has the superior claim. The statutory law of the United States affords some guidance but not all that could be desired, because it fails to announce the circumstances when the child who resides abroad within the territory of a State reasonably claiming his allegiance forfeits completely the right to perfect his inchoate right to retain American citizenship."
    [Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325; 49 S.Ct. 884; 83 L.Ed 1320 (1939)]

Baker v. Keck, 13 F.Supp. 486 (1936):

"Citizenship and domicile are substantially synonymous.  Residency and inhabitance are too often confused with the terms and have not the same significance.  Citizenship implies more than residence.  It carries with it the idea of identification with the state and a participation in its functions.  As a citizen, one sustains social, political, and moral obligation to the state and possesses social and political rights under the Constitution and laws thereof.  Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et al. (C.C.) 182 F. 421; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 763, 32 L.Ed. 766; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 476, 15 L.Ed. 691." 
[Baker v. Keck, 13 F.Supp. 486 (1936)]

Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Page 244:

citizenship.  The status of being a citizen.  There are four ways to acquire citizenship: by birth in the United States, by Birth in U.S. territories, by birth outside the U.S. to U.S. parents, and by naturalization.  See Corporate citizenship; Diversity of citizenship; Dual citizenship; Federal citizenship; Naturalization; Jus sanguinis; Jus soli.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Page 244]

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)

In Perez v. Brownell, supra, I expressed the principles that I believe govern the constitutional status of United [356 U.S. 92] States citizenship. It is my conviction that citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National Government, and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers. The right may be voluntarily relinquished or abandoned either by express language or by language and conduct that show a renunciation of citizenship.

Under these principles, this petitioner has not lost his citizenship. Desertion in wartime, though it may merit the ultimate penalty, does not necessarily signify allegiance to a foreign state. Section 401(g) is not limited to cases of desertion to the enemy, and there is no such element in this case. This soldier committed a crime for which he should be and was punished, but he did not involve himself in any way with a foreign state. There was no dilution of his allegiance to this country. The fact that the desertion occurred on foreign soil is of no consequence. The Solicitor General acknowledged that forfeiture of citizenship would have occurred if the entire incident had transpired in this country.

Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior. The duties of citizenship are numerous, and the discharge of many of these obligations is essential to the security and wellbeing of the Nation. The citizen who fails to pay his taxes or to abide by the laws safeguarding the integrity of elections deals a dangerous blow to his country. But could a citizen be deprived of his nationality for evading these basic responsibilities of citizenship? In time of war, the citizen's duties include not only the military defense of the Nation, but also full participation in the manifold activities of the civilian ranks. Failure to perform any of these obligations may cause the Nation serious injury, and, in appropriate circumstances, the punishing power is available to deal with derelictions of duty. But citizenship is not lost every time a duty of citizenship is shirked. And the deprivation of citizenship [356 U.S. 93] is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be. As long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship, and this petitioner has done neither, I believe his fundamental right of citizenship is secure. On this ground alone, the judgment in this case should be reversed.

[. . .]

This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community of democracies.{35} It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.{36}

The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. It is true that several countries prescribe expatriation in the event that their nationals engage in conduct in derogation of native allegiance.{37} Even statutes of this sort are generally applicable primarily [356 U.S. 103] to naturalized citizens. But use of denationalization as punishment for crime is an entirely different matter. The United Nations' survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.{38} In this country, the Eighth Amendment forbids this to be done.

In concluding, as we do, that the Eighth Amendment forbids Congress to punish by taking away citizenship, we are mindful of the gravity of the issue inevitably raised whenever the constitutionality of an Act of the National Legislature is challenged. No member of the Court believes that, in this case the statute before us can be construed to avoid the issue of constitutionality. That issue confronts us, and the task of resolving it is inescapably ours. This task requires the exercise of judgment, not the reliance upon personal preferences. Courts must not consider the wisdom of statutes, but neither can they sanction as being merely unwise that which the Constitution forbids.
We are oath-bound to defend the Constitution. This obligation requires that congressional enactments be judged by the standards of the Constitution. The Judiciary has the duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights. When the Government acts to take away the fundamental right of citizenship, the safeguards of the Constitution should be examined with special diligence.

The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths. They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental powers in our Nation. They are the rules of government. When the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is challenged in this Court, we must apply those rules. If we [356 U.S. 104] do not, the words of the Constitution become little more than good advice.

When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with one of these provisions, we have no choice but to enforce the paramount commands of the Constitution. We are sworn to do no less. We cannot push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate challenged legislation. We must apply those limits as the Constitution prescribes them, bearing in mind both the broad scope of legislative discretion and the ultimate responsibility of constitutional adjudication. We do well to approach this task cautiously, as all our predecessors have counseled. But the ordeal of judgment cannot be shirked. In some 81 instances since this Court was established, it has determined that congressional action exceeded the bounds of the Constitution. It is so in this case.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for appropriate proceedings.

[Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)]

Relationship of citizenship to Taxation

"Unless the defendant can prove he is not a citizen of the United States, the IRS has the right to inquire and determine a tax liability." U.S. v. Slater, 545 Fed. Supp. 179,182 (1982).

Derived from race and birth

"State Citizenship is a vested substantial property right, and the State has no power to divest or impair these rights." Favot v. Kingsbury, (1929) 98 Cal. App. 284, 276 P. 1083.

"For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of AMERICAN, which belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principle. You
have, in a common cause, fought, and triumphed together; the independence and liberty you possess, are the work of joint councils, and joint efforts -- of common dangers, sufferings and success." George Washington, "Farewell Address", delivered September 17, 1796. (Emphasis added.)

"A Citizen of one state is a citizen of every state in the Union." Butler v. Farnsworth, Fed.Cas.No. 2,240 (U.S. 3d Cir., 4 Wash.C.C. 101).

"Admission on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever, involves equality of constitutional right and power, which cannot afterwards be controlled, and it also involves as Citizens of the United States of those whom Congress makes members of the political community, and who are recognized as such in the formation of the new State with the consent of Congress." Boyd v. Thayer (1891), 143 U.S. 143.

"All white persons or persons of European descent who were born in any of the colonies, or resided or had been adopted there, before 1776, and had adhered to the cause of Independence up to July 4, 1776, were by the Declaration [of Independence] invested with privileges of citizenship." U. S. v. Ritchie, 58 U. S. (17 How.) 525, 539; Ingles v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 99; Boyd v. Nebraska, 36 L.Ed. 103, 110. (Emphasis and insertions added.)

"In general, 'Free White Persons,' includes members of the white or Caucasian race, as distinct from the black, red, yellow, and brown races." U. S. v. Balsara (1910), 180 F. 694, 695; In re Najour (1909), 174 F. 735; In re Ellis (1910), 179 F. 1002, 1003; In re Alverto (1912), 198 F. 688; In re Akhay Kumur Mozumdar (1913), 207 F. 115. (Emphasis added.)

"The privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State by the first clause of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution are only those which belong to [free white de jure State] Citizenship." Conner v. Elliott, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 591. (Insertion added.)

"It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted. And in order to do this, we must recur to the governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were recognized as the people or citizens of a state, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English government; and who declared their independence and assumed the powers of government to defend their rights by force of arms.

"In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument." Dred Scott v. Sanford, supra, p. 407. 

"We give both of these laws in the words used by the respective legislative bodies, because the language in which they are framed, as well as the provisions contained in them, show, too plainly to be misunderstood, the degraded condition of this unhappy race. They were still in force when the revolution began, and are a faithful index to the state of feeling towards the class of persons of whom they speak, and of the position they occupied throughout the thirteen colonies, in the eyes and thoughts of the men who framed the Declaration of Independence and established the state constitutions and governments. They show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages between white persons and Negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only to the parties but to the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between the free Negro or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race. 

"We refer to these historical facts for the purpose of showing the fixed opinions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen of that day spoke and acted. It is necessary to do this in order to determine whether the general terms used in the Constitution of the United States, as to the rights of man and the rights of the people, (were) intended to include them, or to give to them or their posterity the benefit of any of its provisions. The language
of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive: 

"It begins by declaring that, "When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."
"It then proceeds to say: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

"The general words quoted above would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted the declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed
the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.

"Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men -- high in literary acquirements -- high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the Negro race which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted according to the then
established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of a trader were supposed to need protection.

"This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language." Dred Scott v. Sanford, ibid., pp. 409, 410.

"To all this mass of proof we have still to add that Congress has repeatedly legislated upon the same construction of the Constitution that we have given. Three laws, two of which were passed almost immediately after the government went into operation, will be abundantly sufficient to show this. The two first are particularly of notice, because many of the men who assisted in framing the Constitution, and took no active part in procuring its
adoption, were then in the halls of legislation, and certainly understood what they meant when they used the words "people of the United States" and "citizen" in that well considered instrument.

"The first of these acts is the naturalization law, which was passed at the second session of the first Congress, March 26, 1790, and confines the right of becoming citizens "to aliens being free white persons."

". . . But the language of the law above quoted shows that citizenship at that time was perfectly understood to be confined to the white race; and they alone constituted the sovereignty in the government. . . Another of the early laws of which we have spoken is the first militia law, which was passed in 1792, at the first session of the second Congress. The language of this law is equally plain and significant with the one just mentioned. It directs that every "free able-bodied white male citizen" shall be enrolled in the militia. . .

"The third act to which we have alluded is even still more decisive; it was passed as late as 1813. . . and it provides "(t)hat from and after the termination of the war in which the United States are now engaged with Great Britain, it shall not be lawful to employ, on board of any public or private vessels of the
United States, any person or persons except citizens of the United States, or persons of color, natives of the United States." "Here the line of distinction is drawn in express words. Persons of color, in the judgment of Congress, were not included in the word "citizens", and they are described as another and different class of persons, and authorized to be employed, if born in the United States." Dred Scott v. Sanford, supra, pp. 419-421.

"Are free negroes or free colored persons citizens within the meaning of this [Comity] clause? We think not. In recurring to the past history of the constitution, and prior to its formation, to that of the confederation, it will be found that nothing beyond a kind of quasi-citizenship has ever been recognized in the case of colored persons. . . .If citizens in a full and constitutional sense, why were they not permitted to participate in its formation?
They certainly were not. The constitution was the work of the white race, the government for which it provides and of which it is the fundamental law, is in their hands and under their control; and it could not have been intended to place a different race of people in all things upon terms of equality with themselves. Indeed, if such had been the desire, its utter impracticability is too evident to admit of doubt. The two races differing as they do in
complexion, habits, conformation, and intellectual endowments, could not nor ever will live together upon terms of social or political equality. A higher than human power has so ordered it, and a greater than human agency must change the decree. Those who framed the Constitution were aware of this, and hence their intention to exclude them as citizens within the meaning of the clause to which we referred." Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509.
(Emphasis added.) 

"There are, nevertheless, inequalities of great moment in the mind of a legislator, because they have a natural and inevitable influence in society. Let us enumerate some of them: 1. There is an inequality of wealth. . . 2. BIRTH. Let no man be surprised that this species of inequality is introduced here. Let the page in history be quoted where any nation, ancient or modern, civilized or savage, is mentioned, among whom no difference was made between
the citizens on account of extraction. The truth is that more influence is allowed to this advantage in free republics than in despotic governments, or than would be allowed to it in simple monarchies, if severe laws had not been made from age to age to secure it." John Adams, A Defense of the American Constitutions, 1787, from The Political Writings of John Adams, published by Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1954, p. 134. (Emphasis added.)

"These sources of inequality, which are common to every people and can never be altered by any because they are founded in the constitution of nature -- this natural aristocracy among mankind has been dilated on because it is a fact essential to be considered in the institution of government. It forms a body of men which contains the greatest collections of virtues and abilities in a free government, is the brightest ornament and glory of the nation,
and may always be made the greatest blessing of society if it be judiciously managed in the constitution. But if this be not done, it is always the most dangerous; nay, it may be added, it never fails to be the destruction of the commonwealth [sovereignty]." John Adams, A Defense of the American Constitutions, from The Political Writings of John Adams, published by Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1954, p. 139. (Emphasis and Insertion added.)

"Blacks, whether born free or in bondage, if born under the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States, are natives, and not aliens. They are what the common law terms natural born subjects. . . . The better opinion, I should think, was that Negroes or other slaves, born within and under the allegiance of
the United States, are natural born subjects, but not citizens. Citizens, under our Constitution and laws, mean free inhabitants, born within the United States or naturalized under the laws of Congress. . . " James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 7th ed., Volume II, pp. 275-278. (Italics added.)

"But birth will not confer these advantages upon a Negro or an Indian. If so, a man may acquire, by the accident of birth, what the government itself has no right to grant. No Negro, or descendant of Negroes, is a citizen of the Union, or any of the States. They are mere "sojourners in the land", inmates, allowed usually by tacit consent, sometimes by legislative enactment, certain specific rights. Their status and that of the citizen is not the same. Vattel, Book 1, para. 213. But the clause of the Constitution in question applies to citizens, not to sojourners or inmates." State v. Clairborne, 1 Meig's Rep. 331, 335. 

"It results, then, that the plaintiff cannot have been a citizen, either of Pennsylvania or of Virginia, unless she belonged to a class of society upon which, by the institutions of the states, was conferred a right to enjoy all the privileges and immunities appertaining to the state. That this was the case there
is no evidence in the record to show, and the presumption is against it. Free Negroes and mulattoes are, almost everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded race of people; insomuch so, that, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, they cannot become citizens of the United States." Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. Ky. R. 334.

"Again, according to a well established principle of the common law, now in force, none but citizens can hold our lands." Amy v. Smith, supra, p. 339.

"The American colonies brought with them the common, and not the civil law; and each state, at the revolution, adopted either more or less of it, and not one of them exploded the principle that the place of birth conferred citizenship." Ibid., pp. 337, 338. 

"Hence I conclude that every white person at least, born within the United States, whether male or female, is, by birth, a citizen within the meaning of our Constitution, and as such has rights secured by it. . ." Ibid., p. 341.

Attorney-General of the United States, one William Wurtz, in an opinion dated November 7, 1821:

I presume that the description, "citizen of the United States", used in the Constitution, has the same meaning that it has in the several acts of Congress
passed under the authority of the Constitution; otherwise there will arise a vagueness and uncertainty in our laws which will make their execution, if not impracticable, at least extremely difficult and dangerous. 

Looking to the Constitution as the standard of meaning, it seems very manifest that no person is included in the description of "citizen of the United States" who has not the full rights of a citizen in the state of his residence. Among other proofs of this, it will be sufficient to advert to the constitutional provision that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states".

Now, if a person born and residing in Virginia but possessing none of the high characteristic privileges of a citizen of the state is nevertheless a citizen of Virginia in the sense of the Constitution, then, on his removal into another state, he acquires all the immunities and privileges of a citizen of that other state, although he possessed none of them in the state of his nativity; a consequence which certainly could not have been in the contemplation of the Convention. Again: the only qualification required by the Constitution to render a person eligible as President, Senator, or Representative of the United States is that he shall be a "citizen of the United States" of a given age and residence. Free Negroes and mulattoes can satisfy the requisites of age and residence as well as the white man; and if nativity, residence, and allegiance combined (without the rights and privileges of a white man) are sufficient to make him a "citizen of the United States" in the same sense of the Constitution, then free Negroes and mulattoes are eligible to those high offices, and may command the purse and the sword of the nation.

For these and other reasons, which might easily be multiplied, I am of the opinion that the Constitution, by the description of "citizens of the United States", intended those only who enjoyed the full and equal privileges of white citizens in the state of their residence. If this be correct, and if I am right also in the other position -- that we must affix the same sense to this description when found in an act of Congress, as it manifestly has in the Constitution -- then free people of color in Virginia are not citizens of the United States in the sense of our shipping laws, or any other laws, passed under the authority of the Federal Constitution; for such people have very few of the privileges of the citizens of Virginia.

1. They can vote at no election, although they might be freeholders. 

2. They are incapable of any office of trust or profit, civil or military.

3. They are not competent witnesses against a white man in any case, civil or criminal.

4. They are not enrolled in the militia, are incapable of bearing arms, and are forbidden even to have in their possession military weapons, under the penalties of forfeiture and whipping.

5. They are subject to severe corporal punishment for raising their hand against a white man, except in defense of a wanton assault.

6. They are incapable of contracting marriage with a white woman, and the attempt is severely punished.

These are some of the incapacities which distinguished them from the white citizens of Virginia; but they are, I think, amply sufficient to show that such
persons could not have been intended to be embraced by the description "citizens of the United States" in the
sense of the Constitution and acts of Congress. 

The allegiance which the free man of color owes to the State of Virginia is no evidence of citizenship; for he owes it not in consequence of any oath of allegiance. He is not required or permitted to take any such oath; the allegiance which he owes is that which a sojourning stranger owes -- the mere consequence and return for the protection which he receives from the laws. . . . Opinions of the Attorneys General, Volume 1, pp. 506-508.
(Emphasis added.)

"But as the laws of the United States do not now authorize any but a white person to become a citizen, it marks the national sentiment upon the subject and creates a presumption that no state had made persons of color citizens. . . .And as it respects Virginia, we know that free people of color have never been
considered, or treated, either in the practice of the country or by the laws of the state, as possessing the rights and privileges of citizens." Amy v. Smith, supra, p. 334. (Emphasis added.)

"Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, each state had a right to make citizens of any persons they pleased; but as the Federal Constitution does not authorize any but white persons to become citizens of the United States, it furnishes a presumption that none other were then citizens of any state; which presumption will stand until repealed by positive testimony." id. (Emphasis added.)

"That all men are born to equal rights is true. Every being has a right to his own, as clear, as moral, as sacred as any other being has. . . . But to teach that all men are born with equal powers and faculties, to equal property and advantages through life, is as gross a fraud, as glaring an imposition on the
credulity of the people as ever was practiced by monks, by Druids, by Brahmins, by priests of the immortal Lama, or the self-styled philosophers of the late French Revolution. For Honor's sake, . . . , for truth and virtue's sake, let American philosophers and politicians despise it." John Adams, in a letter to a Mr. John Taylor, April 15, 1814 from The Political Writings of John Adams, published by Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1954, p. 201. (Emphasis added.)

U. S. Senator Robert H. Toombs of Georgia in Boston in 1856, as to the inevitable consequences of trespassing on the preamble and altering the posterity of "free white":

"Therefore, so far from being a necessary and proper means of executing a granted powers, it is an arbitrary and despotic usurpation against the letter, the spirit, and the declared purposes of the Constitution; for its exercise neither "promote(s) the general welfare", nor "secure(s) the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity", but, on the contrary, puts in jeopardy all these inestimable blessings. It loosens the bonds of Union, seeks to establish injustice, disturbs the domestic tranquility, weakens the common defense, and endangers the general welfare by sowing hatreds and discords among our people, and puts in eminent peril the liberties of the white race, by whom and for whom the Constitution was made. . . "

Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War between the States, National Publ., Vol. I, p. 632.

Before the 14th amendment [sic] in 1868: ... 

[F]or it is certain, that in the sense in which the word "Citizen" is used in the federal Constitution, "Citizen of each State," and "Citizen of the United States***," are convertible terms; they mean the same thing; for "the Citizens of each State are entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States," and "Citizens of the United States***" are, of course, Citizens of all the United States***. [44 Maine 518 (1859), Hathaway, J. dissenting] [italics in original, underlines & C's added]

After the 14th amendment [sic] in 1868:

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States** and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual. 
[Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36]
[(1873) emphasis added]

The first clause of the fourteenth amendment made negroes citizens of the United States**, and citizens of the State in which they reside, and thereby created two classes of citizens, one of the United States** and the other of the state.
[Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327]
[(1874) headnote 8, emphasis added]

We have in our political system a Government of the United States** and a government of each of the several States. Each
one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own ....
[U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542]
[(1875) emphasis added]

One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the United States. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (17 Am. R. 738); McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507; In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443. 
[McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323]
[(1883) underlines added]

A person who is a citizen of the United States** is necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a citizen of the United States**. To hold otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise of its sovereignty, -- the right to declare who are its citizens.
[State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
[6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]

The first clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution made negroes citizens of the United States**, and citizens of the state in which they reside, and thereby created two classes of citizens, one of the United States** and the other
of the state.
[4 Dec. Dig. '06, p. 1197, sec. 11]
["Citizens" (1906), emphasis added]

There are, then, under our republican form of government, two classes of citizens, one of the United States** and one of the state. One class of citizenship may exist in a person, without the other, as in the case of a resident of the District of
Columbia; but both classes usually exist in the same person.
[Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155]
[48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added]

There is a distinction between citizenship of the United States** and citizenship of a particular state, and a person may be the
former without being the latter.
[Alla v. Kornfeld, 84 F.Supp. 823]
[(1949) headnote 5, emphasis added]

A person may be a citizen of the United States** and yet be not identified or identifiable as a citizen of any particular state.
[Du Vernay v. Ledbetter]
[61 So.2d 573, emphasis added]

... citizens of the District of Columbia were not granted the privilege of litigating in the federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Possibly no better reason for this fact exists than such citizens were not thought of when the judiciary article [III] of the federal Constitution was drafted. ... citizens of the United States** ... were also not thought of; but in any event a citizen of the United States**, who is not a citizen of any state, is not within the language of the [federal] Constitution.
[Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914]
[emphasis added]

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