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Types of civil law:
There are two types of civil law: See
Coopers Industries Inc. v. Leatherman Industries, Inc. No. 99-2035.
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Compensatory:
You are fined and penalized unless and until you do or don't do
something. The fine or punishment stops when the behavior or
absence of behavior stops.
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Punitive. Also
called quasi-criminal. Civil penalty for past conduct. Moral
condemnation.
See also:
COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. LEATHERMAN TOOL GROUP, INC. v.
ETAL .
No. 99-2035. Argued February 26, 2001--Decided May 14, 2001
Although compensatory damages and punitive
damages are typically awarded at the same time by the same
decisionmaker, they serve distinct purposes. The former are intended
to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by
reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts §903, pp. 453-454 (1979); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip,
499 U. S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The
latter, which have been described as "quasi-criminal," id.,
at 19, operate as "private fines" intended to punish the defendant
and to deter future wrongdoing. A jury's assessment of the extent of
a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas
its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral
condemnation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are not
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by
civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence"); Haslip,
499 U. S., at 54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[P]unitive
damages are specifically designed to exact punishment in excess of
actual harm to make clear that the defendant's misconduct was
especially reprehensible").5
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. HASLIP,
499 U.S. 1 (1991)
Justice O'CONNOR, joined by Justice STEVENS,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, observed:
We conclude that the punitive damages assessed
by the jury against Pacific Mutual were not violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true, of course,
that under Alabama law, as under the law of most States, punitive
damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So.2d 1060, 1076 (Ala. 1984).
They have been described as quasi-criminal. See Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). But this in
itself does not provide the answer. We move, then, to the points of
specific attack.
Justice O'CONNOR, dissenting.
Compounding the problem, punitive damages are
quasi-criminal punishment. Unlike compensatory damages, which serve
to allocate an existing loss between two parties, punitive damages
are specifically designed to exact punishment in excess of actual
harm to make clear that the defendant's misconduct was especially
reprehensible. Hence, there is a stigma attached to an award of
punitive damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory
award. The punitive character of punitive damages means that there
is more than just money at stake. This factor militates in favor of
strong procedural safeguards.
HICKS v. FEIOCK, 485 U.S. 624 (1988)
2. For the purposes of applying the Due Process
Clause to a State's proceedings, state law provides strong guidance,
but is not dispositive, as to the classification of the proceeding
or the relief imposed as civil or criminal. The critical features
are the substance of the proceeding and the character of the relief
that the proceeding will afford. With regard to contempt cases, the
proceeding and remedy are for civil contempt if the punishment is
remedial and for the complainant's benefit. But if for criminal
contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the court's
authority. Thus, if the relief provided is a sentence of
imprisonment, it is remedial if the defendant stands committed
unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the
court's order, and is punitive if the sentence is limited to
unconditional imprisonment for a definite period. If the relief
provided is a fine, it is remedial when it is paid to the
complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court, though a
fine that is payable to the court is also remedial when the
defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the act
required by the court's order. These distinctions lead to the
fundamental proposition that criminal penalties may not be imposed
on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the
Constitution requires of criminal proceedings, including the
requirement that the offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pp. 631-635.
Instead, the critical features are the
substance of the proceeding and the character of the relief that the
proceeding will afford. "If it is for civil contempt the punishment
is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is
for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the
authority of the court." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). The character of the relief imposed is
thus ascertainable by applying a few straightforward
[485 U.S. 624, 632] rules. If the
relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial if
"the defendant stands committed unless and until he performs the
affirmative act required by the court's order," and is punitive if
"the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period."
Id., at 442. If the relief provided is a fine, it is remedial when
it is paid to the complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the
court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also
remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by
performing the affirmative act required by the court's order. These
distinctions lead up to the fundamental proposition that criminal
penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded
the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal
proceedings, including the requirement that the offense be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e. g., Gompers, supra, at 444;
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co.,
266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924). 5
The Court has consistently applied these
principles. In Gompers, decided early in this century, three men
were found guilty of contempt and were sentenced to serve 6, 9, and
12 months respectively. The Court found this relief to be criminal
in nature because the sentence was determinate and unconditional.
"The distinction between refusing to do an act commanded, - remedied
by imprisonment until the party performs the required act; and doing
an act forbidden, - punished by imprisonment for a definite term; is
sound in principle, and generally, if not universally, affords a
test by which to determine the character of the punishment."
[485 U.S. 624, 633] Gompers,
221 U.S., at 443 . In the former instance, the conditional
nature of the punishment renders the relief civil in nature because
the contemnor "can end the sentence and discharge himself at any
moment by doing what he had previously refused to do." Id., at 442.
In the latter instance, the unconditional nature of the punishment
renders the relief criminal in nature because the relief "cannot
undo or remedy what has been done nor afford any compensation" and
the contemnor "cannot shorten the term by promising not to repeat
the offense." Ibid.
The distinction between relief that is civil in
nature and relief that is criminal in nature has been repeated and
followed in many cases. An unconditional penalty is criminal in
nature because it is "solely and exclusively punitive in character."
Penfield Co. v. SEC,
330 U.S. 585, 593 (1947). A conditional penalty, by contrast, is
civil because it is specifically designed to compel the doing of
some act. "One who is fined, unless by a day certain he [does the
act ordered], has it in his power to avoid any penalty. And those
who are imprisoned until they obey the order, `carry the keys of
their prison in their own pockets.'" Id., at 590, quoting In re
Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (CA8 1902). In Penfield, a man was found
guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a court order to produce
documents. This Court ruled that since the man was not tried in a
proceeding that afforded him the applicable constitutional
protections, he could be given a conditional term of imprisonment
but could not be made to pay "a flat, unconditional fine of $50.00."
Penfield, supra, at 588. 6 See
[485 U.S. 624, 634] also United
States v. Rylander,
460 U.S. 752 (1983); Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33 (1941); Fox v. Capital Co.,
299 U.S. 105 (1936); Lamb v. Cramer,
285 U.S. 217 (1932); Oriel v. Russell,
278 U.S. 358 (1929); Ex parte Grossman,
267 U.S. 87 (1925); Doyle v. London Guarantee Co.,
204 U.S. 599 (1907); In re Christensen Engineering Co.,
194 U.S. 458 (1904); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324 (1904).
Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364 (1966), adheres to these same principles. There two
men were adjudged guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a court
order to testify under a grant of immunity. Both were sentenced to
two years of imprisonment, with the proviso that if either answered
the questions before his sentence ended, he would be released. The
penalties were upheld because of their "conditional nature," even
though the underlying proceeding lacked certain constitutional
protections that are essential in criminal proceedings. Id., at 365.
Any sentence "must be viewed as remedial," and hence civil in
nature, "if the court conditions release upon the contemnor's
willingness to [comply with the order]." Id., at 370. By the same
token, in a civil proceeding the court "may also impose a
determinate sentence which includes a purge clause." Id., at 370, n.
6 (emphasis added). "On the contrary, a criminal contempt proceeding
would be characterized by the imposition of an
[485 U.S. 624, 635] unconditional
sentence for punishment or deterrence." Id., at 370, n. 5.
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