Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)-Supreme Court held that
state officials acting outside the color of law may be held personally
liable for the injuries or torts they case and that official or sovereign
immunity may not be asserted.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978)- federal
agent of Dept. of Agriculture not entitled to absolute immunity from
suit when acting outside of lawful authority and violating constitutional
rights.
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)-FBI agents who violated
Constitutional rights of a petitioner were held personally liable and
not afforded official immunity.
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896)-patent infringement
by federal officers. Supreme court said they could be held personally
liable and remanded case for another trial.
We have observed that "a
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official's office. . . . As such, it is no different from a suit
against the State itself." Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). And the same must be said of a directive
to an official in his or her official capacity. To say that the
Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control all
of its officers, is to say nothing of significance.
15 Indeed, it merits the description
"empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order," post, at 15.
By resorting to this, thedissent not so much distinguishes New York
as disembowels it. 16
[Printz/Sheriff
Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997)]
[277 U.S. 438, 481] The situation in the case at bar differs
widely from that presented in Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 , 41 S. Ct. 574, 13 A. L. R. 1159. There only a single
lot of papers was involved. They had been obtained by a private detective
while acting on behalf of a private party, without the knowledge of
any federal official, long before any one had thought of instituting
a [277 U.S. 438, 482] federal prosecution. Here the evidence
obtained by crime was obtained at the government's expense, by its officers,
while acting on its behalf; the officers who committed these crimes
are the same officers who were charged with the enforcement of the Prohibition
Act; the crimes of these officers were committed for the purpose of
securing evidence with which to obtain an indictment and to secure a
conviction. The evidence so obtained constitutes the warp and woof of
the government's case. The aggregate of the government evidence occupies
306 pages of the printed record. More than 210 of them are filled by
recitals of the details of the wire tapping and of facts ascertained
thereby. 14 There is literally no other
evidence of guilt on the part of some of the defendants except that
illegally obtained by these officers. As to nearly all the defendants
(except those who admitted guilt), the evidence relied upon to secure
a conviction consisted mainly of that which these officers had so obtained
by violating the state law.
As Judge Rudkin said below (19 F.(2d) 842):
'Here we are concerned with neither eavesdroppers nor thieves. Nor
are we concerned with the acts of private individuals. ... We are
concerned only with the acts of federal agents, whose powers are
limited and controlled by the Constitution of the United States.'
The Eighteenth Amendment has not in terms empowered Congress to authorize
any one to violate the criminal laws of a state. And Congress has never
purported to do so. Compare Maryland v. Soper,
270 U.S. 9 , 46 S. Ct. 185. The terms of appointment of federal
prohibition agents do not purport to confer upon them authority to violate
any criminal law. Their superior officer, the Secretary of the Treasury,
has not instructed them to commit [277 U.S. 438, 483] crime
on behalf of the United States. It may be assumed that the Attorney
General of the United States did not give any such instruction.
15
When these unlawful acts were committed they were crimes only of the
officers individually. The government was innocent, in legal contemplation;
for no federal official is authorized to commit a crime on its behalf.
When the government, having full knowledge, sought, through the Department
of Justice, to avail itself of the fruits of these acts in order to
accomplish its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for the officers'
crimes. Compare the Paquete Habana,
189 U.S. 453, 465 , 23 S. Ct. 593; O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke,
209 U.S. 45, 52 , 28 S. Ct. 439; Dodge v. United States,
272 U.S. 530, 532 , 47 S. Ct. 191; Gambino v. United States,
275 U.S. 310 , 48 S. Ct. 137, and if this court should permit the
government, by means of its officers' crimes, to effect its purpose
of punishing the defendants, there would seem to be present all the
elements of a ratification. If so, the government itself would become
a lawbreaker.
Will this court, by sustaining the judgment below, sanction such conduct
on the part of the executive? The governing principle has long been
settled. It is that a court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes
its aid has unclean hands. 16 The maxim
of unclean hands comes [277 U.S. 438, 484] from courts of
equity. 17 But the principle prevails also in courts of law. Its common
application is in civil actions between private parties. Where the government
is the actor, the reasons for applying it are even more persuasive.
Where the remedies invoked are those of the criminal law, the reasons
are compelling. 18
The door of a court is not barred because the plaintiff has committed
a crime. The confirmed criminal is as much entitled to redress as his
most virtuous fellow citizen; no record of crime, however long, makes
one an outlaw. The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has
violated the law in connection with the very transaction as to which
he seeks legal redress. 19 Then aid is denied despite the defendant's
wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order to
promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve
the judicial process from contamination. The rule is one, not of action,
but of inaction. It is sometimes [277 U.S. 438, 485] spoken
of as a rule of substantive law. But it extends to matters of procedure
as well. 20 A defense may be waived. It
is waived when not pleaded. But the objection that the plaintiff comes
with unclean hands will be taken by the court itself.
21 It will be taken despite the wish to
the contrary of all the parties to the litigation. The court protects
itself.
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to
the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will
be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.
[Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)]
No one has ever suggested that Congress would be powerless to displace
the other common law immunity doctrines that this Court has recognized
as appropriate defenses to certain federal claims such as the judicially
fashioned remedy in GO>Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 [517 U.S. 88] U.S. 388 (1971). See GO>Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511 (1985); GO>Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Similarly,
our cases recognizing qualified officer immunity in § 1983 actions rest
on the conclusion that, in passing that statute, Congress did not intend
to displace the common law immunity that officers would have retained
under suits premised solely on the general jurisdictional statute. See
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, GO>920 (1984). For that reason, the
federal common law of officer immunity that Congress meant to incorporate,
not a contrary state immunity, applies in § 1983 cases. See Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980). There is no reason why Congress'
undoubted power to displace those common law immunities should be either
greater or lesser than its power to displace the common law sovereign
immunity defense.
[Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)]
Young v. IRS, 596 F.Supp.
141 (N.D.Ind 09/25/1984)
Plaintiff's complaint asserts that the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, 1983, and 1986, give this court jurisdiction over his suit.
However, none of these provisions is an appropriate basis for relief
in this case. Section 1981 is restricted by the import of its language
to discrimination based on race or color. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880); Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,
482 F.2d 535, 537 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1973). In fact, the language of § 1981
militates against plaintiff's case, because the section provides that
"all persons" shall be subject to taxes. Section 1983 prohibits deprivation
of rights under color of state law. However, actions of IRS officials,
even if beyond the scope of their official duties, are acts done under
color of federal law and not state law, thus making § 1983 inapplicable.
Seibert v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64 L.Ed.2d 271 (1980); Mack v. Alexander,
575 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir. 1978). Section 1986 creates a cause of action
for failure or neglect to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy. However, § 1985(1)
deals with conspiring to prevent an official from discharging his duties,
while § 1985(2) deals with obstructing justice, both of which are inapplicable
here. Section 1985(3) requires that there be "some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91
S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), none of which is alleged to
be present here. It is therefore obvious that none of these statutory
provisions can provide plaintiff with a basis for suit.
The court notes that two general jurisdiction statutes may have some
potential applicability to this case. However, the court is convinced
that neither one of these statutes will supply this court with jurisdiction
over plaintiff's claim. The first statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1340, grants
the district court original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any act of Congress providing for internal revenue. The very language
of the statute indicates that this section does not create jurisdiction
in and of itself. Section 1340 makes clear that the jurisdiction extends
to civil actions arising under the Internal Revenue laws; as such, the
suit must be based on some cause of action which the Internal Revenue
Code recognizes and allows the plaintiff to bring. Absent some recognition
of this kind of suit under the Internal Revenue Code, § 1340 will not
create an independent basis for jurisdiction. As one court has noted,
"given the limitations which Article III of the Constitution places
on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it is doubtful that the various
jurisdictional statutes [like § 1340] could do more than waive the congressionally
imposed jurisdictional amount requirement." Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commn., 463 F. Supp. 120, 127 n. 8 (E.D.Pa.
1979).
It appears that this case does not arise under the Internal Revenue
Code. Plaintiff does not seek either to enforce any provision of the
Code or to pursue a statutory remedy under the Code. Rather, he seeks
damages for the alleged violation of his rights. In fact, the whole
thrust of plaintiff's case is that he is outside the scope of the Code
so that the actions of the defendants are violations of his rights.
However, if the plaintiff's claim comes from outside the Code, then
it logically cannot "arise under" the Code, and therefore § 1340 cannot
provide plaintiff with jurisdiction.
A second possible source of general jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
the federal question jurisdiction statute. Plaintiff claims that he
is outside the scope of the federal income tax laws. Such a claim brings
into question the interpretation of several provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. This may be sufficient to create some kind of federal
question jurisdiction based on the interpretation of the Code. However,
this federal question would not provide a sufficient jurisdictional
basis for plaintiff's damage claim. In order to recover damages, the
plaintiff must show that he can recover damages for violations stemming
from defendants' alleged unconstitutional activity. Plaintiff can obtain
damages against the defendants under only one of two theories: a claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680; or an implied
cause of action under the principles of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
As will be discussed more
fully in the next section of this order, a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act will fail on principles of sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, in Seibert v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423, 429-32 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64 L.Ed.2d 271 (1980), the
court refused to recognize a Bivens-type cause of action against the
IRS and IRS officials and agents. The actions of the present
defendants in assessing the taxes and penalties against the plaintiff
and in generally operating under the IRS regulatory framework were not
of the outrageous nature of those found in Bivens.
This court agrees with the
Seibert court and refuses to recognize a Bivens-type cause of action
against the IRS or IRS officials and agents for the collection and assessment
of taxes. Thus, while a federal question may exist, it provides
no basis for plaintiff to recover damages. As such, § 1331 cannot provide
this court with jurisdiction over plaintiff's damage claim.
[Young v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 141 (N.D.Ind 09/25/1984)]
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