Introduction
The following letter addressed to Margaret Milner Richardson, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue [Service], was composed in March 1997 by researchers who write under the pseudonyms "Marcel and Fifi De Bunque". The pseudonyms seem particularly appropriate in light of the subject: Who or what is the Internal Revenue Service, and what authority does IRS have in States of the Union? What internal revenue laws does IRS enforce? Where does this phantom agency derive its authority?
Letter content advances research first published by William Cooper in Veritas, his patriot newspaper, in September 1995. Cooper and Wayne Bentson collaborated on the piece. The same month, Gail and I completed the "Monster Index" of implementing regulations applicable to Internal Revenue Code sections. Our research reinforced Cooper/Bentson conclusions, if not their actual research. We subsequently followed up their research, advancing it in some areas, and beginning in June 1996, a memorandum I wrote on the subject was published as legal notice in several newspapers across the nation.
The memorandum must have been on point, as within a month following final Oklahoma publication, I was prosecuted for alleged "obstruction of justice" in a case where there was no affidavit of complaint, the grand jury did not return an indictment in open court, and no certificate of concurrence was filed by the grand jury foreman, assuming a grand jury considered charges, thus reinforcing the Murphy corollary, "No good deed will go unpunished."
Dating research is relevant as a few of the De Bunque mysteries have been resolved since the letter was composed. One of particular significance, the first civil governor and executive committee of Puerto Rico created five bureaus that were eventually merged to become the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, on May 1, 1900. The first Puerto Rican legislature, convened the following year, legislatively endorsed the original bureaus. Reports are published in Senate Documents for Y1900 and after.
Special funds were established for taxes collected on behalf of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. In 1934, Congress legislatively determined that these special funds would be called trusts, i.e., Philippines Trust #2 (internal revenue), and Puerto Rico Trust #62 (Internal Revenue).
As was the case for Cooper/Bentson research, the De Bunque letter butts against what appears to be a stone wall: How does IRS escape Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms regulations to wind up under Customs regulations? Virtually all Internal Revenue Code Subtitle F administrative sections, including regulations relating to assessment, liens, levies, crimes, et al, are under BATF regulations, mostly 27 CFR § 70 (see Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations). Yet transaction codes and other entries on Individual Master Files invariably suggest liabilities under drug laws, with the Virgin Islands being the "situs" of the obligation or infraction.
That riddle has also been resolved: Where IRS initiatives administrative procedures adverse to the American people, there is invariably a presumption of property being used in violation of "internal revenue laws" (drug laws; 26 U.S.C. § 7302), and IRS exits the Internal Revenue Code via 26 U.S.C. § 7327: "The provisions of law applicable to the remission or mitigation by the Secretary of forfeiture under the customs laws shall apply to forfeitures incurred or alleged to have been incurred under the internal revenue laws."
There are two sets of regulations for this section: BATF regulations relating to international trade in alcohol, tobacco and firearms are at 27 CFR § 72, and IRS regulations pertaining to drug-related maritime infractions are at 26 CFR § 403. There is always a presumption of a commercial crime listed in one or the other of these regulatory provisions. Where the De Bunque letter emphasizes IRS operating as a BATF surrogate, the more probable truth is that IRS routinely operates as surrogate of the U.S. Customs Service.
Notwithstanding these gaps, the De Bunque letter is rich with important research elements and is well worth reading. It is another significant contribution to the axiom, "Truth is stranger than fiction."
Authors of the following letter have not reviewed matters addressed in this introduction, so do not implicitly or explicitly endorse conclusions I've advanced.
Dan Meador
February 1, 2000
CERTIFIED _______
From:
[Address deleted]
To:
Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Service
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20224
March 29th, 1997
Dear Commissioner of IRS Margaret Milner Richardson,
This letter is a request for information pursuant to Revenue Procedures 88-1 and 89-1. If this request for information letter is being addressed to the wrong place or party, please forward this request for information letter to the appropriate party or place. Please inform us in writing of any such forwarding, and please also cite the specific authority of the person or office to whom you have forwarded our letter to respond to the questions contained in it.
We also have read your letter in the 1995 1040 Instruction booklet, in which you state: "Providing information about our tax laws or your account status when you want it is another of our priorities." We trust, therefore, that providing direct and specific answers to the enclosed questions concerning the tax laws will be a high priority for your office.
Please note: We are not attempting, by writing this letter, citing the findings contained herein, or by asking the questions enclosed, to express or reflect personal opinion or frustration with the tax system. Nor does this letter in any way reflect our advocating the violation of or noncompliance with any internal revenue laws. We are not attempting, by writing this letter, to enter into a debate regarding the legality of 26 USC, the tax laws, the Constitution or any of its Amendments. We are not protesting any tax. We are simply requesting information via this letter pursuant to the above-referenced Revenue Rulings, and pursuant to your stated priority to provide information to us concerning the tax laws.
Please do not respond to us with a letter stating that we have written some unspecified "type of letter" reflecting personal opinions or frustration with the tax system, unless you specifically cite which of our questions specifically reflect personal opinions or frustrations with the tax system. Please also do not state that "it would be unfortunate if you were to rely on opinions of those who deliberately promote violation of the laws passed by Congress," since we do not rely on opinions, only on statutes, regulations and other government documents, and we most certainly do not rely on, nor do we wish to rely on, the opinions of anyone who deliberately promotes the violation of the laws passed by Congress. This letter contains technical questions concerning statutes, regulations and other government documents.
In addition, we are requesting that you not respond to this request by merely citing 26 USC § 7802 and § 7803, as we deal with those sections in this letter, and why they do not constitute a proper response to this request for information.
Recently, we were directed to your Internet Web Page, and were shown that within it was the following statement relevant to you: "She is the second woman to head the tax collection agency since its creation in 1862." The "tax collection agency" is, of course, the "Internal Revenue Service."
We have been studying, reading and searching for several years to find, within Title 26 of the United States Code, the Internal Revenue Code, the section or sections which created your agency, the so-called "Internal Revenue Service"; but we have been unable to find any such specific statutes or sections. We decided to research and locate whatever other sources of information we could find regarding how the entity which calls itself "Internal Revenue Service" was established; what our research has uncovered is strange and confusing. Here are some of the things which we have found:
In 1972, an Internal Revenue Manual ("IRM") 1100 was published in both the Federal Register and the Cumulative Bulletin; see 37 Fed Reg. 20960, 1972-2 Cum. Bul. 836. On the very first page of this statement published in the bulletin, the following admission was made. (We have emphasized the significant sections):
We have no doubt that, when the employees of the "Internal Revenue Service", and, perhaps others, were researching the origins of the so-called agency so that this statement could be included in the IRM 1100, that these employees and other people must have performed a very thorough and exhaustive investigation. We are sure that the position of the "Internal Revenue Service" regarding how the alleged "Internal Revenue Service" came into being is the best that could be written under these circumstances.
However, besides the problem that these acts simply did not create either the "Bureau of Internal Revenue" or the "Internal Revenue Service", there exists the fact that these acts were repealed by the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1873. Therefore, it would appear that your "agency" has never actually been created by any act of Congress. This is obviously a serious flaw, and creates some valid and serious legal problems.
Furthermore, we have discovered the
following: There was an entity known as the "Bureau of Internal Revenue"
which was renamed "Internal Revenue Service", as revealed by Department
of Treasury Order 150-06, dated July 9, 1953, (see below) and further,
by Treasury Decision 6038, entitled "Change of Nomenclature". However,
an examination of the General Records of the Department of the Treasury
(Record Group 56) 1789-1990, 56.1, Administrative History, from the National
Archives and Record Administration reveals that no agency/entity called
"Bureau of Internal Revenue" is listed in the "Former administrative units
of the Treasury Department". In addition, the National Archives and Record
Administration states:
"The Tax Act of 1862 authorized a permanent internal revenue establishment, the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which supervised a network of district collectors and assessors and other field agents, and which was informally known as the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It was formally redesignated the IRS, 1953." (Emphasis added.)
"Informally known" means that
no such agency was ever statutorily created, and that an "informally known"
nickname was renamed ("redesignated") "IRS" in 1953.
In addition, the case of Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), contains the following in footnote
23:
"There was virtually no Washington bureaucracy created by the Act of
July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, the statute to which the present
Internal Revenue Service can be traced."
So apparently the court in the
Chrysler Corp. case also could not find any evidence of any "bureaucracy"
known as the Internal Revenue Service which had been created by the 1862
statute.
We have also found the following statement in the Federal Register, Volume 41, September 15th, 1976:
We have also located the following
documents: 27 CFR § 201, which is entitled "Short title", is cited
as the "Federal Alcohol Administration Act." In § 201, under HISTORY:
ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES, is found the following:
"Transfer of functions:
We have located the actual document which established the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Treasury Order 120-01, (a renumbering of DOT Order 221) which is entitled "Establishment of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms". TO 120-01 cites various functions and provisions of law which have been delegated to the BATF. In paragraph #2, section b, TO 120-01 states that Chapters 61 through 80, inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Code are delegated to BATF "insofar as they relate to the activities administered and enforced with respect to Chapters 51, 52 and 53;"
Chapters 61 through 80, also known as Subtitle F, of the Code, contain all of the "Procedures and Administration" statutes for filing returns, assessment, collection, interest, penalties, crimes, other offenses and forfeitures, and liability and enforcement of tax. Some of the sections found in Chapters 61 through 80 of Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code, sections which many people would recognize, are the following:
Furthermore, we have found that the only Privacy Act Systems of Records ("SOR") which claims Chapters 61 through 80 of the Code as its authority to maintain records on anyone is Treasury/ATF .003, entitled "Criminal Investigation Report System - Treasury/ATF", which is maintained by BATF, not "IRS". SOR Treasury/ATF .003 covers such categories of individuals as:
In addition, 27 CFR § 70.11 also states that Subtitle F is delegated to be enforced and administered by BATF, "as it relates to any of the foregoing."
The words "the foregoing" in 27 CFR § 70.11, which is a section entitled "Meaning of terms", refer to the following terms: Person; lien; levy; enforced collection; electronic fund transfer; Director (BATF); Commercial Bank; Chief, Tax Processing Center; Code of Federal Regulations; Bureau; ATF Officer. So 27 CFR § 70.11 is stating that BATF has been delegated the authority of Subtitle F as it relates to liens, levies, enforced collection (ie, seizure and forfeiture) - activities which one generally associates with "IRS". Again, we can find no such delegation of authority to "IRS" which relates to such activities. This regulation further appears to make it clear that it is really BATF which is liening, levying and seizing property, even when it appears that "IRS" is doing these things.
Most significant of all in this conclusion
that we have reached that it appears that it is always BATF which is masquerading
as "IRS" when "IRS" is liening, levying and seizing property, is the following:
26 USC § 7321 is the section of the Internal Revenue Code entitled:
"Authority to Seize Property Subject to Forfeiture". It states:
"Any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under any provision of this title may be seized by the Secretary."
Then, in the implementing regulation,
26 CFR § 301.7321 - 1, entitled "Seizure of Property", is stated the
following:
Why is all property seized by "IRS" - "under any provision of Title 26", which would, of course, include Subtitle A, "Income Taxes" - much of it having to with alleged violations of "income tax" laws, and ostensibly having nothing whatsoever to do with alcohol, tobacco or firearms taxes - seized by the district director, and then handed over to this mysterious assistant regional commissioner (alcohol, tobacco and firearms), who clearly appears to be either an official of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, or perhaps an official relevant only to Chapters 51, 52 and 53 of the Internal Revenue Code? It could only be because somehow all of the laws in Chapters 61 through 80, including the seizure and forfeiture laws of the IRC, are relevant only to BATF taxes.
Also in TO 120-01 (dated 6/6/72) is a reference to the term "Director, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division" - the same term which was renamed "Internal Revenue Service" according to the Federal Register of 9/15/76. (See above.) TO 120-01 states:
TO 120-01 goes on to state:
What is even more bizarre is this: after all the property seized by "IRS" is handed over by the district director to this mysterious assistant regional commissioner (alcohol, tobacco and firearms), the remission or mitigation of forfeitures relevant to the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) and its regulations (26 CFR) is governed by the customs laws which are applicable to remission or mitigation of penalties as contained in Title 19 USC - Customs - Sections 1613 and 1618. Sections 1613 and 1618 of Title 19 fall under Chapter 4, which is relevant to the enforcement of the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930. Why are sections of the customs laws which govern the enforcement of the Tariff Act of 1930 the only laws which are cited to be used to remit or mitigate forfeitures of property which has been seized by "IRS" and then handed over to a BATF official? More simply: If our property were seized by "IRS", why would we be forced to use Customs laws to attempt to get it back?
Returning to the above cite from 27 CFR § 201, concerning the Federal Alcohol Administration, it is obvious that some entity with the present name "Internal Revenue Service" used to be known as the "Bureau of Internal Revenue." And we find that renaming confirmed in Treasury Order 150-06, dated July 9th, 1953, entitled "Designation as Internal Revenue Service," which states in paragraph #1:
In addition, we have looked in 31 USC, Chapter 3, at the list of Organizations of the Department of the Treasury, only to find that there is no "Internal Revenue Service" listed there as an organization of the Department of the Treasury. Further research reveals that there is no "Internal Revenue Service" listed as an agency, or even a term, within any of the organizations listed in Chapter 3.
Also in 31 USC, in Section 1321,
the list of Trust Funds maintained by the Treasury, we have found the following:
Section 1321(2) and 1321(62) are named respectively as follows:
"(2) Philippine special fund (internal revenue).
In reference to Puerto Rico, and further questions concerning this issue, we have found in 27 CFR § 250.11 that the definition of "Revenue Agent" is given as:
Does this mean that the "Internal Revenue Service" is found somewhere in the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, since it isn't found in the list of organizations in the Department of the Treasury in Title 31, United States Code, or within any of those listed organizations? Not only that, but since the only definition of "Revenue Agent" which we can find is that in 27 CFR § 250.11, does this mean that all "IRS" Revenue Agents actually work for the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico?
We have found other statutes and regulations which are confusing to us: at 48 USC § 1402 we find the following:
In other words, this cite from Title 48 (§ 1402) plainly states that the entire Internal Revenue Code, from start to finish, is "generally" made up of "internal revenue laws" which are relevant to the enforcement of Title III of the National Prohibition Act, which is presently located in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. In fact, the Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing version of 48 USC § 1402 literally says that 26 USCS - the entire Code - is only the "internal revenue laws" relevant to the enforcement of Title III of the National Prohibition Act, since it makes the statement: "The "internal revenue laws" referred to in this section appear generally as 26 USCS §§ 1 et seq."
This is truly strange. Obviously, when we read the above statute, we must ask this question:
What we surmise from the above is that Title III of the National Prohibition Act was moved to [Puerto Rico and] the Virgin Islands, and that the "internal revenue laws" relevant to its enforcement are "located generally" throughout the Internal Revenue Code, which means that they are internal revenue laws relevant, it appears, to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. We believe this is why the TC 150, which indicates a Virgin Islands transcript, is posted to the IMF whenever a Form 1040 or SFR is filed. We believe this indicates that the Form 1040 is actually a Virgin Islands return, and that we would be committing perjury if we were to file Form 1040, since we are not liable for filing a Virgin Islands return.
In fact, in Mills v. United States, CIV-94-114-TUC-JMR, Fred D. Mills had caused to be filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Cheyenne District Office of Internal Revenue Service requesting a copy of all documents maintained that indicated that "TC 150 means other than and/or in addition to the Virgin Islands." The Internal Revenue Service could produce no documents which demonstrated that TC 150 is connected in the geographical sense to other than the Virgin Islands. IRM 30(55)(4.2) at (29), [now 30(55)(4.2) at (30)] which states: "VIRGIN IS(TC 150)" was held by the Internal Revenue Service to be the only document relevant to venue for TC 150. Loretta C. Argrett, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, stated in a letter dated January 9, 1995: "…no…responsive documents exist" which would provide otherwise.
Perhaps this connection between the Virgin Islands and Title III of the National Prohibition Act is why the assistant regional commissioner (alcohol, tobacco and firearms) ends up with all the property seized by "IRS" under any provision of Title 26 - which itself appears to be the collection of "internal revenue laws" relevant to the enforcement of Title III of the National Prohibition Act, an Act which it seems to us that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, not "IRS", would be responsible for enforcing.
In addition, we have uncovered the following: Form 1040 is entitled "U.S. Individual Income Tax Return", which would indicate that it is a form to [be] filed by a "U.S. Individual." 26 CFR § 1.6017-1(a)(1), dealing with "Self-Employment tax returns", states the following: "an individual who is a resident of the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, or (for any taxable year beginning after 1960) Guam or American Samoa is not to be considered a nonresident alien individual." 26 CFR § 1.6017-1(a)(2) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, the return required by this section shall be made on Form 1040. The form to be used by residents of the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa is Form 1040SS…."
Internal Revenue Publication 676 states that Form 1040 SS is a "Self-Employment Tax Return." But the above section states that the return required "under this section shall be made on Form 1040." It would appear, therefore, that an "individual" is actually a resident of the Virgin Islands (or Puerto Rico, or, before 1960, Guam or American Samoa). Perhaps that is why the TC 150, indicating that a Virgin Islands return has been filed, is posted to the Virgin Islands transcript IMF when a Form 1040 or SFR are filed.
So far our research has brought us to the following conclusions:
Patton v. Bd. Of Health, 127 Cal. 388, 393, 59 P. 702, 704 (1899) - "One of the requisites is that the office must be created by the constitution of the state or it must be authorized by some statute."
First Nat. Bank of Columbus v. State, 80 Neb. 597, 114 N.W. 772, 773 (1908); State ex rel. Peyton v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 197, 103 P. 497, 498 (1909); State ex rel. Stage v. Mackie, 82 Conn. 398, 74 A. 759, 761 (1909); State ex rel. Key v. Bond, 94 W.Va. 255, 118 S.E. 276, 279 (1923) - "a position is a public office when it is created by law";
Coyne v. State, 22 Ohio App. 462, 153 N.E. 876, 877 (1926) - "Unless the office existed there could be no officer either de facto or de jure. A de facto officer is one invested with an office; but if there is no office with which to invest one, there can be no officer. An office may exist only by duly constituted law".
State v. Quinn, 35 N.M. 62, 290 P. 786, 787 (1930); Turner v. State, 226 Ala. 269, 146 So. 601, 602 (1933); Oklahoma City v. Century Indemnity Co., 178 Okl. 212, 62 P.2d 94, 97 (1936); State ex. rel. Nagle v. Kelsey, 102 Mont. 8, 55 P. 2d 685, 689 (1936); Stapleton v. Frohmiller, 53 Ariz. 11, 85 P.2d 49, 51 (1938); Buchholtz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 13 A.2d 348, 350 (1940); Krawiec v. Industrial Comm., 372 Ill. 560, 25 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1940); People v. Rapsey, 16 Cal.2d 636, 107 P.2d 388, 391 (1940); Industrial Comm. v. Arizona State Highway Comm., 61 Ariz. 59, 145 P.2d 846, 849 (1943); State ex rel. Brown v. Blew, 20 Wash.2d 47, 145 P.2d 554, 556 (1944); Martin v. Smith, 239 Wis. 314, 1 N.W.2d 163, 172 (1941); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 75, 202 S.W.2d 992, 994 (1947); State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 29 Wash.2d 68, 185 P.2d 723, 728 (1947); Morris v. Peters, 203 Ga. 350, 46 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1948); Weaver v. North Bergen Tp., 10 N.J. Super. 96, 76 A.2d 701 (1950); Tomaris v. State, 71 Ariz. 147, 224 P.2d 209, 211 (1950); Pollack v. Montoya, 55 N.W. 390, 234 P.2d 336, 338 (1951); Schaeffer v. Superior Court in & for Santa Barbara County, 248 P.2d 450, 453 (Cal.App. 1952); Brusnigham v. State, 86 Ga.App. 340, 71 S.E.2d 698, 703 (1952); State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 258 P.2d 982, 984 (Nev. 1953); Dosker v. Andrus, 342. Mich. 548, 70 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1955); Hetrich v. County Comm. of Anne Arundel County, 222 Md. 304, 159 A.2d 642, 643 (1960); Meiland v. Cody, 359 Mich. 78, 101 N.W.2d 336, 341 (1960); Jones v. Mills, 216, Ga. 616, 118 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1961); State v. Hord, 264 N.C. 149, 141 S.E.2d 241, 245 (1965); Planning Bd. Of Tp. of West Milford v. Tp. Council of Tp. of West Milford, 123 N.J. Super. 135, 301 A.2d 781, 784 (1973); Vander Linden v. Crews, 205, N.W.2d 686, 688 (Iowa 1973); Kirk v. Flournoy, 36 Cal.App. 3d 553, 111 Cal. Rptr. 674, 675 (1974); Wargo v. Industrial Comm., 58 Ill.2d 234, 317 N.E.2d 519, 521 (1974); State v. Bailey, 220 S.E.2d 432, 435 (W.Va. 1975); Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 539 P.2d 304, 323 (1975); Midwest Television, Inc. v. Champaign-Urbana Communications, Inc., 37 Ill.App.3d 926, 347 N.E.2d 34, 38 (1976); and State v. Pickney, 276 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa 1979).
This same rule applies at the federal level; see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441, 6 S.Ct. 1121 (1886) - "there can be no officer, either de jure or de facto, if there be no office to fill"; United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 8 S.Ct. 505 (1888); United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 8 S.Ct. 595 (1888); Glavey v. United States, 182 U.S. 595, 607, 21 S.Ct. 891 (1901) - "The law creates the office, prescribes its duties"; Cochnower v. United States, 248 U.S. 405, 407, 39 S.Ct. 137 (1919) - "Primarily we may say that the creation of offices and the assignment of their compensation is a legislative function. . . And we think the delegation of such function and the extent of its delegation must have clear expression or implication"; Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516, 40 S.Ct. 374, 376 (1920); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 46 S.Ct. 172, 173 (1926); N.L.R.B. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville, 350 U.S. 264, 269, 76 S.Ct. 383 (1956) - "'Officers' normally means those who hold defined offices. It does not mean the boys in the back room or other agencies of invisible government, whether in politics or in the trade-union movement"; Crowley v. Southern Ry. Co., 139 F. 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1905); Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908); Sully v. United States, 193 F. 185, 187 (D.Nev. 1910) - "There can be no offices of the United States, strictly speaking, except those which are created by the Constitution itself, or by an act of Congress, and, when Congress does so establish an inferior office"; Commissioner v. Harlan, 80 F.2d 660, 662 (9th Cir. 1935); Varden v. Ridings, 20 F.Supp. 495 (E.D.Ky. 1937); Annoni v. Blas Nadal's Heirs, 94 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1938); and Pope v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1943).
In addition to the above cited cases, we are including a copy of letter from Congressman Pat Danner, 6th District, Missouri, to Bill Petterson, Route 2, Box 37, Trenton, Missouri, 64683-9610. It is apparent from Congressman Danner's letter that Mr. Petterson has contacted him about this question of the establishment of an agency known as "Internal Revenue Service". The letter from Congressman Danner is enclosed herein and states, in unnumbered paragraph #2:
"[The Act of
June 30, 1926, 44 Stat. 777, Ch. 712], which created the 50 titles of the
United States Code is still in effect and is the foundation for the current
design of the United States Code. The act did not repeal any prior laws
or attempt to replace them. The titles and code sections contained therein
were only made prima facie evidence of the laws of the United States. Their
use was suitable in court, but they could be impeached by showing what
the underlying statutes were and that the code sections were different
from the statutes; in such event, the statutes controlled. This condition
prevails today for those titles which are not positive law, and the same
titles, or any particular section thereof, can be impeached by showing
a difference between the title or code section and the underlying or supporting
statutes; see Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir.
1983); and Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1934)."
Since your Web page makes the public pronouncement that the "tax collection agency" of which you are the head was "created" in 1862, certainly you, as the head of this alleged agency, which posted this public pronouncement to your Web page, should be easily and immediately able to produce the documents which support your pronouncement. If you cannot, then you are disseminating incorrect and misleading information through your Web site. Relevant to our needing documentation to support pronouncements by the government: please be advised of the following:
Finally, we are also asking you to provide us with a clear and statutorily supported statement which clarifies exactly which internal revenue laws "generally located" in the entire Internal Revenue Code are relevant to anything other than and/or in addition to the enforcement of Title III of the National Prohibition Act (which was moved to the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico) and an explanation of why all seized property is handed over to the assistant regional commissioner (alcohol, tobacco and firearms). We also need to know why the Transaction Code 150, designating Virgin Islands, is posted to the IMF whenever a Form 1040 is filed, or a SFR is filed by IRS.
Since this letter contains questions of profound personal and national importance, we request that you provide us with the requested answers as soon as possible, or within the amount of time allotted for an information letter pursuant to the instant Revenue Rulings. Failing a response within that time period, we shall conclude that you can find no such statute(s) responsive to our request, nor responses to our other questions, and we shall act accordingly. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
______________________ __________________________
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